linux-stable/kernel/watchdog_perf.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
watchdog/perf: rename watchdog_hld.c to watchdog_perf.c The code currently in "watchdog_hld.c" is for detecting hardlockups using perf, as evidenced by the line in the Makefile that only compiles this file if CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF is defined. Rename the file to prepare for the buddy hardlockup detector, which doesn't use perf. It could be argued that the new name makes it less obvious that this is a hardlockup detector. While true, it's not hard to remember that the "perf" detector is always a hardlockup detector and it's nice not to have names that are too convoluted. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.7.Ice803cb078d0e15fb2cbf49132f096ee2bd4199d@changeid Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Acked-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-19 17:18:31 +00:00
* Detect hard lockups on a system using perf
*
* started by Don Zickus, Copyright (C) 2010 Red Hat, Inc.
*
* Note: Most of this code is borrowed heavily from the original softlockup
* detector, so thanks to Ingo for the initial implementation.
* Some chunks also taken from the old x86-specific nmi watchdog code, thanks
* to those contributors as well.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "NMI watchdog: " fmt
#include <linux/nmi.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
#include <asm/irq_regs.h>
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct perf_event *, watchdog_ev);
watchdog/harclockup/perf: Revert a33d44843d45 ("watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Simplify deferred event destroy") Guenter reported a crash in the watchdog/perf code, which is caused by cleanup() and enable() running concurrently. The reason for this is: The watchdog functions are serialized via the watchdog_mutex and cpu hotplug locking, but the enable of the perf based watchdog happens in context of the unpark callback of the smpboot thread. But that unpark function is not synchronous inside the locking. The unparking of the thread just wakes it up and leaves so there is no guarantee when the thread is executing. If it starts running _before_ the cleanup happened then it will create a event and overwrite the dead event pointer. The new event is then cleaned up because the event is marked dead. lock(watchdog_mutex); lockup_detector_reconfigure(); cpus_read_lock(); stop(); park() update(); start(); unpark() cpus_read_unlock(); thread runs() overwrite dead event ptr cleanup(); free new event, which is active inside perf.... unlock(watchdog_mutex); The park side is safe as that actually waits for the thread to reach parked state. Commit a33d44843d45 removed the protection against this kind of scenario under the stupid assumption that the hotplug serialization and the watchdog_mutex cover everything. Bring it back. Reverts: a33d44843d45 ("watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Simplify deferred event destroy") Reported-and-tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Feels-stupid Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1710312145190.1942@nanos
2017-10-31 21:32:00 +00:00
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct perf_event *, dead_event);
watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Prevent CPU hotplug deadlock The following deadlock is possible in the watchdog hotplug code: cpus_write_lock() ... takedown_cpu() smpboot_park_threads() smpboot_park_thread() kthread_park() ->park() := watchdog_disable() watchdog_nmi_disable() perf_event_release_kernel(); put_event() _free_event() ->destroy() := hw_perf_event_destroy() x86_release_hardware() release_ds_buffers() get_online_cpus() when a per cpu watchdog perf event is destroyed which drops the last reference to the PMU hardware. The cleanup code there invokes get_online_cpus() which instantly deadlocks because the hotplug percpu rwsem is write locked. To solve this add a deferring mechanism: cpus_write_lock() kthread_park() watchdog_nmi_disable(deferred) perf_event_disable(event); move_event_to_deferred(event); .... cpus_write_unlock() cleaup_deferred_events() perf_event_release_kernel() This is still properly serialized against concurrent hotplug via the cpu_add_remove_lock, which is held by the task which initiated the hotplug event. This is also used to handle event destruction when the watchdog threads are parked via other mechanisms than CPU hotplug. Analyzed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170912194146.884469246@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-09-12 19:37:04 +00:00
static struct cpumask dead_events_mask;
static atomic_t watchdog_cpus = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
kernel/watchdog: Prevent false positives with turbo modes The hardlockup detector on x86 uses a performance counter based on unhalted CPU cycles and a periodic hrtimer. The hrtimer period is about 2/5 of the performance counter period, so the hrtimer should fire 2-3 times before the performance counter NMI fires. The NMI code checks whether the hrtimer fired since the last invocation. If not, it assumess a hard lockup. The calculation of those periods is based on the nominal CPU frequency. Turbo modes increase the CPU clock frequency and therefore shorten the period of the perf/NMI watchdog. With extreme Turbo-modes (3x nominal frequency) the perf/NMI period is shorter than the hrtimer period which leads to false positives. A simple fix would be to shorten the hrtimer period, but that comes with the side effect of more frequent hrtimer and softlockup thread wakeups, which is not desired. Implement a low pass filter, which checks the perf/NMI period against kernel time. If the perf/NMI fires before 4/5 of the watchdog period has elapsed then the event is ignored and postponed to the next perf/NMI. That solves the problem and avoids the overhead of shorter hrtimer periods and more frequent softlockup thread wakeups. Fixes: 58687acba592 ("lockup_detector: Combine nmi_watchdog and softlockup detector") Reported-and-tested-by: Kan Liang <Kan.liang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dzickus@redhat.com Cc: prarit@redhat.com Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: babu.moger@oracle.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: eranian@google.com Cc: acme@redhat.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: atomlin@redhat.com Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1708150931310.1886@nanos
2017-08-15 07:50:13 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_CHECK_TIMESTAMP
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(ktime_t, last_timestamp);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned int, nmi_rearmed);
static ktime_t watchdog_hrtimer_sample_threshold __read_mostly;
void watchdog_update_hrtimer_threshold(u64 period)
{
/*
* The hrtimer runs with a period of (watchdog_threshold * 2) / 5
*
* So it runs effectively with 2.5 times the rate of the NMI
* watchdog. That means the hrtimer should fire 2-3 times before
* the NMI watchdog expires. The NMI watchdog on x86 is based on
* unhalted CPU cycles, so if Turbo-Mode is enabled the CPU cycles
* might run way faster than expected and the NMI fires in a
* smaller period than the one deduced from the nominal CPU
* frequency. Depending on the Turbo-Mode factor this might be fast
* enough to get the NMI period smaller than the hrtimer watchdog
* period and trigger false positives.
*
* The sample threshold is used to check in the NMI handler whether
* the minimum time between two NMI samples has elapsed. That
* prevents false positives.
*
* Set this to 4/5 of the actual watchdog threshold period so the
* hrtimer is guaranteed to fire at least once within the real
* watchdog threshold.
*/
watchdog_hrtimer_sample_threshold = period * 2;
}
static bool watchdog_check_timestamp(void)
{
ktime_t delta, now = ktime_get_mono_fast_ns();
delta = now - __this_cpu_read(last_timestamp);
if (delta < watchdog_hrtimer_sample_threshold) {
/*
* If ktime is jiffies based, a stalled timer would prevent
* jiffies from being incremented and the filter would look
* at a stale timestamp and never trigger.
*/
if (__this_cpu_inc_return(nmi_rearmed) < 10)
return false;
}
__this_cpu_write(nmi_rearmed, 0);
__this_cpu_write(last_timestamp, now);
return true;
}
#else
static inline bool watchdog_check_timestamp(void)
{
return true;
}
#endif
static struct perf_event_attr wd_hw_attr = {
.type = PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE,
.config = PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES,
.size = sizeof(struct perf_event_attr),
.pinned = 1,
.disabled = 1,
};
/* Callback function for perf event subsystem */
static void watchdog_overflow_callback(struct perf_event *event,
watchdog/core: Remove the park_in_progress obfuscation Commit: b94f51183b06 ("kernel/watchdog: prevent false hardlockup on overloaded system") tries to fix the following issue: proc_write() set_sample_period() <--- New sample period becoms visible <----- Broken starts proc_watchdog_update() watchdog_enable_all_cpus() watchdog_hrtimer_fn() update_watchdog_all_cpus() restart_timer(sample_period) watchdog_park_threads() thread->park() disable_nmi() <----- Broken ends The reason why this is broken is that the update of the watchdog threshold becomes immediately effective and visible for the hrtimer function which uses that value to rearm the timer. But the NMI/perf side still uses the old value up to the point where it is disabled. If the rate has been lowered then the NMI can run fast enough to 'detect' a hard lockup because the timer has not fired due to the longer period. The patch 'fixed' this by adding a variable: proc_write() set_sample_period() <----- Broken starts proc_watchdog_update() watchdog_enable_all_cpus() watchdog_hrtimer_fn() update_watchdog_all_cpus() restart_timer(sample_period) watchdog_park_threads() park_in_progress = 1 <----- Broken ends nmi_watchdog() if (park_in_progress) return; The only effect of this variable was to make the window where the breakage can hit small enough that it was not longer observable in testing. From a correctness point of view it is a pointless bandaid which merily papers over the root cause: the unsychronized update of the variable. Looking deeper into the related code pathes unearthed similar problems in the watchdog_start()/stop() functions. watchdog_start() perf_nmi_event_start() hrtimer_start() watchdog_stop() hrtimer_cancel() perf_nmi_event_stop() In both cases the call order is wrong because if the tasks gets preempted or the VM gets scheduled out long enough after the first call, then there is a chance that the next NMI will see a stale hrtimer interrupt count and trigger a false positive hard lockup splat. Get rid of park_in_progress so the code can be gradually deobfuscated and pruned from several layers of duct tape papering over the root cause, which has been either ignored or not understood at all. Once this is removed the underlying problem will be fixed by rewriting the proc interface to do a proper synchronized update. Address the start/stop() ordering problem as well by reverting the call order, so this part is at least correct now. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1709052038270.2393@nanos Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-09-12 19:37:05 +00:00
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/* Ensure the watchdog never gets throttled */
event->hw.interrupts = 0;
watchdog/perf: more properly prevent false positives with turbo modes Currently, in the watchdog_overflow_callback() we first check to see if the watchdog had been touched and _then_ we handle the workaround for turbo mode. This order should be reversed. Specifically, "touching" the hardlockup detector's watchdog should avoid lockups being detected for one period that should be roughly the same regardless of whether we're running turbo or not. That means that we should do the extra accounting for turbo _before_ we look at (and clear) the global indicating that we've been touched. NOTE: this fix is made based on code inspection. I am not aware of any reports where the old code would have generated false positives. That being said, this order seems more correct and also makes it easier down the line to share code with the "buddy" hardlockup detector. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.2.I843b0d1de3e096ba111a179f3adb16d576bef5c7@changeid Fixes: 7edaeb6841df ("kernel/watchdog: Prevent false positives with turbo modes") Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-19 17:18:26 +00:00
if (!watchdog_check_timestamp())
return;
watchdog/hardlockup: add a "cpu" param to watchdog_hardlockup_check() In preparation for the buddy hardlockup detector where the CPU checking for lockup might not be the currently running CPU, add a "cpu" parameter to watchdog_hardlockup_check(). As part of this change, make hrtimer_interrupts an atomic_t since now the CPU incrementing the value and the CPU reading the value might be different. Technially this could also be done with just READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE, but atomic_t feels a little cleaner in this case. While hrtimer_interrupts is made atomic_t, we change hrtimer_interrupts_saved from "unsigned long" to "int". The "int" is needed to match the data type backing atomic_t for hrtimer_interrupts. Even if this changes us from 64-bits to 32-bits (which I don't think is true for most compilers), it doesn't really matter. All we ever do is increment it every few seconds and compare it to an old value so 32-bits is fine (even 16-bits would be). The "signed" vs "unsigned" also doesn't matter for simple equality comparisons. hrtimer_interrupts_saved is _not_ switched to atomic_t nor even accessed with READ_ONCE / WRITE_ONCE. The hrtimer_interrupts_saved is always consistently accessed with the same CPU. NOTE: with the upcoming "buddy" detector there is one special case. When a CPU goes offline/online then we can change which CPU is the one to consistently access a given instance of hrtimer_interrupts_saved. We still can't end up with a partially updated hrtimer_interrupts_saved, however, because we end up petting all affected CPUs to make sure the new and old CPU can't end up somehow read/write hrtimer_interrupts_saved at the same time. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.10.I3a7d4dd8c23ac30ee0b607d77feb6646b64825c0@changeid Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-19 17:18:34 +00:00
watchdog_hardlockup_check(smp_processor_id(), regs);
}
static int hardlockup_detector_event_create(void)
{
watchdog/perf: ensure CPU-bound context when creating hardlockup detector event hardlockup_detector_event_create() should create perf_event on the current CPU. Preemption could not get disabled because perf_event_create_kernel_counter() allocates memory. Instead, the CPU locality is achieved by processing the code in a per-CPU bound kthread. Add a check to prevent mistakes when calling the code in another code path. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.5.I654063e53782b11d53e736a8ad4897ffd207406a@changeid Signed-off-by: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-19 17:18:29 +00:00
unsigned int cpu;
struct perf_event_attr *wd_attr;
struct perf_event *evt;
watchdog/perf: ensure CPU-bound context when creating hardlockup detector event hardlockup_detector_event_create() should create perf_event on the current CPU. Preemption could not get disabled because perf_event_create_kernel_counter() allocates memory. Instead, the CPU locality is achieved by processing the code in a per-CPU bound kthread. Add a check to prevent mistakes when calling the code in another code path. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.5.I654063e53782b11d53e736a8ad4897ffd207406a@changeid Signed-off-by: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-19 17:18:29 +00:00
/*
* Preemption is not disabled because memory will be allocated.
* Ensure CPU-locality by calling this in per-CPU kthread.
*/
WARN_ON(!is_percpu_thread());
cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
wd_attr = &wd_hw_attr;
wd_attr->sample_period = hw_nmi_get_sample_period(watchdog_thresh);
/* Try to register using hardware perf events */
evt = perf_event_create_kernel_counter(wd_attr, cpu, NULL,
watchdog_overflow_callback, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(evt)) {
pr_debug("Perf event create on CPU %d failed with %ld\n", cpu,
PTR_ERR(evt));
return PTR_ERR(evt);
}
this_cpu_write(watchdog_ev, evt);
return 0;
}
/**
watchdog/hardlockup: have the perf hardlockup use __weak functions more cleanly The fact that there watchdog_hardlockup_enable(), watchdog_hardlockup_disable(), and watchdog_hardlockup_probe() are declared __weak means that the configured hardlockup detector can define non-weak versions of those functions if it needs to. Instead of doing this, the perf hardlockup detector hooked itself into the default __weak implementation, which was a bit awkward. Clean this up. From comments, it looks as if the original design was done because the __weak function were expected to implemented by the architecture and not by the configured hardlockup detector. This got awkward when we tried to add the buddy lockup detector which was not arch-specific but wanted to hook into those same functions. This is not expected to have any functional impact. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.13.I847d9ec852449350997ba00401d2462a9cb4302b@changeid Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-19 17:18:37 +00:00
* watchdog_hardlockup_enable - Enable the local event
*
* @cpu: The CPU to enable hard lockup on.
*/
watchdog/hardlockup: have the perf hardlockup use __weak functions more cleanly The fact that there watchdog_hardlockup_enable(), watchdog_hardlockup_disable(), and watchdog_hardlockup_probe() are declared __weak means that the configured hardlockup detector can define non-weak versions of those functions if it needs to. Instead of doing this, the perf hardlockup detector hooked itself into the default __weak implementation, which was a bit awkward. Clean this up. From comments, it looks as if the original design was done because the __weak function were expected to implemented by the architecture and not by the configured hardlockup detector. This got awkward when we tried to add the buddy lockup detector which was not arch-specific but wanted to hook into those same functions. This is not expected to have any functional impact. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.13.I847d9ec852449350997ba00401d2462a9cb4302b@changeid Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-19 17:18:37 +00:00
void watchdog_hardlockup_enable(unsigned int cpu)
{
watchdog/hardlockup: have the perf hardlockup use __weak functions more cleanly The fact that there watchdog_hardlockup_enable(), watchdog_hardlockup_disable(), and watchdog_hardlockup_probe() are declared __weak means that the configured hardlockup detector can define non-weak versions of those functions if it needs to. Instead of doing this, the perf hardlockup detector hooked itself into the default __weak implementation, which was a bit awkward. Clean this up. From comments, it looks as if the original design was done because the __weak function were expected to implemented by the architecture and not by the configured hardlockup detector. This got awkward when we tried to add the buddy lockup detector which was not arch-specific but wanted to hook into those same functions. This is not expected to have any functional impact. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.13.I847d9ec852449350997ba00401d2462a9cb4302b@changeid Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-19 17:18:37 +00:00
WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu != smp_processor_id());
if (hardlockup_detector_event_create())
return;
/* use original value for check */
if (!atomic_fetch_inc(&watchdog_cpus))
pr_info("Enabled. Permanently consumes one hw-PMU counter.\n");
perf_event_enable(this_cpu_read(watchdog_ev));
}
watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Prevent CPU hotplug deadlock The following deadlock is possible in the watchdog hotplug code: cpus_write_lock() ... takedown_cpu() smpboot_park_threads() smpboot_park_thread() kthread_park() ->park() := watchdog_disable() watchdog_nmi_disable() perf_event_release_kernel(); put_event() _free_event() ->destroy() := hw_perf_event_destroy() x86_release_hardware() release_ds_buffers() get_online_cpus() when a per cpu watchdog perf event is destroyed which drops the last reference to the PMU hardware. The cleanup code there invokes get_online_cpus() which instantly deadlocks because the hotplug percpu rwsem is write locked. To solve this add a deferring mechanism: cpus_write_lock() kthread_park() watchdog_nmi_disable(deferred) perf_event_disable(event); move_event_to_deferred(event); .... cpus_write_unlock() cleaup_deferred_events() perf_event_release_kernel() This is still properly serialized against concurrent hotplug via the cpu_add_remove_lock, which is held by the task which initiated the hotplug event. This is also used to handle event destruction when the watchdog threads are parked via other mechanisms than CPU hotplug. Analyzed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170912194146.884469246@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-09-12 19:37:04 +00:00
/**
watchdog/hardlockup: have the perf hardlockup use __weak functions more cleanly The fact that there watchdog_hardlockup_enable(), watchdog_hardlockup_disable(), and watchdog_hardlockup_probe() are declared __weak means that the configured hardlockup detector can define non-weak versions of those functions if it needs to. Instead of doing this, the perf hardlockup detector hooked itself into the default __weak implementation, which was a bit awkward. Clean this up. From comments, it looks as if the original design was done because the __weak function were expected to implemented by the architecture and not by the configured hardlockup detector. This got awkward when we tried to add the buddy lockup detector which was not arch-specific but wanted to hook into those same functions. This is not expected to have any functional impact. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.13.I847d9ec852449350997ba00401d2462a9cb4302b@changeid Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-19 17:18:37 +00:00
* watchdog_hardlockup_disable - Disable the local event
*
* @cpu: The CPU to enable hard lockup on.
watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Prevent CPU hotplug deadlock The following deadlock is possible in the watchdog hotplug code: cpus_write_lock() ... takedown_cpu() smpboot_park_threads() smpboot_park_thread() kthread_park() ->park() := watchdog_disable() watchdog_nmi_disable() perf_event_release_kernel(); put_event() _free_event() ->destroy() := hw_perf_event_destroy() x86_release_hardware() release_ds_buffers() get_online_cpus() when a per cpu watchdog perf event is destroyed which drops the last reference to the PMU hardware. The cleanup code there invokes get_online_cpus() which instantly deadlocks because the hotplug percpu rwsem is write locked. To solve this add a deferring mechanism: cpus_write_lock() kthread_park() watchdog_nmi_disable(deferred) perf_event_disable(event); move_event_to_deferred(event); .... cpus_write_unlock() cleaup_deferred_events() perf_event_release_kernel() This is still properly serialized against concurrent hotplug via the cpu_add_remove_lock, which is held by the task which initiated the hotplug event. This is also used to handle event destruction when the watchdog threads are parked via other mechanisms than CPU hotplug. Analyzed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170912194146.884469246@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-09-12 19:37:04 +00:00
*/
watchdog/hardlockup: have the perf hardlockup use __weak functions more cleanly The fact that there watchdog_hardlockup_enable(), watchdog_hardlockup_disable(), and watchdog_hardlockup_probe() are declared __weak means that the configured hardlockup detector can define non-weak versions of those functions if it needs to. Instead of doing this, the perf hardlockup detector hooked itself into the default __weak implementation, which was a bit awkward. Clean this up. From comments, it looks as if the original design was done because the __weak function were expected to implemented by the architecture and not by the configured hardlockup detector. This got awkward when we tried to add the buddy lockup detector which was not arch-specific but wanted to hook into those same functions. This is not expected to have any functional impact. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.13.I847d9ec852449350997ba00401d2462a9cb4302b@changeid Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-19 17:18:37 +00:00
void watchdog_hardlockup_disable(unsigned int cpu)
{
watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Prevent CPU hotplug deadlock The following deadlock is possible in the watchdog hotplug code: cpus_write_lock() ... takedown_cpu() smpboot_park_threads() smpboot_park_thread() kthread_park() ->park() := watchdog_disable() watchdog_nmi_disable() perf_event_release_kernel(); put_event() _free_event() ->destroy() := hw_perf_event_destroy() x86_release_hardware() release_ds_buffers() get_online_cpus() when a per cpu watchdog perf event is destroyed which drops the last reference to the PMU hardware. The cleanup code there invokes get_online_cpus() which instantly deadlocks because the hotplug percpu rwsem is write locked. To solve this add a deferring mechanism: cpus_write_lock() kthread_park() watchdog_nmi_disable(deferred) perf_event_disable(event); move_event_to_deferred(event); .... cpus_write_unlock() cleaup_deferred_events() perf_event_release_kernel() This is still properly serialized against concurrent hotplug via the cpu_add_remove_lock, which is held by the task which initiated the hotplug event. This is also used to handle event destruction when the watchdog threads are parked via other mechanisms than CPU hotplug. Analyzed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170912194146.884469246@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-09-12 19:37:04 +00:00
struct perf_event *event = this_cpu_read(watchdog_ev);
watchdog/hardlockup: have the perf hardlockup use __weak functions more cleanly The fact that there watchdog_hardlockup_enable(), watchdog_hardlockup_disable(), and watchdog_hardlockup_probe() are declared __weak means that the configured hardlockup detector can define non-weak versions of those functions if it needs to. Instead of doing this, the perf hardlockup detector hooked itself into the default __weak implementation, which was a bit awkward. Clean this up. From comments, it looks as if the original design was done because the __weak function were expected to implemented by the architecture and not by the configured hardlockup detector. This got awkward when we tried to add the buddy lockup detector which was not arch-specific but wanted to hook into those same functions. This is not expected to have any functional impact. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.13.I847d9ec852449350997ba00401d2462a9cb4302b@changeid Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-19 17:18:37 +00:00
WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu != smp_processor_id());
if (event) {
perf_event_disable(event);
watchdog/harclockup/perf: Revert a33d44843d45 ("watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Simplify deferred event destroy") Guenter reported a crash in the watchdog/perf code, which is caused by cleanup() and enable() running concurrently. The reason for this is: The watchdog functions are serialized via the watchdog_mutex and cpu hotplug locking, but the enable of the perf based watchdog happens in context of the unpark callback of the smpboot thread. But that unpark function is not synchronous inside the locking. The unparking of the thread just wakes it up and leaves so there is no guarantee when the thread is executing. If it starts running _before_ the cleanup happened then it will create a event and overwrite the dead event pointer. The new event is then cleaned up because the event is marked dead. lock(watchdog_mutex); lockup_detector_reconfigure(); cpus_read_lock(); stop(); park() update(); start(); unpark() cpus_read_unlock(); thread runs() overwrite dead event ptr cleanup(); free new event, which is active inside perf.... unlock(watchdog_mutex); The park side is safe as that actually waits for the thread to reach parked state. Commit a33d44843d45 removed the protection against this kind of scenario under the stupid assumption that the hotplug serialization and the watchdog_mutex cover everything. Bring it back. Reverts: a33d44843d45 ("watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Simplify deferred event destroy") Reported-and-tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Feels-stupid Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1710312145190.1942@nanos
2017-10-31 21:32:00 +00:00
this_cpu_write(watchdog_ev, NULL);
this_cpu_write(dead_event, event);
watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Prevent CPU hotplug deadlock The following deadlock is possible in the watchdog hotplug code: cpus_write_lock() ... takedown_cpu() smpboot_park_threads() smpboot_park_thread() kthread_park() ->park() := watchdog_disable() watchdog_nmi_disable() perf_event_release_kernel(); put_event() _free_event() ->destroy() := hw_perf_event_destroy() x86_release_hardware() release_ds_buffers() get_online_cpus() when a per cpu watchdog perf event is destroyed which drops the last reference to the PMU hardware. The cleanup code there invokes get_online_cpus() which instantly deadlocks because the hotplug percpu rwsem is write locked. To solve this add a deferring mechanism: cpus_write_lock() kthread_park() watchdog_nmi_disable(deferred) perf_event_disable(event); move_event_to_deferred(event); .... cpus_write_unlock() cleaup_deferred_events() perf_event_release_kernel() This is still properly serialized against concurrent hotplug via the cpu_add_remove_lock, which is held by the task which initiated the hotplug event. This is also used to handle event destruction when the watchdog threads are parked via other mechanisms than CPU hotplug. Analyzed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170912194146.884469246@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-09-12 19:37:04 +00:00
cpumask_set_cpu(smp_processor_id(), &dead_events_mask);
atomic_dec(&watchdog_cpus);
}
}
watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Prevent CPU hotplug deadlock The following deadlock is possible in the watchdog hotplug code: cpus_write_lock() ... takedown_cpu() smpboot_park_threads() smpboot_park_thread() kthread_park() ->park() := watchdog_disable() watchdog_nmi_disable() perf_event_release_kernel(); put_event() _free_event() ->destroy() := hw_perf_event_destroy() x86_release_hardware() release_ds_buffers() get_online_cpus() when a per cpu watchdog perf event is destroyed which drops the last reference to the PMU hardware. The cleanup code there invokes get_online_cpus() which instantly deadlocks because the hotplug percpu rwsem is write locked. To solve this add a deferring mechanism: cpus_write_lock() kthread_park() watchdog_nmi_disable(deferred) perf_event_disable(event); move_event_to_deferred(event); .... cpus_write_unlock() cleaup_deferred_events() perf_event_release_kernel() This is still properly serialized against concurrent hotplug via the cpu_add_remove_lock, which is held by the task which initiated the hotplug event. This is also used to handle event destruction when the watchdog threads are parked via other mechanisms than CPU hotplug. Analyzed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170912194146.884469246@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-09-12 19:37:04 +00:00
/**
* hardlockup_detector_perf_cleanup - Cleanup disabled events and destroy them
*
* Called from lockup_detector_cleanup(). Serialized by the caller.
*/
void hardlockup_detector_perf_cleanup(void)
{
int cpu;
for_each_cpu(cpu, &dead_events_mask) {
watchdog/harclockup/perf: Revert a33d44843d45 ("watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Simplify deferred event destroy") Guenter reported a crash in the watchdog/perf code, which is caused by cleanup() and enable() running concurrently. The reason for this is: The watchdog functions are serialized via the watchdog_mutex and cpu hotplug locking, but the enable of the perf based watchdog happens in context of the unpark callback of the smpboot thread. But that unpark function is not synchronous inside the locking. The unparking of the thread just wakes it up and leaves so there is no guarantee when the thread is executing. If it starts running _before_ the cleanup happened then it will create a event and overwrite the dead event pointer. The new event is then cleaned up because the event is marked dead. lock(watchdog_mutex); lockup_detector_reconfigure(); cpus_read_lock(); stop(); park() update(); start(); unpark() cpus_read_unlock(); thread runs() overwrite dead event ptr cleanup(); free new event, which is active inside perf.... unlock(watchdog_mutex); The park side is safe as that actually waits for the thread to reach parked state. Commit a33d44843d45 removed the protection against this kind of scenario under the stupid assumption that the hotplug serialization and the watchdog_mutex cover everything. Bring it back. Reverts: a33d44843d45 ("watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Simplify deferred event destroy") Reported-and-tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Feels-stupid Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1710312145190.1942@nanos
2017-10-31 21:32:00 +00:00
struct perf_event *event = per_cpu(dead_event, cpu);
watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Prevent CPU hotplug deadlock The following deadlock is possible in the watchdog hotplug code: cpus_write_lock() ... takedown_cpu() smpboot_park_threads() smpboot_park_thread() kthread_park() ->park() := watchdog_disable() watchdog_nmi_disable() perf_event_release_kernel(); put_event() _free_event() ->destroy() := hw_perf_event_destroy() x86_release_hardware() release_ds_buffers() get_online_cpus() when a per cpu watchdog perf event is destroyed which drops the last reference to the PMU hardware. The cleanup code there invokes get_online_cpus() which instantly deadlocks because the hotplug percpu rwsem is write locked. To solve this add a deferring mechanism: cpus_write_lock() kthread_park() watchdog_nmi_disable(deferred) perf_event_disable(event); move_event_to_deferred(event); .... cpus_write_unlock() cleaup_deferred_events() perf_event_release_kernel() This is still properly serialized against concurrent hotplug via the cpu_add_remove_lock, which is held by the task which initiated the hotplug event. This is also used to handle event destruction when the watchdog threads are parked via other mechanisms than CPU hotplug. Analyzed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170912194146.884469246@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-09-12 19:37:04 +00:00
/*
* Required because for_each_cpu() reports unconditionally
* CPU0 as set on UP kernels. Sigh.
*/
if (event)
perf_event_release_kernel(event);
watchdog/harclockup/perf: Revert a33d44843d45 ("watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Simplify deferred event destroy") Guenter reported a crash in the watchdog/perf code, which is caused by cleanup() and enable() running concurrently. The reason for this is: The watchdog functions are serialized via the watchdog_mutex and cpu hotplug locking, but the enable of the perf based watchdog happens in context of the unpark callback of the smpboot thread. But that unpark function is not synchronous inside the locking. The unparking of the thread just wakes it up and leaves so there is no guarantee when the thread is executing. If it starts running _before_ the cleanup happened then it will create a event and overwrite the dead event pointer. The new event is then cleaned up because the event is marked dead. lock(watchdog_mutex); lockup_detector_reconfigure(); cpus_read_lock(); stop(); park() update(); start(); unpark() cpus_read_unlock(); thread runs() overwrite dead event ptr cleanup(); free new event, which is active inside perf.... unlock(watchdog_mutex); The park side is safe as that actually waits for the thread to reach parked state. Commit a33d44843d45 removed the protection against this kind of scenario under the stupid assumption that the hotplug serialization and the watchdog_mutex cover everything. Bring it back. Reverts: a33d44843d45 ("watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Simplify deferred event destroy") Reported-and-tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Feels-stupid Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1710312145190.1942@nanos
2017-10-31 21:32:00 +00:00
per_cpu(dead_event, cpu) = NULL;
watchdog/hardlockup/perf: Prevent CPU hotplug deadlock The following deadlock is possible in the watchdog hotplug code: cpus_write_lock() ... takedown_cpu() smpboot_park_threads() smpboot_park_thread() kthread_park() ->park() := watchdog_disable() watchdog_nmi_disable() perf_event_release_kernel(); put_event() _free_event() ->destroy() := hw_perf_event_destroy() x86_release_hardware() release_ds_buffers() get_online_cpus() when a per cpu watchdog perf event is destroyed which drops the last reference to the PMU hardware. The cleanup code there invokes get_online_cpus() which instantly deadlocks because the hotplug percpu rwsem is write locked. To solve this add a deferring mechanism: cpus_write_lock() kthread_park() watchdog_nmi_disable(deferred) perf_event_disable(event); move_event_to_deferred(event); .... cpus_write_unlock() cleaup_deferred_events() perf_event_release_kernel() This is still properly serialized against concurrent hotplug via the cpu_add_remove_lock, which is held by the task which initiated the hotplug event. This is also used to handle event destruction when the watchdog threads are parked via other mechanisms than CPU hotplug. Analyzed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170912194146.884469246@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-09-12 19:37:04 +00:00
}
cpumask_clear(&dead_events_mask);
}
/**
* hardlockup_detector_perf_stop - Globally stop watchdog events
*
* Special interface for x86 to handle the perf HT bug.
*/
void __init hardlockup_detector_perf_stop(void)
{
int cpu;
lockdep_assert_cpus_held();
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
struct perf_event *event = per_cpu(watchdog_ev, cpu);
if (event)
perf_event_disable(event);
}
}
/**
* hardlockup_detector_perf_restart - Globally restart watchdog events
*
* Special interface for x86 to handle the perf HT bug.
*/
void __init hardlockup_detector_perf_restart(void)
{
int cpu;
lockdep_assert_cpus_held();
watchdog/hardlockup: rename some "NMI watchdog" constants/function Do a search and replace of: - NMI_WATCHDOG_ENABLED => WATCHDOG_HARDLOCKUP_ENABLED - SOFT_WATCHDOG_ENABLED => WATCHDOG_SOFTOCKUP_ENABLED - watchdog_nmi_ => watchdog_hardlockup_ - nmi_watchdog_available => watchdog_hardlockup_available - nmi_watchdog_user_enabled => watchdog_hardlockup_user_enabled - soft_watchdog_user_enabled => watchdog_softlockup_user_enabled - NMI_WATCHDOG_DEFAULT => WATCHDOG_HARDLOCKUP_DEFAULT Then update a few comments near where names were changed. This is specifically to make it less confusing when we want to introduce the buddy hardlockup detector, which isn't using NMIs. As part of this, we sanitized a few names for consistency. [trix@redhat.com: make variables static] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230525162822.1.I0fb41d138d158c9230573eaa37dc56afa2fb14ee@changeid Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.12.I91f7277bab4bf8c0cb238732ed92e7ce7bbd71a6@changeid Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-19 17:18:36 +00:00
if (!(watchdog_enabled & WATCHDOG_HARDLOCKUP_ENABLED))
return;
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
struct perf_event *event = per_cpu(watchdog_ev, cpu);
if (event)
perf_event_enable(event);
}
}
watchdog/perf: add a weak function for an arch to detect if perf can use NMIs On arm64, NMI support needs to be detected at runtime. Add a weak function to the perf hardlockup detector so that an architecture can implement it to detect whether NMIs are available. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.15.Ic55cb6f90ef5967d8aaa2b503a4e67c753f64d3a@changeid Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-19 17:18:39 +00:00
bool __weak __init arch_perf_nmi_is_available(void)
{
return true;
}
/**
watchdog/hardlockup: have the perf hardlockup use __weak functions more cleanly The fact that there watchdog_hardlockup_enable(), watchdog_hardlockup_disable(), and watchdog_hardlockup_probe() are declared __weak means that the configured hardlockup detector can define non-weak versions of those functions if it needs to. Instead of doing this, the perf hardlockup detector hooked itself into the default __weak implementation, which was a bit awkward. Clean this up. From comments, it looks as if the original design was done because the __weak function were expected to implemented by the architecture and not by the configured hardlockup detector. This got awkward when we tried to add the buddy lockup detector which was not arch-specific but wanted to hook into those same functions. This is not expected to have any functional impact. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.13.I847d9ec852449350997ba00401d2462a9cb4302b@changeid Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-19 17:18:37 +00:00
* watchdog_hardlockup_probe - Probe whether NMI event is available at all
*/
watchdog/hardlockup: have the perf hardlockup use __weak functions more cleanly The fact that there watchdog_hardlockup_enable(), watchdog_hardlockup_disable(), and watchdog_hardlockup_probe() are declared __weak means that the configured hardlockup detector can define non-weak versions of those functions if it needs to. Instead of doing this, the perf hardlockup detector hooked itself into the default __weak implementation, which was a bit awkward. Clean this up. From comments, it looks as if the original design was done because the __weak function were expected to implemented by the architecture and not by the configured hardlockup detector. This got awkward when we tried to add the buddy lockup detector which was not arch-specific but wanted to hook into those same functions. This is not expected to have any functional impact. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.13.I847d9ec852449350997ba00401d2462a9cb4302b@changeid Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-19 17:18:37 +00:00
int __init watchdog_hardlockup_probe(void)
{
watchdog/perf: add a weak function for an arch to detect if perf can use NMIs On arm64, NMI support needs to be detected at runtime. Add a weak function to the perf hardlockup detector so that an architecture can implement it to detect whether NMIs are available. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.15.Ic55cb6f90ef5967d8aaa2b503a4e67c753f64d3a@changeid Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@chromium.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-19 17:18:39 +00:00
int ret;
if (!arch_perf_nmi_is_available())
return -ENODEV;
ret = hardlockup_detector_event_create();
if (ret) {
pr_info("Perf NMI watchdog permanently disabled\n");
} else {
perf_event_release_kernel(this_cpu_read(watchdog_ev));
this_cpu_write(watchdog_ev, NULL);
}
return ret;
}