linux-stable/lib/strnlen_user.c

121 lines
3.3 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
lib: untag user pointers in strn*_user Patch series "arm64: untag user pointers passed to the kernel", v19. === Overview arm64 has a feature called Top Byte Ignore, which allows to embed pointer tags into the top byte of each pointer. Userspace programs (such as HWASan, a memory debugging tool [1]) might use this feature and pass tagged user pointers to the kernel through syscalls or other interfaces. Right now the kernel is already able to handle user faults with tagged pointers, due to these patches: 1. 81cddd65 ("arm64: traps: fix userspace cache maintenance emulation on a tagged pointer") 2. 7dcd9dd8 ("arm64: hw_breakpoint: fix watchpoint matching for tagged pointers") 3. 276e9327 ("arm64: entry: improve data abort handling of tagged pointers") This patchset extends tagged pointer support to syscall arguments. As per the proposed ABI change [3], tagged pointers are only allowed to be passed to syscalls when they point to memory ranges obtained by anonymous mmap() or sbrk() (see the patchset [3] for more details). For non-memory syscalls this is done by untaging user pointers when the kernel performs pointer checking to find out whether the pointer comes from userspace (most notably in access_ok). The untagging is done only when the pointer is being checked, the tag is preserved as the pointer makes its way through the kernel and stays tagged when the kernel dereferences the pointer when perfoming user memory accesses. The mmap and mremap (only new_addr) syscalls do not currently accept tagged addresses. Architectures may interpret the tag as a background colour for the corresponding vma. Other memory syscalls (mprotect, etc.) don't do user memory accesses but rather deal with memory ranges, and untagged pointers are better suited to describe memory ranges internally. Thus for memory syscalls we untag pointers completely when they enter the kernel. === Other approaches One of the alternative approaches to untagging that was considered is to completely strip the pointer tag as the pointer enters the kernel with some kind of a syscall wrapper, but that won't work with the countless number of different ioctl calls. With this approach we would need a custom wrapper for each ioctl variation, which doesn't seem practical. An alternative approach to untagging pointers in memory syscalls prologues is to inspead allow tagged pointers to be passed to find_vma() (and other vma related functions) and untag them there. Unfortunately, a lot of find_vma() callers then compare or subtract the returned vma start and end fields against the pointer that was being searched. Thus this approach would still require changing all find_vma() callers. === Testing The following testing approaches has been taken to find potential issues with user pointer untagging: 1. Static testing (with sparse [2] and separately with a custom static analyzer based on Clang) to track casts of __user pointers to integer types to find places where untagging needs to be done. 2. Static testing with grep to find parts of the kernel that call find_vma() (and other similar functions) or directly compare against vm_start/vm_end fields of vma. 3. Static testing with grep to find parts of the kernel that compare user pointers with TASK_SIZE or other similar consts and macros. 4. Dynamic testing: adding BUG_ON(has_tag(addr)) to find_vma() and running a modified syzkaller version that passes tagged pointers to the kernel. Based on the results of the testing the requried patches have been added to the patchset. === Notes This patchset is meant to be merged together with "arm64 relaxed ABI" [3]. This patchset is a prerequisite for ARM's memory tagging hardware feature support [4]. This patchset has been merged into the Pixel 2 & 3 kernel trees and is now being used to enable testing of Pixel phones with HWASan. Thanks! [1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html [2] https://github.com/lucvoo/sparse-dev/commit/5f960cb10f56ec2017c128ef9d16060e0145f292 [3] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/6/12/745 [4] https://community.arm.com/processors/b/blog/posts/arm-a-profile-architecture-2018-developments-armv85a This patch (of 11) This patch is a part of a series that extends kernel ABI to allow to pass tagged user pointers (with the top byte set to something else other than 0x00) as syscall arguments. strncpy_from_user and strnlen_user accept user addresses as arguments, and do not go through the same path as copy_from_user and others, so here we need to handle the case of tagged user addresses separately. Untag user pointers passed to these functions. Note, that this patch only temporarily untags the pointers to perform validity checks, but then uses them as is to perform user memory accesses. [andreyknvl@google.com: fix sparc4 build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAAeHK+yx4a-P0sDrXTUxMvO2H0CJZUFPffBrg_cU7oJOZyC7ew@mail.gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c5a78bcad3e94d6cda71fcaa60a423231ae71e4c.1563904656.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com> Cc: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com> Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-25 23:48:27 +00:00
#include <linux/mm.h>
