linux-stable/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item_recover.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000-2006 Silicon Graphics, Inc.
* All Rights Reserved.
*/
#include "xfs.h"
#include "xfs_fs.h"
#include "xfs_shared.h"
#include "xfs_format.h"
#include "xfs_log_format.h"
#include "xfs_trans_resv.h"
#include "xfs_bit.h"
#include "xfs_mount.h"
#include "xfs_trans.h"
#include "xfs_buf_item.h"
#include "xfs_trans_priv.h"
#include "xfs_trace.h"
#include "xfs_log.h"
#include "xfs_log_priv.h"
#include "xfs_log_recover.h"
#include "xfs_error.h"
#include "xfs_inode.h"
#include "xfs_dir2.h"
#include "xfs_quota.h"
/*
* This is the number of entries in the l_buf_cancel_table used during
* recovery.
*/
#define XLOG_BC_TABLE_SIZE 64
#define XLOG_BUF_CANCEL_BUCKET(log, blkno) \
((log)->l_buf_cancel_table + ((uint64_t)blkno % XLOG_BC_TABLE_SIZE))
/*
* This structure is used during recovery to record the buf log items which
* have been canceled and should not be replayed.
*/
struct xfs_buf_cancel {
xfs_daddr_t bc_blkno;
uint bc_len;
int bc_refcount;
struct list_head bc_list;
};
static struct xfs_buf_cancel *
xlog_find_buffer_cancelled(
struct xlog *log,
xfs_daddr_t blkno,
uint len)
{
struct list_head *bucket;
struct xfs_buf_cancel *bcp;
if (!log->l_buf_cancel_table)
return NULL;
bucket = XLOG_BUF_CANCEL_BUCKET(log, blkno);
list_for_each_entry(bcp, bucket, bc_list) {
if (bcp->bc_blkno == blkno && bcp->bc_len == len)
return bcp;
}
return NULL;
}
static bool
xlog_add_buffer_cancelled(
struct xlog *log,
xfs_daddr_t blkno,
uint len)
{
struct xfs_buf_cancel *bcp;
/*
* If we find an existing cancel record, this indicates that the buffer
* was cancelled multiple times. To ensure that during pass 2 we keep
* the record in the table until we reach its last occurrence in the
* log, a reference count is kept to tell how many times we expect to
* see this record during the second pass.
*/
bcp = xlog_find_buffer_cancelled(log, blkno, len);
if (bcp) {
bcp->bc_refcount++;
return false;
}
bcp = kmalloc(sizeof(struct xfs_buf_cancel), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL);
bcp->bc_blkno = blkno;
bcp->bc_len = len;
bcp->bc_refcount = 1;
list_add_tail(&bcp->bc_list, XLOG_BUF_CANCEL_BUCKET(log, blkno));
return true;
}
/*
* Check if there is and entry for blkno, len in the buffer cancel record table.
*/
bool
xlog_is_buffer_cancelled(
struct xlog *log,
xfs_daddr_t blkno,
uint len)
{
return xlog_find_buffer_cancelled(log, blkno, len) != NULL;
}
/*
* Check if there is and entry for blkno, len in the buffer cancel record table,
* and decremented the reference count on it if there is one.
*
* Remove the cancel record once the refcount hits zero, so that if the same
* buffer is re-used again after its last cancellation we actually replay the
* changes made at that point.
*/
static bool
xlog_put_buffer_cancelled(
struct xlog *log,
xfs_daddr_t blkno,
uint len)
{
struct xfs_buf_cancel *bcp;
bcp = xlog_find_buffer_cancelled(log, blkno, len);
if (!bcp) {
ASSERT(0);
return false;
}
if (--bcp->bc_refcount == 0) {
list_del(&bcp->bc_list);
kfree(bcp);
}
return true;
}
/* log buffer item recovery */
/*
* Sort buffer items for log recovery. Most buffer items should end up on the
* buffer list and are recovered first, with the following exceptions:
*
* 1. XFS_BLF_CANCEL buffers must be processed last because some log items
* might depend on the incor ecancellation record, and replaying a cancelled
* buffer item can remove the incore record.
*
* 2. XFS_BLF_INODE_BUF buffers are handled after most regular items so that
* we replay di_next_unlinked only after flushing the inode 'free' state
* to the inode buffer.
*
* See xlog_recover_reorder_trans for more details.
*/
STATIC enum xlog_recover_reorder
xlog_recover_buf_reorder(
struct xlog_recover_item *item)
{
struct xfs_buf_log_format *buf_f = item->ri_buf[0].i_addr;
if (buf_f->blf_flags & XFS_BLF_CANCEL)
return XLOG_REORDER_CANCEL_LIST;
if (buf_f->blf_flags & XFS_BLF_INODE_BUF)
return XLOG_REORDER_INODE_BUFFER_LIST;
return XLOG_REORDER_BUFFER_LIST;
}
STATIC void
xlog_recover_buf_ra_pass2(
struct xlog *log,
struct xlog_recover_item *item)
{
struct xfs_buf_log_format *buf_f = item->ri_buf[0].i_addr;
xlog_buf_readahead(log, buf_f->blf_blkno, buf_f->blf_len, NULL);
}
/*
* Build up the table of buf cancel records so that we don't replay cancelled
* data in the second pass.
*/
static int
xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass1(
struct xlog *log,
struct xlog_recover_item *item)
{
struct xfs_buf_log_format *bf = item->ri_buf[0].i_addr;
if (!xfs_buf_log_check_iovec(&item->ri_buf[0])) {
xfs_err(log->l_mp, "bad buffer log item size (%d)",
item->ri_buf[0].i_len);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if (!(bf->blf_flags & XFS_BLF_CANCEL))
trace_xfs_log_recover_buf_not_cancel(log, bf);
else if (xlog_add_buffer_cancelled(log, bf->blf_blkno, bf->blf_len))
trace_xfs_log_recover_buf_cancel_add(log, bf);
else
trace_xfs_log_recover_buf_cancel_ref_inc(log, bf);
return 0;
}
/*
* Validate the recovered buffer is of the correct type and attach the
* appropriate buffer operations to them for writeback. Magic numbers are in a
* few places:
* the first 16 bits of the buffer (inode buffer, dquot buffer),
* the first 32 bits of the buffer (most blocks),
* inside a struct xfs_da_blkinfo at the start of the buffer.
