cosmopolitan/test/libc/calls/unveil_test.c

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/*-*- mode:c;indent-tabs-mode:nil;c-basic-offset:2;tab-width:8;coding:utf-8 -*-│
vi: set net ft=c ts=2 sts=2 sw=2 fenc=utf-8 :vi
Copyright 2022 Justine Alexandra Roberts Tunney
Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for
any purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the
above copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL
WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER
TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR
PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "libc/calls/calls.h"
#include "libc/calls/landlock.h"
#include "libc/calls/struct/dirent.h"
#include "libc/calls/struct/stat.h"
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#include "libc/calls/syscall-sysv.internal.h"
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#include "libc/dce.h"
#include "libc/errno.h"
#include "libc/intrin/kprintf.h"
#include "libc/mem/io.h"
#include "libc/runtime/gc.h"
#include "libc/runtime/internal.h"
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#include "libc/runtime/runtime.h"
#include "libc/sock/sock.h"
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#include "libc/stdio/stdio.h"
#include "libc/str/str.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/af.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/map.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/msync.h"
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#include "libc/sysv/consts/o.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/prot.h"
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#include "libc/sysv/consts/s.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/sig.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/sock.h"
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#include "libc/testlib/testlib.h"
#include "libc/thread/spawn.h"
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#include "libc/x/x.h"
STATIC_YOINK("zip_uri_support");
#define EACCES_OR_ENOENT (IsOpenbsd() ? ENOENT : EACCES)
#define SPAWN(METHOD) \
{ \
int ws, pid; \
ASSERT_NE(-1, (pid = METHOD())); \
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if (!pid) {
#define EXITS(rc) \
_Exit(0); \
} \
ASSERT_NE(-1, wait(&ws)); \
ASSERT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(ws)); \
ASSERT_EQ(rc, WEXITSTATUS(ws)); \
}
char testlib_enable_tmp_setup_teardown;
struct stat st;
static bool SupportsLandlock(void) {
int e = errno;
bool r = landlock_create_ruleset(0, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION) >= 0;
errno = e;
return r;
}
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void SetUpOnce(void) {
__enable_threads();
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if (!(IsLinux() && SupportsLandlock()) && !IsOpenbsd()) exit(0);
}
void SetUp(void) {
// make sure zipos maps executable into memory early
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, stat("/zip/life.elf", &st));
}
int extract(const char *from, const char *to, int mode) {
int fdin, fdout;
if ((fdin = open(from, O_RDONLY)) == -1) return -1;
if ((fdout = creat(to, mode)) == -1) {
close(fdin);
return -1;
}
if (_copyfd(fdin, fdout, -1) == -1) {
close(fdout);
close(fdin);
return -1;
}
return close(fdout) | close(fdin);
}
TEST(unveil, api_differences) {
SPAWN(fork);
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ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("foo", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("foo", "r"));
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if (IsOpenbsd()) {
// openbsd imposes restrictions immediately
ASSERT_SYS(ENOENT, -1, open("/", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY));
} else {
// restrictions on linux don't go into effect until unveil(0,0)
Prove that Makefile is fully defined The whole repository is now buildable with GNU Make Landlock sandboxing. This proves that no Makefile targets exist which touch files other than their declared prerequisites. In order to do this, we had to: 1. Stop code morphing GCC output in package.com and instead run a newly introduced FIXUPOBJ.COM command after GCC invocations. 2. Disable all the crumby Python unit tests that do things like create files in the current directory, or rename() files between folders. This ended up being a lot of tests, but most of them are still ok. 3. Introduce an .UNSANDBOXED variable to GNU Make to disable Landlock. We currently only do this for things like `make tags`. 4. This change deletes some GNU Make code that was preventing the execve() optimization from working. This means it should no longer be necessary in most cases for command invocations to be indirected through the cocmd interpreter. 5. Missing dependencies had to be declared in certain places, in cases where they couldn't be automatically determined by MKDEPS.COM 6. The libcxx header situation has finally been tamed. One of the things that makes this difficult is MKDEPS.COM only wants to consider the first 64kb of a file, in order to go fast. But libcxx likes to have #include lines buried after huge documentation. 7. An .UNVEIL variable has been introduced to GNU Make just in case we ever wish to explicitly specify additional things that need to be whitelisted which aren't strictly prerequisites. This works in a manner similar to the recently introduced .EXTRA_PREREQS feature. There's now a new build/bootstrap/make.com prebuilt binary available. It should no longer be possible to write invalid Makefile code.
