Rewrite Linux pledge() code so it can be a payload

It's now possible to build our pledge() polyfill as a dynamic shared
object that can be injected into a glibc executable using LD_PRELOAD
This commit is contained in:
Justine Tunney 2022-08-08 11:41:08 -07:00
parent 7bd4179b9b
commit 0277d7d6e9
37 changed files with 1980 additions and 1600 deletions

View file

@ -290,9 +290,9 @@ int sys_unveil_linux(const char *path, const char *permissions) {
* possible to use opendir() and go fishing for paths which weren't
* previously known.
*
* 5. Use ftruncate() rather than truncate(). One of the backdoors with
* Landlock is it currently can't restrict truncate() and setxattr()
* which permits certain kinds of modifications to files outside the
* 5. Use ftruncate() rather than truncate(). One issue Landlock hasn't
* addressed yet is restrictions over truncate() and setxattr() which
* could permit certain kinds of modifications to files outside the
* sandbox. When your policy is committed, we install a SECCOMP BPF
* filter to disable those calls, however similar trickery may be
* possible through other unaddressed calls like ioctl(). Using the