2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
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/* Asymmetric public-key cryptography key type
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*
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* See Documentation/security/asymmetric-keys.txt
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
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KEYS: Asymmetric key pluggable data parsers
The instantiation data passed to the asymmetric key type are expected to be
formatted in some way, and there are several possible standard ways to format
the data.
The two obvious standards are OpenPGP keys and X.509 certificates. The latter
is especially useful when dealing with UEFI, and the former might be useful
when dealing with, say, eCryptfs.
Further, it might be desirable to provide formatted blobs that indicate
hardware is to be accessed to retrieve the keys or that the keys live
unretrievably in a hardware store, but that the keys can be used by means of
the hardware.
From userspace, the keys can be loaded using the keyctl command, for example,
an X.509 binary certificate:
keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s <dhowells.pem
or a PGP key:
keyctl padd asymmetric bar @s <dhowells.pub
or a pointer into the contents of the TPM:
keyctl add asymmetric zebra "TPM:04982390582905f8" @s
Inside the kernel, pluggable parsers register themselves and then get to
examine the payload data to see if they can handle it. If they can, they get
to:
(1) Propose a name for the key, to be used it the name is "" or NULL.
(2) Specify the key subtype.
(3) Provide the data for the subtype.
The key type asks the parser to do its stuff before a key is allocated and thus
before the name is set. If successful, the parser stores the suggested data
into the key_preparsed_payload struct, which will be either used (if the key is
successfully created and instantiated or updated) or discarded.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-09-13 14:17:32 +00:00
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#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
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PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type
A PKCS#7 or CMS message can have per-signature authenticated attributes
that are digested as a lump and signed by the authorising key for that
signature. If such attributes exist, the content digest isn't itself
signed, but rather it is included in a special authattr which then
contributes to the signature.
Further, we already require the master message content type to be
pkcs7_signedData - but there's also a separate content type for the data
itself within the SignedData object and this must be repeated inside the
authattrs for each signer [RFC2315 9.2, RFC5652 11.1].
We should really validate the authattrs if they exist or forbid them
entirely as appropriate. To this end:
(1) Alter the PKCS#7 parser to reject any message that has more than one
signature where at least one signature has authattrs and at least one
that does not.
(2) Validate authattrs if they are present and strongly restrict them.
Only the following authattrs are permitted and all others are
rejected:
(a) contentType. This is checked to be an OID that matches the
content type in the SignedData object.
(b) messageDigest. This must match the crypto digest of the data.
(c) signingTime. If present, we check that this is a valid, parseable
UTCTime or GeneralTime and that the date it encodes fits within
the validity window of the matching X.509 cert.
(d) S/MIME capabilities. We don't check the contents.
(e) Authenticode SP Opus Info. We don't check the contents.
(f) Authenticode Statement Type. We don't check the contents.
The message is rejected if (a) or (b) are missing. If the message is
an Authenticode type, the message is rejected if (e) is missing; if
not Authenticode, the message is rejected if (d) - (f) are present.
The S/MIME capabilities authattr (d) unfortunately has to be allowed
to support kernels already signed by the pesign program. This only
affects kexec. sign-file suppresses them (CMS_NOSMIMECAP).
The message is also rejected if an authattr is given more than once or
if it contains more than one element in its set of values.
(3) Add a parameter to pkcs7_verify() to select one of the following
restrictions and pass in the appropriate option from the callers:
(*) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and
forbids authattrs. sign-file sets CMS_NOATTR. We could be more
flexible and permit authattrs optionally, but only permit minimal
content.
(*) VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and
requires authattrs. In future, this will require an attribute
holding the target firmware name in addition to the minimal set.
(*) VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data but
allows either no authattrs or only permits the minimal set.
(*) VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE
This only supports the Authenticode SPC_INDIRECT_DATA content type
and requires at least an SpcSpOpusInfo authattr in addition to the
minimal set. It also permits an SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE authattr (and
an S/MIME capabilities authattr because the pesign program doesn't
remove these).
(*) VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE
(*) VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE
These are invalid in this context but are included for later use
when limiting the use of X.509 certs.
(4) The pkcs7_test key type is given a module parameter to select between
the above options for testing purposes. For example:
echo 1 >/sys/module/pkcs7_test_key/parameters/usage
keyctl padd pkcs7_test foo @s </tmp/stuff.pkcs7
will attempt to check the signature on stuff.pkcs7 as if it contains a
firmware blob (1 being VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE).
