linux-stable/drivers/md/dm-verity-fec.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* Copyright (C) 2015 Google, Inc.
*
* Author: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
*/
#include "dm-verity-fec.h"
#include <linux/math64.h>
#define DM_MSG_PREFIX "verity-fec"
/*
* If error correction has been configured, returns true.
*/
bool verity_fec_is_enabled(struct dm_verity *v)
{
return v->fec && v->fec->dev;
}
/*
* Return a pointer to dm_verity_fec_io after dm_verity_io and its variable
* length fields.
*/
static inline struct dm_verity_fec_io *fec_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
{
return (struct dm_verity_fec_io *)
((char *)io + io->v->ti->per_io_data_size - sizeof(struct dm_verity_fec_io));
}
/*
* Return an interleaved offset for a byte in RS block.
*/
static inline u64 fec_interleave(struct dm_verity *v, u64 offset)
{
u32 mod;
mod = do_div(offset, v->fec->rsn);
return offset + mod * (v->fec->rounds << v->data_dev_block_bits);
}
/*
* Decode an RS block using Reed-Solomon.
*/
static int fec_decode_rs8(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio,
u8 *data, u8 *fec, int neras)
{
int i;
uint16_t par[DM_VERITY_FEC_RSM - DM_VERITY_FEC_MIN_RSN];
for (i = 0; i < v->fec->roots; i++)
par[i] = fec[i];
return decode_rs8(fio->rs, data, par, v->fec->rsn, NULL, neras,
fio->erasures, 0, NULL);
}
/*
* Read error-correcting codes for the requested RS block. Returns a pointer
* to the data block. Caller is responsible for releasing buf.
*/
static u8 *fec_read_parity(struct dm_verity *v, u64 rsb, int index,
unsigned int *offset, struct dm_buffer **buf)
{
dm verity: fix FEC for RS roots unaligned to block size Optional Forward Error Correction (FEC) code in dm-verity uses Reed-Solomon code and should support roots from 2 to 24. The error correction parity bytes (of roots lengths per RS block) are stored on a separate device in sequence without any padding. Currently, to access FEC device, the dm-verity-fec code uses dm-bufio client with block size set to verity data block (usually 4096 or 512 bytes). Because this block size is not divisible by some (most!) of the roots supported lengths, data repair cannot work for partially stored parity bytes. This fix changes FEC device dm-bufio block size to "roots << SECTOR_SHIFT" where we can be sure that the full parity data is always available. (There cannot be partial FEC blocks because parity must cover whole sectors.) Because the optional FEC starting offset could be unaligned to this new block size, we have to use dm_bufio_set_sector_offset() to configure it. The problem is easily reproduced using veritysetup, e.g. for roots=13: # create verity device with RS FEC dd if=/dev/urandom of=data.img bs=4096 count=8 status=none veritysetup format data.img hash.img --fec-device=fec.img --fec-roots=13 | awk '/^Root hash/{ print $3 }' >roothash # create an erasure that should be always repairable with this roots setting dd if=/dev/zero of=data.img conv=notrunc bs=1 count=8 seek=4088 status=none # try to read it through dm-verity veritysetup open data.img test hash.img --fec-device=fec.img --fec-roots=13 $(cat roothash) dd if=/dev/mapper/test of=/dev/null bs=4096 status=noxfer # wait for possible recursive recovery in kernel udevadm settle veritysetup close test With this fix, errors are properly repaired. device-mapper: verity-fec: 7:1: FEC 0: corrected 8 errors ... Without it, FEC code usually ends on unrecoverable failure in RS decoder: device-mapper: verity-fec: 7:1: FEC 0: failed to correct: -74 ... This problem is present in all kernels since the FEC code's introduction (kernel 4.5). It is thought that this problem is not visible in Android ecosystem because it always uses a default RS roots=2. Depends-on: a14e5ec66a7a ("dm bufio: subtract the number of initial sectors in dm_bufio_get_device_size") Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Tested-by: Jérôme Carretero <cJ-ko@zougloub.eu> Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5+ Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2021-02-23 20:21:21 +00:00
u64 position, block, rem;
u8 *res;
position = (index + rsb) * v->fec->roots;
block = div64_u64_rem(position, v->fec->io_size, &rem);
*offset = (unsigned int)rem;
dm verity: fix FEC for RS roots unaligned to block size Optional Forward Error Correction (FEC) code in dm-verity uses Reed-Solomon code and should support roots from 2 to 24. The error correction parity bytes (of roots lengths per RS block) are stored on a separate device in sequence without any padding. Currently, to access FEC device, the dm-verity-fec code uses dm-bufio client with block size set to verity data block (usually 4096 or 512 bytes). Because this block size is not divisible by some (most!) of the roots supported lengths, data repair cannot work for partially stored parity bytes. This fix changes FEC device dm-bufio block size to "roots << SECTOR_SHIFT" where we can be sure that the full parity data is always available. (There cannot be partial FEC blocks because parity must cover whole sectors.) Because the optional FEC starting offset could be unaligned to this new block size, we have to use dm_bufio_set_sector_offset() to configure it. The problem is easily reproduced using veritysetup, e.g. for roots=13: # create verity device with RS FEC dd if=/dev/urandom of=data.img bs=4096 count=8 status=none veritysetup format data.img hash.img --fec-device=fec.img --fec-roots=13 | awk '/^Root hash/{ print $3 }' >roothash # create an erasure that should be always repairable with this roots setting dd if=/dev/zero of=data.img conv=notrunc bs=1 count=8 seek=4088 status=none # try to read it through dm-verity veritysetup open data.img test hash.img --fec-device=fec.img --fec-roots=13 $(cat roothash) dd if=/dev/mapper/test of=/dev/null bs=4096 status=noxfer # wait for possible recursive recovery in kernel udevadm settle veritysetup close test With this fix, errors are properly repaired. device-mapper: verity-fec: 7:1: FEC 0: corrected 8 errors ... Without it, FEC code usually ends on unrecoverable failure in RS decoder: device-mapper: verity-fec: 7:1: FEC 0: failed to correct: -74 ... This problem is present in all kernels since the FEC code's introduction (kernel 4.5). It is thought that this problem is not visible in Android ecosystem because it always uses a default RS roots=2. Depends-on: a14e5ec66a7a ("dm bufio: subtract the number of initial sectors in dm_bufio_get_device_size") Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Tested-by: Jérôme Carretero <cJ-ko@zougloub.eu> Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5+ Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2021-02-23 20:21:21 +00:00
res = dm_bufio_read(v->fec->bufio, block, buf);
if (IS_ERR(res)) {
DMERR("%s: FEC %llu: parity read failed (block %llu): %ld",
v->data_dev->name, (unsigned long long)rsb,
dm verity: fix FEC for RS roots unaligned to block size Optional Forward Error Correction (FEC) code in dm-verity uses Reed-Solomon code and should support roots from 2 to 24. The error correction parity bytes (of roots lengths per RS block) are stored on a separate device in sequence without any padding. Currently, to access FEC device, the dm-verity-fec code uses dm-bufio client with block size set to verity data block (usually 4096 or 512 bytes). Because this block size is not divisible by some (most!) of the roots supported lengths, data repair cannot work for partially stored parity bytes. This fix changes FEC device dm-bufio block size to "roots << SECTOR_SHIFT" where we can be sure that the full parity data is always available. (There cannot be partial FEC blocks because parity must cover whole sectors.) Because the optional FEC starting offset could be unaligned to this new block size, we have to use dm_bufio_set_sector_offset() to configure it. The problem is easily reproduced using veritysetup, e.g. for roots=13: # create verity device with RS FEC dd if=/dev/urandom of=data.img bs=4096 count=8 status=none veritysetup format data.img hash.img --fec-device=fec.img --fec-roots=13 | awk '/^Root hash/{ print $3 }' >roothash # create an erasure that should be always repairable with