License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/mount.h>
|
2019-03-25 16:38:23 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/pseudo_fs.h>
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/file.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/fs.h>
|
2020-01-04 20:59:52 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/magic.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/ktime.h>
|
2015-05-24 17:49:04 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
|
2020-06-07 20:47:08 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
|
2016-09-06 07:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/nsfs.h>
|
2017-01-25 01:04:15 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2024-06-24 15:49:50 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "mount.h"
|
2020-01-04 20:59:52 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "internal.h"
|
|
|
|
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct vfsmount *nsfs_mnt;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-09-06 07:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
static long ns_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int ioctl,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long arg);
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
static const struct file_operations ns_file_operations = {
|
|
|
|
.llseek = no_llseek,
|
2016-09-06 07:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
.unlocked_ioctl = ns_ioctl,
|
2023-01-11 16:46:30 +00:00
|
|
|
.compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static char *ns_dname(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, int buflen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-03-17 22:26:12 +00:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
|
2024-02-18 13:51:23 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ns_common *ns = inode->i_private;
|
|
|
|
const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_ops = ns->ops;
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-01-30 20:03:49 +00:00
|
|
|
return dynamic_dname(buffer, buflen, "%s:[%lu]",
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
ns_ops->name, inode->i_ino);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2024-02-21 08:59:51 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct dentry_operations ns_dentry_operations = {
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
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.d_delete = always_delete_dentry,
|
|
|
|
.d_dname = ns_dname,
|
2024-02-21 08:59:51 +00:00
|
|
|
.d_prune = stashed_dentry_prune,
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
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};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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static void nsfs_evict(struct inode *inode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ns_common *ns = inode->i_private;
|
|
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|
clear_inode(inode);
|
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|
ns->ops->put(ns);
|
|
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|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-06 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
int ns_get_path_cb(struct path *path, ns_get_path_helper_t *ns_get_cb,
|
2017-12-28 02:39:08 +00:00
|
|
|
void *private_data)
|
2016-09-06 07:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2024-02-18 13:52:24 +00:00
|
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|
struct ns_common *ns;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ns = ns_get_cb(private_data);
|
|
|
|
if (!ns)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOENT;
|
2024-03-01 09:26:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2024-03-12 09:39:44 +00:00
|
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return path_from_stashed(&ns->stashed, nsfs_mnt, ns, path);
|
2016-09-06 07:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-12-28 02:39:08 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ns_get_path_task_args {
|
|
|
|
const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_ops;
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *task;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct ns_common *ns_get_path_task(void *private_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ns_get_path_task_args *args = private_data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return args->ns_ops->get(args->task);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-06 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
int ns_get_path(struct path *path, struct task_struct *task,
|
2017-12-28 02:39:08 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_ops)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ns_get_path_task_args args = {
|
|
|
|
.ns_ops = ns_ops,
|
|
|
|
.task = task,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ns_get_path_cb(path, ns_get_path_task, &args);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2024-06-27 14:11:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* open_namespace - open a namespace
|
|
|
|
* @ns: the namespace to open
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This will consume a reference to @ns indendent of success or failure.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: A file descriptor on success or a negative error code on failure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int open_namespace(struct ns_common *ns)
|
2016-09-06 07:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2024-06-27 14:11:41 +00:00
|
|
|
struct path path __free(path_put) = {};
|
2016-09-06 07:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
struct file *f;
|
2019-12-06 14:13:27 +00:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
2016-09-06 07:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2024-06-27 14:11:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/* call first to consume reference */
|
|
|
|
err = path_from_stashed(&ns->stashed, nsfs_mnt, ns, &path);
|
|
|
|
if (err < 0)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CLASS(get_unused_fd, fd)(O_CLOEXEC);
|
2016-09-06 07:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fd < 0)
|
|
|
|
return fd;
|
|
|
|
|
2024-06-27 14:11:41 +00:00
|
|
|
f = dentry_open(&path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(f))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(f);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fd_install(fd, f);
|
|
|
|
return take_fd(fd);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int open_related_ns(struct ns_common *ns,
|
|
|
|
struct ns_common *(*get_ns)(struct ns_common *ns))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ns_common *relative;
|
|
|
|
|
2024-02-18 13:52:24 +00:00
|
|
|
relative = get_ns(ns);
|
2024-06-27 14:11:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(relative))
