cosmopolitan/libc/mem/unveil.c
Justine Tunney e81edf7b04 Improve pledge() and unveil()
The pledge.com command now supports the new [WIP] unveil() support. For
example, to strongly sandbox our command for listing directories.

    o//tool/build/assimilate.com o//examples/ls.com
    pledge.com -v /etc -p 'stdio rpath' o//examples/ls.com /etc

This file system sandboxing is going to be perfect for us, because APE
binaries are self-contained static executables that really don't use the
filesystem that much. On the other hand, with non-static executables,
sandboxing is going to be more difficult. For example, here's how to
sandbox the `ls` command on the latest Alpine:

    pledge.com -v rx:/lib -v /usr/lib -v /etc -p 'stdio rpath exec' ls /etc

This change fixes the `execpromises` API with pledge().

This change also adds unix.unveil() to redbean.

Fixes #494
2022-07-18 07:58:20 -07:00

157 lines
5.9 KiB
C

/*-*- mode:c;indent-tabs-mode:nil;c-basic-offset:2;tab-width:8;coding:utf-8 -*-│
│vi: set net ft=c ts=2 sts=2 sw=2 fenc=utf-8 :vi│
╞══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╡
│ Copyright 2020 Justine Alexandra Roberts Tunney │
│ │
│ Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for │
│ any purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the │
│ above copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. │
│ │
│ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL │
│ WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED │
│ WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE │
│ AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL │
│ DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR │
│ PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER │
│ TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR │
│ PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. │
╚─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────*/
#include "libc/assert.h"
#include "libc/calls/calls.h"
#include "libc/calls/internal.h"
#include "libc/calls/landlock.h"
#include "libc/calls/strace.internal.h"
#include "libc/calls/struct/stat.h"
#include "libc/calls/syscall-sysv.internal.h"
#include "libc/calls/syscall_support-sysv.internal.h"
#include "libc/errno.h"
#include "libc/mem/mem.h"
#include "libc/nexgen32e/threaded.h"
#include "libc/runtime/internal.h"
#include "libc/str/str.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/at.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/f.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/o.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/pr.h"
#include "libc/sysv/consts/s.h"
#include "libc/sysv/errfuns.h"
#define FILE_BITS \
(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)
/*
* Long living state for landlock calls.
* The bits are set at runtime to handle future API additions.
* As of 5.19, the latest abi is v2.
*
* TODO:
* - Documentation for sys_unveil.
* - Integrate with pledge and remove the file access?
* - Stuff state into the .protected section?
*/
_Thread_local static struct {
int abi;
int fd;
uint64_t read;
uint64_t write;
uint64_t exec;
uint64_t create;
} State = {
.abi = 2,
.read = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
.write = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
.exec = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
.create = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM,
};
static int unveil_final(void) {
int rc;
if (State.fd == -1) return 0;
assert(State.fd > 0);
if ((rc = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) != -1 &&
(rc = landlock_restrict_self(State.fd, 0)) != -1 &&
(rc = sys_close(State.fd)) != -1)
State.fd = -1;
return rc;
}
static int err_close(int rc, int fd) {
int serrno = errno;
sys_close(fd);
errno = serrno;
return rc;
}
static int unveil_init(void) {
int rc, fd;
if ((rc = landlock_create_ruleset(0, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION)) < 0)
return -1;
State.abi = rc;
if (State.abi < 2) State.read &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER;
const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
.handled_access_fs = State.read | State.write | State.exec | State.create,
};
if ((rc = landlock_create_ruleset(&attr, sizeof(attr), 0)) < 0) return -1;
// grant file descriptor a higher number that's less likely to interfere
if ((fd = __sys_fcntl(rc, F_DUPFD, 100)) == -1) return err_close(-1, rc);
if (sys_close(rc) == -1) return err_close(-1, fd);
State.fd = fd;
return 0;
}
static int sys_unveil_linux(const char *path, const char *permissions) {
int rc;
if (!State.fd && (rc = unveil_init()) == -1) return rc;
if (!path && !permissions) return unveil_final();
struct landlock_path_beneath_attr pb = {0};
for (const char *c = permissions; *c != '\0'; c++) {
switch (*c) {
case 'r':
pb.allowed_access |= State.read;
break;
case 'w':
pb.allowed_access |= State.write;
break;
case 'x':
pb.allowed_access |= State.exec;
break;
case 'c':
pb.allowed_access |= State.create;
break;
default:
return einval();
}
}
if ((rc = sys_open(path, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC, 0)) == -1) return rc;
pb.parent_fd = rc;
struct stat st;
if ((rc = sys_fstat(pb.parent_fd, &st)) == -1) {
return err_close(rc, pb.parent_fd);
}
if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) pb.allowed_access &= FILE_BITS;
if ((rc = landlock_add_rule(State.fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, &pb, 0))) {
return err_close(rc, pb.parent_fd);
}
sys_close(pb.parent_fd);
return rc;
}
/**
* Unveil parts of a restricted filesystem view.
*/
int unveil(const char *path, const char *permissions) {
int rc;
__enable_tls();
if (IsLinux()) {
rc = sys_unveil_linux(path, permissions);
} else {
rc = sys_unveil(path, permissions);
}
STRACE("unveil(%#s, %#s) → %d% m", path, permissions, rc);
return rc;
}