*/
static void
xlog_recover_validate_buf_type(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_buf_log_format *buf_f,
xfs_lsn_t current_lsn)
{
struct xfs_da_blkinfo *info = bp->b_addr;
uint32_t magic32;
uint16_t magic16;
uint16_t magicda;
char *warnmsg = NULL;
/*
* We can only do post recovery validation on items on CRC enabled
* fielsystems as we need to know when the buffer was written to be able
* to determine if we should have replayed the item. If we replay old
* metadata over a newer buffer, then it will enter a temporarily
* inconsistent state resulting in verification failures. Hence for now
* just avoid the verification stage for non-crc filesystems
*/
if (!xfs_has_crc(mp))
return;
magic32 = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)bp->b_addr);
magic16 = be16_to_cpu(*(__be16*)bp->b_addr);
magicda = be16_to_cpu(info->magic);
switch (xfs_blft_from_flags(buf_f)) {
case XFS_BLFT_BTREE_BUF:
switch (magic32) {
case XFS_ABTB_CRC_MAGIC:
case XFS_ABTB_MAGIC:
bp->b_ops = &xfs_bnobt_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_ABTC_CRC_MAGIC:
case XFS_ABTC_MAGIC:
bp->b_ops = &xfs_cntbt_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_IBT_CRC_MAGIC:
case XFS_IBT_MAGIC:
bp->b_ops = &xfs_inobt_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_FIBT_CRC_MAGIC:
case XFS_FIBT_MAGIC:
bp->b_ops = &xfs_finobt_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_BMAP_CRC_MAGIC:
case XFS_BMAP_MAGIC:
bp->b_ops = &xfs_bmbt_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_RMAP_CRC_MAGIC:
bp->b_ops = &xfs_rmapbt_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_REFC_CRC_MAGIC:
bp->b_ops = &xfs_refcountbt_buf_ops;
break;
default:
warnmsg = "Bad btree block magic!";
break;
}
break;
case XFS_BLFT_AGF_BUF:
if (magic32 != XFS_AGF_MAGIC) {
warnmsg = "Bad AGF block magic!";
break;
}
bp->b_ops = &xfs_agf_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_BLFT_AGFL_BUF:
if (magic32 != XFS_AGFL_MAGIC) {
warnmsg = "Bad AGFL block magic!";
break;
}
bp->b_ops = &xfs_agfl_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_BLFT_AGI_BUF:
if (magic32 != XFS_AGI_MAGIC) {
warnmsg = "Bad AGI block magic!";
break;
}
bp->b_ops = &xfs_agi_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_BLFT_UDQUOT_BUF:
case XFS_BLFT_PDQUOT_BUF:
case XFS_BLFT_GDQUOT_BUF:
#ifdef CONFIG_XFS_QUOTA
if (magic16 != XFS_DQUOT_MAGIC) {
warnmsg = "Bad DQUOT block magic!";
break;
}
bp->b_ops = &xfs_dquot_buf_ops;
#else
xfs_alert(mp,
"Trying to recover dquots without QUOTA support built in!");
ASSERT(0);
#endif
break;
case XFS_BLFT_DINO_BUF:
if (magic16 != XFS_DINODE_MAGIC) {
warnmsg = "Bad INODE block magic!";
break;
}
bp->b_ops = &xfs_inode_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_BLFT_SYMLINK_BUF:
if (magic32 != XFS_SYMLINK_MAGIC) {
warnmsg = "Bad symlink block magic!";
break;
}
bp->b_ops = &xfs_symlink_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_BLFT_DIR_BLOCK_BUF:
if (magic32 != XFS_DIR2_BLOCK_MAGIC &&
magic32 != XFS_DIR3_BLOCK_MAGIC) {
warnmsg = "Bad dir block magic!";
break;
}
bp->b_ops = &xfs_dir3_block_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_BLFT_DIR_DATA_BUF:
if (magic32 != XFS_DIR2_DATA_MAGIC &&
magic32 != XFS_DIR3_DATA_MAGIC) {
warnmsg = "Bad dir data magic!";
break;
}
bp->b_ops = &xfs_dir3_data_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_BLFT_DIR_FREE_BUF:
if (magic32 != XFS_DIR2_FREE_MAGIC &&
magic32 != XFS_DIR3_FREE_MAGIC) {
warnmsg = "Bad dir3 free magic!";
break;
}
bp->b_ops = &xfs_dir3_free_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_BLFT_DIR_LEAF1_BUF:
if (magicda != XFS_DIR2_LEAF1_MAGIC &&
magicda != XFS_DIR3_LEAF1_MAGIC) {
warnmsg = "Bad dir leaf1 magic!";
break;
}
bp->b_ops = &xfs_dir3_leaf1_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_BLFT_DIR_LEAFN_BUF:
if (magicda != XFS_DIR2_LEAFN_MAGIC &&
magicda != XFS_DIR3_LEAFN_MAGIC) {
warnmsg = "Bad dir leafn magic!";
break;
}
bp->b_ops = &xfs_dir3_leafn_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_BLFT_DA_NODE_BUF:
if (magicda != XFS_DA_NODE_MAGIC &&
magicda != XFS_DA3_NODE_MAGIC) {
warnmsg = "Bad da node magic!";
break;
}
bp->b_ops = &xfs_da3_node_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_BLFT_ATTR_LEAF_BUF:
if (magicda != XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAGIC &&
magicda != XFS_ATTR3_LEAF_MAGIC) {
warnmsg = "Bad attr leaf magic!";
break;
}
bp->b_ops = &xfs_attr3_leaf_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_BLFT_ATTR_RMT_BUF:
if (magic32 != XFS_ATTR3_RMT_MAGIC) {
warnmsg = "Bad attr remote magic!";
break;
}
bp->b_ops = &xfs_attr3_rmt_buf_ops;
break;
case XFS_BLFT_SB_BUF:
if (magic32 != XFS_SB_MAGIC) {
warnmsg = "Bad SB block magic!";
break;
}
bp->b_ops = &xfs_sb_buf_ops;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_XFS_RT
case XFS_BLFT_RTBITMAP_BUF:
case XFS_BLFT_RTSUMMARY_BUF:
/* no magic numbers for verification of RT buffers */
bp->b_ops = &xfs_rtbuf_ops;
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_XFS_RT */
default:
xfs_warn(mp, "Unknown buffer type %d!",
xfs_blft_from_flags(buf_f));
break;
}
/*
* Nothing else to do in the case of a NULL current LSN as this means
* the buffer is more recent than the change in the log and will be
* skipped.
*/
if (current_lsn == NULLCOMMITLSN)
return;
if (warnmsg) {
xfs_warn(mp, warnmsg);
ASSERT(0);
}
/*
* We must update the metadata LSN of the buffer as it is written out to
* ensure that older transactions never replay over this one and corrupt
* the buffer. This can occur if log recovery is interrupted at some
* point after the current transaction completes, at which point a
* subsequent mount starts recovery from the beginning.
*
* Write verifiers update the metadata LSN from log items attached to
* the buffer. Therefore, initialize a bli purely to carry the LSN to
* the verifier.
*/
if (bp->b_ops) {
struct xfs_buf_log_item *bip;
bp->b_flags |= _XBF_LOGRECOVERY;
xfs_buf_item_init(bp, mp);
bip = bp->b_log_item;
bip->bli_item.li_lsn = current_lsn;
}
}
/*
* Perform a 'normal' buffer recovery. Each logged region of the
* buffer should be copied over the corresponding region in the
* given buffer. The bitmap in the buf log format structure indicates
* where to place the logged data.
*/
STATIC void
xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xlog_recover_item *item,
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_buf_log_format *buf_f,
xfs_lsn_t current_lsn)
{
int i;
int bit;
int nbits;
xfs_failaddr_t fa;
const size_t size_disk_dquot = sizeof(struct xfs_disk_dquot);
trace_xfs_log_recover_buf_reg_buf(mp->m_log, buf_f);
bit = 0;
i = 1; /* 0 is the buf format structure */
while (1) {
bit = xfs_next_bit(buf_f->blf_data_map,
buf_f->blf_map_size, bit);
if (bit == -1)
break;
nbits = xfs_contig_bits(buf_f->blf_data_map,
buf_f->blf_map_size, bit);
ASSERT(nbits > 0);
ASSERT(item->ri_buf[i].i_addr != NULL);
ASSERT(item->ri_buf[i].i_len % XFS_BLF_CHUNK == 0);
ASSERT(BBTOB(bp->b_length) >=
((uint)bit << XFS_BLF_SHIFT) + (nbits << XFS_BLF_SHIFT));
/*
* The dirty regions logged in the buffer, even though
* contiguous, may span multiple chunks. This is because the
* dirty region may span a physical page boundary in a buffer
* and hence be split into two separate vectors for writing into
* the log. Hence we need to trim nbits back to the length of
* the current region being copied out of the log.
*/
if (item->ri_buf[i].i_len < (nbits << XFS_BLF_SHIFT))
nbits = item->ri_buf[i].i_len >> XFS_BLF_SHIFT;
/*
* Do a sanity check if this is a dquot buffer. Just checking
* the first dquot in the buffer should do. XXXThis is
* probably a good thing to do for other buf types also.
*/
fa = NULL;
if (buf_f->blf_flags &
(XFS_BLF_UDQUOT_BUF|XFS_BLF_PDQUOT_BUF|XFS_BLF_GDQUOT_BUF)) {
if (item->ri_buf[i].i_addr == NULL) {
xfs_alert(mp,
"XFS: NULL dquot in %s.", __func__);
goto next;
}
if (item->ri_buf[i].i_len < size_disk_dquot) {
xfs_alert(mp,
"XFS: dquot too small (%d) in %s.",
item->ri_buf[i].i_len, __func__);
goto next;
}
fa = xfs_dquot_verify(mp, item->ri_buf[i].i_addr, -1);
if (fa) {
xfs_alert(mp,
"dquot corrupt at %pS trying to replay into block 0x%llx",
fa, xfs_buf_daddr(bp));
goto next;
}
}
memcpy(xfs_buf_offset(bp,
(uint)bit << XFS_BLF_SHIFT), /* dest */
item->ri_buf[i].i_addr, /* source */
nbits<<XFS_BLF_SHIFT); /* length */
next:
i++;
bit += nbits;
}
/* Shouldn't be any more regions */
ASSERT(i == item->ri_total);
xlog_recover_validate_buf_type(mp, bp, buf_f, current_lsn);
}
/*
* Perform a dquot buffer recovery.
* Simple algorithm: if we have found a QUOTAOFF log item of the same type
* (ie. USR or GRP), then just toss this buffer away; don't recover it.
* Else, treat it as a regular buffer and do recovery.
*
* Return false if the buffer was tossed and true if we recovered the buffer to
* indicate to the caller if the buffer needs writing.
*/
STATIC bool
xlog_recover_do_dquot_buffer(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xlog *log,
struct xlog_recover_item *item,
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_buf_log_format *buf_f)
{
uint type;
trace_xfs_log_recover_buf_dquot_buf(log, buf_f);
/*
* Filesystems are required to send in quota flags at mount time.
*/
if (!mp->m_qflags)
return false;
type = 0;
if (buf_f->blf_flags & XFS_BLF_UDQUOT_BUF)
type |= XFS_DQTYPE_USER;
if (buf_f->blf_flags & XFS_BLF_PDQUOT_BUF)
type |= XFS_DQTYPE_PROJ;
if (buf_f->blf_flags & XFS_BLF_GDQUOT_BUF)
type |= XFS_DQTYPE_GROUP;
/*
* This type of quotas was turned off, so ignore this buffer
*/
if (log->l_quotaoffs_flag & type)
return false;
xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer(mp, item, bp, buf_f, NULLCOMMITLSN);
return true;
}
/*
* Perform recovery for a buffer full of inodes. In these buffers, the only
* data which should be recovered is that which corresponds to the
* di_next_unlinked pointers in the on disk inode structures. The rest of the
* data for the inodes is always logged through the inodes themselves rather
* than the inode buffer and is recovered in xlog_recover_inode_pass2().
*
* The only time when buffers full of inodes are fully recovered is when the
* buffer is full of newly allocated inodes. In this case the buffer will
* not be marked as an inode buffer and so will be sent to
* xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() below during recovery.
*/
STATIC int
xlog_recover_do_inode_buffer(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xlog_recover_item *item,
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_buf_log_format *buf_f)
{
int i;
int item_index = 0;
int bit = 0;
int nbits = 0;
int reg_buf_offset = 0;
int reg_buf_bytes = 0;
int next_unlinked_offset;
int inodes_per_buf;
xfs_agino_t *logged_nextp;
xfs_agino_t *buffer_nextp;
trace_xfs_log_recover_buf_inode_buf(mp->m_log, buf_f);
/*
* Post recovery validation only works properly on CRC enabled
* filesystems.
*/
if (xfs_has_crc(mp))
bp->b_ops = &xfs_inode_buf_ops;
inodes_per_buf = BBTOB(bp->b_length) >> mp->m_sb.sb_inodelog;
for (i = 0; i < inodes_per_buf; i++) {
next_unlinked_offset = (i * mp->m_sb.sb_inodesize) +
offsetof(struct xfs_dinode, di_next_unlinked);
while (next_unlinked_offset >=
(reg_buf_offset + reg_buf_bytes)) {
/*
* The next di_next_unlinked field is beyond
* the current logged region. Find the next
* logged region that contains or is beyond
* the current di_next_unlinked field.
*/
bit += nbits;
bit = xfs_next_bit(buf_f->blf_data_map,
buf_f->blf_map_size, bit);
/*
* If there are no more logged regions in the
* buffer, then we're done.
*/
if (bit == -1)
return 0;
nbits = xfs_contig_bits(buf_f->blf_data_map,
buf_f->blf_map_size, bit);
ASSERT(nbits > 0);
reg_buf_offset = bit << XFS_BLF_SHIFT;
reg_buf_bytes = nbits << XFS_BLF_SHIFT;
item_index++;
}
/*
* If the current logged region starts after the current
* di_next_unlinked field, then move on to the next
* di_next_unlinked field.
*/
if (next_unlinked_offset < reg_buf_offset)
continue;
ASSERT(item->ri_buf[item_index].i_addr != NULL);
ASSERT((item->ri_buf[item_index].i_len % XFS_BLF_CHUNK) == 0);
ASSERT((reg_buf_offset + reg_buf_bytes) <= BBTOB(bp->b_length));
/*
* The current logged region contains a copy of the
* current di_next_unlinked field. Extract its value
* and copy it to the buffer copy.
*/
logged_nextp = item->ri_buf[item_index].i_addr +
next_unlinked_offset - reg_buf_offset;
if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp, *logged_nextp == 0)) {
xfs_alert(mp,
"Bad inode buffer log record (ptr = "PTR_FMT", bp = "PTR_FMT"). "
"Trying to replay bad (0) inode di_next_unlinked field.",
item, bp);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
buffer_nextp = xfs_buf_offset(bp, next_unlinked_offset);
*buffer_nextp = *logged_nextp;
/*
* If necessary, recalculate the CRC in the on-disk inode. We
* have to leave the inode in a consistent state for whoever
* reads it next....
*/
xfs_dinode_calc_crc(mp,
xfs_buf_offset(bp, i * mp->m_sb.sb_inodesize));
}
return 0;
}
/*
* V5 filesystems know the age of the buffer on disk being recovered. We can
* have newer objects on disk than we are replaying, and so for these cases we
* don't want to replay the current change as that will make the buffer contents
* temporarily invalid on disk.
*
* The magic number might not match the buffer type we are going to recover
* (e.g. reallocated blocks), so we ignore the xfs_buf_log_format flags. Hence
* extract the LSN of the existing object in the buffer based on it's current
* magic number. If we don't recognise the magic number in the buffer, then
* return a LSN of -1 so that the caller knows it was an unrecognised block and
* so can recover the buffer.
*
* Note: we cannot rely solely on magic number matches to determine that the
* buffer has a valid LSN - we also need to verify that it belongs to this
* filesystem, so we need to extract the object's LSN and compare it to that
* which we read from the superblock. If the UUIDs don't match, then we've got a
* stale metadata block from an old filesystem instance that we need to recover
* over the top of.
*/
static xfs_lsn_t
xlog_recover_get_buf_lsn(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_buf_log_format *buf_f)
{
uint32_t magic32;
uint16_t magic16;
uint16_t magicda;
void *blk = bp->b_addr;
uuid_t *uuid;
xfs_lsn_t lsn = -1;
uint16_t blft;
/* v4 filesystems always recover immediately */
if (!xfs_has_crc(mp))
goto recover_immediately;
/*
* realtime bitmap and summary file blocks do not have magic numbers or
* UUIDs, so we must recover them immediately.
*/
blft = xfs_blft_from_flags(buf_f);
if (blft == XFS_BLFT_RTBITMAP_BUF || blft == XFS_BLFT_RTSUMMARY_BUF)
goto recover_immediately;
magic32 = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)blk);
switch (magic32) {
case XFS_ABTB_CRC_MAGIC:
case XFS_ABTC_CRC_MAGIC:
case XFS_ABTB_MAGIC:
case XFS_ABTC_MAGIC:
case XFS_RMAP_CRC_MAGIC:
case XFS_REFC_CRC_MAGIC:
case XFS_FIBT_CRC_MAGIC:
case XFS_FIBT_MAGIC:
case XFS_IBT_CRC_MAGIC:
case XFS_IBT_MAGIC: {
struct xfs_btree_block *btb = blk;
lsn = be64_to_cpu(btb->bb_u.s.bb_lsn);
uuid = &btb->bb_u.s.bb_uuid;
break;
}
case XFS_BMAP_CRC_MAGIC:
case XFS_BMAP_MAGIC: {
struct xfs_btree_block *btb = blk;
lsn = be64_to_cpu(btb->bb_u.l.bb_lsn);
uuid = &btb->bb_u.l.bb_uuid;
break;
}
case XFS_AGF_MAGIC:
lsn = be64_to_cpu(((struct xfs_agf *)blk)->agf_lsn);
uuid = &((struct xfs_agf *)blk)->agf_uuid;
break;
case XFS_AGFL_MAGIC:
lsn = be64_to_cpu(((struct xfs_agfl *)blk)->agfl_lsn);
uuid = &((struct xfs_agfl *)blk)->agfl_uuid;
break;
case XFS_AGI_MAGIC:
lsn = be64_to_cpu(((struct xfs_agi *)blk)->agi_lsn);
uuid = &((struct xfs_agi *)blk)->agi_uuid;
break;
case XFS_SYMLINK_MAGIC:
lsn = be64_to_cpu(((struct xfs_dsymlink_hdr *)blk)->sl_lsn);
uuid = &((struct xfs_dsymlink_hdr *)blk)->sl_uuid;
break;
case XFS_DIR3_BLOCK_MAGIC:
case XFS_DIR3_DATA_MAGIC:
case XFS_DIR3_FREE_MAGIC:
lsn = be64_to_cpu(((struct xfs_dir3_blk_hdr *)blk)->lsn);
uuid = &((struct xfs_dir3_blk_hdr *)blk)->uuid;
break;
case XFS_ATTR3_RMT_MAGIC:
/*
* Remote attr blocks are written synchronously, rather than
* being logged. That means they do not contain a valid LSN
* (i.e. transactionally ordered) in them, and hence any time we
* see a buffer to replay over the top of a remote attribute
* block we should simply do so.
*/
goto recover_immediately;
case XFS_SB_MAGIC:
/*
* superblock uuids are magic. We may or may not have a
* sb_meta_uuid on disk, but it will be set in the in-core
* superblock. We set the uuid pointer for verification
* according to the superblock feature mask to ensure we check
* the relevant UUID in the superblock.
*/
lsn = be64_to_cpu(((struct xfs_dsb *)blk)->sb_lsn);
if (xfs_has_metauuid(mp))
uuid = &((struct xfs_dsb *)blk)->sb_meta_uuid;
else
uuid = &((struct xfs_dsb *)blk)->sb_uuid;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (lsn != (xfs_lsn_t)-1) {
if (!uuid_equal(&mp->m_sb.sb_meta_uuid, uuid))
goto recover_immediately;
return lsn;
}
magicda = be16_to_cpu(((struct xfs_da_blkinfo *)blk)->magic);
switch (magicda) {
case XFS_DIR3_LEAF1_MAGIC:
case XFS_DIR3_LEAFN_MAGIC:
xfs: Enforce attr3 buffer recovery order From the department of "WTAF? How did we miss that!?"... When we are recovering a buffer, the first thing we do is check the buffer magic number and extract the LSN from the buffer. If the LSN is older than the current LSN, we replay the modification to it. If the metadata on disk is newer than the transaction in the log, we skip it. This is a fundamental v5 filesystem metadata recovery behaviour. generic/482 failed with an attribute writeback failure during log recovery. The write verifier caught the corruption before it got written to disk, and the attr buffer dump looked like: XFS (dm-3): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_attr3_leaf_verify+0x275/0x2e0, xfs_attr3_leaf block 0x19be8 XFS (dm-3): Unmount and run xfs_repair XFS (dm-3): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 3b ee 00 00 4d 2a 01 e1 ........;...M*.. 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 01 9b e8 00 00 00 01 00 00 05 38 ...............8 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 00000020: df 39 5e 51 58 ac 44 b6 8d c5 e7 10 44 09 bc 17 .9^QX.D.....D... 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 83 00 03 00 cc 0f 24 01 00 .............$.. 00000040: 00 68 0e bc 0f c8 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .h.............. 00000050: 00 00 3c 31 0f 24 01 00 00 00 3c 32 0f 88 01 00 ..<1.$....<2.... 00000060: 00 00 3c 33 0f d8 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..<3............ 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ ..... The highlighted bytes are the LSN that was replayed into the buffer: 0x100000538. This is cycle 1, block 0x538. Prior to replay, that block on disk looks like this: $ sudo xfs_db -c "fsb 0x417d" -c "type attr3" -c p /dev/mapper/thin-vol hdr.info.hdr.forw = 0 hdr.info.hdr.back = 0 hdr.info.hdr.magic = 0x3bee hdr.info.crc = 0xb5af0bc6 (correct) hdr.info.bno = 105448 hdr.info.lsn = 0x100000900 ^^^^^^^^^^^ hdr.info.uuid = df395e51-58ac-44b6-8dc5-e7104409bc17 hdr.info.owner = 131203 hdr.count = 2 hdr.usedbytes = 120 hdr.firstused = 3796 hdr.holes = 1 hdr.freemap[0-2] = [base,size] Note the LSN stamped into the buffer on disk: 1/0x900. The version on disk is much newer than the log transaction that was being replayed. That's a bug, and should -never- happen. So I immediately went to look at xlog_recover_get_buf_lsn() to check that we handled the LSN correctly. I was wondering if there was a similar "two commits with the same start LSN skips the second replay" problem with buffers. I didn't get that far, because I found a much more basic, rudimentary bug: xlog_recover_get_buf_lsn() doesn't recognise buffers with XFS_ATTR3_LEAF_MAGIC set in them!!! IOWs, attr3 leaf buffers fall through the magic number checks unrecognised, so trigger the "recover immediately" behaviour instead of undergoing an LSN check. IOWs, we incorrectly replay ATTR3 leaf buffers and that causes silent on disk corruption of inode attribute forks and potentially other things.... Git history shows this is *another* zero day bug, this time introduced in commit 50d5c8d8e938 ("xfs: check LSN ordering for v5 superblocks during recovery") which failed to handle the attr3 leaf buffers in recovery. And we've failed to handle them ever since... Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
2021-07-27 23:23:50 +00:00
case XFS_ATTR3_LEAF_MAGIC:
case XFS_DA3_NODE_MAGIC:
lsn = be64_to_cpu(((struct xfs_da3_blkinfo *)blk)->lsn);
uuid = &((struct xfs_da3_blkinfo *)blk)->uuid;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (lsn != (xfs_lsn_t)-1) {
xfs: check sb_meta_uuid for dabuf buffer recovery Got a report that a repeated crash test of a container host would eventually fail with a log recovery error preventing the system from mounting the root filesystem. It manifested as a directory leaf node corruption on writeback like so: XFS (loop0): Mounting V5 Filesystem XFS (loop0): Starting recovery (logdev: internal) XFS (loop0): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_dir3_leaf_check_int+0x99/0xf0, xfs_dir3_leaf1 block 0x12faa158 XFS (loop0): Unmount and run xfs_repair XFS (loop0): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 3d f1 00 00 e1 9e d5 8b ........=....... 00000010: 00 00 00 00 12 fa a1 58 00 00 00 29 00 00 1b cc .......X...).... 00000020: 91 06 78 ff f7 7e 4a 7d 8d 53 86 f2 ac 47 a8 23 ..x..~J}.S...G.# 00000030: 00 00 00 00 17 e0 00 80 00 43 00 00 00 00 00 00 .........C...... 00000040: 00 00 00 2e 00 00 00 08 00 00 17 2e 00 00 00 0a ................ 00000050: 02 35 79 83 00 00 00 30 04 d3 b4 80 00 00 01 50 .5y....0.......P 00000060: 08 40 95 7f 00 00 02 98 08 41 fe b7 00 00 02 d4 .@.......A...... 00000070: 0d 62 ef a7 00 00 01 f2 14 50 21 41 00 00 00 0c .b.......P!A.... XFS (loop0): Corruption of in-memory data (0x8) detected at xfs_do_force_shutdown+0x1a/0x20 (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:1514). Shutting down. XFS (loop0): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s) XFS (loop0): log mount/recovery failed: error -117 XFS (loop0): log mount failed Tracing indicated that we were recovering changes from a transaction at LSN 0x29/0x1c16 into a buffer that had an LSN of 0x29/0x1d57. That is, log recovery was overwriting a buffer with newer changes on disk than was in the transaction. Tracing indicated that we were hitting the "recovery immediately" case in xfs_buf_log_recovery_lsn(), and hence it was ignoring the LSN in the buffer. The code was extracting the LSN correctly, then ignoring it because the UUID in the buffer did not match the superblock UUID. The problem arises because the UUID check uses the wrong UUID - it should be checking the sb_meta_uuid, not sb_uuid. This filesystem has sb_uuid != sb_meta_uuid (which is fine), and the buffer has the correct matching sb_meta_uuid in it, it's just the code checked it against the wrong superblock uuid. The is no corruption in the filesystem, and failing to recover the buffer due to a write verifier failure means the recovery bug did not propagate the corruption to disk. Hence there is no corruption before or after this bug has manifested, the impact is limited simply to an unmountable filesystem.... This was missed back in 2015 during an audit of incorrect sb_uuid usage that resulted in commit fcfbe2c4ef42 ("xfs: log recovery needs to validate against sb_meta_uuid") that fixed the magic32 buffers to validate against sb_meta_uuid instead of sb_uuid. It missed the magicda buffers.... Fixes: ce748eaa65f2 ("xfs: create new metadata UUID field and incompat flag") Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
2021-12-17 01:32:18 +00:00
if (!uuid_equal(&mp->m_sb.sb_meta_uuid, uuid))
goto recover_immediately;
return lsn;
}
/*
* We do individual object checks on dquot and inode buffers as they
* have their own individual LSN records. Also, we could have a stale
* buffer here, so we have to at least recognise these buffer types.
*
* A notd complexity here is inode unlinked list processing - it logs
* the inode directly in the buffer, but we don't know which inodes have
* been modified, and there is no global buffer LSN. Hence we need to
* recover all inode buffer types immediately. This problem will be
* fixed by logical logging of the unlinked list modifications.
*/
magic16 = be16_to_cpu(*(__be16 *)blk);
switch (magic16) {
case XFS_DQUOT_MAGIC:
case XFS_DINODE_MAGIC:
goto recover_immediately;
default:
break;
}
/* unknown buffer contents, recover immediately */
recover_immediately:
return (xfs_lsn_t)-1;
}
/*
* This routine replays a modification made to a buffer at runtime.
* There are actually two types of buffer, regular and inode, which
* are handled differently. Inode buffers are handled differently
* in that we only recover a specific set of data from them, namely
* the inode di_next_unlinked fields. This is because all other inode
* data is actually logged via inode records and any data we replay
* here which overlaps that may be stale.
*
* When meta-data buffers are freed at run time we log a buffer item
* with the XFS_BLF_CANCEL bit set to indicate that previous copies
* of the buffer in the log should not be replayed at recovery time.
* This is so that if the blocks covered by the buffer are reused for
* file data before we crash we don't end up replaying old, freed
* meta-data into a user's file.
*
* To handle the cancellation of buffer log items, we make two passes
* over the log during recovery. During the first we build a table of
* those buffers which have been cancelled, and during the second we
* only replay those buffers which do not have corresponding cancel
* records in the table. See xlog_recover_buf_pass[1,2] above
* for more details on the implementation of the table of cancel records.
*/
STATIC int
xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass2(
struct xlog *log,
struct list_head *buffer_list,
struct xlog_recover_item *item,
xfs_lsn_t current_lsn)
{
struct xfs_buf_log_format *buf_f = item->ri_buf[0].i_addr;
struct xfs_mount *mp = log->l_mp;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
int error;
uint buf_flags;
xfs_lsn_t lsn;
/*
* In this pass we only want to recover all the buffers which have
* not been cancelled and are not cancellation buffers themselves.
*/
if (buf_f->blf_flags & XFS_BLF_CANCEL) {
if (xlog_put_buffer_cancelled(log, buf_f->blf_blkno,
buf_f->blf_len))
goto cancelled;
} else {
if (xlog_is_buffer_cancelled(log, buf_f->blf_blkno,
buf_f->blf_len))
goto cancelled;
}
trace_xfs_log_recover_buf_recover(log, buf_f);
buf_flags = 0;
if (buf_f->blf_flags & XFS_BLF_INODE_BUF)
buf_flags |= XBF_UNMAPPED;
error = xfs_buf_read(mp->m_ddev_targp, buf_f->blf_blkno, buf_f->blf_len,
buf_flags, &bp, NULL);
if (error)
return error;
/*
* Recover the buffer only if we get an LSN from it and it's less than
* the lsn of the transaction we are replaying.
*
* Note that we have to be extremely careful of readahead here.
* Readahead does not attach verfiers to the buffers so if we don't
* actually do any replay after readahead because of the LSN we found
* in the buffer if more recent than that current transaction then we
* need to attach the verifier directly. Failure to do so can lead to
* future recovery actions (e.g. EFI and unlinked list recovery) can
* operate on the buffers and they won't get the verifier attached. This
* can lead to blocks on disk having the correct content but a stale
* CRC.
*
* It is safe to assume these clean buffers are currently up to date.
* If the buffer is dirtied by a later transaction being replayed, then
* the verifier will be reset to match whatever recover turns that
* buffer into.
*/
lsn = xlog_recover_get_buf_lsn(mp, bp, buf_f);
if (lsn && lsn != -1 && XFS_LSN_CMP(lsn, current_lsn) >= 0) {
trace_xfs_log_recover_buf_skip(log, buf_f);
xlog_recover_validate_buf_type(mp, bp, buf_f, NULLCOMMITLSN);
xfs: verify buffer contents when we skip log replay syzbot detected a crash during log recovery: XFS (loop0): Mounting V5 Filesystem bfdc47fc-10d8-4eed-a562-11a831b3f791 XFS (loop0): Torn write (CRC failure) detected at log block 0x180. Truncating head block from 0x200. XFS (loop0): Starting recovery (logdev: internal) ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xfs_btree_lookup_get_block+0x15c/0x6d0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1813 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807e89f258 by task syz-executor132/5074 CPU: 0 PID: 5074 Comm: syz-executor132 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:306 print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:417 kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:517 xfs_btree_lookup_get_block+0x15c/0x6d0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1813 xfs_btree_lookup+0x346/0x12c0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1913 xfs_btree_simple_query_range+0xde/0x6a0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:4713 xfs_btree_query_range+0x2db/0x380 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:4953 xfs_refcount_recover_cow_leftovers+0x2d1/0xa60 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_refcount.c:1946 xfs_reflink_recover_cow+0xab/0x1b0 fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c:930 xlog_recover_finish+0x824/0x920 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:3493 xfs_log_mount_finish+0x1ec/0x3d0 fs/xfs/xfs_log.c:829 xfs_mountfs+0x146a/0x1ef0 fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c:933 xfs_fs_fill_super+0xf95/0x11f0 fs/xfs/xfs_super.c:1666 get_tree_bdev+0x400/0x620 fs/super.c:1282 vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1489 do_new_mount+0x289/0xad0 fs/namespace.c:3145 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3488 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3697 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x2d3/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3674 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f89fa3f4aca Code: 83 c4 08 5b 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fffd5fb5ef8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00646975756f6e2c RCX: 00007f89fa3f4aca RDX: 0000000020000100 RSI: 0000000020009640 RDI: 00007fffd5fb5f10 RBP: 00007fffd5fb5f10 R08: 00007fffd5fb5f50 R09: 000000000000970d R10: 0000000000200800 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000004 R13: 0000555556c6b2c0 R14: 0000000000200800 R15: 00007fffd5fb5f50 </TASK> The fuzzed image contains an AGF with an obviously garbage agf_refcount_level value of 32, and a dirty log with a buffer log item for that AGF. The ondisk AGF has a higher LSN than the recovered log item. xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass2 reads the buffer, compares the LSNs, and decides to skip replay because the ondisk buffer appears to be newer. Unfortunately, the ondisk buffer is corrupt, but recovery just read the buffer with no buffer ops specified: error = xfs_buf_read(mp->m_ddev_targp, buf_f->blf_blkno, buf_f->blf_len, buf_flags, &bp, NULL); Skipping the buffer leaves its contents in memory unverified. This sets us up for a kernel crash because xfs_refcount_recover_cow_leftovers reads the buffer (which is still around in XBF_DONE state, so no read verification) and creates a refcountbt cursor of height 32. This is impossible so we run off the end of the cursor object and crash. Fix this by invoking the verifier on all skipped buffers and aborting log recovery if the ondisk buffer is corrupt. It might be smarter to force replay the log item atop the buffer and then see if it'll pass the write verifier (like ext4 does) but for now let's go with the conservative option where we stop immediately. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7e9494b8b399902e994e Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2023-04-12 05:49:23 +00:00
/*
* We're skipping replay of this buffer log item due to the log
* item LSN being behind the ondisk buffer. Verify the buffer
* contents since we aren't going to run the write verifier.
*/
if (bp->b_ops) {
bp->b_ops->verify_read(bp);
error = bp->b_error;
}
goto out_release;
}
if (buf_f->blf_flags & XFS_BLF_INODE_BUF) {
error = xlog_recover_do_inode_buffer(mp, item, bp, buf_f);
if (error)
goto out_release;
} else if (buf_f->blf_flags &
(XFS_BLF_UDQUOT_BUF|XFS_BLF_PDQUOT_BUF|XFS_BLF_GDQUOT_BUF)) {
bool dirty;
dirty = xlog_recover_do_dquot_buffer(mp, log, item, bp, buf_f);
if (!dirty)
goto out_release;
} else {
xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer(mp, item, bp, buf_f, current_lsn);
}
/*
* Perform delayed write on the buffer. Asynchronous writes will be
* slower when taking into account all the buffers to be flushed.
*
* Also make sure that only inode buffers with good sizes stay in
* the buffer cache. The kernel moves inodes in buffers of 1 block
* or inode_cluster_size bytes, whichever is bigger. The inode
* buffers in the log can be a different size if the log was generated
* by an older kernel using unclustered inode buffers or a newer kernel
* running with a different inode cluster size. Regardless, if
* the inode buffer size isn't max(blocksize, inode_cluster_size)
* for *our* value of inode_cluster_size, then we need to keep
* the buffer out of the buffer cache so that the buffer won't
* overlap with future reads of those inodes.
*/
if (XFS_DINODE_MAGIC ==
be16_to_cpu(*((__be16 *)xfs_buf_offset(bp, 0))) &&
(BBTOB(bp->b_length) != M_IGEO(log->l_mp)->inode_cluster_size)) {
xfs_buf_stale(bp);
error = xfs_bwrite(bp);
} else {
ASSERT(bp->b_mount == mp);
bp->b_flags |= _XBF_LOGRECOVERY;
xfs_buf_delwri_queue(bp, buffer_list);
}
out_release:
xfs_buf_relse(bp);
return error;
cancelled:
trace_xfs_log_recover_buf_cancel(log, buf_f);
return 0;
}
const struct xlog_recover_item_ops xlog_buf_item_ops = {
.item_type = XFS_LI_BUF,
.reorder = xlog_recover_buf_reorder,
.ra_pass2 = xlog_recover_buf_ra_pass2,
.commit_pass1 = xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass1,
.commit_pass2 = xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass2,
};
#ifdef DEBUG
void
xlog_check_buf_cancel_table(
struct xlog *log)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < XLOG_BC_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
ASSERT(list_empty(&log->l_buf_cancel_table[i]));
}
#endif
int
xlog_alloc_buf_cancel_table(
struct xlog *log)
{
void *p;
int i;
ASSERT(log->l_buf_cancel_table == NULL);
p = kmalloc_array(XLOG_BC_TABLE_SIZE, sizeof(struct list_head),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
return -ENOMEM;
log->l_buf_cancel_table = p;
for (i = 0; i < XLOG_BC_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&log->l_buf_cancel_table[i]);
return 0;
}
void
xlog_free_buf_cancel_table(
struct xlog *log)
{
xfs: don't leak xfs_buf_cancel structures when recovery fails If log recovery fails, we free the memory used by the buffer cancellation buckets, but we don't actually traverse each bucket list to free the individual xfs_buf_cancel objects. This leads to a memory leak, as reported by kmemleak in xfs/051: unreferenced object 0xffff888103629560 (size 32): comm "mount", pid 687045, jiffies 4296935916 (age 10.752s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 08 d3 0a 01 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................ d0 f5 0b 92 81 88 ff ff 80 64 64 25 81 88 ff ff .........dd%.... backtrace: [<ffffffffa0317c83>] kmem_alloc+0x73/0x140 [xfs] [<ffffffffa03234a9>] xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass1+0x139/0x200 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032dc27>] xlog_recover_commit_trans+0x307/0x350 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032df15>] xlog_recovery_process_trans+0xa5/0xe0 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032e12d>] xlog_recover_process_data+0x8d/0x140 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032e49d>] xlog_do_recovery_pass+0x19d/0x740 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032f22d>] xlog_do_log_recovery+0x6d/0x150 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032f343>] xlog_do_recover+0x33/0x1d0 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032faba>] xlog_recover+0xda/0x190 [xfs] [<ffffffffa03194bc>] xfs_log_mount+0x14c/0x360 [xfs] [<ffffffffa030bfed>] xfs_mountfs+0x50d/0xa60 [xfs] [<ffffffffa03124b5>] xfs_fs_fill_super+0x6a5/0x950 [xfs] [<ffffffff812b92a5>] get_tree_bdev+0x175/0x280 [<ffffffff812b7c3a>] vfs_get_tree+0x1a/0x80 [<ffffffff812e366f>] path_mount+0x6ff/0xaa0 [<ffffffff812e3b13>] __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140 Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2022-05-27 00:26:38 +00:00
int i;
if (!log->l_buf_cancel_table)
return;
xfs: don't leak xfs_buf_cancel structures when recovery fails If log recovery fails, we free the memory used by the buffer cancellation buckets, but we don't actually traverse each bucket list to free the individual xfs_buf_cancel objects. This leads to a memory leak, as reported by kmemleak in xfs/051: unreferenced object 0xffff888103629560 (size 32): comm "mount", pid 687045, jiffies 4296935916 (age 10.752s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 08 d3 0a 01 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................ d0 f5 0b 92 81 88 ff ff 80 64 64 25 81 88 ff ff .........dd%.... backtrace: [<ffffffffa0317c83>] kmem_alloc+0x73/0x140 [xfs] [<ffffffffa03234a9>] xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass1+0x139/0x200 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032dc27>] xlog_recover_commit_trans+0x307/0x350 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032df15>] xlog_recovery_process_trans+0xa5/0xe0 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032e12d>] xlog_recover_process_data+0x8d/0x140 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032e49d>] xlog_do_recovery_pass+0x19d/0x740 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032f22d>] xlog_do_log_recovery+0x6d/0x150 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032f343>] xlog_do_recover+0x33/0x1d0 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032faba>] xlog_recover+0xda/0x190 [xfs] [<ffffffffa03194bc>] xfs_log_mount+0x14c/0x360 [xfs] [<ffffffffa030bfed>] xfs_mountfs+0x50d/0xa60 [xfs] [<ffffffffa03124b5>] xfs_fs_fill_super+0x6a5/0x950 [xfs] [<ffffffff812b92a5>] get_tree_bdev+0x175/0x280 [<ffffffff812b7c3a>] vfs_get_tree+0x1a/0x80 [<ffffffff812e366f>] path_mount+0x6ff/0xaa0 [<ffffffff812e3b13>] __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140 Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2022-05-27 00:26:38 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < XLOG_BC_TABLE_SIZE; i++) {
struct xfs_buf_cancel *bc;
while ((bc = list_first_entry_or_null(
&log->l_buf_cancel_table[i],
struct xfs_buf_cancel, bc_list))) {
list_del(&bc->bc_list);
kfree(bc);
xfs: don't leak xfs_buf_cancel structures when recovery fails If log recovery fails, we free the memory used by the buffer cancellation buckets, but we don't actually traverse each bucket list to free the individual xfs_buf_cancel objects. This leads to a memory leak, as reported by kmemleak in xfs/051: unreferenced object 0xffff888103629560 (size 32): comm "mount", pid 687045, jiffies 4296935916 (age 10.752s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 08 d3 0a 01 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................ d0 f5 0b 92 81 88 ff ff 80 64 64 25 81 88 ff ff .........dd%.... backtrace: [<ffffffffa0317c83>] kmem_alloc+0x73/0x140 [xfs] [<ffffffffa03234a9>] xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass1+0x139/0x200 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032dc27>] xlog_recover_commit_trans+0x307/0x350 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032df15>] xlog_recovery_process_trans+0xa5/0xe0 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032e12d>] xlog_recover_process_data+0x8d/0x140 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032e49d>] xlog_do_recovery_pass+0x19d/0x740 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032f22d>] xlog_do_log_recovery+0x6d/0x150 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032f343>] xlog_do_recover+0x33/0x1d0 [xfs] [<ffffffffa032faba>] xlog_recover+0xda/0x190 [xfs] [<ffffffffa03194bc>] xfs_log_mount+0x14c/0x360 [xfs] [<ffffffffa030bfed>] xfs_mountfs+0x50d/0xa60 [xfs] [<ffffffffa03124b5>] xfs_fs_fill_super+0x6a5/0x950 [xfs] [<ffffffff812b92a5>] get_tree_bdev+0x175/0x280 [<ffffffff812b7c3a>] vfs_get_tree+0x1a/0x80 [<ffffffff812e366f>] path_mount+0x6ff/0xaa0 [<ffffffff812e3b13>] __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140 Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2022-05-27 00:26:38 +00:00
}
}
kfree(log->l_buf_cancel_table);
log->l_buf_cancel_table = NULL;
}