linux-stable/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S

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/*
* Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/cache.h>
#include <asm/asm-uaccess.h>
/*
* Copy to user space from a kernel buffer (alignment handled by the hardware)
*
* Parameters:
* x0 - to
* x1 - from
* x2 - n
* Returns:
* x0 - bytes not copied
*/
.macro ldrb1 ptr, regB, val
ldrb \ptr, [\regB], \val
.endm
.macro strb1 ptr, regB, val
uao_user_alternative 9998f, strb, sttrb, \ptr, \regB, \val
.endm
.macro ldrh1 ptr, regB, val
ldrh \ptr, [\regB], \val
.endm
.macro strh1 ptr, regB, val
uao_user_alternative 9998f, strh, sttrh, \ptr, \regB, \val
.endm
.macro ldr1 ptr, regB, val
ldr \ptr, [\regB], \val
.endm
.macro str1 ptr, regB, val
uao_user_alternative 9998f, str, sttr, \ptr, \regB, \val
.endm
.macro ldp1 ptr, regB, regC, val
ldp \ptr, \regB, [\regC], \val
.endm
.macro stp1 ptr, regB, regC, val
uao_stp 9998f, \ptr, \regB, \regC, \val
.endm
end .req x5
ENTRY(__arch_copy_to_user)
uaccess_enable_not_uao x3, x4, x5
add end, x0, x2
#include "copy_template.S"
arm64: kpti: Fix the interaction between ASID switching and software PAN Commit 6b88a32c7af6 upstream. With ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN enabled, the exception entry code checks the active ASID to decide whether user access was enabled (non-zero ASID) when the exception was taken. On return from exception, if user access was previously disabled, it re-instates TTBR0_EL1 from the per-thread saved value (updated in switch_mm() or efi_set_pgd()). Commit 7655abb95386 ("arm64: mm: Move ASID from TTBR0 to TTBR1") makes a TTBR0_EL1 + ASID switching non-atomic. Subsequently, commit 27a921e75711 ("arm64: mm: Fix and re-enable ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN") changes the __uaccess_ttbr0_disable() function and asm macro to first write the reserved TTBR0_EL1 followed by the ASID=0 update in TTBR1_EL1. If an exception occurs between these two, the exception return code will re-instate a valid TTBR0_EL1. Similar scenario can happen in cpu_switch_mm() between setting the reserved TTBR0_EL1 and the ASID update in cpu_do_switch_mm(). This patch reverts the entry.S check for ASID == 0 to TTBR0_EL1 and disables the interrupts around the TTBR0_EL1 and ASID switching code in __uaccess_ttbr0_disable(). It also ensures that, when returning from the EFI runtime services, efi_set_pgd() doesn't leave a non-zero ASID in TTBR1_EL1 by using uaccess_ttbr0_{enable,disable}. The accesses to current_thread_info()->ttbr0 are updated to use READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE. As a safety measure, __uaccess_ttbr0_enable() always masks out any existing non-zero ASID TTBR1_EL1 before writing in the new ASID. Fixes: 27a921e75711 ("arm64: mm: Fix and re-enable ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN") Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Tested-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-10 13:18:30 +00:00
uaccess_disable_not_uao x3, x4
mov x0, #0
ret
ENDPROC(__arch_copy_to_user)
.section .fixup,"ax"
.align 2
9998: sub x0, end, dst // bytes not copied
arm64: uaccess: Ensure PAN is re-enabled after unhandled uaccess fault commit 94bb804e1e6f0a9a77acf20d7c70ea141c6c821e upstream. A number of our uaccess routines ('__arch_clear_user()' and '__arch_copy_{in,from,to}_user()') fail to re-enable PAN if they encounter an unhandled fault whilst accessing userspace. For CPUs implementing both hardware PAN and UAO, this bug has no effect when both extensions are in use by the kernel. For CPUs implementing hardware PAN but not UAO, this means that a kernel using hardware PAN may execute portions of code with PAN inadvertently disabled, opening us up to potential security vulnerabilities that rely on userspace access from within the kernel which would usually be prevented by this mechanism. In other words, parts of the kernel run the same way as they would on a CPU without PAN implemented/emulated at all. For CPUs not implementing hardware PAN and instead relying on software emulation via 'CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN=y', the impact is unfortunately much worse. Calling 'schedule()' with software PAN disabled means that the next task will execute in the kernel using the page-table and ASID of the previous process even after 'switch_mm()', since the actual hardware switch is deferred until return to userspace. At this point, or if there is a intermediate call to 'uaccess_enable()', the page-table and ASID of the new process are installed. Sadly, due to the changes introduced by KPTI, this is not an atomic operation and there is a very small window (two instructions) where the CPU is configured with the page-table of the old task and the ASID of the new task; a speculative access in this state is disastrous because it would corrupt the TLB entries for the new task with mappings from the previous address space. As Pavel explains: | I was able to reproduce memory corruption problem on Broadcom's SoC | ARMv8-A like this: | | Enable software perf-events with PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN so userland's | stack is accessed and copied. | | The test program performed the following on every CPU and forking | many processes: | | unsigned long *map = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, | MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); | map[0] = getpid(); | sched_yield(); | if (map[0] != getpid()) { | fprintf(stderr, "Corruption detected!"); | } | munmap(map, PAGE_SIZE); | | From time to time I was getting map[0] to contain pid for a | different process. Ensure that PAN is re-enabled when returning after an unhandled user fault from our uaccess routines. Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 338d4f49d6f7 ("arm64: kernel: Add support for Privileged Access Never") Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> [will: rewrote commit message] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-11-19 22:10:06 +00:00
uaccess_disable_not_uao x3, x4
ret
.previous