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
2015-08-05 14:22:27 +00:00
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#include <crypto/public_key.h>
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2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
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#include <linux/seq_file.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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2014-09-16 16:36:11 +00:00
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#include <linux/ctype.h>
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2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
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#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
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MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
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|
PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type
A PKCS#7 or CMS message can have per-signature authenticated attributes
that are digested as a lump and signed by the authorising key for that
signature. If such attributes exist, the content digest isn't itself
signed, but rather it is included in a special authattr which then
contributes to the signature.
Further, we already require the master message content type to be
pkcs7_signedData - but there's also a separate content type for the data
itself within the SignedData object and this must be repeated inside the
authattrs for each signer [RFC2315 9.2, RFC5652 11.1].
We should really validate the authattrs if they exist or forbid them
entirely as appropriate. To this end:
(1) Alter the PKCS#7 parser to reject any message that has more than one
signature where at least one signature has authattrs and at least one
that does not.
(2) Validate authattrs if they are present and strongly restrict them.
Only the following authattrs are permitted and all others are
rejected:
(a) contentType. This is checked to be an OID that matches the
content type in the SignedData object.
(b) messageDigest. This must match the crypto digest of the data.
(c) signingTime. If present, we check that this is a valid, parseable
UTCTime or GeneralTime and that the date it encodes fits within
the validity window of the matching X.509 cert.
(d) S/MIME capabilities. We don't check the contents.
(e) Authenticode SP Opus Info. We don't check the contents.
(f) Authenticode Statement Type. We don't check the contents.
The message is rejected if (a) or (b) are missing. If the message is
an Authenticode type, the message is rejected if (e) is missing; if
not Authenticode, the message is rejected if (d) - (f) are present.
The S/MIME capabilities authattr (d) unfortunately has to be allowed
to support kernels already signed by the pesign program. This only
affects kexec. sign-file suppresses them (CMS_NOSMIMECAP).
The message is also rejected if an authattr is given more than once or
if it contains more than one element in its set of values.
(3) Add a parameter to pkcs7_verify() to select one of the following
restrictions and pass in the appropriate option from the callers:
(*) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and
forbids authattrs. sign-file sets CMS_NOATTR. We could be more
flexible and permit authattrs optionally, but only permit minimal
content.
(*) VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and
requires authattrs. In future, this will require an attribute
holding the target firmware name in addition to the minimal set.
(*) VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data but
allows either no authattrs or only permits the minimal set.
(*) VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE
This only supports the Authenticode SPC_INDIRECT_DATA content type
and requires at least an SpcSpOpusInfo authattr in addition to the
minimal set. It also permits an SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE authattr (and
an S/MIME capabilities authattr because the pesign program doesn't
remove these).
(*) VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE
(*) VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE
These are invalid in this context but are included for later use
when limiting the use of X.509 certs.
(4) The pkcs7_test key type is given a module parameter to select between
the above options for testing purposes. For example:
echo 1 >/sys/module/pkcs7_test_key/parameters/usage
keyctl padd pkcs7_test foo @s </tmp/stuff.pkcs7
will attempt to check the signature on stuff.pkcs7 as if it contains a
firmware blob (1 being VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE).
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
2015-08-05 14:22:27 +00:00
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const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = {
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[VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "mod sig",
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[VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE] = "firmware sig",
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[VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE] = "kexec PE sig",
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[VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE] = "key sig",
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[VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE] = "key self sig",
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[VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE] = "unspec sig",
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};
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_being_used_for);
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|
KEYS: Asymmetric key pluggable data parsers
The instantiation data passed to the asymmetric key type are expected to be
formatted in some way, and there are several possible standard ways to format
the data.
The two obvious standards are OpenPGP keys and X.509 certificates. The latter
is especially useful when dealing with UEFI, and the former might be useful
when dealing with, say, eCryptfs.
Further, it might be desirable to provide formatted blobs that indicate
hardware is to be accessed to retrieve the keys or that the keys live
unretrievably in a hardware store, but that the keys can be used by means of
the hardware.
From userspace, the keys can be loaded using the keyctl command, for example,
an X.509 binary certificate:
keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s <dhowells.pem
or a PGP key:
keyctl padd asymmetric bar @s <dhowells.pub
or a pointer into the contents of the TPM:
keyctl add asymmetric zebra "TPM:04982390582905f8" @s
Inside the kernel, pluggable parsers register themselves and then get to
examine the payload data to see if they can handle it. If they can, they get
to:
(1) Propose a name for the key, to be used it the name is "" or NULL.
