Loader path security (#1012)

The ape loader now passes the program executable name directly as a
register. `x2` is used on aarch64, `%rdx` on x86_64. This is passed
as the third argument to `cosmo()` (M1) or `Launch` (non-M1) and is
assigned to the global `__program_executable_name`.

`GetProgramExecutableName` now returns this global's value, setting
it if it is initially null. `InitProgramExecutableName` first tries
exotic, secure methods: `KERN_PROC_PATHNAME` on FreeBSD/NetBSD, and
`/proc` on Linux. If those produce a reasonable response (i.e., not
`"/usr/bin/ape"`, which happens with the loader before this change),
that is used. Otherwise, if `issetugid()`, the empty string is used.
Otherwise, the old argv/envp parsing code is run.

The value returned from the loader is always the full absolute path
of the binary to be executed, having passed through `realpath`. For
the non-M1 loader, this necessitated writing `RealPath`, which uses
`readlinkat` of `"/proc/self/fd/[progfd]"` on Linux, `F_GETPATH` on
Xnu, and the `__realpath` syscall on OpenBSD. On FreeBSD/NetBSD, it
punts to `GetProgramExecutableName`, which is secure on those OSes.

With the loader, all platforms now have a secure program executable
name. With no loader or an old loader, everything still works as it
did, but setuid/setgid is not supported if the insecure pathfinding
code would have been needed.

Fixes #991.

examples/env.c

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 #include "libc/runtime/runtime.h"
 
 int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
-  printf("%s\n", argv[0]);
+  fprintf(stderr, "%s (%s)\n", argv[0], GetProgramExecutableName());
   for (char **p = environ; *p; ++p) {
-    printf("  %s\n", *p);
+    printf("%s\n", *p);
   }
   return 0;
 }