cosmopolitan/test/libc/calls/unveil_test.c
Justine Tunney ae5d06dc53 Unbloat build config
- 10.5% reduction of o//depend dependency graph
- 8.8% reduction in latency of make command
- Fix issue with temporary file cleanup

There's a new -w option in compile.com that turns off the recent
Landlock output path workaround for "good commands" which do not
unlink() the output file like GNU tooling does.

Our new GNU Make unveil sandboxing appears to have zero overhead
in the grand scheme of things. Full builds are pretty fast since
the only thing that's actually slowed us down is probably libcxx

    make -j16 MODE=rel
    RL: took 85,732,063µs wall time
    RL: ballooned to 323,612kb in size
    RL: needed 828,560,521µs cpu (11% kernel)
    RL: caused 39,080,670 page faults (99% memcpy)
    RL: 350,073 context switches (72% consensual)
    RL: performed 0 reads and 11,494,960 write i/o operations

pledge() and unveil() no longer consider ENOSYS to be an error.
These functions have also been added to Python's cosmo module.

This change also removes some WIN32 APIs and System Five magnums
which we're not using and it's doubtful anyone else would be too
2022-08-10 04:43:09 -07:00

412 lines
14 KiB
C

/*-*- mode:c;indent-tabs-mode:nil;c-basic-offset:2;tab-width:8;coding:utf-8 -*-│
│vi: set net ft=c ts=2 sts=2 sw=2 fenc=utf-8 :vi│
╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╡
│ Copyright 2022 Justine Alexandra Roberts Tunney │
│ │
│ Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for │
│ any purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the │
│ above copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. │
│ │
│ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL │
│ WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED │
│ WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE │
│ AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL │
│ DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR │
│ PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER │
│ TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR │
│ PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. │
╚─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────*/
#include "libc/calls/calls.h"
#include "libc/calls/landlock.h"
#include "libc/calls/struct/dirent.h"
#include "libc/calls/struct/stat.h"
#include "libc/calls/syscall-sysv.internal.h"
#include "libc/dce.h"
#include "libc/errno.h"
#include "libc/intrin/kprintf.h"
#include "libc/mem/io.h"
#include "libc/runtime/gc.h"
#include "libc/runtime/internal.h"
#include "libc/runtime/runtime.h"
#include "libc/sock/sock.h"
#include "libc/stdio/stdio.h"
#include "libc/str/str.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/af.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/map.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/msync.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/o.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/prot.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/s.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/sig.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/sock.h"
#include "libc/testlib/testlib.h"
#include "libc/thread/spawn.h"
#include "libc/x/x.h"
STATIC_YOINK("zip_uri_support");
#define EACCES_OR_ENOENT (IsOpenbsd() ? ENOENT : EACCES)
#define SPAWN(METHOD) \
{ \
int ws, pid; \
ASSERT_NE(-1, (pid = METHOD())); \
if (!pid) {
#define EXITS(rc) \
_Exit(0); \
} \
ASSERT_NE(-1, wait(&ws)); \
ASSERT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(ws)); \
ASSERT_EQ(rc, WEXITSTATUS(ws)); \
}
char testlib_enable_tmp_setup_teardown;
struct stat st;
static bool SupportsLandlock(void) {
int e = errno;
bool r = landlock_create_ruleset(0, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION) >= 0;
errno = e;
return r;
}
void SetUpOnce(void) {
__enable_threads();
if (!(IsLinux() && SupportsLandlock()) && !IsOpenbsd()) exit(0);
}
void SetUp(void) {
// make sure zipos maps executable into memory early
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, stat("/zip/life.elf", &st));
}
int extract(const char *from, const char *to, int mode) {
int fdin, fdout;
if ((fdin = open(from, O_RDONLY)) == -1) return -1;
if ((fdout = creat(to, mode)) == -1) {
close(fdin);
return -1;
}
if (_copyfd(fdin, fdout, -1) == -1) {
close(fdout);
close(fdin);
return -1;
}
return close(fdout) | close(fdin);
}
TEST(unveil, api_differences) {
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("foo", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("foo", "r"));
if (IsOpenbsd()) {
// openbsd imposes restrictions immediately
ASSERT_SYS(ENOENT, -1, open("/", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY));
} else {
// restrictions on linux don't go into effect until unveil(0,0)
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open(".", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, close(3));
}
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
// error numbers are inconsistent
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open("/", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY));
// wut
if (IsLinux()) {
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open("/", O_PATH)); // wut
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, stat("/", &st)); // wut
}
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, rx_readOnlyPreexistingExecutable_worksFine) {
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("folder", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, extract("/zip/life.elf", "folder/life.elf", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("folder", "rx"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
SPAWN(fork);
execl("folder/life.elf", "folder/life.elf", 0);
kprintf("execve failed! %s\n", strerror(errno));
_Exit(127);
EXITS(42);
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, r_noExecutePreexistingExecutable_raisesEacces) {
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("folder", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, extract("/zip/life.elf", "folder/life.elf", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("folder", "r"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES, -1, execl("folder/life.elf", "folder/life.elf", 0));
EXITS(0);
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, canBeUsedAgainAfterVfork) {
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, touch("bad", 0644));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, touch("good", 0644));
SPAWN(fork);
SPAWN(vfork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("bad", "r"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("good", "r"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open("bad", 0));
EXITS(0);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("good", "r"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open("good", 0));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open("bad", 0));
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, rwc_createExecutableFile_isAllowedButCantBeRun) {
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("folder", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("folder", "rwc"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, extract("/zip/life.elf", "folder/life.elf", 0755));
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, stat("folder/life.elf", &st));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES, -1, execl("folder/life.elf", "folder/life.elf", 0));
EXITS(0);
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, rwcx_createExecutableFile_canAlsoBeRun) {
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("folder", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("folder", "rwcx"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, extract("/zip/life.elf", "folder/life.elf", 0755));
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, stat("folder/life.elf", &st));
execl("folder/life.elf", "folder/life.elf", 0);
kprintf("execve failed! %s\n", strerror(errno));
_Exit(127);
EXITS(42);
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, dirfdHacking_doesntWork) {
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("garden", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, touch("garden/secret.txt", 0644));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open("garden", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, openat(3, "secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, mostRestrictivePolicy) {
if (IsOpenbsd()) return; // openbsd behaves oddly; see docs
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("garden", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, touch("garden/secret.txt", 0644));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open("jail", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, overlappingDirectories_inconsistentBehavior) {
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, makedirs("f1/f2", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, extract("/zip/life.elf", "f1/f2/life.elf", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("f1", "x"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("f1/f2", "r"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
if (IsOpenbsd()) {
// OpenBSD favors the most restrictive policy
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, stat("f1/f2/life.elf", &st));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES, -1, execl("f1/f2/life.elf", "f1/f2/life.elf", 0));
EXITS(0);
} else {
// Landlock (Linux) uses the union of policies
//
// TODO(jart): this test flakes on github actions. it reports an
// exit code of 0! find out why this is happening...
// so far it's happened to MODE=rel and MODE=tiny...
//
// SPAWN(fork);
// ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, stat("f1/f2/life.elf", &st));
// execl("f1/f2/life.elf", "f1/f2/life.elf", 0);
// kprintf("execve failed! %s\n", strerror(errno));
// _Exit(127);
// EXITS(42);
}
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, usedTwice_allowedOnLinux) {
if (IsOpenbsd()) return;
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, xbarf("jail/ok.txt", "hello", 5));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("garden", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, xbarf("garden/secret.txt", "hello", 5));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("heaven", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, xbarf("heaven/verysecret.txt", "hello", 5));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("garden", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("heaven", "rw")); // not allowed, superset of parent
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 4, open("jail/ok.txt", O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES, -1, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES, -1, open("heaven/verysecret.txt", O_RDONLY));
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, truncate_isForbiddenBySeccomp) {
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("garden", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, xbarf("garden/secret.txt", "hello", 5));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(IsOpenbsd() ? ENOENT : EPERM, -1,
truncate("garden/secret.txt", 0));
if (IsLinux()) {
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, stat("garden/secret.txt", &st));
ASSERT_EQ(5, st.st_size);
}
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, ftruncate_isForbidden) {
if (IsOpenbsd()) return; // b/c O_PATH is a Linux thing
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("garden", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, xbarf("garden/secret.txt", "hello", 5));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open("garden/secret.txt", O_PATH));
ASSERT_SYS(EBADF, -1, ftruncate(3, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, close(3));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, stat("garden/secret.txt", &st));
ASSERT_EQ(5, st.st_size);
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, procfs_isForbiddenByDefault) {
if (IsOpenbsd()) return;
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES, -1, open("/proc/self/cmdline", O_RDONLY));
EXITS(0);
}
int Worker(void *arg, int tid) {
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
return 0;
}
TEST(unveil, isInheritedAcrossThreads) {
struct spawn t;
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("garden", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, xbarf("garden/secret.txt", "hello", 5));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, _spawn(Worker, 0, &t));
EXPECT_SYS(0, 0, _join(&t));
EXITS(0);
}
int Worker2(void *arg, int tid) {
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
return 0;
}
TEST(unveil, isThreadSpecificOnLinux_isProcessWideOnOpenbsd) {
struct spawn t;
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("garden", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, xbarf("garden/secret.txt", "hello", 5));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, _spawn(Worker2, 0, &t));
EXPECT_SYS(0, 0, _join(&t));
if (IsOpenbsd()) {
ASSERT_SYS(ENOENT, -1, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
} else {
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
}
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, usedTwice_forbidden_worksWithPledge) {
int ws, pid;
bool *gotsome;
ASSERT_NE(-1, (gotsome = _mapshared(FRAMESIZE)));
ASSERT_NE(-1, (pid = fork()));
if (!pid) {
// install our first seccomp filter
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unveil", 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("jail", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("garden", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, xbarf("garden/secret.txt", "hello", 5));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("jail", "rw"));
// committing and locking causes a new bpf filter to be installed
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
// verify the second filter is working
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open("garden/secret.txt", O_RDONLY));
// verify the first filter is still working
*gotsome = true;
socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
_Exit(0);
}
ASSERT_NE(-1, wait(&ws));
ASSERT_TRUE(*gotsome);
ASSERT_TRUE(WIFSIGNALED(ws));
ASSERT_EQ(SIGABRT, WTERMSIG(ws));
EXPECT_SYS(0, 0, munmap(gotsome, FRAMESIZE));
}
TEST(unveil, lotsOfPaths) {
int i, n;
SPAWN(fork);
n = 100;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, touch(xasprintf("%d", i), 0644));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, touch(xasprintf("%d-", i), 0644));
}
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(xasprintf("%d", i), "rw"));
}
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, open(xasprintf("%d", i), O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, close(3));
ASSERT_SYS(EACCES_OR_ENOENT, -1, open(xasprintf("%d-", i), O_RDONLY));
}
EXITS(0);
}
TEST(unveil, reparent) {
return; // need abi 2 :'(
SPAWN(fork);
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("x", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil("x", "rwc"));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, unveil(0, 0));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, mkdir("x/y", 0755));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, touch("x/y/z", 0644));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, rename("x/y/z", "x/z"));
EXITS(0);
}