lib: introduce copy_struct_from_user() helper A common pattern for syscall extensions is increasing the size of a struct passed from userspace, such that the zero-value of the new fields result in the old kernel behaviour (allowing for a mix of userspace and kernel vintages to operate on one another in most cases). While this interface exists for communication in both directions, only one interface is straightforward to have reasonable semantics for (userspace passing a struct to the kernel). For kernel returns to userspace, what the correct semantics are (whether there should be an error if userspace is unaware of a new extension) is very syscall-dependent and thus probably cannot be unified between syscalls (a good example of this problem is [1]). Previously there was no common lib/ function that implemented the necessary extension-checking semantics (and different syscalls implemented them slightly differently or incompletely[2]). Future patches replace common uses of this pattern to make use of copy_struct_from_user(). Some in-kernel selftests that insure that the handling of alignment and various byte patterns are all handled identically to memchr_inv() usage. [1]: commit 1251201c0d34 ("sched/core: Fix uclamp ABI bug, clean up and robustify sched_read_attr() ABI logic and code") [2]: For instance {sched_setattr,perf_event_open,clone3}(2) all do do similar checks to copy_struct_from_user() while rt_sigprocmask(2) always rejects differently-sized struct arguments. Suggested-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191001011055.19283-2-cyphar@cyphar.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2019-10-01 01:10:52 +00:00
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <asm/word-at-a-time.h>
/*
* Do a strnlen, return length of string *with* final '\0'.
* 'count' is the user-supplied count, while 'max' is the
* address space maximum.
*
* Return 0 for exceptions (which includes hitting the address
* space maximum), or 'count+1' if hitting the user-supplied
* maximum count.
*
* NOTE! We can sometimes overshoot the user-supplied maximum
* if it fits in a aligned 'long'. The caller needs to check
* the return value against "> max".
*/
static inline long do_strnlen_user(const char __user *src, unsigned long count, unsigned long max)
{
const struct word_at_a_time constants = WORD_AT_A_TIME_CONSTANTS;
unsigned long align, res = 0;
unsigned long c;
/*
* Do everything aligned. But that means that we
* need to also expand the maximum..
*/
align = (sizeof(unsigned long) - 1) & (unsigned long)src;
src -= align;
max += align;
unsafe_[get|put]_user: change interface to use a error target label When I initially added the unsafe_[get|put]_user() helpers in commit 5b24a7a2aa20 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses"), I made the mistake of modeling the interface on our traditional __[get|put]_user() functions, which return zero on success, or -EFAULT on failure. That interface is fairly easy to use, but it's actually fairly nasty for good code generation, since it essentially forces the caller to check the error value for each access. In particular, since the error handling is already internally implemented with an exception handler, and we already use "asm goto" for various other things, we could fairly easily make the error cases just jump directly to an error label instead, and avoid the need for explicit checking after each operation. So switch the interface to pass in an error label, rather than checking the error value in the caller. Best do it now before we start growing more users (the signal handling code in particular would be a good place to use the new interface). So rather than if (unsafe_get_user(x, ptr)) ... handle error .. the interface is now unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, label); where an error during the user mode fetch will now just cause a jump to 'label' in the caller. Right now the actual _implementation_ of this all still ends up being a "if (err) goto label", and does not take advantage of any exception label tricks, but for "unsafe_put_user()" in particular it should be fairly straightforward to convert to using the exception table model. Note that "unsafe_get_user()" is much harder to convert to a clever exception table model, because current versions of gcc do not allow the use of "asm goto" (for the exception) with output values (for the actual value to be fetched). But that is hopefully not a limitation in the long term. [ Also note that it might be a good idea to switch unsafe_get_user() to actually _return_ the value it fetches from user space, but this commit only changes the error handling semantics ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-08 20:02:01 +00:00
unsafe_get_user(c, (unsigned long __user *)src, efault);
c |= aligned_byte_mask(align);
for (;;) {
unsigned long data;
if (has_zero(c, &data, &constants)) {
data = prep_zero_mask(c, data, &constants);
data = create_zero_mask(data);
return res + find_zero(data) + 1 - align;
}
res += sizeof(unsigned long);
/* We already handled 'unsigned long' bytes. Did we do it all ? */
if (unlikely(max <= sizeof(unsigned long)))
break;
max -= sizeof(unsigned long);
unsafe_[get|put]_user: change interface to use a error target label When I initially added the unsafe_[get|put]_user() helpers in commit 5b24a7a2aa20 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses"), I made the mistake of modeling the interface on our traditional __[get|put]_user() functions, which return zero on success, or -EFAULT on failure. That interface is fairly easy to use, but it's actually fairly nasty for good code generation, since it essentially forces the caller to check the error value for each access. In particular, since the error handling is already internally implemented with an exception handler, and we already use "asm goto" for various other things, we could fairly easily make the error cases just jump directly to an error label instead, and avoid the need for explicit checking after each operation. So switch the interface to pass in an error label, rather than checking the error value in the caller. Best do it now before we start growing more users (the signal handling code in particular would be a good place to use the new interface). So rather than if (unsafe_get_user(x, ptr)) ... handle error .. the interface is now unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, label); where an error during the user mode fetch will now just cause a jump to 'label' in the caller. Right now the actual _implementation_ of this all still ends up being a "if (err) goto label", and does not take advantage of any exception label tricks, but for "unsafe_put_user()" in particular it should be fairly straightforward to convert to using the exception table model. Note that "unsafe_get_user()" is much harder to convert to a clever exception table model, because current versions of gcc do not allow the use of "asm goto" (for the exception) with output values (for the actual value to be fetched). But that is hopefully not a limitation in the long term. [ Also note that it might be a good idea to switch unsafe_get_user() to actually _return_ the value it fetches from user space, but this commit only changes the error handling semantics ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-08 20:02:01 +00:00
unsafe_get_user(c, (unsigned long __user *)(src+res), efault);
}
res -= align;
/*
* Uhhuh. We hit 'max'. But was that the user-specified maximum
* too? If so, return the marker for "too long".
*/
if (res >= count)
return count+1;
/*
* Nope: we hit the address space limit, and we still had more
* characters the caller would have wanted. That's 0.
*/
unsafe_[get|put]_user: change interface to use a error target label When I initially added the unsafe_[get|put]_user() helpers in commit 5b24a7a2aa20 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses"), I made the mistake of modeling the interface on our traditional __[get|put]_user() functions, which return zero on success, or -EFAULT on failure. That interface is fairly easy to use, but it's actually fairly nasty for good code generation, since it essentially forces the caller to check the error value for each access. In particular, since the error handling is already internally implemented with an exception handler, and we already use "asm goto" for various other things, we could fairly easily make the error cases just jump directly to an error label instead, and avoid the need for explicit checking after each operation. So switch the interface to pass in an error label, rather than checking the error value in the caller. Best do it now before we start growing more users (the signal handling code in particular would be a good place to use the new interface). So rather than if (unsafe_get_user(x, ptr)) ... handle error .. the interface is now unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, label); where an error during the user mode fetch will now just cause a jump to 'label' in the caller. Right now the actual _implementation_ of this all still ends up being a "if (err) goto label", and does not take advantage of any exception label tricks, but for "unsafe_put_user()" in particular it should be fairly straightforward to convert to using the exception table model. Note that "unsafe_get_user()" is much harder to convert to a clever exception table model, because current versions of gcc do not allow the use of "asm goto" (for the exception) with output values (for the actual value to be fetched). But that is hopefully not a limitation in the long term. [ Also note that it might be a good idea to switch unsafe_get_user() to actually _return_ the value it fetches from user space, but this commit only changes the error handling semantics ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-08 20:02:01 +00:00
efault:
return 0;
}
/**
* strnlen_user: - Get the size of a user string INCLUDING final NUL.
* @str: The string to measure.
* @count: Maximum count (including NUL character)
*
* Context: User context only. This function may sleep if pagefaults are
* enabled.
*
* Get the size of a NUL-terminated string in user space.
*
* Returns the size of the string INCLUDING the terminating NUL.
* If the string is too long, returns a number larger than @count. User
* has to check the return value against "> count".
* On exception (or invalid count), returns 0.
*
* NOTE! You should basically never use this function. There is
* almost never any valid case for using the length of a user space
* string, since the string can be changed at any time by other
* threads. Use "strncpy_from_user()" instead to get a stable copy
* of the string.
*/
long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long count)
{
unsigned long max_addr, src_addr;
if (unlikely(count <= 0))
return 0;
max_addr = user_addr_max();
lib: untag user pointers in strn*_user Patch series "arm64: untag user pointers passed to the kernel", v19. === Overview arm64 has a feature called Top Byte Ignore, which allows to embed pointer tags into the top byte of each pointer. Userspace programs (such as HWASan, a memory debugging tool [1]) might use this feature and pass tagged user pointers to the kernel through syscalls or other interfaces. Right now the kernel is already able to handle user faults with tagged pointers, due to these patches: 1. 81cddd65 ("arm64: traps: fix userspace cache maintenance emulation on a tagged pointer") 2. 7dcd9dd8 ("arm64: hw_breakpoint: fix watchpoint matching for tagged pointers") 3. 276e9327 ("arm64: entry: improve data abort handling of tagged pointers") This patchset extends tagged pointer support to syscall arguments. As per the proposed ABI change [3], tagged pointers are only allowed to be passed to syscalls when they point to memory ranges obtained by anonymous mmap() or sbrk() (see the patchset [3] for more details). For non-memory syscalls this is done by untaging user pointers when the kernel performs pointer checking to find out whether the pointer comes from userspace (most notably in access_ok). The untagging is done only when the pointer is being checked, the tag is preserved as the pointer makes its way through the kernel and stays tagged when the kernel dereferences the pointer when perfoming user memory accesses. The mmap and mremap (only new_addr) syscalls do not currently accept tagged addresses. Architectures may interpret the tag as a background colour for the corresponding vma. Other memory syscalls (mprotect, etc.) don't do user memory accesses but rather deal with memory ranges, and untagged pointers are better suited to describe memory ranges internally. Thus for memory syscalls we untag pointers completely when they enter the kernel. === Other approaches One of the alternative approaches to untagging that was considered is to completely strip the pointer tag as the pointer enters the kernel with some kind of a syscall wrapper, but that won't work with the countless number of different ioctl calls. With this approach we would need a custom wrapper for each ioctl variation, which doesn't seem practical. An alternative approach to untagging pointers in memory syscalls prologues is to inspead allow tagged pointers to be passed to find_vma() (and other vma related functions) and untag them there. Unfortunately, a lot of find_vma() callers then compare or subtract the returned vma start and end fields against the pointer that was being searched. Thus this approach would still require changing all find_vma() callers. === Testing The following testing approaches has been taken to find potential issues with user pointer untagging: 1. Static testing (with sparse [2] and separately with a custom static analyzer based on Clang) to track casts of __user pointers to integer types to find places where untagging needs to be done. 2. Static testing with grep to find parts of the kernel that call find_vma() (and other similar functions) or directly compare against vm_start/vm_end fields of vma. 3. Static testing with grep to find parts of the kernel that compare user pointers with TASK_SIZE or other similar consts and macros. 4. Dynamic testing: adding BUG_ON(has_tag(addr)) to find_vma() and running a modified syzkaller version that passes tagged pointers to the kernel. Based on the results of the testing the requried patches have been added to the patchset. === Notes This patchset is meant to be merged together with "arm64 relaxed ABI" [3]. This patchset is a prerequisite for ARM's memory tagging hardware feature support [4]. This patchset has been merged into the Pixel 2 & 3 kernel trees and is now being used to enable testing of Pixel phones with HWASan. Thanks! [1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html [2] https://github.com/lucvoo/sparse-dev/commit/5f960cb10f56ec2017c128ef9d16060e0145f292 [3] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/6/12/745 [4] https://community.arm.com/processors/b/blog/posts/arm-a-profile-architecture-2018-developments-armv85a This patch (of 11) This patch is a part of a series that extends kernel ABI to allow to pass tagged user pointers (with the top byte set to something else other than 0x00) as syscall arguments. strncpy_from_user and strnlen_user accept user addresses as arguments, and do not go through the same path as copy_from_user and others, so here we need to handle the case of tagged user addresses separately. Untag user pointers passed to these functions. Note, that this patch only temporarily untags the pointers to perform validity checks, but then uses them as is to perform user memory accesses. [andreyknvl@google.com: fix sparc4 build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAAeHK+yx4a-P0sDrXTUxMvO2H0CJZUFPffBrg_cU7oJOZyC7ew@mail.gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c5a78bcad3e94d6cda71fcaa60a423231ae71e4c.1563904656.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com> Cc: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com> Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-25 23:48:27 +00:00
src_addr = (unsigned long)untagged_addr(str);
if (likely(src_addr < max_addr)) {
unsigned long max = max_addr - src_addr;
long retval;
/*
* Truncate 'max' to the user-specified limit, so that
* we only have one limit we need to check in the loop
*/
if (max > count)
max = count;
if (user_read_access_begin(str, max)) {
retval = do_strnlen_user(str, count, max);
user_read_access_end();
return retval;
}
}
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(strnlen_user);