/*-*- mode:c;indent-tabs-mode:nil;c-basic-offset:4;tab-width:4;coding:utf-8 -*-│ │vi: set net ft=c ts=2 sts=2 sw=2 fenc=utf-8 :vi│ ╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╡ │ Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors │ │ │ │ Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); │ │ you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. │ │ You may obtain a copy of the License at │ │ │ │ http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 │ │ │ │ Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software │ │ distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, │ │ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. │ │ See the License for the specific language governing permissions and │ │ limitations under the License. │ ╚─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────*/ #include "libc/stdio/stdio.h" #include "libc/str/str.h" #include "third_party/mbedtls/common.h" #include "third_party/mbedtls/error.h" #include "third_party/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" #include "third_party/mbedtls/platform.h" asm(".ident\t\"\\n\\n\ Mbed TLS (Apache 2.0)\\n\ Copyright ARM Limited\\n\ Copyright Mbed TLS Contributors\""); asm(".include \"libc/disclaimer.inc\""); /* clang-format off */ /* * HMAC_DRBG implementation (NIST SP 800-90) * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ /* * The NIST SP 800-90A DRBGs are described in the following publication. * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf * References below are based on rev. 1 (January 2012). */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) /** * \brief HMAC_DRBG context initialization. * * This function makes the context ready for mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(), * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf() or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(). * * \note The reseed interval is #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL * by default. Override this value by calling * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval(). * * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be initialized. */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ) { mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ) ); ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; } /** * \brief This function updates the state of the HMAC_DRBG context. * * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe * to call this function if another thread might be * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same * context or updating or reseeding the same context. * * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. * \param additional The data to update the state with. * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data. * \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes. * Unused if \p additional is \c NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success, or an error from the underlying * hash calculation. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ) { size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_ctx.md_info ); unsigned char rounds = ( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 ) ? 2 : 1; unsigned char sep[1]; unsigned char K[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; for( sep[0] = 0; sep[0] < rounds; sep[0]++ ) { /* Step 1 or 4 */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, sep, 1 ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; if( rounds == 2 ) { if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; } if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, K ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; /* Step 2 or 5 */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, K, md_len ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; } exit: mbedtls_platform_zeroize( K, sizeof( K ) ); return( ret ); } /** * \brief Initilisation of simpified HMAC_DRBG (never reseeds). * * This function is meant for use in algorithms that need a pseudorandom * input such as deterministic ECDSA. * * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be initialised. * \param md_info MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG. * \param data Concatenation of the initial entropy string and * the additional data. * \param data_len Length of \p data in bytes. * * \return \c 0 if successful. or * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p md_info is * invalid. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED if there was not enough * memory to allocate context data. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THIS_CORRUPTION; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); /* * Set initial working state. * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value. */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); memset( ctx->V, 0x01, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, data, data_len ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); return( 0 ); } /* * Internal function used both for seeding and reseeding the DRBG. * Comments starting with arabic numbers refer to section 10.1.2.4 * of SP800-90A, while roman numbers refer to section 9.2. */ static int hmac_drbg_reseed_core( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const unsigned char *additional, size_t len, int use_nonce ) { unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; size_t seedlen = 0; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THIS_CORRUPTION; { size_t total_entropy_len; if( use_nonce == 0 ) total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len; else total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len * 3 / 2; /* III. Check input length */ if( len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT || total_entropy_len + len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); } } mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seed, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ); /* IV. Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy for the seed */ if( ( ret = ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed, ctx->entropy_len ) ) != 0 ) { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); } seedlen += ctx->entropy_len; /* For initial seeding, allow adding of nonce generated * from the entropy source. See Sect 8.6.7 in SP800-90A. */ if( use_nonce ) { /* Note: We don't merge the two calls to f_entropy() in order * to avoid requesting too much entropy from f_entropy() * at once. Specifically, if the underlying digest is not * SHA-1, 3 / 2 * entropy_len is at least 36 Bytes, which * is larger than the maximum of 32 Bytes that our own * entropy source implementation can emit in a single * call in configurations disabling SHA-512. */ if( ( ret = ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed + seedlen, ctx->entropy_len / 2 ) ) != 0 ) { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); } seedlen += ctx->entropy_len / 2; } /* 1. Concatenate entropy and additional data if any */ if( additional != NULL && len != 0 ) { memcpy( seed + seedlen, additional, len ); seedlen += len; } /* 2. Update state */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, seed, seedlen ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; /* 3. Reset reseed_counter */ ctx->reseed_counter = 1; exit: /* 4. Done */ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seed, seedlen ); return( ret ); } /** * \brief This function reseeds the HMAC_DRBG context, that is * extracts data from the entropy source. * * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe * to call this function if another thread might be * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same * context or updating or reseeding the same context. * * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. * \param additional Additional data to add to the state. * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data * and \p len should be \c 0. * \param len The length of the additional data. * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT * and also at most * #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \p entropy_len * where \p entropy_len is the entropy length * (see mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len()). * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED * if a call to the entropy function failed. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ) { return( hmac_drbg_reseed_core( ctx, additional, len, 0 ) ); } /** * \brief HMAC_DRBG initial seeding. * * Set the initial seed and set up the entropy source for future reseeds. * * A typical choice for the \p f_entropy and \p p_entropy parameters is * to use the entropy module: * - \p f_entropy is mbedtls_entropy_func(); * - \p p_entropy is an instance of ::mbedtls_entropy_context initialized * with mbedtls_entropy_init() (which registers the platform's default * entropy sources). * * You can provide a personalization string in addition to the * entropy source, to make this instantiation as unique as possible. * * \note By default, the security strength as defined by NIST is: * - 128 bits if \p md_info is SHA-1; * - 192 bits if \p md_info is SHA-224; * - 256 bits if \p md_info is SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512. * Note that SHA-256 is just as efficient as SHA-224. * The security strength can be reduced if a smaller * entropy length is set with * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len(). * * \note The default entropy length is the security strength * (converted from bits to bytes). You can override * it by calling mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len(). * * \note During the initial seeding, this function calls * the entropy source to obtain a nonce * whose length is half the entropy length. * * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be seeded. * \param md_info MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG. * \param f_entropy The entropy callback, taking as arguments the * \p p_entropy context, the buffer to fill, and the * length of the buffer. * \p f_entropy is always called with a length that is * less than or equal to the entropy length. * \param p_entropy The entropy context to pass to \p f_entropy. * \param custom The personalization string. * This can be \c NULL, in which case the personalization * string is empty regardless of the value of \p len. * \param len The length of the personalization string. * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT * and also at most * #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \p entropy_len * 3 / 2 * where \p entropy_len is the entropy length * described above. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p md_info is * invalid. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED if there was not enough * memory to allocate context data. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED * if the call to \p f_entropy failed. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info, int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_entropy, const unsigned char *custom, size_t len ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THIS_CORRUPTION; size_t md_size; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); /* * Set initial working state. * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value. */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_size ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); memset( ctx->V, 0x01, md_size ); ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy; ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy; if( ctx->entropy_len == 0 ) { /* * See SP800-57 5.6.1 (p. 65-66) for the security strength provided by * each hash function, then according to SP800-90A rev1 10.1 table 2, * min_entropy_len (in bits) is security_strength. * * (This also matches the sizes used in the NIST test vectors.) */ ctx->entropy_len = md_size <= 20 ? 