/*-*- mode:c;indent-tabs-mode:nil;c-basic-offset:4;tab-width:4;coding:utf-8 -*-│ │vi: set net ft=c ts=2 sts=2 sw=2 fenc=utf-8 :vi│ ╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╡ │ Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors │ │ │ │ Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); │ │ you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. │ │ You may obtain a copy of the License at │ │ │ │ http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 │ │ │ │ Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software │ │ distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, │ │ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. │ │ See the License for the specific language governing permissions and │ │ limitations under the License. │ ╚─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────*/ #include "libc/bits/bits.h" #include "libc/bits/likely.h" #include "libc/log/log.h" #include "libc/nexgen32e/x86feature.h" #include "libc/runtime/runtime.h" #include "libc/str/str.h" #include "third_party/mbedtls/aes.h" #include "third_party/mbedtls/aesni.h" #include "third_party/mbedtls/cipher.h" #include "third_party/mbedtls/common.h" #include "third_party/mbedtls/endian.h" #include "third_party/mbedtls/error.h" #include "third_party/mbedtls/gcm.h" #include "third_party/mbedtls/platform.h" asm(".ident\t\"\\n\\n\ Mbed TLS (Apache 2.0)\\n\ Copyright ARM Limited\\n\ Copyright Mbed TLS Contributors\""); asm(".include \"libc/disclaimer.inc\""); /* clang-format off */ /* * NIST SP800-38D compliant GCM implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may * not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ /* * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf * * See also: * [MGV] http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/gcm/gcm-revised-spec.pdf * * We use the algorithm described as Shoup's method with 4-bit tables in * [MGV] 4.1, pp. 12-13, to enhance speed without using too much memory. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) /* Parameter validation macros */ #define GCM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ) #define GCM_VALIDATE( cond ) \ MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) /** * \brief This function initializes the specified GCM context, * to make references valid, and prepares the context * for mbedtls_gcm_setkey() or mbedtls_gcm_free(). * * The function does not bind the GCM context to a particular * cipher, nor set the key. For this purpose, use * mbedtls_gcm_setkey(). * * \param ctx The GCM context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_gcm_init( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ) { GCM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_gcm_context ) ); } /* * Precompute small multiples of H, that is set * HH[i] || HL[i] = H times i, * where i is seen as a field element as in [MGV], ie high-order bits * correspond to low powers of P. The result is stored in the same way, that * is the high-order bit of HH corresponds to P^0 and the low-order bit of HL * corresponds to P^127. */ static int gcm_gen_table( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ) { int ret, i, j; uint64_t hi, lo; uint64_t vl, vh; unsigned char h[16]; size_t olen = 0; mbedtls_platform_zeroize( h, 16 ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, h, 16, h, &olen ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); vh = READ64BE( h + 0 ); vl = READ64BE( h + 8 ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) /* With CLMUL support, we need only h, not the rest of the table */ if (X86_HAVE(AES) && X86_HAVE(PCLMUL)) { ctx->H8[0] = vl; ctx->H8[1] = vh; return 0; } #endif /* 0 corresponds to 0 in GF(2^128) */ ctx->HH[0] = 0; ctx->HL[0] = 0; /* 8 = 1000 corresponds to 1 in GF(2^128) */ ctx->HL[8] = vl; ctx->HH[8] = vh; for( i = 4; i > 0; i >>= 1 ) { uint32_t T = ( vl & 1 ) * 0xe1000000U; vl = ( vh << 63 ) | ( vl >> 1 ); vh = ( vh >> 1 ) ^ ( (uint64_t) T << 32); ctx->HL[i] = vl; ctx->HH[i] = vh; } for( i = 2; i <= 8; i *= 2 ) { uint64_t *HiL = ctx->HL + i, *HiH = ctx->HH + i; vh = *HiH; vl = *HiL; for( j = 1; j < i; j++ ) { HiH[j] = vh ^ ctx->HH[j]; HiL[j] = vl ^ ctx->HL[j]; } } return( 0 ); } /** * \brief This function associates a GCM context with a * cipher algorithm and a key. * * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. * \param cipher The 128-bit block cipher to use. * \param key The encryption key. This must be a readable buffer of at * least \p keybits bits. * \param keybits The key size in bits. Valid options are: * * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THIS_CORRUPTION; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( keybits == 128 || keybits == 192 || keybits == 256 ); cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits, MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ); if( cipher_info == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); if( cipher_info->block_size != 16 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx ); ctx->cipher = cipher; if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx->cipher_ctx, key, keybits, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 ) { return( ret ); } if( ( ret = gcm_gen_table( ctx ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); return( 0 ); } /* * Shoup's method for multiplication use this table with * last4[x] = x times P^128 * where x and last4[x] are seen as elements of GF(2^128) as in [MGV] */ static const uint64_t last4[16] = { 0x0000, 0x1c20, 0x3840, 0x2460, 0x7080, 0x6ca0, 0x48c0, 0x54e0, 0xe100, 0xfd20, 0xd940, 0xc560, 0x9180, 0x8da0, 0xa9c0, 0xb5e0 }; /* * Sets output to x times H using the precomputed tables. * x and output are seen as elements of GF(2^128) as in [MGV]. */ static void gcm_mult( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, unsigned char x[16] ) { int i; uint64_t zh, zl; unsigned char lo, hi, rem; #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) if (LIKELY(X86_HAVE(AES) && X86_HAVE(PCLMUL))) { mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult( x, ctx->H8 ); return; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C && MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 */ lo = x[15] & 0xf; zh = ctx->HH[lo]; zl = ctx->HL[lo]; for( i = 15; i >= 0; i-- ) { lo = x[i] & 0xf; hi = ( x[i] >> 4 ) & 0xf; if( i != 15 ) { rem = (unsigned char) zl & 0xf; zl = ( zh << 60 ) | ( zl >> 4 ); zh = ( zh >> 4 ); zh ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; zh ^= ctx->HH[lo]; zl ^= ctx->HL[lo]; } rem = (unsigned char) zl & 0xf; zl = ( zh << 60 ) | ( zl >> 4 ); zh = ( zh >> 4 ); zh ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; zh ^= ctx->HH[hi]; zl ^= ctx->HL[hi]; } PUT_UINT64_BE( zh, x, 0 ); PUT_UINT64_BE( zl, x, 8 ); } /** * \brief This function starts a GCM encryption or decryption * operation. * * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. * \param mode The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT or * #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT. * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer of * at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the IV. * \param add The buffer holding the additional data, or \c NULL * if \p add_len is \c 0. * \param add_len The length of the additional data. If \c 0, * \p add may be \c NULL. * * \return \c 0 on success. */ int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, int mode, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len ) { size_t i; const unsigned char *p; size_t use_len, olen = 0; unsigned char work_buf[16]; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THIS_CORRUPTION; GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); /* IV and AD are limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */ /* IV is not allowed to be zero length */ if( iv_len == 0 || ( (uint64_t) iv_len ) >> 61 != 0 || ( (uint64_t) add_len ) >> 61 != 0 ) { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); } mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->y, sizeof(ctx->y) ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->buf, sizeof(ctx->buf) ); ctx->mode = mode; ctx->len = 0; ctx->add_len = 0; if( iv_len == 12 ) { memcpy( ctx->y, iv, iv_len ); ctx->y[15] = 1; } else { mbedtls_platform_zeroize( work_buf, 16 ); PUT_UINT32_BE( iv_len * 8, work_buf, 12 ); p = iv; while( iv_len > 0 ) { use_len = ( iv_len < 16 ) ? iv_len : 16; for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ ) ctx->y[i] ^= p[i]; gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->y ); iv_len -= use_len; p += use_len; } for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) ctx->y[i] ^= work_buf[i]; gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->y ); } if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->base_ectr, &olen ) ) != 0 ) { return( ret ); } ctx->add_len = add_len; p = add; while( add_len > 0 ) { use_len = ( add_len < 16 ) ? add_len : 16; for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ ) ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i]; gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf ); add_len -= use_len; p += use_len; } return( 0 ); } /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing GCM * encryption or decryption operation. * * The function expects input to be a multiple of 16 * Bytes. Only the last call before calling * mbedtls_gcm_finish() can be less than 16 Bytes. * * \note For decryption, the output buffer cannot be the same as * input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer * must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer. * * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. * \param length The length of the input data. This must be a multiple of * 16 except in the last call before mbedtls_gcm_finish(). * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that * size in Bytes. * \param output The buffer for holding the output data. If \p length is * greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at * least that size in Bytes. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure. */ int mbedtls_gcm_update( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { size_t i, j; uint64_t a, b; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THIS_CORRUPTION; unsigned char ectr[16]; const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *q, *out_p = output; size_t olen = 0; GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( !length || input ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( !length || output ); if( output > input && (size_t) ( output - input ) < length ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); /* Total length is restricted to 2^39 - 256 bits, ie 2^36 - 2^5 bytes * Also check for possible overflow */ if( ctx->len + length < ctx->len || (uint64_t) ctx->len + length > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull ) { return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); } ctx->len += length; p = input; q = ctx->buf; for( j = 0; j + 16 <= length; j += 16 ){ for( i = 16; i > 12; i-- ) if( ++ctx->y[i - 1] != 0 ) break; if( !( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ectr, &olen ) ) ) { if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT ) { __builtin_memcpy(&a, p+j, 8); __builtin_memcpy(&b, q, 8); b ^= a; __builtin_memcpy(q, &b, 8); __builtin_memcpy(&b, ectr, 8); b ^= a; __builtin_memcpy(out_p+j, &b, 8); __builtin_memcpy(&a, p+j+8, 8); __builtin_memcpy(&b, q+8, 8); b ^= a; __builtin_memcpy(q+8, &b, 8); __builtin_memcpy(&b, ectr+8, 8); b ^= a; __builtin_memcpy(out_p+j+8, &b, 8); /* for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i]; */ /* for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) out_p[i] = ectr[i] ^ p[i]; */ } else { __builtin_memcpy(&a, ectr, 8); __builtin_memcpy(&b, p+j, 8); b ^= a; __builtin_memcpy(out_p+j, &b, 8); __builtin_memcpy(&a, q, 8); b ^= a; __builtin_memcpy(q, &b, 8); __builtin_memcpy(&a, ectr+8, 8); __builtin_memcpy(&b, p+j+8, 8); b ^= a; __builtin_memcpy(out_p+j+8, &b, 8); __builtin_memcpy(&a, q+8, 8); b ^= a; __builtin_memcpy(q+8, &b, 8); /* for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) out_p[i] = ectr[i] ^ p[i]; */ /* for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) ctx->buf[i] ^= out_p[i]; */ } gcm_mult( ctx, q ); } else { return( ret ); } } length -= j; out_p += j; p += j; if( length ) { for( i = 16; i > 12; i-- ) if( ++ctx->y[i - 1] != 0 ) break; if( !( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ectr, &olen ) ) ) { if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT ) { for( i = 0; i < length; i++ ){ q[i] ^= p[i]; out_p[i] = ectr[i] ^ p[i]; } } else { for( i = 0; i < length; i++ ){ out_p[i] = ectr[i] ^ p[i]; q[i] ^= out_p[i]; } } gcm_mult( ctx, q ); } else { return( ret ); } } return( 0 ); } /** * \brief This function finishes the GCM operation and generates * the authentication tag. * * It wraps up the GCM stream, and generates the * tag. The tag can have a maximum length of 16 Bytes. * * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a writable * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. This must be at least * four. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure. */ int mbedtls_gcm_finish( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { size_t i; uint64_t orig_len; uint64_t orig_add_len; GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); orig_len = ctx->len * 8; orig_add_len = ctx->add_len * 8; if( tag_len > 16 || tag_len < 4 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); memcpy( tag, ctx->base_ectr, tag_len ); if( orig_len || orig_add_len ) { Write64be( ctx->buf + 0, READ64BE( ctx->buf + 0 ) ^ orig_add_len ); Write64be( ctx->buf + 8, READ64BE( ctx->buf + 8 ) ^ orig_len ); gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf ); for( i = 0; i < tag_len; i++ ) tag[i] ^= ctx->buf[i]; } return( 0 ); } /** * \brief This function performs GCM encryption or decryption of a buffer. * * \note For encryption, the output buffer can be the same as the * input buffer. For decryption, the output buffer cannot be * the same as input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output * buffer must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer. * * \warning When this function performs a decryption, it outputs the * authentication tag and does not verify that the data is * authentic. You should use this function to perform encryption * only. For decryption, use mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt() instead. * * \param ctx The GCM context to use for encryption or decryption. This * must be initialized. * \param mode The operation to perform: * - #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT to perform authenticated encryption. * The ciphertext is written to \p output and the * authentication tag is written to \p tag. * - #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT to perform decryption. * The plaintext is written to \p output and the * authentication tag is written to \p tag. * Note that this mode is not recommended, because it does * not verify the authenticity of the data. For this reason, * you should use mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt() instead of * calling this function in decryption mode. * \param length The length of the input data, which is equal to the length * of the output data. * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer of * at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the IV. * \param add The buffer holding the additional data. This must be of at * least that size in Bytes. * \param add_len The length of the additional data. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that * size in Bytes. * \param output The buffer for holding the output data. If \p length is greater * than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at least that * size in Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a writable * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * * \return \c 0 if the encryption or decryption was performed * successfully. Note that in #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT mode, * this does not indicate that the data is authentic. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths or pointers are * not valid or a cipher-specific error code if the encryption * or decryption failed. */ int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t tag_len, unsigned char *tag ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THIS_CORRUPTION; GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( ctx, mode, iv, iv_len, add, add_len ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( ctx, length, input, output ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( ctx, tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 ) return( ret ); return( 0 ); } /** * \brief This function performs a GCM authenticated decryption of a * buffer. * * \note For decryption, the output buffer cannot be the same as * input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer * must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer. * * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. * \param length The length of the ciphertext to decrypt, which is also * the length of the decrypted plaintext. * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer * of at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the IV. * \param add The buffer holding the additional data. This must be of at * least that size in Bytes. * \param add_len The length of the additional data. * \param tag The buffer holding the tag to verify. This must be a * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the tag to verify. * \param input The buffer holding the ciphertext. If \p length is greater * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that * size. * \param output The buffer for holding the decrypted plaintext. If \p length * is greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at * least that size. * * \return \c 0 if successful and authenticated. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED if the tag does not match. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths or pointers are * not valid or a cipher-specific error code if the decryption * failed. */ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THIS_CORRUPTION; unsigned char check_tag[16]; size_t i; int diff; GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, length, iv, iv_len, add, add_len, input, output, tag_len, check_tag ) ) != 0 ) { return( ret ); } /* Check tag in "constant-time" */ for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++ ) diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i]; if( diff != 0 ) { mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, length ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED ); } return( 0 ); } /** * \brief This function clears a GCM context and the underlying * cipher sub-context. * * \param ctx The GCM context to clear. If this is \c NULL, the call has * no effect. Otherwise, this must be initialized. */ void mbedtls_gcm_free( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ) { if( ctx == NULL ) return; mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx ); mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_gcm_context ) ); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) /* * AES-GCM test vectors from: * * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/mac/gcmtestvectors.zip */ #define MAX_TESTS 6 static const int key_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; static const unsigned char key_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, { 0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c, 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c, 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08 }, }; static const size_t iv_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 12, 12, 12, 12, 8, 60 }; static const int iv_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2 }; static const unsigned char iv_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, { 0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad, 0xde, 0xca, 0xf8, 0x88 }, { 0x93, 0x13, 0x22, 0x5d, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, 0x55, 0x90, 0x9c, 0x5a, 0xff, 0x52, 0x69, 0xaa, 0x6a, 0x7a, 0x95, 0x38, 0x53, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0xa1, 0xe4, 0xc3, 0x03, 0xd2, 0xa3, 0x18, 0xa7, 0x28, 0xc3, 0xc0, 0xc9, 0x51, 0x56, 0x80, 0x95, 0x39, 0xfc, 0xf0, 0xe2, 0x42, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0x52, 0x54, 0x16, 0xae, 0xdb, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0xde, 0x6a, 0x57, 0xa6, 0x37, 0xb3, 0x9b }, }; static const size_t add_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 0, 20, 20, 20 }; static const int add_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 }; static const unsigned char additional_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = { { 0x00 }, { 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xab, 0xad, 0xda, 0xd2 }, }; static const size_t pt_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 16, 64, 60, 60, 60 }; static const int pt_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; static const unsigned char pt_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, { 0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a, 0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72, 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53, 0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25, 0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57, 0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0xd2, 0x55 }, }; static const unsigned char ct_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][64] = { { 0x00 }, { 0x03, 0x88, 0xda, 0xce, 0x60, 0xb6, 0xa3, 0x92, 0xf3, 0x28, 0xc2, 0xb9, 0x71, 0xb2, 0xfe, 0x78 }, { 0x42, 0x83, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x21, 0x77, 0x74, 0x24, 0x4b, 0x72, 0x21, 0xb7, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0x9c, 0xe3, 0xaa, 0x21, 0x2f, 0x2c, 0x02, 0xa4, 0xe0, 0x35, 0xc1, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x29, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x2e, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xb2, 0x54, 0x66, 0x93, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0x5a, 0xac, 0x84, 0xaa, 0x05, 0x1b, 0xa3, 0x0b, 0x39, 0x6a, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x97, 