this roots setting dd if=/dev/zero of=data.img conv=notrunc bs=1 count=8 seek=4088 status=none # try to read it through dm-verity veritysetup open data.img test hash.img --fec-device=fec.img --fec-roots=13 $(cat roothash) dd if=/dev/mapper/test of=/dev/null bs=4096 status=noxfer # wait for possible recursive recovery in kernel udevadm settle veritysetup close test With this fix, errors are properly repaired. device-mapper: verity-fec: 7:1: FEC 0: corrected 8 errors ... Without it, FEC code usually ends on unrecoverable failure in RS decoder: device-mapper: verity-fec: 7:1: FEC 0: failed to correct: -74 ... This problem is present in all kernels since the FEC code's introduction (kernel 4.5). It is thought that this problem is not visible in Android ecosystem because it always uses a default RS roots=2. Depends-on: a14e5ec66a7a ("dm bufio: subtract the number of initial sectors in dm_bufio_get_device_size") Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Tested-by: Jérôme Carretero <cJ-ko@zougloub.eu> Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5+ Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2021-02-23 20:21:21 +00:00
(unsigned long long)block, PTR_ERR(res));
*buf = NULL;
}
return res;
}
/* Loop over each preallocated buffer slot. */
#define fec_for_each_prealloc_buffer(__i) \
for (__i = 0; __i < DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_PREALLOC; __i++)
/* Loop over each extra buffer slot. */
#define fec_for_each_extra_buffer(io, __i) \
for (__i = DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_PREALLOC; __i < DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_MAX; __i++)
/* Loop over each allocated buffer. */
#define fec_for_each_buffer(io, __i) \
for (__i = 0; __i < (io)->nbufs; __i++)
/* Loop over each RS block in each allocated buffer. */
#define fec_for_each_buffer_rs_block(io, __i, __j) \
fec_for_each_buffer(io, __i) \
for (__j = 0; __j < 1 << DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_RS_BITS; __j++)
/*
* Return a pointer to the current RS block when called inside
* fec_for_each_buffer_rs_block.
*/
static inline u8 *fec_buffer_rs_block(struct dm_verity *v,
struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio,
unsigned int i, unsigned int j)
{
return &fio->bufs[i][j * v->fec->rsn];
}
/*
* Return an index to the current RS block when called inside
* fec_for_each_buffer_rs_block.
*/
static inline unsigned int fec_buffer_rs_index(unsigned int i, unsigned int j)
{
return (i << DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_RS_BITS) + j;
}
/*
* Decode all RS blocks from buffers and copy corrected bytes into fio->output
* starting from block_offset.
*/
static int fec_decode_bufs(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio,
u64 rsb, int byte_index, unsigned int block_offset,
int neras)
{
int r, corrected = 0, res;
struct dm_buffer *buf;
unsigned int n, i, offset;
u8 *par, *block;
par = fec_read_parity(v, rsb, block_offset, &offset, &buf);
if (IS_ERR(par))
return PTR_ERR(par);
/*
* Decode the RS blocks we have in bufs. Each RS block results in
* one corrected target byte and consumes fec->roots parity bytes.
*/
fec_for_each_buffer_rs_block(fio, n, i) {
block = fec_buffer_rs_block(v, fio, n, i);
res = fec_decode_rs8(v, fio, block, &par[offset], neras);
if (res < 0) {
r = res;
goto error;
}
corrected += res;
fio->output[block_offset] = block[byte_index];
block_offset++;
if (block_offset >= 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits)
goto done;
/* read the next block when we run out of parity bytes */
offset += v->fec->roots;
if (offset >= v->fec->io_size) {
dm_bufio_release(buf);
par = fec_read_parity(v, rsb, block_offset, &offset, &buf);
if (IS_ERR(par))
return PTR_ERR(par);
}
}
done:
r = corrected;
error:
dm_bufio_release(buf);
if (r < 0 && neras)
DMERR_LIMIT("%s: FEC %llu: failed to correct: %d",
v->data_dev->name, (unsigned long long)rsb, r);
else if (r > 0)
DMWARN_LIMIT("%s: FEC %llu: corrected %d errors",
v->data_dev->name, (unsigned long long)rsb, r);
return r;
}
/*
* Locate data block erasures using verity hashes.
*/
static int fec_is_erasure(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
u8 *want_digest, u8 *data)
{
if (unlikely(verity_hash(v, verity_io_hash_req(v, io),
data, 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits,
dm-verity: don't use blocking calls from tasklets The commit 5721d4e5a9cd enhanced dm-verity, so that it can verify blocks from tasklets rather than from workqueues. This reportedly improves performance significantly. However, dm-verity was using the flag CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP from tasklets which resulted in warnings about sleeping function being called from non-sleeping context. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at crypto/internal.h:206 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 14, name: ksoftirqd/0 preempt_count: 100, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 CPU: 0 PID: 14 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G W 6.7.0-rc1 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x32/0x50 __might_resched+0x110/0x160 crypto_hash_walk_done+0x54/0xb0 shash_ahash_update+0x51/0x60 verity_hash_update.isra.0+0x4a/0x130 [dm_verity] verity_verify_io+0x165/0x550 [dm_verity] ? free_unref_page+0xdf/0x170 ? psi_group_change+0x113/0x390 verity_tasklet+0xd/0x70 [dm_verity] tasklet_action_common.isra.0+0xb3/0xc0 __do_softirq+0xaf/0x1ec ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x1d/0x200 ? sort_range+0x20/0x20 run_ksoftirqd+0x15/0x30 smpboot_thread_fn+0xed/0x200 kthread+0xdc/0x110 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x28/0x40 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> This commit fixes dm-verity so that it doesn't use the flags CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP and CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG from tasklets. The crypto API would do GFP_ATOMIC allocation instead, it could return -ENOMEM and we catch -ENOMEM in verity_tasklet and requeue the request to the workqueue. Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.0+ Fixes: 5721d4e5a9cd ("dm verity: Add optional "try_verify_in_tasklet" feature") Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
2023-11-17 17:37:25 +00:00
verity_io_real_digest(v, io), true)))
return 0;
return memcmp(verity_io_real_digest(v, io), want_digest,
v->digest_size) != 0;
}
/*
* Read data blocks that are part of the RS block and deinterleave as much as
* fits into buffers. Check for erasure locations if @neras is non-NULL.
*/
static int fec_read_bufs(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
u64 rsb, u64 target, unsigned int block_offset,
int *neras)
{
bool is_zero;
int i, j, target_index = -1;
struct dm_buffer *buf;
struct dm_bufio_client *bufio;
struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio = fec_io(io);
u64 block, ileaved;
u8 *bbuf, *rs_block;
u8 want_digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
unsigned int n, k;
if (neras)
*neras = 0;
if (WARN_ON(v->digest_size > sizeof(want_digest)))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* read each of the rsn data blocks that are part of the RS block, and
* interleave contents to available bufs
*/
for (i = 0; i < v->fec->rsn; i++) {
ileaved = fec_interleave(v, rsb * v->fec->rsn + i);
/*
* target is the data block we want to correct, target_index is
* the index of this block within the rsn RS blocks
*/
if (ileaved == target)
target_index = i;
block = ileaved >> v->data_dev_block_bits;
bufio = v->fec->data_bufio;
if (block >= v->data_blocks) {
block -= v->data_blocks;
/*
* blocks outside the area were assumed to contain
* zeros when encoding data was generated
*/
if (unlikely(block >= v->fec->hash_blocks))
continue;
block += v->hash_start;
bufio = v->bufio;
}
bbuf = dm_bufio_read(bufio, block, &buf);
if (IS_ERR(bbuf)) {
DMWARN_LIMIT("%s: FEC %llu: read failed (%llu): %ld",
v->data_dev->name,
(unsigned long long)rsb,
(unsigned long long)block, PTR_ERR(bbuf));
/* assume the block is corrupted */
if (neras && *neras <= v->fec->roots)
fio->erasures[(*neras)++] = i;
continue;
}
/* locate erasures if the block is on the data device */
if (bufio == v->fec->data_bufio &&
verity_hash_for_block(v, io, block, want_digest,
&is_zero) == 0) {
/* skip known zero blocks entirely */
if (is_zero)
goto done;
/*
* skip if we have already found the theoretical
* maximum number (i.e. fec->roots) of erasures
*/
if (neras && *neras <= v->fec->roots &&
fec_is_erasure(v, io, want_digest, bbuf))
fio->erasures[(*neras)++] = i;
}
/*
* deinterleave and copy the bytes that fit into bufs,
* starting from block_offset
*/
fec_for_each_buffer_rs_block(fio, n, j) {
k = fec_buffer_rs_index(n, j) + block_offset;
if (k >= 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits)
goto done;
rs_block = fec_buffer_rs_block(v, fio, n, j);
rs_block[i] = bbuf[k];
}
done:
dm_bufio_release(buf);
}
return target_index;
}
/*
* Allocate RS control structure and FEC buffers from preallocated mempools,
* and attempt to allocate as many extra buffers as available.
*/
static int fec_alloc_bufs(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio)
{
unsigned int n;
if (!fio->rs)
fio->rs = mempool_alloc(&v->fec->rs_pool, GFP_NOIO);
fec_for_each_prealloc_buffer(n) {
if (fio->bufs[n])
continue;
fio->bufs[n] = mempool_alloc(&v->fec->prealloc_pool, GFP_NOWAIT);
if (unlikely(!fio->bufs[n])) {
DMERR("failed to allocate FEC buffer");
return -ENOMEM;
}
}
/* try to allocate the maximum number of buffers */
fec_for_each_extra_buffer(fio, n) {
if (fio->bufs[n])
continue;
fio->bufs[n] = mempool_alloc(&v->fec->extra_pool, GFP_NOWAIT);
/* we can manage with even one buffer if necessary */
if (unlikely(!fio->bufs[n]))
break;
}
fio->nbufs = n;
if (!fio->output)
fio->output = mempool_alloc(&v->fec->output_pool, GFP_NOIO);
return 0;
}
/*
* Initialize buffers and clear erasures. fec_read_bufs() assumes buffers are
* zeroed before deinterleaving.
*/
static void fec_init_bufs(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio)
{
unsigned int n;
fec_for_each_buffer(fio, n)
memset(fio->bufs[n], 0, v->fec->rsn << DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_RS_BITS);
memset(fio->erasures, 0, sizeof(fio->erasures));
}
/*
* Decode all RS blocks in a single data block and return the target block
* (indicated by @offset) in fio->output. If @use_erasures is non-zero, uses
* hashes to locate erasures.
*/
static int fec_decode_rsb(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio, u64 rsb, u64 offset,
bool use_erasures)
{
int r, neras = 0;
unsigned int pos;
r = fec_alloc_bufs(v, fio);
if (unlikely(r < 0))
return r;
for (pos = 0; pos < 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits; ) {
fec_init_bufs(v, fio);
r = fec_read_bufs(v, io, rsb, offset, pos,
use_erasures ? &neras : NULL);
if (unlikely(r < 0))
return r;
r = fec_decode_bufs(v, fio, rsb, r, pos, neras);
if (r < 0)
return r;
pos += fio->nbufs << DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_RS_BITS;
}
/* Always re-validate the corrected block against the expected hash */
r = verity_hash(v, verity_io_hash_req(v, io), fio->output,
1 << v->data_dev_block_bits,
dm-verity: don't use blocking calls from tasklets The commit 5721d4e5a9cd enhanced dm-verity, so that it can verify blocks from tasklets rather than from workqueues. This reportedly improves performance significantly. However, dm-verity was using the flag CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP from tasklets which resulted in warnings about sleeping function being called from non-sleeping context. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at crypto/internal.h:206 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 14, name: ksoftirqd/0 preempt_count: 100, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 CPU: 0 PID: 14 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G W 6.7.0-rc1 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x32/0x50 __might_resched+0x110/0x160 crypto_hash_walk_done+0x54/0xb0 shash_ahash_update+0x51/0x60 verity_hash_update.isra.0+0x4a/0x130 [dm_verity] verity_verify_io+0x165/0x550 [dm_verity] ? free_unref_page+0xdf/0x170 ? psi_group_change+0x113/0x390 verity_tasklet+0xd/0x70 [dm_verity] tasklet_action_common.isra.0+0xb3/0xc0 __do_softirq+0xaf/0x1ec ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x1d/0x200 ? sort_range+0x20/0x20 run_ksoftirqd+0x15/0x30 smpboot_thread_fn+0xed/0x200 kthread+0xdc/0x110 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x28/0x40 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> This commit fixes dm-verity so that it doesn't use the flags CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP and CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG from tasklets. The crypto API would do GFP_ATOMIC allocation instead, it could return -ENOMEM and we catch -ENOMEM in verity_tasklet and requeue the request to the workqueue. Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.0+ Fixes: 5721d4e5a9cd ("dm verity: Add optional "try_verify_in_tasklet" feature") Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
2023-11-17 17:37:25 +00:00
verity_io_real_digest(v, io), true);
if (unlikely(r < 0))
return r;
if (memcmp(verity_io_real_digest(v, io), verity_io_want_digest(v, io),
v->digest_size)) {
DMERR_LIMIT("%s: FEC %llu: failed to correct (%d erasures)",
v->data_dev->name, (unsigned long long)rsb, neras);
return -EILSEQ;
}
return 0;
}
static int fec_bv_copy(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io, u8 *data,
size_t len)
{
struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio = fec_io(io);
memcpy(data, &fio->output[fio->output_pos], len);
fio->output_pos += len;
return 0;
}
/*
* Correct errors in a block. Copies corrected block to dest if non-NULL,
* otherwise to a bio_vec starting from iter.
*/
int verity_fec_decode(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io,
enum verity_block_type type, sector_t block, u8 *dest,
struct bvec_iter *iter)
{
int r;
struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio = fec_io(io);
u64 offset, res, rsb;
if (!verity_fec_is_enabled(v))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (fio->level >= DM_VERITY_FEC_MAX_RECURSION) {
DMWARN_LIMIT("%s: FEC: recursion too deep", v->data_dev->name);
return -EIO;
}
fio->level++;
if (type == DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_METADATA)
block = block - v->hash_start + v->data_blocks;
/*
* For RS(M, N), the continuous FEC data is divided into blocks of N
* bytes. Since block size may not be divisible by N, the last block
* is zero padded when decoding.
*
* Each byte of the block is covered by a different RS(M, N) code,
* and each code is interleaved over N blocks to make it less likely
* that bursty corruption will leave us in unrecoverable state.
*/
offset = block << v->data_dev_block_bits;
res = div64_u64(offset, v->fec->rounds << v->data_dev_block_bits);
/*
* The base RS block we can feed to the interleaver to find out all
* blocks required for decoding.
*/
rsb = offset - res * (v->fec->rounds << v->data_dev_block_bits);
/*
* Locating erasures is slow, so attempt to recover the block without
* them first. Do a second attempt with erasures if the corruption is
* bad enough.
*/
r = fec_decode_rsb(v, io, fio, rsb, offset, false);
if (r < 0) {
r = fec_decode_rsb(v, io, fio, rsb, offset, true);
if (r < 0)
goto done;
}
if (dest)
memcpy(dest, fio->output, 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits);
else if (iter) {
fio->output_pos = 0;
r = verity_for_bv_block(v, io, iter, fec_bv_copy);
}
done:
fio->level--;
return r;
}
/*
* Clean up per-bio data.