(2) Specify the key subtype.
(3) Provide the data for the subtype.
The key type asks the parser to do its stuff before a key is allocated and thus
before the name is set. If successful, the parser stores the suggested data
into the key_preparsed_payload struct, which will be either used (if the key is
successfully created and instantiated or updated) or discarded.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-09-13 14:17:32 +00:00
|
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static LIST_HEAD(asymmetric_key_parsers);
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static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
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2014-09-16 16:36:11 +00:00
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/**
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* asymmetric_key_generate_id: Construct an asymmetric key ID
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* @val_1: First binary blob
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* @len_1: Length of first binary blob
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* @val_2: Second binary blob
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* @len_2: Length of second binary blob
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*
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* Construct an asymmetric key ID from a pair of binary blobs.
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*/
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struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_generate_id(const void *val_1,
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size_t len_1,
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const void *val_2,
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size_t len_2)
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{
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struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
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kid = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + len_1 + len_2,
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!kid)
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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kid->len = len_1 + len_2;
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memcpy(kid->data, val_1, len_1);
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memcpy(kid->data + len_1, val_2, len_2);
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return kid;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_key_generate_id);
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/**
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* asymmetric_key_id_same - Return true if two asymmetric keys IDs are the same.
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* @kid_1, @kid_2: The key IDs to compare
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*/
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bool asymmetric_key_id_same(const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid1,
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const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid2)
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{
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if (!kid1 || !kid2)
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return false;
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if (kid1->len != kid2->len)
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return false;
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return memcmp(kid1->data, kid2->data, kid1->len) == 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_key_id_same);
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2014-10-06 14:21:05 +00:00
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/**
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* asymmetric_key_id_partial - Return true if two asymmetric keys IDs
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* partially match
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* @kid_1, @kid_2: The key IDs to compare
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*/
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bool asymmetric_key_id_partial(const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid1,
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const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid2)
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{
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if (!kid1 || !kid2)
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return false;
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if (kid1->len < kid2->len)
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return false;
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return memcmp(kid1->data + (kid1->len - kid2->len),
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kid2->data, kid2->len) == 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_key_id_partial);
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2014-09-16 16:36:11 +00:00
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/**
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* asymmetric_match_key_ids - Search asymmetric key IDs
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* @kids: The list of key IDs to check
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* @match_id: The key ID we're looking for
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2014-10-06 14:21:05 +00:00
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* @match: The match function to use
|
2014-09-16 16:36:11 +00:00
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*/
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2014-10-06 14:21:05 +00:00
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static bool asymmetric_match_key_ids(
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const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids,
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const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id,
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bool (*match)(const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid1,
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const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid2))
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2014-09-16 16:36:11 +00:00
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{
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2014-10-06 14:21:05 +00:00
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int i;
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2014-09-16 16:36:11 +00:00
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if (!kids || !match_id)
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return false;
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2014-10-06 14:21:05 +00:00
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kids->id); i++)
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if (match(kids->id[i], match_id))
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return true;
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2014-09-16 16:36:11 +00:00
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return false;
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}
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2015-02-11 12:33:34 +00:00
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/* helper function can be called directly with pre-allocated memory */
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inline int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id,
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struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id,
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size_t hexlen)
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{
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match_id->len = hexlen;
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return hex2bin(match_id->data, id, hexlen);
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}
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2014-09-16 16:36:11 +00:00
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/**
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* asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id - Convert a hex string into a key ID.
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* @id: The ID as a hex string.
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*/
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struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id)
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{
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struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id;
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2015-02-11 12:33:34 +00:00
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size_t asciihexlen;
|
2014-09-21 23:02:01 +00:00
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int ret;
|
2014-09-16 16:36:11 +00:00
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if (!*id)
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return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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2015-02-11 12:33:34 +00:00
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asciihexlen = strlen(id);
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if (asciihexlen & 1)
|
2014-09-16 16:36:11 +00:00
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return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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|
2015-02-11 12:33:34 +00:00
|
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match_id = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + asciihexlen / 2,
|
2014-09-16 16:36:11 +00:00
|
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GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!match_id)
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
2015-02-11 12:33:34 +00:00
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ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id, match_id, asciihexlen / 2);
|
2014-09-21 23:02:01 +00:00
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|
|
if (ret < 0) {
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kfree(match_id);
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|
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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|
}
|
2014-09-16 16:36:11 +00:00
|
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|
return match_id;
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}
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|
2014-06-17 08:56:57 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-10-06 14:21:05 +00:00
|
|
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* Match asymmetric keys by an exact match on an ID.
|
2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
|
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|
*/
|
2014-09-16 16:36:08 +00:00
|
|
|
static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
|
|
|
|
const struct key_match_data *match_data)
|
2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-09-16 16:36:13 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
|
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|
|
const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id = match_data->preparsed;
|
2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
|
|
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|
2014-10-06 14:21:05 +00:00
|
|
|
return asymmetric_match_key_ids(kids, match_id,
|
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|
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asymmetric_key_id_same);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Match asymmetric keys by a partial match on an IDs.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static bool asymmetric_key_cmp_partial(const struct key *key,
|
|
|
|
const struct key_match_data *match_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
|
|
|
|
const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id = match_data->preparsed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return asymmetric_match_key_ids(kids, match_id,
|
|
|
|
asymmetric_key_id_partial);
|
2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-16 16:36:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Preparse the match criterion. If we don't set lookup_type and cmp,
|
|
|
|
* the default will be an exact match on the key description.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* There are some specifiers for matching key IDs rather than by the key
|
|
|
|
* description:
|
|
|
|
*
|
2014-10-06 14:21:05 +00:00
|
|
|
* "id:<id>" - find a key by partial match on any available ID
|
|
|
|
* "ex:<id>" - find a key by exact match on any available ID
|
2014-09-16 16:36:02 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* These have to be searched by iteration rather than by direct lookup because
|
|
|
|
* the key is hashed according to its description.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-09-16 16:36:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id;
|
|
|
|
const char *spec = match_data->raw_data;
|
|
|
|
const char *id;
|
2014-10-06 14:21:05 +00:00
|
|
|
bool (*cmp)(const struct key *, const struct key_match_data *) =
|
|
|
|
asymmetric_key_cmp;
|
2014-09-16 16:36:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!spec || !*spec)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (spec[0] == 'i' &&
|
|
|
|
spec[1] == 'd' &&
|
|
|
|
spec[2] == ':') {
|
|
|
|
id = spec + 3;
|
2014-10-06 14:21:05 +00:00
|
|
|
cmp = asymmetric_key_cmp_partial;
|
|
|
|
} else if (spec[0] == 'e' &&
|
|
|
|
spec[1] == 'x' &&
|
|
|
|
spec[2] == ':') {
|
|
|
|
id = spec + 3;
|
2014-09-16 16:36:13 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
goto default_match;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
match_id = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id);
|
2014-10-03 08:53:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(match_id))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(match_id);
|
2014-09-16 16:36:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
match_data->preparsed = match_id;
|
2014-10-06 14:21:05 +00:00
|
|
|
match_data->cmp = cmp;
|
2014-09-16 16:36:13 +00:00
|
|
|
match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default_match:
|
2014-09-16 16:36:02 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Free the preparsed the match criterion.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void asymmetric_key_match_free(struct key_match_data *match_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-09-16 16:36:13 +00:00
|
|
|
kfree(match_data->preparsed);
|
2014-09-16 16:36:02 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Describe the asymmetric key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
|
2014-09-16 16:36:13 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
|
|
|
|
const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
int n;
|
2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
seq_puts(m, key->description);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (subtype) {
|
|
|
|
seq_puts(m, ": ");
|
|
|
|
subtype->describe(key, m);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-06 16:25:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (kids && kids->id[1]) {
|
|
|
|
kid = kids->id[1];
|
2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
|
|
|
seq_putc(m, ' ');
|
2014-09-16 16:36:13 +00:00
|
|
|
n = kid->len;
|
|
|
|
p = kid->data;
|
2014-10-06 16:25:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (n > 4) {
|
|
|
|
p += n - 4;
|
|
|
|
n = 4;
|
2014-09-16 16:36:13 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
seq_printf(m, "%*phN", n, p);
|
2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
seq_puts(m, " [");
|
|
|
|
/* put something here to indicate the key's capabilities */
|
|
|
|
seq_putc(m, ']');
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
KEYS: Asymmetric key pluggable data parsers
The instantiation data passed to the asymmetric key type are expected to be
formatted in some way, and there are several possible standard ways to format
the data.
The two obvious standards are OpenPGP keys and X.509 certificates. The latter
is especially useful when dealing with UEFI, and the former might be useful
when dealing with, say, eCryptfs.
Further, it might be desirable to provide formatted blobs that indicate
hardware is to be accessed to retrieve the keys or that the keys live
unretrievably in a hardware store, but that the keys can be used by means of
the hardware.
From userspace, the keys can be loaded using the keyctl command, for example,
an X.509 binary certificate:
keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s <dhowells.pem
or a PGP key:
keyctl padd asymmetric bar @s <dhowells.pub
or a pointer into the contents of the TPM:
keyctl add asymmetric zebra "TPM:04982390582905f8" @s
Inside the kernel, pluggable parsers register themselves and then get to
examine the payload data to see if they can handle it. If they can, they get
to:
(1) Propose a name for the key, to be used it the name is "" or NULL.
(2) Specify the key subtype.
(3) Provide the data for the subtype.
The key type asks the parser to do its stuff before a key is allocated and thus
before the name is set. If successful, the parser stores the suggested data
into the key_preparsed_payload struct, which will be either used (if the key is
successfully created and instantiated or updated) or discarded.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-09-13 14:17:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Preparse a asymmetric payload to get format the contents appropriately for the
|
|
|
|
* internal payload to cut down on the number of scans of the data performed.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We also generate a proposed description from the contents of the key that
|
|
|
|
* can be used to name the key if the user doesn't want to provide one.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int asymmetric_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct asymmetric_key_parser *parser;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (prep->datalen == 0)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
down_read(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -EBADMSG;
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(parser, &asymmetric_key_parsers, link) {
|
|
|
|
pr_debug("Trying parser '%s'\n", parser->name);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = parser->parse(prep);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != -EBADMSG) {
|
|
|
|
pr_debug("Parser recognised the format (ret %d)\n",
|
|
|
|
ret);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
up_read(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
|
|
|
|
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-21 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Clean up the key ID list
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void asymmetric_key_free_kids(struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (kids) {
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kids->id); i++)
|
|
|
|
kfree(kids->id[i]);
|
|
|
|
kfree(kids);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
KEYS: Asymmetric key pluggable data parsers
The instantiation data passed to the asymmetric key type are expected to be
formatted in some way, and there are several possible standard ways to format
the data.
The two obvious standards are OpenPGP keys and X.509 certificates. The latter
is especially useful when dealing with UEFI, and the former might be useful
when dealing with, say, eCryptfs.
Further, it might be desirable to provide formatted blobs that indicate
hardware is to be accessed to retrieve the keys or that the keys live
unretrievably in a hardware store, but that the keys can be used by means of
the hardware.
From userspace, the keys can be loaded using the keyctl command, for example,
an X.509 binary certificate:
keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s <dhowells.pem
or a PGP key:
keyctl padd asymmetric bar @s <dhowells.pub
or a pointer into the contents of the TPM:
keyctl add asymmetric zebra "TPM:04982390582905f8" @s
Inside the kernel, pluggable parsers register themselves and then get to
examine the payload data to see if they can handle it. If they can, they get
to:
(1) Propose a name for the key, to be used it the name is "" or NULL.
(2) Specify the key subtype.
(3) Provide the data for the subtype.
The key type asks the parser to do its stuff before a key is allocated and thus
before the name is set. If successful, the parser stores the suggested data
into the key_preparsed_payload struct, which will be either used (if the key is
successfully created and instantiated or updated) or discarded.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-09-13 14:17:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Clean up the preparse data
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-10-21 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = prep->payload.data[asym_subtype];
|
|
|
|
struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids];
|
KEYS: Asymmetric key pluggable data parsers
The instantiation data passed to the asymmetric key type are expected to be
formatted in some way, and there are several possible standard ways to format
the data.
The two obvious standards are OpenPGP keys and X.509 certificates. The latter
is especially useful when dealing with UEFI, and the former might be useful
when dealing with, say, eCryptfs.
Further, it might be desirable to provide formatted blobs that indicate
hardware is to be accessed to retrieve the keys or that the keys live
unretrievably in a hardware store, but that the keys can be used by means of
the hardware.
From userspace, the keys can be loaded using the keyctl command, for example,
an X.509 binary certificate:
keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s <dhowells.pem
or a PGP key:
keyctl padd asymmetric bar @s <dhowells.pub
or a pointer into the contents of the TPM:
keyctl add asymmetric zebra "TPM:04982390582905f8" @s
Inside the kernel, pluggable parsers register themselves and then get to
examine the payload data to see if they can handle it. If they can, they get
to:
(1) Propose a name for the key, to be used it the name is "" or NULL.
(2) Specify the key subtype.
(3) Provide the data for the subtype.
The key type asks the parser to do its stuff before a key is allocated and thus
before the name is set. If successful, the parser stores the suggested data
into the key_preparsed_payload struct, which will be either used (if the key is
successfully created and instantiated or updated) or discarded.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-09-13 14:17:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (subtype) {
|
2015-10-21 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
subtype->destroy(prep->payload.data[asym_crypto]);
|
KEYS: Asymmetric key pluggable data parsers
The instantiation data passed to the asymmetric key type are expected to be
formatted in some way, and there are several possible standard ways to format
the data.
The two obvious standards are OpenPGP keys and X.509 certificates. The latter
is especially useful when dealing with UEFI, and the former might be useful
when dealing with, say, eCryptfs.
Further, it might be desirable to provide formatted blobs that indicate
hardware is to be accessed to retrieve the keys or that the keys live
unretrievably in a hardware store, but that the keys can be used by means of
the hardware.
From userspace, the keys can be loaded using the keyctl command, for example,
an X.509 binary certificate:
keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s <dhowells.pem
or a PGP key:
keyctl padd asymmetric bar @s <dhowells.pub
or a pointer into the contents of the TPM:
keyctl add asymmetric zebra "TPM:04982390582905f8" @s
Inside the kernel, pluggable parsers register themselves and then get to
examine the payload data to see if they can handle it. If they can, they get
to:
(1) Propose a name for the key, to be used it the name is "" or NULL.
(2) Specify the key subtype.
(3) Provide the data for the subtype.
The key type asks the parser to do its stuff before a key is allocated and thus
before the name is set. If successful, the parser stores the suggested data
into the key_preparsed_payload struct, which will be either used (if the key is
successfully created and instantiated or updated) or discarded.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-09-13 14:17:32 +00:00
|
|
|
module_put(subtype->owner);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-10-21 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
asymmetric_key_free_kids(kids);
|
KEYS: Asymmetric key pluggable data parsers
The instantiation data passed to the asymmetric key type are expected to be
formatted in some way, and there are several possible standard ways to format
the data.
The two obvious standards are OpenPGP keys and X.509 certificates. The latter
is especially useful when dealing with UEFI, and the former might be useful
when dealing with, say, eCryptfs.
Further, it might be desirable to provide formatted blobs that indicate
hardware is to be accessed to retrieve the keys or that the keys live
unretrievably in a hardware store, but that the keys can be used by means of
the hardware.
From userspace, the keys can be loaded using the keyctl command, for example,
an X.509 binary certificate:
keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s <dhowells.pem
or a PGP key:
keyctl padd asymmetric bar @s <dhowells.pub
or a pointer into the contents of the TPM:
keyctl add asymmetric zebra "TPM:04982390582905f8" @s
Inside the kernel, pluggable parsers register themselves and then get to
examine the payload data to see if they can handle it. If they can, they get
to:
(1) Propose a name for the key, to be used it the name is "" or NULL.
(2) Specify the key subtype.
(3) Provide the data for the subtype.
The key type asks the parser to do its stuff before a key is allocated and thus
before the name is set. If successful, the parser stores the suggested data
into the key_preparsed_payload struct, which will be either used (if the key is
successfully created and instantiated or updated) or discarded.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-09-13 14:17:32 +00:00
|
|
|
kfree(prep->description);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a asymmetric key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
|
2015-10-21 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = key->payload.data[asym_key_ids];
|
|
|
|
void *data = key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key->payload.data[asym_crypto] = NULL;
|
|
|
|
key->payload.data[asym_subtype] = NULL;
|
|
|
|
key->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = NULL;
|
2014-09-16 16:36:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (subtype) {
|
2015-10-21 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
subtype->destroy(data);
|
2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
|
|
|
module_put(subtype->owner);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-09-16 16:36:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-10-21 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
asymmetric_key_free_kids(kids);
|
2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
|
|
|
|
.name = "asymmetric",
|
KEYS: Asymmetric key pluggable data parsers
The instantiation data passed to the asymmetric key type are expected to be
formatted in some way, and there are several possible standard ways to format
the data.
The two obvious standards are OpenPGP keys and X.509 certificates. The latter
is especially useful when dealing with UEFI, and the former might be useful
when dealing with, say, eCryptfs.
Further, it might be desirable to provide formatted blobs that indicate
hardware is to be accessed to retrieve the keys or that the keys live
unretrievably in a hardware store, but that the keys can be used by means of
the hardware.
From userspace, the keys can be loaded using the keyctl command, for example,
an X.509 binary certificate:
keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s <dhowells.pem
or a PGP key:
keyctl padd asymmetric bar @s <dhowells.pub
or a pointer into the contents of the TPM:
keyctl add asymmetric zebra "TPM:04982390582905f8" @s
Inside the kernel, pluggable parsers register themselves and then get to
examine the payload data to see if they can handle it. If they can, they get
to:
(1) Propose a name for the key, to be used it the name is "" or NULL.
(2) Specify the key subtype.
(3) Provide the data for the subtype.
The key type asks the parser to do its stuff before a key is allocated and thus
before the name is set. If successful, the parser stores the suggested data
into the key_preparsed_payload struct, which will be either used (if the key is
successfully created and instantiated or updated) or discarded.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-09-13 14:17:32 +00:00
|
|
|
.preparse = asymmetric_key_preparse,
|
|
|
|
.free_preparse = asymmetric_key_free_preparse,
|
2014-07-18 17:56:34 +00:00
|
|
|
.instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
|
2014-09-16 16:36:02 +00:00
|
|
|
.match_preparse = asymmetric_key_match_preparse,
|
|
|
|
.match_free = asymmetric_key_match_free,
|
2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
|
|
|
.destroy = asymmetric_key_destroy,
|
|
|
|
.describe = asymmetric_key_describe,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_asymmetric);
|
|
|
|
|
KEYS: Asymmetric key pluggable data parsers
The instantiation data passed to the asymmetric key type are expected to be
formatted in some way, and there are several possible standard ways to format
the data.
The two obvious standards are OpenPGP keys and X.509 certificates. The latter
is especially useful when dealing with UEFI, and the former might be useful
when dealing with, say, eCryptfs.
Further, it might be desirable to provide formatted blobs that indicate
hardware is to be accessed to retrieve the keys or that the keys live
unretrievably in a hardware store, but that the keys can be used by means of
the hardware.
From userspace, the keys can be loaded using the keyctl command, for example,
an X.509 binary certificate:
keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s <dhowells.pem
or a PGP key:
keyctl padd asymmetric bar @s <dhowells.pub
or a pointer into the contents of the TPM:
keyctl add asymmetric zebra "TPM:04982390582905f8" @s
Inside the kernel, pluggable parsers register themselves and then get to
examine the payload data to see if they can handle it. If they can, they get
to:
(1) Propose a name for the key, to be used it the name is "" or NULL.
(2) Specify the key subtype.
(3) Provide the data for the subtype.
The key type asks the parser to do its stuff before a key is allocated and thus
before the name is set. If successful, the parser stores the suggested data
into the key_preparsed_payload struct, which will be either used (if the key is
successfully created and instantiated or updated) or discarded.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-09-13 14:17:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* register_asymmetric_key_parser - Register a asymmetric key blob parser
|
|
|
|
* @parser: The parser to register
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int register_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *parser)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct asymmetric_key_parser *cursor;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
down_write(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(cursor, &asymmetric_key_parsers, link) {
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(cursor->name, parser->name) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
pr_err("Asymmetric key parser '%s' already registered\n",
|
|
|
|
parser->name);
|
|
|
|
ret = -EEXIST;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
list_add_tail(&parser->link, &asymmetric_key_parsers);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pr_notice("Asymmetric key parser '%s' registered\n", parser->name);
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
up_write(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_asymmetric_key_parser);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* unregister_asymmetric_key_parser - Unregister a asymmetric key blob parser
|
|
|
|
* @parser: The parser to unregister
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *parser)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
down_write(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
|
|
|
|
list_del(&parser->link);
|
|
|
|
up_write(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pr_notice("Asymmetric key parser '%s' unregistered\n", parser->name);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_asymmetric_key_parser);
|
|
|
|
|
2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Module stuff
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int __init asymmetric_key_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return register_key_type(&key_type_asymmetric);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void __exit asymmetric_key_cleanup(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unregister_key_type(&key_type_asymmetric);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
module_init(asymmetric_key_init);
|
|
|
|
module_exit(asymmetric_key_cleanup);
|