0x3d, 0x58, 0xe0, 0x91, 0x47, 0x3f, 0x59, 0x85 }, { 0x42, 0x83, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x21, 0x77, 0x74, 0x24, 0x4b, 0x72, 0x21, 0xb7, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0x9c, 0xe3, 0xaa, 0x21, 0x2f, 0x2c, 0x02, 0xa4, 0xe0, 0x35, 0xc1, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x29, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x2e, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xb2, 0x54, 0x66, 0x93, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0x5a, 0xac, 0x84, 0xaa, 0x05, 0x1b, 0xa3, 0x0b, 0x39, 0x6a, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x97, 0x3d, 0x58, 0xe0, 0x91 }, { 0x61, 0x35, 0x3b, 0x4c, 0x28, 0x06, 0x93, 0x4a, 0x77, 0x7f, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0xa2, 0x2a, 0x47, 0x55, 0x69, 0x9b, 0x2a, 0x71, 0x4f, 0xcd, 0xc6, 0xf8, 0x37, 0x66, 0xe5, 0xf9, 0x7b, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x23, 0x73, 0x80, 0x69, 0x00, 0xe4, 0x9f, 0x24, 0xb2, 0x2b, 0x09, 0x75, 0x44, 0xd4, 0x89, 0x6b, 0x42, 0x49, 0x89, 0xb5, 0xe1, 0xeb, 0xac, 0x0f, 0x07, 0xc2, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x98 }, { 0x8c, 0xe2, 0x49, 0x98, 0x62, 0x56, 0x15, 0xb6, 0x03, 0xa0, 0x33, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0x94, 0xbe, 0x91, 0x12, 0xa5, 0xc3, 0xa2, 0x11, 0xa8, 0xba, 0x26, 0x2a, 0x3c, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x2c, 0xa7, 0x01, 0xe4, 0xa9, 0xa4, 0xfb, 0xa4, 0x3c, 0x90, 0xcc, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0x81, 0xd4, 0x8c, 0x7c, 0x6f, 0xd6, 0x28, 0x75, 0xd2, 0xac, 0xa4, 0x17, 0x03, 0x4c, 0x34, 0xae, 0xe5 }, { 0x00 }, { 0x98, 0xe7, 0x24, 0x7c, 0x07, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x41, 0x1c, 0x26, 0x7e, 0x43, 0x84, 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x00 }, { 0x39, 0x80, 0xca, 0x0b, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xe8, 0x41, 0xeb, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xc4, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x57, 0x85, 0x9e, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xa6, 0xef, 0xd9, 0x84, 0x62, 0x85, 0x93, 0xb4, 0x0c, 0xa1, 0xe1, 0x9c, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x3d, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x44, 0xc5, 0x25, 0xac, 0x61, 0x9d, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0x47, 0x18, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x24, 0xd9, 0xcc, 0xda, 0x27, 0x10, 0xac, 0xad, 0xe2, 0x56 }, { 0x39, 0x80, 0xca, 0x0b, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xe8, 0x41, 0xeb, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xc4, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x57, 0x85, 0x9e, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xa6, 0xef, 0xd9, 0x84, 0x62, 0x85, 0x93, 0xb4, 0x0c, 0xa1, 0xe1, 0x9c, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x3d, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x44, 0xc5, 0x25, 0xac, 0x61, 0x9d, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0x47, 0x18, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x24, 0xd9, 0xcc, 0xda, 0x27, 0x10 }, { 0x0f, 0x10, 0xf5, 0x99, 0xae, 0x14, 0xa1, 0x54, 0xed, 0x24, 0xb3, 0x6e, 0x25, 0x32, 0x4d, 0xb8, 0xc5, 0x66, 0x63, 0x2e, 0xf2, 0xbb, 0xb3, 0x4f, 0x83, 0x47, 0x28, 0x0f, 0xc4, 0x50, 0x70, 0x57, 0xfd, 0xdc, 0x29, 0xdf, 0x9a, 0x47, 0x1f, 0x75, 0xc6, 0x65, 0x41, 0xd4, 0xd4, 0xda, 0xd1, 0xc9, 0xe9, 0x3a, 0x19, 0xa5, 0x8e, 0x8b, 0x47, 0x3f, 0xa0, 0xf0, 0x62, 0xf7 }, { 0xd2, 0x7e, 0x88, 0x68, 0x1c, 0xe3, 0x24, 0x3c, 0x48, 0x30, 0x16, 0x5a, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0xf9, 0xff, 0x1d, 0xe9, 0xa1, 0xd8, 0xe6, 0xb4, 0x47, 0xef, 0x6e, 0xf7, 0xb7, 0x98, 0x28, 0x66, 0x6e, 0x45, 0x81, 0xe7, 0x90, 0x12, 0xaf, 0x34, 0xdd, 0xd9, 0xe2, 0xf0, 0x37, 0x58, 0x9b, 0x29, 0x2d, 0xb3, 0xe6, 0x7c, 0x03, 0x67, 0x45, 0xfa, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xe9, 0xb7, 0x37, 0x3b }, { 0x00 }, { 0xce, 0xa7, 0x40, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0x60, 0x6b, 0x6e, 0x07, 0x4e, 0xc5, 0xd3, 0xba, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x18 }, { 0x52, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x99, 0x56, 0x7d, 0x07, 0xf4, 0x7f, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7d, 0x64, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0xc9, 0x75, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x55, 0xd1, 0xaa, 0x8c, 0xb0, 0x8e, 0x48, 0x59, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0x3d, 0xa7, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x10, 0x56, 0x82, 0x88, 0x38, 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1e, 0x63, 0x93, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0a, 0xbc, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0x62, 0x89, 0x80, 0x15, 0xad }, { 0x52, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x99, 0x56, 0x7d, 0x07, 0xf4, 0x7f, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7d, 0x64, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0xc9, 0x75, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x55, 0xd1, 0xaa, 0x8c, 0xb0, 0x8e, 0x48, 0x59, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0x3d, 0xa7, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x10, 0x56, 0x82, 0x88, 0x38, 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1e, 0x63, 0x93, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0a, 0xbc, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0x62 }, { 0xc3, 0x76, 0x2d, 0xf1, 0xca, 0x78, 0x7d, 0x32, 0xae, 0x47, 0xc1, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0x98, 0x44, 0xcb, 0xaf, 0x1a, 0xe1, 0x4d, 0x0b, 0x97, 0x6a, 0xfa, 0xc5, 0x2f, 0xf7, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0xba, 0x9d, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xb5, 0x82, 0xd3, 0x39, 0x34, 0xa4, 0xf0, 0x95, 0x4c, 0xc2, 0x36, 0x3b, 0xc7, 0x3f, 0x78, 0x62, 0xac, 0x43, 0x0e, 0x64, 0xab, 0xe4, 0x99, 0xf4, 0x7c, 0x9b, 0x1f }, { 0x5a, 0x8d, 0xef, 0x2f, 0x0c, 0x9e, 0x53, 0xf1, 0xf7, 0x5d, 0x78, 0x53, 0x65, 0x9e, 0x2a, 0x20, 0xee, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0x2a, 0xaf, 0xde, 0x64, 0x19, 0xa0, 0x58, 0xab, 0x4f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x6b, 0xf4, 0x0f, 0xc0, 0xc3, 0xb7, 0x80, 0xf2, 0x44, 0x45, 0x2d, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0xf1, 0xc5, 0xd8, 0x2c, 0xde, 0xa2, 0x41, 0x89, 0x97, 0x20, 0x0e, 0xf8, 0x2e, 0x44, 0xae, 0x7e, 0x3f }, }; static const unsigned char tag_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][16] = { { 0x58, 0xe2, 0xfc, 0xce, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0x30, 0x61, 0x36, 0x7f, 0x1d, 0x57, 0xa4, 0xe7, 0x45, 0x5a }, { 0xab, 0x6e, 0x47, 0xd4, 0x2c, 0xec, 0x13, 0xbd, 0xf5, 0x3a, 0x67, 0xb2, 0x12, 0x57, 0xbd, 0xdf }, { 0x4d, 0x5c, 0x2a, 0xf3, 0x27, 0xcd, 0x64, 0xa6, 0x2c, 0xf3, 0x5a, 0xbd, 0x2b, 0xa6, 0xfa, 0xb4 }, { 0x5b, 0xc9, 0x4f, 0xbc, 0x32, 0x21, 0xa5, 0xdb, 0x94, 0xfa, 0xe9, 0x5a, 0xe7, 0x12, 0x1a, 0x47 }, { 0x36, 0x12, 0xd2, 0xe7, 0x9e, 0x3b, 0x07, 0x85, 0x56, 0x1b, 0xe1, 0x4a, 0xac, 0xa2, 0xfc, 0xcb }, { 0x61, 0x9c, 0xc5, 0xae, 0xff, 0xfe, 0x0b, 0xfa, 0x46, 0x2a, 0xf4, 0x3c, 0x16, 0x99, 0xd0, 0x50 }, { 0xcd, 0x33, 0xb2, 0x8a, 0xc7, 0x73, 0xf7, 0x4b, 0xa0, 0x0e, 0xd1, 0xf3, 0x12, 0x57, 0x24, 0x35 }, { 0x2f, 0xf5, 0x8d, 0x80, 0x03, 0x39, 0x27, 0xab, 0x8e, 0xf4, 0xd4, 0x58, 0x75, 0x14, 0xf0, 0xfb }, { 0x99, 0x24, 0xa7, 0xc8, 0x58, 0x73, 0x36, 0xbf, 0xb1, 0x18, 0x02, 0x4d, 0xb8, 0x67, 0x4a, 0x14 }, { 0x25, 0x19, 0x49, 0x8e, 0x80, 0xf1, 0x47, 0x8f, 0x37, 0xba, 0x55, 0xbd, 0x6d, 0x27, 0x61, 0x8c }, { 0x65, 0xdc, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xcf, 0x62, 0x3a, 0x24, 0x09, 0x4f, 0xcc, 0xa4, 0x0d, 0x35, 0x33, 0xf8 }, { 0xdc, 0xf5, 0x66, 0xff, 0x29, 0x1c, 0x25, 0xbb, 0xb8, 0x56, 0x8f, 0xc3, 0xd3, 0x76, 0xa6, 0xd9 }, { 0x53, 0x0f, 0x8a, 0xfb, 0xc7, 0x45, 0x36, 0xb9, 0xa9, 0x63, 0xb4, 0xf1, 0xc4, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x8b }, { 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xc8, 0xa7, 0x99, 0x99, 0x6b, 0xf0, 0x26, 0x5b, 0x98, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0x8a, 0xb9, 0x19 }, { 0xb0, 0x94, 0xda, 0xc5, 0xd9, 0x34, 0x71, 0xbd, 0xec, 0x1a, 0x50, 0x22, 0x70, 0xe3, 0xcc, 0x6c }, { 0x76, 0xfc, 0x6e, 0xce, 0x0f, 0x4e, 0x17, 0x68, 0xcd, 0xdf, 0x88, 0x53, 0xbb, 0x2d, 0x55, 0x1b }, { 0x3a, 0x33, 0x7d, 0xbf, 0x46, 0xa7, 0x92, 0xc4, 0x5e, 0x45, 0x49, 0x13, 0xfe, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf2 }, { 0xa4, 0x4a, 0x82, 0x66, 0xee, 0x1c, 0x8e, 0xb0, 0xc8, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0xcf, 0x5a, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0x9a }, }; /** * \brief The GCM checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ) { mbedtls_gcm_context ctx; unsigned char buf[64]; unsigned char tag_buf[16]; int i, j, ret; mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES; for( j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) { int key_len = 128 + 64 * j; for( i = 0; i < MAX_TESTS; i++ ) { mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx ); if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d (%s): ", key_len, i, "enc" ); ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], key_len ); if( ret != 0 ) { goto exit; } ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, pt_len_test_data[i], iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], iv_len_test_data[i], additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], add_len_test_data[i], pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], buf, 16, tag_buf ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; if ( timingsafe_bcmp( buf, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || timingsafe_bcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) { ret = 1; goto exit; } mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx ); if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d (%s): ", key_len, i, "dec" ); ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], key_len ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, pt_len_test_data[i], iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], iv_len_test_data[i], additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], add_len_test_data[i], ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], buf, 16, tag_buf ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; if( timingsafe_bcmp( buf, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || timingsafe_bcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) { ret = 1; goto exit; } mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx ); if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d split (%s): ", key_len, i, "enc" ); ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], key_len ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], iv_len_test_data[i], additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], add_len_test_data[i] ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; if( pt_len_test_data[i] > 32 ) { size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32; ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, 32, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], buf ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, rest_len, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]] + 32, buf + 32 ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; } else { ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, pt_len_test_data[i], pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], buf ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; } ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( &ctx, tag_buf, 16 ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; if( timingsafe_bcmp( buf, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || timingsafe_bcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) { ret = 1; goto exit; } mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx ); if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d split (%s): ", key_len, i, "dec" ); ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], key_len ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], iv_len_test_data[i], additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], add_len_test_data[i] ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; if( pt_len_test_data[i] > 32 ) { size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32; ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, 32, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], buf ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, rest_len, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i] + 32, buf + 32 ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; } else { ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, pt_len_test_data[i], ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], buf ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; } ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( &ctx, tag_buf, 16 ); if( ret != 0 ) goto exit; if( timingsafe_bcmp( buf, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || timingsafe_bcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) { ret = 1; goto exit; } mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); } } if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); ret = 0; exit: if( ret != 0 ) { if( verbose != 0 ) mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); } return( ret ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */