cosmopolitan/test/libc/calls/seccomp_test.c
Justine Tunney 5a132f9652 Add seccomp bpf sandboxing to redbean
It's now possible to pass the `-S` or `-SS` flags to sandbox redbean
worker proecsses after they've been forked. The first `-S` flag is
intended to be a permissive builtin policy that limits system calls to
only that which the various parts of redbean serving need. The second
`-SS` flag is intended to be more restrictive, preventing things like
the Lua extensions you download off the web from using the HTTP client
or sockets APIs. In upcoming changes you'll be able to implement your
own Berkeley Packet Filter sandbox programs and load them via Lua.
2022-04-18 08:54:42 -07:00

125 lines
5 KiB
C

/*-*- mode:c;indent-tabs-mode:nil;c-basic-offset:2;tab-width:8;coding:utf-8 -*-│
│vi: set net ft=c ts=2 sts=2 sw=2 fenc=utf-8 :vi│
╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╡
│ Copyright 2022 Justine Alexandra Roberts Tunney │
│ │
│ Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for │
│ any purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the │
│ above copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. │
│ │
│ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL │
│ WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED │
│ WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE │
│ AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL │
│ DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR │
│ PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER │
│ TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR │
│ PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. │
╚─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────*/
#include "libc/calls/calls.h"
#include "libc/calls/struct/bpf.h"
#include "libc/calls/struct/filter.h"
#include "libc/calls/struct/iovec.h"
#include "libc/calls/struct/seccomp.h"
#include "libc/errno.h"
#include "libc/intrin/kprintf.h"
#include "libc/runtime/runtime.h"
#include "libc/sock/sock.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/audit.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/o.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/pr.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/sig.h"
#include "libc/testlib/testlib.h"
#include "tool/net/sandbox.h"
bool __is_linux_2_6_23(void) {
int rc;
if (!IsLinux()) return false;
asm volatile("syscall"
: "=a"(rc)
: "0"(157), "D"(PR_GET_SECCOMP)
: "rcx", "r11", "memory");
return rc != -EINVAL;
}
void SetUp(void) {
if (!__is_linux_2_6_23()) {
exit(0);
}
}
TEST(seccompStrictMode, evilProcess_getsKill9d) {
int ws, pid;
ASSERT_NE(-1, (pid = fork()));
if (!pid) {
EXPECT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT, 0, 0));
open("/etc/passwd", O_RDWR);
_Exit1(127);
}
EXPECT_NE(-1, wait(&ws));
EXPECT_TRUE(WIFSIGNALED(ws));
EXPECT_EQ(SIGKILL, WTERMSIG(ws));
}
TEST(seccompStrictMode, goodProcess_isAuthorized) {
int ws, pid;
int pfds[2];
char buf[3] = {0};
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, pipe(pfds));
ASSERT_NE(-1, (pid = fork()));
if (!pid) {
EXPECT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT, 0, 0));
write(pfds[1], "hi", 3);
_Exit1(0);
}
EXPECT_SYS(0, 0, close(pfds[1]));
EXPECT_SYS(0, 3, read(pfds[0], buf, 3));
EXPECT_SYS(0, 0, close(pfds[0]));
EXPECT_NE(-1, wait(&ws));
EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(ws));
EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(ws));
EXPECT_STREQ("hi", buf);
}
TEST(seccompFilter, isSoMuchBetter) {
char buf[3] = {0};
int ws, pid, pfds[2];
ASSERT_SYS(0, 0, pipe(pfds));
ASSERT_NE(-1, (pid = fork()));
if (!pid) {
struct sock_filter filter[] = {
_SECCOMP_MACHINE(AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64), //
_SECCOMP_LOAD_SYSCALL_NR(), //
_SECCOMP_ALLOW_SYSCALL(0x0013), // readv
_SECCOMP_ALLOW_SYSCALL(0x0014), // writev
_SECCOMP_ALLOW_SYSCALL(0x0000), // read
_SECCOMP_ALLOW_SYSCALL(0x0001), // write
_SECCOMP_ALLOW_SYSCALL(0x0003), // close
_SECCOMP_ALLOW_SYSCALL(0x000f), // rt_sigreturn
_SECCOMP_ALLOW_SYSCALL(0x00e7), // exit_group
_SECCOMP_ALLOW_SYSCALL(0x0009), // mmap
_SECCOMP_ALLOW_SYSCALL(0x0106), // newfstatat
_SECCOMP_ALLOW_SYSCALL(0x0008), // lseek
_SECCOMP_ALLOW_SYSCALL(0x000b), // munmap
_SECCOMP_ALLOW_SYSCALL(0x00e4), // clock_gettime
_SECCOMP_ALLOW_SYSCALL(0x003f), // uname
_SECCOMP_LOG_AND_RETURN_ERRNO(1), // EPERM
};
struct sock_fprog prog = {
.len = ARRAYLEN(filter),
.filter = filter,
};
ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog));
ASSERT_SYS(0, 3, write(pfds[1], "hi", 3));
ASSERT_SYS(EPERM, -1, open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY));
_Exit(0);
}
EXPECT_SYS(0, 0, close(pfds[1]));
EXPECT_SYS(0, 3, read(pfds[0], buf, 3));
EXPECT_SYS(0, 0, close(pfds[0]));
EXPECT_NE(-1, wait(&ws));
EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(ws));
EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(ws));
EXPECT_STREQ("hi", buf);
}