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ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open(".", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY));
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ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, close(3));
}
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
// error numbers are inconsistent
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open("/", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY));
// wut
if (IsLinux()) {
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open("/", O_PATH)); // wut
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, stat("/", &st)); // wut
}
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, rx_readOnlyPreexistingExecutable_worksFine) {
SPAWN(fork);
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ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("folder", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, extract("/zip/life.elf", "folder/life.elf", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("folder", "rx"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
SPAWN(fork);
execl("folder/life.elf", "folder/life.elf", 0);
kprintf("execve failed! %s\n", strerror(errno));
_Exit(127);
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EXITS(42);
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, r_noExecutePreexistingExecutable_raisesEacces) {
SPAWN(fork);
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ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("folder", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, extract("/zip/life.elf", "folder/life.elf", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("folder", "r"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES, -1, execl("folder/life.elf", "folder/life.elf", 0));
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EXITS(0);
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, canBeUsedAgainAfterVfork) {
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, touch("bad", 0644));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, touch("good", 0644));
SPAWN(fork);
SPAWN(vfork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("bad", "r"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("good", "r"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open("bad", 0));
EXITS(0);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("good", "r"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open("good", 0));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open("bad", 0));
EXITS(0);
}
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TEST(unveil, rwc_createExecutableFile_isAllowedButCantBeRun) {
SPAWN(fork);
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ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("folder", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("folder", "rwc"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, extract("/zip/life.elf", "folder/life.elf", 0755));
SPAWN(fork);
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ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, stat("folder/life.elf", &st));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES, -1, execl("folder/life.elf", "folder/life.elf", 0));
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EXITS(0);
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, rwcx_createExecutableFile_canAlsoBeRun) {
SPAWN(fork);
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ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("folder", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("folder", "rwcx"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, extract("/zip/life.elf", "folder/life.elf", 0755));
SPAWN(fork);
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ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, stat("folder/life.elf", &st));
execl("folder/life.elf", "folder/life.elf", 0);
kprintf("execve failed! %s\n", strerror(errno));
_Exit(127);
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EXITS(42);
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, dirfdHacking_doesntWork) {
SPAWN(fork);
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ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("garden", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, touch("garden/secret.txt", 0644));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open("garden", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, openat(3, "secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, mostRestrictivePolicy) {
if (IsOpenbsd()) return; // openbsd behaves oddly; see docs
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("garden", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, touch("garden/secret.txt", 0644));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open("jail", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
EXITS(0);
}
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TEST(unveil, overlappingDirectories_inconsistentBehavior) {
SPAWN(fork);
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ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, makedirs("f1/f2", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, extract("/zip/life.elf", "f1/f2/life.elf", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("f1", "x"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("f1/f2", "r"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
if (IsOpenbsd()) {
// OpenBSD favors the most restrictive policy
SPAWN(fork);
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ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, stat("f1/f2/life.elf", &st));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES, -1, execl("f1/f2/life.elf", "f1/f2/life.elf", 0));
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EXITS(0);
} else {
// Landlock (Linux) uses the union of policies
//
// TODO(jart): this test flakes on github actions. it reports an
// exit code of 0! find out why this is happening...
// so far it's happened to MODE=rel and MODE=tiny...
//
// SPAWN(fork);
// ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, stat("f1/f2/life.elf", &st));
// execl("f1/f2/life.elf", "f1/f2/life.elf", 0);
// kprintf("execve failed! %s\n", strerror(errno));
// _Exit(127);
// EXITS(42);
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}
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, usedTwice_allowedOnLinux) {
if (IsOpenbsd()) return;
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, xbarf("jail/ok.txt", "hello", 5));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("garden", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, xbarf("garden/secret.txt", "hello", 5));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("heaven", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, xbarf("heaven/verysecret.txt", "hello", 5));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("garden", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("heaven", "rw")); // not allowed, superset of parent
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 4, open("jail/ok.txt", O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES, -1, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES, -1, open("heaven/verysecret.txt", O_RDONLY));
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, truncate_isForbiddenBySeccomp) {
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("garden", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, xbarf("garden/secret.txt", "hello", 5));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(IsOpenbsd() ? ENOENT : EPERM, -1,
truncate("garden/secret.txt", 0));
if (IsLinux()) {
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, stat("garden/secret.txt", &st));
ASSERT_EQ(5, st.st_size);
}
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, ftruncate_isForbidden) {
if (IsOpenbsd()) return; // b/c O_PATH is a Linux thing
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("garden", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, xbarf("garden/secret.txt", "hello", 5));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open("garden/secret.txt", O_PATH));
ASSERT_SYS(EBADF, -1, ftruncate(3, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, close(3));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, stat("garden/secret.txt", &st));
ASSERT_EQ(5, st.st_size);
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, procfs_isForbiddenByDefault) {
if (IsOpenbsd()) return;
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES, -1, open("/proc/self/cmdline", O_RDONLY));
EXITS(0);
}
int Worker(void *arg, int tid) {
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
return 0;
}
TEST(unveil, isInheritedAcrossThreads) {
struct spawn t;
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("garden", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, xbarf("garden/secret.txt", "hello", 5));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, _spawn(Worker, 0, &t));
EXPECT_SYS(0, 0, _join(&t));
EXITS(0);
}
int Worker2(void *arg, int tid) {
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
return 0;
}
TEST(unveil, isThreadSpecificOnLinux_isProcessWideOnOpenbsd) {
struct spawn t;
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("garden", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, xbarf("garden/secret.txt", "hello", 5));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, _spawn(Worker2, 0, &t));
EXPECT_SYS(0, 0, _join(&t));
if (IsOpenbsd()) {
ASSERT_SYS(ENOENT, -1, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
} else {
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
}
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, usedTwice_forbidden_worksWithPledge) {
int ws, pid;
bool *gotsome;
ASSERT_NE(-1, (gotsome = _mapshared(FRAMESIZE)));
ASSERT_NE(-1, (pid = fork()));
if (!pid) {
// install our first seccomp filter
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unveil", 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("garden", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, xbarf("garden/secret.txt", "hello", 5));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
// committing and locking causes a new bpf filter to be installed
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
// verify the second filter is working
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
// verify the first filter is still working
*gotsome = true;
socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
_Exit(0);
}
ASSERT_NE(-1, wait(&ws));
ASSERT_TRUE(*gotsome);
ASSERT_TRUE(WIFSIGNALED(ws));
ASSERT_EQ(IsOpenbsd() ? SIGABRT : SIGSYS, WTERMSIG(ws));
EXPECT_SYS(0, 0, munmap(gotsome, FRAMESIZE));
}
Make pledge() and unveil() work amazingly This change reconciles our pledge() implementation with the OpenBSD kernel source code. We now a polyfill that's much closer to OpenBSD's behavior. For example, it was discovered that "stdio" permits threads. There were a bunch of Linux system calls that needed to be added, like sched_yield(). The exec / execnative category division is now dropped. We're instead using OpenBSD's "prot_exec" promise for launching APE binaries and dynamic shared objects. We also now filter clone() flags. The pledge.com command has been greatly improved. It now does unveiling by default when Landlock is available. It's now smart enough to unveil a superset of paths that OpenBSD automatically unveils with pledge(), such as /etc/localtime. pledge.com also now checks if the executable being launched is a dynamic shared object, in which case it unveils libraries. These changes now make it possible to pledge curl on ubuntu 20.04 glibc: pledge.com -p 'stdio rpath prot_exec inet dns tty sendfd recvfd' \ curl -s https://justine.lol/hello.txt Here's what pledging curl on Alpine 3.16 with Musl Libc looks like: pledge.com -p 'stdio rpath prot_exec dns inet' \ curl -s https://justine.lol/hello.txt Here's what pledging curl.com w/ ape loader looks like: pledge.com -p 'stdio rpath prot_exec dns inet' \ o//examples/curl.com https://justine.lol/hello.txt The most secure sandbox, is curl.com converted to static ELF: o//tool/build/assimilate.com o//examples/curl.com pledge.com -p 'stdio rpath dns inet' \ o//examples/curl.com https://justine.lol/hello.txt A weird corner case needed to be handled when resolving symbolic links during the unveiling process, that's arguably a Landlock bug. It's not surprising since Musl and Glibc are also inconsistent here too.
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TEST(unveil, lotsOfPaths) {
int i, n;
SPAWN(fork);
Make pledge() and unveil() work amazingly This change reconciles our pledge() implementation with the OpenBSD kernel source code. We now a polyfill that's much closer to OpenBSD's behavior. For example, it was discovered that "stdio" permits threads. There were a bunch of Linux system calls that needed to be added, like sched_yield(). The exec / execnative category division is now dropped. We're instead using OpenBSD's "prot_exec" promise for launching APE binaries and dynamic shared objects. We also now filter clone() flags. The pledge.com command has been greatly improved. It now does unveiling by default when Landlock is available. It's now smart enough to unveil a superset of paths that OpenBSD automatically unveils with pledge(), such as /etc/localtime. pledge.com also now checks if the executable being launched is a dynamic shared object, in which case it unveils libraries. These changes now make it possible to pledge curl on ubuntu 20.04 glibc: pledge.com -p 'stdio rpath prot_exec inet dns tty sendfd recvfd' \ curl -s https://justine.lol/hello.txt Here's what pledging curl on Alpine 3.16 with Musl Libc looks like: pledge.com -p 'stdio rpath prot_exec dns inet' \ curl -s https://justine.lol/hello.txt Here's what pledging curl.com w/ ape loader looks like: pledge.com -p 'stdio rpath prot_exec dns inet' \ o//examples/curl.com https://justine.lol/hello.txt The most secure sandbox, is curl.com converted to static ELF: o//tool/build/assimilate.com o//examples/curl.com pledge.com -p 'stdio rpath dns inet' \ o//examples/curl.com https://justine.lol/hello.txt A weird corner case needed to be handled when resolving symbolic links during the unveiling process, that's arguably a Landlock bug. It's not surprising since Musl and Glibc are also inconsistent here too.
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n = 100;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, touch(xasprintf("%d", i), 0644));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, touch(xasprintf("%d-", i), 0644));
}
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(xasprintf("%d", i), "rw"));
}
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open(xasprintf("%d", i), O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, close(3));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open(xasprintf("%d-", i), O_RDONLY));
}
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, reparent) {
return; // need abi 2 :'(
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("x", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("x", "rwc"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("x/y", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, touch("x/y/z", 0644));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, rename("x/y/z", "x/z"));
EXITS(0);
}