|
2024-02-18 13:52:24 +00:00
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(relative);
|
2016-09-06 07:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2024-06-27 14:11:41 +00:00
|
|
|
return open_namespace(relative);
|
2016-09-06 07:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-02-14 13:40:05 +00:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(open_related_ns);
|
2016-09-06 07:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static long ns_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int ioctl,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long arg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-01-25 01:04:15 +00:00
|
|
|
struct user_namespace *user_ns;
|
2020-06-07 20:47:08 +00:00
|
|
|
struct pid_namespace *pid_ns;
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *tsk;
|
2016-09-06 07:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ns_common *ns = get_proc_ns(file_inode(filp));
|
2017-01-25 01:04:15 +00:00
|
|
|
uid_t __user *argp;
|
|
|
|
uid_t uid;
|
2020-06-07 20:47:08 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2016-09-06 07:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (ioctl) {
|
|
|
|
case NS_GET_USERNS:
|
|
|
|
return open_related_ns(ns, ns_get_owner);
|
2016-09-06 07:47:15 +00:00
|
|
|
case NS_GET_PARENT:
|
|
|
|
if (!ns->ops->get_parent)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
return open_related_ns(ns, ns->ops->get_parent);
|
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type
Linux 4.9 added two ioctl() operations that can be used to discover:
* the parental relationships for hierarchical namespaces (user and PID)
[NS_GET_PARENT]
* the user namespaces that owns a specified non-user-namespace
[NS_GET_USERNS]
For no good reason that I can glean, NS_GET_USERNS was made synonymous
with NS_GET_PARENT for user namespaces. It might have been better if
NS_GET_USERNS had returned an error if the supplied file descriptor
referred to a user namespace, since it suggests that the caller may be
confused. More particularly, if it had generated an error, then I wouldn't
need the new ioctl() operation proposed here. (On the other hand, what
I propose here may be more generally useful.)
I would like to write code that discovers namespace relationships for
the purpose of understanding the namespace setup on a running system.
In particular, given a file descriptor (or pathname) for a namespace,
N, I'd like to obtain the corresponding user namespace. Namespace N
might be a user namespace (in which case my code would just use N) or
a non-user namespace (in which case my code will use NS_GET_USERNS to
get the user namespace associated with N). The problem is that there
is no way to tell the difference by looking at the file descriptor
(and if I try to use NS_GET_USERNS on an N that is a user namespace, I
get the parent user namespace of N, which is not what I want).
This patch therefore adds a new ioctl(), NS_GET_NSTYPE, which, given
a file descriptor that refers to a user namespace, returns the
namespace type (one of the CLONE_NEW* constants).
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-01-25 01:03:36 +00:00
|
|
|
case NS_GET_NSTYPE:
|
|
|
|
return ns->ops->type;
|
2017-01-25 01:04:15 +00:00
|
|
|
case NS_GET_OWNER_UID:
|
|
|
|
if (ns->ops->type != CLONE_NEWUSER)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
user_ns = container_of(ns, struct user_namespace, ns);
|
|
|
|
argp = (uid_t __user *) arg;
|
|
|
|
uid = from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), user_ns->owner);
|
|
|
|
return put_user(uid, argp);
|
2024-06-24 15:49:50 +00:00
|
|
|
case NS_GET_MNTNS_ID: {
|
|
|
|
struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns;
|
|
|
|
__u64 __user *idp;
|
|
|
|
__u64 id;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ns->ops->type != CLONE_NEWNS)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mnt_ns = container_of(ns, struct mnt_namespace, ns);
|
|
|
|
idp = (__u64 __user *)arg;
|
|
|
|
id = mnt_ns->seq;
|
|
|
|
return put_user(id, idp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-06-07 20:47:08 +00:00
|
|
|
case NS_GET_PID_FROM_PIDNS:
|
|
|
|
fallthrough;
|
|
|
|
case NS_GET_TGID_FROM_PIDNS:
|
|
|
|
fallthrough;
|
|
|
|
case NS_GET_PID_IN_PIDNS:
|
|
|
|
fallthrough;
|
2024-07-16 07:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
case NS_GET_TGID_IN_PIDNS: {
|
2020-06-07 20:47:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ns->ops->type != CLONE_NEWPID)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -ESRCH;
|
|
|
|
pid_ns = container_of(ns, struct pid_namespace, ns);
|
|
|
|
|
2024-07-16 07:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
guard(rcu)();
|
2020-06-07 20:47:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ioctl == NS_GET_PID_IN_PIDNS ||
|
|
|
|
ioctl == NS_GET_TGID_IN_PIDNS)
|
|
|
|
tsk = find_task_by_vpid(arg);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
tsk = find_task_by_pid_ns(arg, pid_ns);
|
|
|
|
if (!tsk)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (ioctl) {
|
|
|
|
case NS_GET_PID_FROM_PIDNS:
|
|
|
|
ret = task_pid_vnr(tsk);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NS_GET_TGID_FROM_PIDNS:
|
|
|
|
ret = task_tgid_vnr(tsk);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NS_GET_PID_IN_PIDNS:
|
|
|
|
ret = task_pid_nr_ns(tsk, pid_ns);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NS_GET_TGID_IN_PIDNS:
|
|
|
|
ret = task_tgid_nr_ns(tsk, pid_ns);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
|
|
ret = -ESRCH;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2024-07-16 07:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-09-06 07:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2020-06-07 20:47:08 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = -ENOTTY;
|
2016-09-06 07:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-06-07 20:47:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2016-09-06 07:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int ns_get_name(char *buf, size_t size, struct task_struct *task,
|
|
|
|
const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_ops)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ns_common *ns;
|
|
|
|
int res = -ENOENT;
|
2017-05-08 22:56:38 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *name;
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
ns = ns_ops->get(task);
|
|
|
|
if (ns) {
|
2017-05-08 22:56:38 +00:00
|
|
|
name = ns_ops->real_ns_name ? : ns_ops->name;
|
|
|
|
res = snprintf(buf, size, "%s:[%u]", name, ns->inum);
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
ns_ops->put(ns);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
nsproxy: attach to namespaces via pidfds
For quite a while we have been thinking about using pidfds to attach to
namespaces. This patchset has existed for about a year already but we've
wanted to wait to see how the general api would be received and adopted.
Now that more and more programs in userspace have started using pidfds
for process management it's time to send this one out.
This patch makes it possible to use pidfds to attach to the namespaces
of another process, i.e. they can be passed as the first argument to the
setns() syscall. When only a single namespace type is specified the
semantics are equivalent to passing an nsfd. That means
setns(nsfd, CLONE_NEWNET) equals setns(pidfd, CLONE_NEWNET). However,
when a pidfd is passed, multiple namespace flags can be specified in the
second setns() argument and setns() will attach the caller to all the
specified namespaces all at once or to none of them. Specifying 0 is not
valid together with a pidfd.
Here are just two obvious examples:
setns(pidfd, CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWNET);
setns(pidfd, CLONE_NEWUSER);
Allowing to also attach subsets of namespaces supports various use-cases
where callers setns to a subset of namespaces to retain privilege, perform
an action and then re-attach another subset of namespaces.
If the need arises, as Eric suggested, we can extend this patchset to
assume even more context than just attaching all namespaces. His suggestion
specifically was about assuming the process' root directory when
setns(pidfd, 0) or setns(pidfd, SETNS_PIDFD) is specified. For now, just
keep it flexible in terms of supporting subsets of namespaces but let's
wait until we have users asking for even more context to be assumed. At
that point we can add an extension.
The obvious example where this is useful is a standard container
manager interacting with a running container: pushing and pulling files
or directories, injecting mounts, attaching/execing any kind of process,
managing network devices all these operations require attaching to all
or at least multiple namespaces at the same time. Given that nowadays
most containers are spawned with all namespaces enabled we're currently
looking at at least 14 syscalls, 7 to open the /proc/<pid>/ns/<ns>
nsfds, another 7 to actually perform the namespace switch. With time
namespaces we're looking at about 16 syscalls.
(We could amortize the first 7 or 8 syscalls for opening the nsfds by
stashing them in each container's monitor process but that would mean
we need to send around those file descriptors through unix sockets
everytime we want to interact with the container or keep on-disk
state. Even in scenarios where a caller wants to join a particular
namespace in a particular order callers still profit from batching
other namespaces. That mostly applies to the user namespace but
all container runtimes I found join the user namespace first no matter
if it privileges or deprivileges the container similar to how unshare
behaves.)
With pidfds this becomes a single syscall no matter how many namespaces
are supposed to be attached to.
A decently designed, large-scale container manager usually isn't the
parent of any of the containers it spawns so the containers don't die
when it crashes or needs to update or reinitialize. This means that
for the manager to interact with containers through pids is inherently
racy especially on systems where the maximum pid number is not
significicantly bumped. This is even more problematic since we often spawn
and manage thousands or ten-thousands of containers. Interacting with a
container through a pid thus can become risky quite quickly. Especially
since we allow for an administrator to enable advanced features such as
syscall interception where we're performing syscalls in lieu of the
container. In all of those cases we use pidfds if they are available and
we pass them around as stable references. Using them to setns() to the
target process' namespaces is as reliable as using nsfds. Either the
target process is already dead and we get ESRCH or we manage to attach
to its namespaces but we can't accidently attach to another process'
namespaces. So pidfds lend themselves to be used with this api.
The other main advantage is that with this change the pidfd becomes the
only relevant token for most container interactions and it's the only
token we need to create and send around.