16 : /* 160-bits hash -> 128 bits */ md_size <= 28 ? 24 : /* 224-bits hash -> 192 bits */ 32; /* better (256+) -> 256 bits */ } if( ( ret = hmac_drbg_reseed_core( ctx, custom, len, 1 /* add nonce */ ) ) != 0 ) { return( ret ); } return( 0 ); } /** * \brief This function turns prediction resistance on or off. * The default value is off. * * \note If enabled, entropy is gathered at the beginning of * every call to mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add() * or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(). * Only use this if your entropy source has sufficient * throughput. * * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. * \param resistance #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON or #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF. */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, int resistance ) { ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance; } /** * \brief This function sets the amount of entropy grabbed on each * seed or reseed. * * See the documentation of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed() for the default value. * * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. * \param len The amount of entropy to grab, in bytes. */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len ) { ctx->entropy_len = len; } /** * \brief Set the reseed interval. * * The reseed interval is the number of calls to mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random() * or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add() after which the entropy function * is called again. * * The default value is #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL. * * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. * \param interval The reseed interval. */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, int interval ) { ctx->reseed_interval = interval; } /** * \brief This function updates an HMAC_DRBG instance with additional * data and uses it to generate random data. * * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded * or prediction resistance is enabled. * * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe * to call this function if another thread might be * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same * context or updating or reseeding the same context. * * \param p_rng The HMAC_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a * #mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context structure. * \param output The buffer to fill. * \param output_len The length of the buffer in bytes. * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. * \param additional Additional data to update with. * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data * and \p add_len should be \c 0. * \param add_len The length of the additional data. * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED * if a call to the entropy source failed. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG if * \p output_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if * \p add_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len, const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THIS_CORRUPTION; mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng; size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_ctx.md_info ); size_t left = out_len; unsigned char *out = output; /* II. Check request length */ if( out_len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG ); /* III. Check input length */ if( add_len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); /* 1. (aka VII and IX) Check reseed counter and PR */ if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL && /* For no-reseeding instances */ ( ctx->prediction_resistance == MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON || ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval ) ) { if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( ctx, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); add_len = 0; /* VII.4 */ } /* 2. Use additional data if any */ if( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 ) { if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; } /* 3, 4, 5. Generate bytes */ while( left != 0 ) { size_t use_len = left > md_len ? md_len : left; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; memcpy( out, ctx->V, use_len ); out += use_len; left -= use_len; } /* 6. Update */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; /* 7. Update reseed counter */ ctx->reseed_counter++; exit: /* 8. Done */ return( ret ); } /** * \brief This function uses HMAC_DRBG to generate random data. * * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded * or prediction resistance is enabled. * * \param p_rng The HMAC_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a * #mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context structure. * \param output The buffer to fill. * \param out_len The length of the buffer in bytes. * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED * if a call to the entropy source failed. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG if * \p out_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len ) { mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng; return mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( ctx, output, out_len, NULL, 0 ); } /** * \brief This function resets HMAC_DRBG context to the state immediately * after initial call of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(). * * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context to free. */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ) { if( ctx == NULL ) return; mbedtls_md_free( &ctx->md_ctx ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ) ); ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** * \brief This function writes a seed file. * * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. * \param path The name of the file. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on reseed * failure. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THIS_CORRUPTION; FILE *f; unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( ctx, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ) != 0 ) goto exit; if( fwrite( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ) != sizeof( buf ) ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; goto exit; } ret = 0; exit: fclose( f ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); return( ret ); } /** * \brief This function reads and updates a seed file. The seed * is added to this instance. * * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. * \param path The name of the file. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on * reseed failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if the existing * seed file is too large. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ) { int ret = 0; FILE *f = NULL; size_t n; unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; unsigned char c; if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); n = fread( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ); if( fread( &c, 1, 1, f ) != 0 ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; goto exit; } if( n == 0 || ferror( f ) ) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; goto exit; } fclose( f ); f = NULL; ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, buf, n ); exit: mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); if( f != NULL ) fclose( f ); if( ret != 0 ) return( ret ); return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) #define OUTPUT_LEN 80 /* From a NIST PR=true test vector */ static const unsigned char entropy_pr[] = { 0xa0, 0xc9, 0xab, 0x58, 0xf1, 0xe2, 0xe5, 0xa4, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xbd, 0x4f, 0xf7, 0x3e, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xef, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x02, 0x8c, 0xf8, 0x11, 0x48, 0xa5, 0x84, 0xfe, 0x69, 0xab, 0x5a, 0xee, 0x42, 0xaa, 0x4d, 0x42, 0x17, 0x60, 0x99, 0xd4, 0x5e, 0x13, 0x97, 0xdc, 0x40, 0x4d, 0x86, 0xa3, 0x7b, 0xf5, 0x59, 0x54, 0x75, 0x69, 0x51, 0xe4 }; static const unsigned char result_pr[OUTPUT_LEN] = { 0x9a, 0x00, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0xd5, 0x9b, 0xfe, 0x31, 0xec, 0xb1, 0x39, 0x9b, 0x60, 0x81, 0x48, 0xd1, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x25, 0x0d, 0x3c, 0x1e, 0x94, 0x10, 0x10, 0x98, 0x12, 0x93, 0x25, 0xca, 0xb8, 0xfc, 0xcc, 0x2d, 0x54, 0x73, 0x19, 0x70, 0xc0, 0x10, 0x7a, 0xa4, 0x89, 0x25, 0x19, 0x95, 0x5e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0x00, 0x1d, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x6a, 0x2b, 0xf8, 0xa3, 0x01, 0xab, 0x46, 0x05, 0x5c, 0x09, 0xa6, 0x71, 0x88, 0xf1, 0xa7, 0x40, 0xee, 0xf3, 0xe1, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x9b, 0x44, 0xaf, 0x03, 0x44 }; /* From a NIST PR=false test vector */ static const unsigned char entropy_nopr[] = { 0x79, 0x34, 0x9b, 0xbf, 0x7c, 0xdd, 0xa5, 0x79, 0x95, 0x57, 0x86, 0x66, 0x21, 0xc9, 0x13, 0x83, 0x11, 0x46, 0x73, 0x3a, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0x35, 0xc8, 0xc7, 0x21, 0x5b, 0x5b, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x9b, 0x33, 0x8c, 0x74, 0xe3, 0xe9, 0x9d, 0xfe, 0xdf }; static const unsigned char result_nopr[OUTPUT_LEN] = { 0xc6, 0xa1, 0x6a, 0xb8, 0xd4, 0x20, 0x70, 0x6f, 0x0f, 0x34, 0xab, 0x7f, 0xec, 0x5a, 0xdc, 0xa9, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x3e, 0x15, 0x9c, 0xa6, 0xac, 0x43, 0xc6, 0xf8, 0xa2, 0xbe, 0x22, 0x83, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0x0a, 0xff, 0xb1, 0x0d, 0x71, 0x94, 0xf1, 0xc1, 0xa5, 0xcf, 0x73, 0x22, 0xec, 0x1a, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x4e, 0xd4, 0xbf, 0x12, 0x27, 0x46, 0xe0, 0x87, 0xfd, 0xb5, 0xb3, 0xe9, 0x1b, 0x34, 0x93, 0xd5, 0xbb, 0x98, 0xfa, 0xed, 0x49, 0xe8, 0x5f, 0x13, 0x0f, 0xc8, 0xa4, 0x59, 0xb7 }; /* "Entropy" from buffer */ static size_t test_offset; static int hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy( void *data, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) { const unsigned char *p = data; memcpy( buf, p + test_offset, len ); test_offset += len; return( 0 ); } #define CHK( c ) if( (c) != 0 ) \ { \ if( verbose != 0 ) \ mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \ return( 1 ); \ } /** * \brief The HMAC_DRBG Checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 if successful. * \return \c 1 if the test failed. */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test( int verbose ) { mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ctx; unsigned char buf[OUTPUT_LEN]; const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ); mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx ); /* * PR = True */ if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( " HMAC_DRBG (PR = True) : " ); test_offset = 0; CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &ctx, md_info, hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_pr, NULL, 0 ) ); mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON ); CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); CHK( memcmp( buf, result_pr, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); /* * PR = False */ if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( " HMAC_DRBG (PR = False) : " ); mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx ); test_offset = 0; CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &ctx, md_info, hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_nopr, NULL, 0 ) ); CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) ); CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); CHK( memcmp( buf, result_nopr, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); return( 0 ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */