linux-stable/fs/ceph/quota.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* quota.c - CephFS quota
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2018 SUSE
*/
#include <linux/statfs.h>
#include "super.h"
#include "mds_client.h"
void ceph_adjust_quota_realms_count(struct inode *inode, bool inc)
{
struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = ceph_sb_to_mdsc(inode->i_sb);
if (inc)
atomic64_inc(&mdsc->quotarealms_count);
else
atomic64_dec(&mdsc->quotarealms_count);
}
static inline bool ceph_has_realms_with_quotas(struct inode *inode)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = ceph_sb_to_mdsc(sb);
ceph: fix inode number handling on arches with 32-bit ino_t Tuan and Ulrich mentioned that they were hitting a problem on s390x, which has a 32-bit ino_t value, even though it's a 64-bit arch (for historical reasons). I think the current handling of inode numbers in the ceph driver is wrong. It tries to use 32-bit inode numbers on 32-bit arches, but that's actually not a problem. 32-bit arches can deal with 64-bit inode numbers just fine when userland code is compiled with LFS support (the common case these days). What we really want to do is just use 64-bit numbers everywhere, unless someone has mounted with the ino32 mount option. In that case, we want to ensure that we hash the inode number down to something that will fit in 32 bits before presenting the value to userland. Add new helper functions that do this, and only do the conversion before presenting these values to userland in getattr and readdir. The inode table hashvalue is changed to just cast the inode number to unsigned long, as low-order bits are the most likely to vary anyway. While it's not strictly required, we do want to put something in inode->i_ino. Instead of basing it on BITS_PER_LONG, however, base it on the size of the ino_t type. NOTE: This is a user-visible change on 32-bit arches: 1/ inode numbers will be seen to have changed between kernel versions. 32-bit arches will see large inode numbers now instead of the hashed ones they saw before. 2/ any really old software not built with LFS support may start failing stat() calls with -EOVERFLOW on inode numbers >2^32. Nothing much we can do about these, but hopefully the intersection of people running such code on ceph will be very small. The workaround for both problems is to mount with "-o ino32". [ idryomov: changelog tweak ] URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/46828 Reported-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Reported-and-Tested-by: Tuan Hoang1 <Tuan.Hoang1@ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2020-08-18 12:03:48 +00:00
struct inode *root = d_inode(sb->s_root);
if (atomic64_read(&mdsc->quotarealms_count) > 0)
return true;
/* if root is the real CephFS root, we don't have quota realms */
ceph: fix inode number handling on arches with 32-bit ino_t Tuan and Ulrich mentioned that they were hitting a problem on s390x, which has a 32-bit ino_t value, even though it's a 64-bit arch (for historical reasons). I think the current handling of inode numbers in the ceph driver is wrong. It tries to use 32-bit inode numbers on 32-bit arches, but that's actually not a problem. 32-bit arches can deal with 64-bit inode numbers just fine when userland code is compiled with LFS support (the common case these days). What we really want to do is just use 64-bit numbers everywhere, unless someone has mounted with the ino32 mount option. In that case, we want to ensure that we hash the inode number down to something that will fit in 32 bits before presenting the value to userland. Add new helper functions that do this, and only do the conversion before presenting these values to userland in getattr and readdir. The inode table hashvalue is changed to just cast the inode number to unsigned long, as low-order bits are the most likely to vary anyway. While it's not strictly required, we do want to put something in inode->i_ino. Instead of basing it on BITS_PER_LONG, however, base it on the size of the ino_t type. NOTE: This is a user-visible change on 32-bit arches: 1/ inode numbers will be seen to have changed between kernel versions. 32-bit arches will see large inode numbers now instead of the hashed ones they saw before. 2/ any really old software not built with LFS support may start failing stat() calls with -EOVERFLOW on inode numbers >2^32. Nothing much we can do about these, but hopefully the intersection of people running such code on ceph will be very small. The workaround for both problems is to mount with "-o ino32". [ idryomov: changelog tweak ] URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/46828 Reported-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Reported-and-Tested-by: Tuan Hoang1 <Tuan.Hoang1@ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2020-08-18 12:03:48 +00:00
if (root && ceph_ino(root) == CEPH_INO_ROOT)
return false;
/* MDS stray dirs have no quota realms */
if (ceph_vino_is_reserved(ceph_inode(inode)->i_vino))
return false;
/* otherwise, we can't know for sure */
return true;
}
void ceph_handle_quota(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc,
struct ceph_mds_session *session,
struct ceph_msg *msg)
{
struct super_block *sb = mdsc->fsc->sb;
struct ceph_mds_quota *h = msg->front.iov_base;
struct ceph_client *cl = mdsc->fsc->client;
struct ceph_vino vino;
struct inode *inode;
struct ceph_inode_info *ci;
ceph: drop messages from MDS when unmounting When unmounting all the dirty buffers will be flushed and after the last osd request is finished the last reference of the i_count will be released. Then it will flush the dirty cap/snap to MDSs, and the unmounting won't wait the possible acks, which will ihold the inodes when updating the metadata locally but makes no sense any more, of this. This will make the evict_inodes() to skip these inodes. If encrypt is enabled the kernel generate a warning when removing the encrypt keys when the skipped inodes still hold the keyring: WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 168846 at fs/crypto/keyring.c:242 fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0 CPU: 4 PID: 168846 Comm: umount Tainted: G S 6.1.0-rc5-ceph-g72ead199864c #1 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5018R-WR/X10SRW-F, BIOS 2.0 12/17/2015 RIP: 0010:fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b277e28 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88810d52ac00 RCX: ffff88810b56aa00 RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffff822f3a09 RDI: ffff888108f59000 RBP: ffff8881d394fb88 R08: 0000000000000028 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 11ff4fe6834fcd91 R12: ffff8881d394fc40 R13: ffff888108f59000 R14: ffff8881d394f800 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fd83f6f1080(0000) GS:ffff88885fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f918d417000 CR3: 000000017f89a005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> generic_shutdown_super+0x47/0x120 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 ceph_kill_sb+0x36/0x90 [ceph] deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140 task_work_run+0x67/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x23d/0x240 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x25/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x40/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7fd83dc39e9b Later the kernel will crash when iput() the inodes and dereferencing the "sb->s_master_keys", which has been released by the generic_shutdown_super(). Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/59162 Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Milind Changire <mchangir@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2022-12-21 06:13:51 +00:00
if (!ceph_inc_mds_stopping_blocker(mdsc, session))
return;
if (msg->front.iov_len < sizeof(*h)) {
pr_err_client(cl, "corrupt message mds%d len %d\n",
session->s_mds, (int)msg->front.iov_len);
ceph_msg_dump(msg);
ceph: drop messages from MDS when unmounting When unmounting all the dirty buffers will be flushed and after the last osd request is finished the last reference of the i_count will be released. Then it will flush the dirty cap/snap to MDSs, and the unmounting won't wait the possible acks, which will ihold the inodes when updating the metadata locally but makes no sense any more, of this. This will make the evict_inodes() to skip these inodes. If encrypt is enabled the kernel generate a warning when removing the encrypt keys when the skipped inodes still hold the keyring: WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 168846 at fs/crypto/keyring.c:242 fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0 CPU: 4 PID: 168846 Comm: umount Tainted: G S 6.1.0-rc5-ceph-g72ead199864c #1 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5018R-WR/X10SRW-F, BIOS 2.0 12/17/2015 RIP: 0010:fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b277e28 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88810d52ac00 RCX: ffff88810b56aa00 RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffff822f3a09 RDI: ffff888108f59000 RBP: ffff8881d394fb88 R08: 0000000000000028 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 11ff4fe6834fcd91 R12: ffff8881d394fc40 R13: ffff888108f59000 R14: ffff8881d394f800 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fd83f6f1080(0000) GS:ffff88885fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f918d417000 CR3: 000000017f89a005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> generic_shutdown_super+0x47/0x120 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 ceph_kill_sb+0x36/0x90 [ceph] deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140 task_work_run+0x67/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x23d/0x240 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x25/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x40/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7fd83dc39e9b Later the kernel will crash when iput() the inodes and dereferencing the "sb->s_master_keys", which has been released by the generic_shutdown_super(). Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/59162 Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Milind Changire <mchangir@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2022-12-21 06:13:51 +00:00
goto out;
}
/* lookup inode */
vino.ino = le64_to_cpu(h->ino);
vino.snap = CEPH_NOSNAP;
inode = ceph_find_inode(sb, vino);
if (!inode) {
pr_warn_client(cl, "failed to find inode %llx\n", vino.ino);
ceph: drop messages from MDS when unmounting When unmounting all the dirty buffers will be flushed and after the last osd request is finished the last reference of the i_count will be released. Then it will flush the dirty cap/snap to MDSs, and the unmounting won't wait the possible acks, which will ihold the inodes when updating the metadata locally but makes no sense any more, of this. This will make the evict_inodes() to skip these inodes. If encrypt is enabled the kernel generate a warning when removing the encrypt keys when the skipped inodes still hold the keyring: WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 168846 at fs/crypto/keyring.c:242 fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0 CPU: 4 PID: 168846 Comm: umount Tainted: G S 6.1.0-rc5-ceph-g72ead199864c #1 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5018R-WR/X10SRW-F, BIOS 2.0 12/17/2015 RIP: 0010:fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b277e28 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88810d52ac00 RCX: ffff88810b56aa00 RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffff822f3a09 RDI: ffff888108f59000 RBP: ffff8881d394fb88 R08: 0000000000000028 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 11ff4fe6834fcd91 R12: ffff8881d394fc40 R13: ffff888108f59000 R14: ffff8881d394f800 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fd83f6f1080(0000) GS:ffff88885fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f918d417000 CR3: 000000017f89a005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> generic_shutdown_super+0x47/0x120 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 ceph_kill_sb+0x36/0x90 [ceph] deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140 task_work_run+0x67/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x23d/0x240 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x25/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x40/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7fd83dc39e9b Later the kernel will crash when iput() the inodes and dereferencing the "sb->s_master_keys", which has been released by the generic_shutdown_super(). Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/59162 Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Milind Changire <mchangir@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2022-12-21 06:13:51 +00:00
goto out;
}
ci = ceph_inode(inode);
spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
ci->i_rbytes = le64_to_cpu(h->rbytes);
ci->i_rfiles = le64_to_cpu(h->rfiles);
ci->i_rsubdirs = le64_to_cpu(h->rsubdirs);
__ceph_update_quota(ci, le64_to_cpu(h->max_bytes),
le64_to_cpu(h->max_files));
spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
iput(inode);
ceph: drop messages from MDS when unmounting When unmounting all the dirty buffers will be flushed and after the last osd request is finished the last reference of the i_count will be released. Then it will flush the dirty cap/snap to MDSs, and the unmounting won't wait the possible acks, which will ihold the inodes when updating the metadata locally but makes no sense any more, of this. This will make the evict_inodes() to skip these inodes. If encrypt is enabled the kernel generate a warning when removing the encrypt keys when the skipped inodes still hold the keyring: WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 168846 at fs/crypto/keyring.c:242 fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0 CPU: 4 PID: 168846 Comm: umount Tainted: G S 6.1.0-rc5-ceph-g72ead199864c #1 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5018R-WR/X10SRW-F, BIOS 2.0 12/17/2015 RIP: 0010:fscrypt_destroy_keyring+0x7e/0xd0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b277e28 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88810d52ac00 RCX: ffff88810b56aa00 RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffff822f3a09 RDI: ffff888108f59000 RBP: ffff8881d394fb88 R08: 0000000000000028 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 11ff4fe6834fcd91 R12: ffff8881d394fc40 R13: ffff888108f59000 R14: ffff8881d394f800 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fd83f6f1080(0000) GS:ffff88885fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f918d417000 CR3: 000000017f89a005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> generic_shutdown_super+0x47/0x120 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 ceph_kill_sb+0x36/0x90 [ceph] deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140 task_work_run+0x67/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x23d/0x240 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x25/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x40/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7fd83dc39e9b Later the kernel will crash when iput() the inodes and dereferencing the "sb->s_master_keys", which has been released by the generic_shutdown_super(). Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/59162 Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> Reviewed-and-tested-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Milind Changire <mchangir@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
2022-12-21 06:13:51 +00:00
out:
ceph_dec_mds_stopping_blocker(mdsc);
}
static struct ceph_quotarealm_inode *
find_quotarealm_inode(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, u64 ino)
{
struct ceph_quotarealm_inode *qri = NULL;
struct rb_node **node, *parent = NULL;
struct ceph_client *cl = mdsc->fsc->client;
mutex_lock(&mdsc->quotarealms_inodes_mutex);
node = &(mdsc->quotarealms_inodes.rb_node);
while (*node) {
parent = *node;
qri = container_of(*node, struct ceph_quotarealm_inode, node);
if (ino < qri->ino)
node = &((*node)->rb_left);
else if (ino > qri->ino)
node = &((*node)->rb_right);
else
break;
}
if (!qri || (qri->ino != ino)) {
/* Not found, create a new one and insert it */
qri = kmalloc(sizeof(*qri), GFP_KERNEL);
if (qri) {
qri->ino = ino;
qri->inode = NULL;
qri->timeout = 0;
mutex_init(&qri->mutex);
rb_link_node(&qri->node, parent, node);
rb_insert_color(&qri->node, &mdsc->quotarealms_inodes);
} else
pr_warn_client(cl, "Failed to alloc quotarealms_inode\n");
}
mutex_unlock(&mdsc->quotarealms_inodes_mutex);
return qri;
}
/*
* This function will try to lookup a realm inode which isn't visible in the
* filesystem mountpoint. A list of these kind of inodes (not visible) is
* maintained in the mdsc and freed only when the filesystem is umounted.
*
* Note that these inodes are kept in this list even if the lookup fails, which
* allows to prevent useless lookup requests.
*/
static struct inode *lookup_quotarealm_inode(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc,
struct super_block *sb,
struct ceph_snap_realm *realm)
{
struct ceph_client *cl = mdsc->fsc->client;
struct ceph_quotarealm_inode *qri;
struct inode *in;
qri = find_quotarealm_inode(mdsc, realm->ino);
if (!qri)
return NULL;
mutex_lock(&qri->mutex);
if (qri->inode && ceph_is_any_caps(qri->inode)) {
/* A request has already returned the inode */
mutex_unlock(&qri->mutex);
return qri->inode;
}
/* Check if this inode lookup has failed recently */
if (qri->timeout &&
time_before_eq(jiffies, qri->timeout)) {
mutex_unlock(&qri->mutex);
return NULL;
}
if (qri->inode) {
/* get caps */
int ret = __ceph_do_getattr(qri->inode, NULL,
CEPH_STAT_CAP_INODE, true);
if (ret >= 0)
in = qri->inode;
else
in = ERR_PTR(ret);
} else {
in = ceph_lookup_inode(sb, realm->ino);
}
if (IS_ERR(in)) {
doutc(cl, "Can't lookup inode %llx (err: %ld)\n", realm->ino,
PTR_ERR(in));
qri->timeout = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(60 * 1000); /* XXX */
} else {
qri->timeout = 0;
qri->inode = in;
}
mutex_unlock(&qri->mutex);
return in;
}
void ceph_cleanup_quotarealms_inodes(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc)
{
struct ceph_quotarealm_inode *qri;
struct rb_node *node;
/*
* It should now be safe to clean quotarealms_inode tree without holding
* mdsc->quotarealms_inodes_mutex...
*/
mutex_lock(&mdsc->quotarealms_inodes_mutex);
while (!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&mdsc->quotarealms_inodes)) {
node = rb_first(&mdsc->quotarealms_inodes);
qri = rb_entry(node, struct ceph_quotarealm_inode, node);
rb_erase(node, &mdsc->quotarealms_inodes);
iput(qri->inode);
kfree(qri);
}
mutex_unlock(&mdsc->quotarealms_inodes_mutex);
}
/*
* This function walks through the snaprealm for an inode and set the
* realmp with the first snaprealm that has quotas set (max_files,
* max_bytes, or any, depending on the 'which_quota' argument). If the root is
* reached, set the realmp with the root ceph_snap_realm instead.
*
* Note that the caller is responsible for calling ceph_put_snap_realm() on the
* returned realm.
*
* Callers of this function need to hold mdsc->snap_rwsem. However, if there's
* a need to do an inode lookup, this rwsem will be temporarily dropped. Hence
* the 'retry' argument: if rwsem needs to be dropped and 'retry' is 'false'
* this function will return -EAGAIN; otherwise, the snaprealms walk-through
* will be restarted.
*/
static int get_quota_realm(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, struct inode *inode,
enum quota_get_realm which_quota,
struct ceph_snap_realm **realmp, bool retry)
{
struct ceph_client *cl = mdsc->fsc->client;
struct ceph_inode_info *ci = NULL;
struct ceph_snap_realm *realm, *next;
struct inode *in;
bool has_quota;
if (realmp)
*realmp = NULL;
if (ceph_snap(inode) != CEPH_NOSNAP)
return 0;
restart:
realm = ceph_inode(inode)->i_snap_realm;
if (realm)
ceph_get_snap_realm(mdsc, realm);
else
pr_err_ratelimited_client(cl,
"%p %llx.%llx null i_snap_realm\n",
inode, ceph_vinop(inode));
while (realm) {
bool has_inode;
spin_lock(&realm->inodes_with_caps_lock);
has_inode = realm->inode;
in = has_inode ? igrab(realm->inode) : NULL;
spin_unlock(&realm->inodes_with_caps_lock);
if (has_inode && !in)
break;
if (!in) {
up_read(&mdsc->snap_rwsem);
in = lookup_quotarealm_inode(mdsc, inode->i_sb, realm);
down_read(&mdsc->snap_rwsem);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(in))
break;
ceph_put_snap_realm(mdsc, realm);
if (!retry)
return -EAGAIN;
goto restart;
}
ci = ceph_inode(in);
has_quota = __ceph_has_quota(ci, which_quota);
iput(in);
next = realm->parent;
if (has_quota || !next) {
if (realmp)
*realmp = realm;
return 0;
}
ceph_get_snap_realm(mdsc, next);
ceph_put_snap_realm(mdsc, realm);
realm = next;
}
if (realm)
ceph_put_snap_realm(mdsc, realm);
return 0;
}
bool ceph_quota_is_same_realm(struct inode *old, struct inode *new)
{
struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = ceph_sb_to_mdsc(old->i_sb);
struct ceph_snap_realm *old_realm, *new_realm;
bool is_same;
int ret;
restart:
/*
* We need to lookup 2 quota realms atomically, i.e. with snap_rwsem.
* However, get_quota_realm may drop it temporarily. By setting the
* 'retry' parameter to 'false', we'll get -EAGAIN if the rwsem was
* dropped and we can then restart the whole operation.
*/
down_read(&mdsc->snap_rwsem);
get_quota_realm(mdsc, old, QUOTA_GET_ANY, &old_realm, true);
ret = get_quota_realm(mdsc, new, QUOTA_GET_ANY, &new_realm, false);
if (ret == -EAGAIN) {
up_read(&mdsc->snap_rwsem);
if (old_realm)
ceph_put_snap_realm(mdsc, old_realm);
goto restart;
}
is_same = (old_realm == new_realm);
up_read(&mdsc->snap_rwsem);
if (old_realm)
ceph_put_snap_realm(mdsc, old_realm);
if (new_realm)
ceph_put_snap_realm(mdsc, new_realm);
return is_same;
}
enum quota_check_op {
QUOTA_CHECK_MAX_FILES_OP, /* check quota max_files limit */
QUOTA_CHECK_MAX_BYTES_OP, /* check quota max_files limit */
QUOTA_CHECK_MAX_BYTES_APPROACHING_OP /* check if quota max_files
limit is approaching */
};
/*
* check_quota_exceeded() will walk up the snaprealm hierarchy and, for each
* realm, it will execute quota check operation defined by the 'op' parameter.
* The snaprealm walk is interrupted if the quota check detects that the quota
* is exceeded or if the root inode is reached.
*/
static bool check_quota_exceeded(struct inode *inode, enum quota_check_op op,
loff_t delta)
{
struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = ceph_sb_to_mdsc(inode->i_sb);
struct ceph_client *cl = mdsc->fsc->client;
struct ceph_inode_info *ci;
struct ceph_snap_realm *realm, *next;
struct inode *in;
u64 max, rvalue;
bool exceeded = false;
if (ceph_snap(inode) != CEPH_NOSNAP)
return false;
down_read(&mdsc->snap_rwsem);
restart:
realm = ceph_inode(inode)->i_snap_realm;
if (realm)
ceph_get_snap_realm(mdsc, realm);
else
pr_err_ratelimited_client(cl,
"%p %llx.%llx null i_snap_realm\n",
inode, ceph_vinop(inode));
while (realm) {
bool has_inode;
spin_lock(&realm->inodes_with_caps_lock);
has_inode = realm->inode;
in = has_inode ? igrab(realm->inode) : NULL;
spin_unlock(&realm->inodes_with_caps_lock);
if (has_inode && !in)
break;
if (!in) {
up_read(&mdsc->snap_rwsem);
in = lookup_quotarealm_inode(mdsc, inode->i_sb, realm);
down_read(&mdsc->snap_rwsem);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(in))
break;
ceph_put_snap_realm(mdsc, realm);
goto restart;
}
ci = ceph_inode(in);
spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
if (op == QUOTA_CHECK_MAX_FILES_OP) {
max = ci->i_max_files;
rvalue = ci->i_rfiles + ci->i_rsubdirs;
} else {
max = ci->i_max_bytes;
rvalue = ci->i_rbytes;
}
spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
switch (op) {
case QUOTA_CHECK_MAX_FILES_OP:
case QUOTA_CHECK_MAX_BYTES_OP:
exceeded = (max && (rvalue + delta > max));
break;
case QUOTA_CHECK_MAX_BYTES_APPROACHING_OP:
if (max) {
if (rvalue >= max)
exceeded = true;
else {
/*
* when we're writing more that 1/16th
* of the available space
*/
exceeded =
(((max - rvalue) >> 4) < delta);
}
}
break;
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
pr_warn_client(cl, "Invalid quota check op (%d)\n", op);
exceeded = true; /* Just break the loop */
}
iput(in);
next = realm->parent;
if (exceeded || !next)
break;
ceph_get_snap_realm(mdsc, next);
ceph_put_snap_realm(mdsc, realm);
realm = next;
}
if (realm)
ceph_put_snap_realm(mdsc, realm);
up_read(&mdsc->snap_rwsem);
return exceeded;
}
/*
* ceph_quota_is_max_files_exceeded - check if we can create a new file
* @inode: directory where a new file is being created
*
* This functions returns true is max_files quota allows a new file to be
* created. It is necessary to walk through the snaprealm hierarchy (until the
* FS root) to check all realms with quotas set.
*/
bool ceph_quota_is_max_files_exceeded(struct inode *inode)
{
if (!ceph_has_realms_with_quotas(inode))
return false;
WARN_ON(!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode));
return check_quota_exceeded(inode, QUOTA_CHECK_MAX_FILES_OP, 1);
}
/*
* ceph_quota_is_max_bytes_exceeded - check if we can write to a file
* @inode: inode being written
* @newsize: new size if write succeeds
*
* This functions returns true is max_bytes quota allows a file size to reach
* @newsize; it returns false otherwise.
*/
bool ceph_quota_is_max_bytes_exceeded(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
{
loff_t size = i_size_read(inode);
if (!ceph_has_realms_with_quotas(inode))
return false;
/* return immediately if we're decreasing file size */
if (newsize <= size)
return false;
return check_quota_exceeded(inode, QUOTA_CHECK_MAX_BYTES_OP, (newsize - size));
}
/*
* ceph_quota_is_max_bytes_approaching - check if we're reaching max_bytes
* @inode: inode being written
* @newsize: new size if write succeeds
*
* This function returns true if the new file size @newsize will be consuming
* more than 1/16th of the available quota space; it returns false otherwise.
*/
bool ceph_quota_is_max_bytes_approaching(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize)
{
loff_t size = ceph_inode(inode)->i_reported_size;
if (!ceph_has_realms_with_quotas(inode))
return false;
/* return immediately if we're decreasing file size */
if (newsize <= size)
return false;
return check_quota_exceeded(inode, QUOTA_CHECK_MAX_BYTES_APPROACHING_OP,
(newsize - size));
}
/*
* ceph_quota_update_statfs - if root has quota update statfs with quota status
* @fsc: filesystem client instance
* @buf: statfs to update
*
* If the mounted filesystem root has max_bytes quota set, update the filesystem
* statistics with the quota status.
*
* This function returns true if the stats have been updated, false otherwise.
*/
bool ceph_quota_update_statfs(struct ceph_fs_client *fsc, struct kstatfs *buf)
{
struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = fsc->mdsc;
struct ceph_inode_info *ci;
struct ceph_snap_realm *realm;
struct inode *in;
u64 total = 0, used, free;
bool is_updated = false;
down_read(&mdsc->snap_rwsem);
get_quota_realm(mdsc, d_inode(fsc->sb->s_root), QUOTA_GET_MAX_BYTES,
&realm, true);
up_read(&mdsc->snap_rwsem);
if (!realm)
return false;
spin_lock(&realm->inodes_with_caps_lock);
in = realm->inode ? igrab(realm->inode) : NULL;
spin_unlock(&realm->inodes_with_caps_lock);
if (in) {
ci = ceph_inode(in);
spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
if (ci->i_max_bytes) {
total = ci->i_max_bytes >> CEPH_BLOCK_SHIFT;
used = ci->i_rbytes >> CEPH_BLOCK_SHIFT;
/* For quota size less than 4MB, use 4KB block size */
if (!total) {
total = ci->i_max_bytes >> CEPH_4K_BLOCK_SHIFT;
used = ci->i_rbytes >> CEPH_4K_BLOCK_SHIFT;
buf->f_frsize = 1 << CEPH_4K_BLOCK_SHIFT;
}
/* It is possible for a quota to be exceeded.
* Report 'zero' in that case
*/
free = total > used ? total - used : 0;
/* For quota size less than 4KB, report the
* total=used=4KB,free=0 when quota is full
* and total=free=4KB, used=0 otherwise */
if (!total) {
total = 1;
free = ci->i_max_bytes > ci->i_rbytes ? 1 : 0;
buf->f_frsize = 1 << CEPH_4K_BLOCK_SHIFT;
}
}
spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
if (total) {
buf->f_blocks = total;
buf->f_bfree = free;
buf->f_bavail = free;
is_updated = true;
}
iput(in);
}
ceph_put_snap_realm(mdsc, realm);
return is_updated;
}