Apart from significiantly reducing the number of syscalls from double
digit to single digit which is a decent reason post-spectre/meltdown
this also allows to switch to a set of namespaces atomically, i.e.
either attaching to all the specified namespaces succeeds or we fail. If
we fail we haven't changed a single namespace. There are currently three
namespaces that can fail (other than for ENOMEM which really is not
very interesting since we then have other problems anyway) for
non-trivial reasons, user, mount, and pid namespaces. We can fail to
attach to a pid namespace if it is not our current active pid namespace
or a descendant of it. We can fail to attach to a user namespace because
we are multi-threaded or because our current mount namespace shares
filesystem state with other tasks, or because we're trying to setns()
to the same user namespace, i.e. the target task has the same user
namespace as we do. We can fail to attach to a mount namespace because
it shares filesystem state with other tasks or because we fail to lookup
the new root for the new mount namespace. In most non-pathological
scenarios these issues can be somewhat mitigated. But there are cases where
we're half-attached to some namespace and failing to attach to another one.
I've talked about some of these problem during the hallway track (something
only the pre-COVID-19 generation will remember) of Plumbers in Los Angeles
in 2018(?). Even if all these issues could be avoided with super careful
userspace coding it would be nicer to have this done in-kernel. Pidfds seem
to lend themselves nicely for this.
The other neat thing about this is that setns() becomes an actual
counterpart to the namespace bits of unshare().
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200505140432.181565-3-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
2020-05-05 14:04:31 +00:00
|
|
|
bool proc_ns_file(const struct file *file)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return file->f_op == &ns_file_operations;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-03-04 20:41:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* ns_match() - Returns true if current namespace matches dev/ino provided.
|
2022-11-07 11:08:17 +00:00
|
|
|
* @ns: current namespace
|
2020-03-04 20:41:55 +00:00
|
|
|
* @dev: dev_t from nsfs that will be matched against current nsfs
|
|
|
|
* @ino: ino_t from nsfs that will be matched against current nsfs
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: true if dev and ino matches the current nsfs.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
bool ns_match(const struct ns_common *ns, dev_t dev, ino_t ino)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (ns->inum == ino) && (nsfs_mnt->mnt_sb->s_dev == dev);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-24 17:49:04 +00:00
|
|
|
static int nsfs_show_path(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
|
2024-02-18 13:51:23 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct ns_common *ns = inode->i_private;
|
|
|
|
const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_ops = ns->ops;
|
2015-05-24 17:49:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-09-11 20:07:48 +00:00
|
|
|
seq_printf(seq, "%s:[%lu]", ns_ops->name, inode->i_ino);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2015-05-24 17:49:04 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
static const struct super_operations nsfs_ops = {
|
|
|
|
.statfs = simple_statfs,
|
|
|
|
.evict_inode = nsfs_evict,
|
2015-05-24 17:49:04 +00:00
|
|
|
.show_path = nsfs_show_path,
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
2019-03-25 16:38:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2024-03-12 09:39:44 +00:00
|
|
|
static int nsfs_init_inode(struct inode *inode, void *data)
|
2024-03-01 09:26:03 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2024-03-12 09:39:44 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ns_common *ns = data;
|
|
|
|
|
2024-03-01 09:26:03 +00:00
|
|
|
inode->i_private = data;
|
|
|
|
inode->i_mode |= S_IRUGO;
|
|
|
|
inode->i_fop = &ns_file_operations;
|
2024-03-12 09:39:44 +00:00
|
|
|
inode->i_ino = ns->inum;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2024-03-01 09:26:03 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void nsfs_put_data(void *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ns_common *ns = data;
|
|
|
|
ns->ops->put(ns);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct stashed_operations nsfs_stashed_ops = {
|
|
|
|
.init_inode = nsfs_init_inode,
|
|
|
|
.put_data = nsfs_put_data,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-25 16:38:23 +00:00
|
|
|
static int nsfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-03-25 16:38:23 +00:00
|
|
|
struct pseudo_fs_context *ctx = init_pseudo(fc, NSFS_MAGIC);
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
ctx->ops = &nsfs_ops;
|
|
|
|
ctx->dops = &ns_dentry_operations;
|
2024-03-01 09:26:03 +00:00
|
|
|
fc->s_fs_info = (void *)&nsfs_stashed_ops;
|
2019-03-25 16:38:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-03-25 16:38:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct file_system_type nsfs = {
|
|
|
|
.name = "nsfs",
|
2019-03-25 16:38:23 +00:00
|
|
|
.init_fs_context = nsfs_init_fs_context,
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
.kill_sb = kill_anon_super,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void __init nsfs_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
nsfs_mnt = kern_mount(&nsfs);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(nsfs_mnt))
|
|
|
|
panic("can't set nsfs up\n");
|
2017-11-27 21:05:09 +00:00
|
|
|
nsfs_mnt->mnt_sb->s_flags &= ~SB_NOUSER;
|
take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().
This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).
Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.
As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-01 14:57:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|