*/
void verity_fec_finish_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
{
unsigned int n;
struct dm_verity_fec *f = io->v->fec;
struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio = fec_io(io);
if (!verity_fec_is_enabled(io->v))
return;
mempool_free(fio->rs, &f->rs_pool);
fec_for_each_prealloc_buffer(n)
mempool_free(fio->bufs[n], &f->prealloc_pool);
fec_for_each_extra_buffer(fio, n)
mempool_free(fio->bufs[n], &f->extra_pool);
mempool_free(fio->output, &f->output_pool);
}
/*
* Initialize per-bio data.
*/
void verity_fec_init_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
{
struct dm_verity_fec_io *fio = fec_io(io);
if (!verity_fec_is_enabled(io->v))
return;
fio->rs = NULL;
memset(fio->bufs, 0, sizeof(fio->bufs));
fio->nbufs = 0;
fio->output = NULL;
fio->level = 0;
}
/*
* Append feature arguments and values to the status table.
*/
unsigned int verity_fec_status_table(struct dm_verity *v, unsigned int sz,
char *result, unsigned int maxlen)
{
if (!verity_fec_is_enabled(v))
return sz;
DMEMIT(" " DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_DEV " %s "
DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_BLOCKS " %llu "
DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_START " %llu "
DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_ROOTS " %d",
v->fec->dev->name,
(unsigned long long)v->fec->blocks,
(unsigned long long)v->fec->start,
v->fec->roots);
return sz;
}
void verity_fec_dtr(struct dm_verity *v)
{
struct dm_verity_fec *f = v->fec;
if (!verity_fec_is_enabled(v))
goto out;
mempool_exit(&f->rs_pool);
mempool_exit(&f->prealloc_pool);
mempool_exit(&f->extra_pool);
dm verity fec: fix memory leak in verity_fec_dtr Fix below kmemleak detected in verity_fec_ctr. output_pool is allocated for each dm-verity-fec device. But it is not freed when dm-table for the verity target is removed. Hence free the output mempool in destructor function verity_fec_dtr. unreferenced object 0xffffffffa574d000 (size 4096): comm "init", pid 1667, jiffies 4294894890 (age 307.168s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 8e 36 00 98 66 a8 0b 9b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .6..f........... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<0000000060e82407>] __kmalloc+0x2b4/0x340 [<00000000dd99488f>] mempool_kmalloc+0x18/0x20 [<000000002560172b>] mempool_init_node+0x98/0x118 [<000000006c3574d2>] mempool_init+0x14/0x20 [<0000000008cb266e>] verity_fec_ctr+0x388/0x3b0 [<000000000887261b>] verity_ctr+0x87c/0x8d0 [<000000002b1e1c62>] dm_table_add_target+0x174/0x348 [<000000002ad89eda>] table_load+0xe4/0x328 [<000000001f06f5e9>] dm_ctl_ioctl+0x3b4/0x5a0 [<00000000bee5fbb7>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x5dc/0x928 [<00000000b475b8f5>] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x70/0x98 [<000000005361e2e8>] el0_svc_common+0xa0/0x158 [<000000001374818f>] el0_svc_handler+0x6c/0x88 [<000000003364e9f4>] el0_svc+0x8/0xc [<000000009d84cec9>] 0xffffffffffffffff Fixes: a739ff3f543af ("dm verity: add support for forward error correction") Depends-on: 6f1c819c219f7 ("dm: convert to bioset_init()/mempool_init()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Harshini Shetty <harshini.x.shetty@sony.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2020-03-17 09:15:45 +00:00
mempool_exit(&f->output_pool);
kmem_cache_destroy(f->cache);
if (f->data_bufio)
dm_bufio_client_destroy(f->data_bufio);
if (f->bufio)
dm_bufio_client_destroy(f->bufio);
if (f->dev)
dm_put_device(v->ti, f->dev);
out:
kfree(f);
v->fec = NULL;
}
static void *fec_rs_alloc(gfp_t gfp_mask, void *pool_data)
{
struct dm_verity *v = pool_data;
return init_rs_gfp(8, 0x11d, 0, 1, v->fec->roots, gfp_mask);
}
static void fec_rs_free(void *element, void *pool_data)
{
struct rs_control *rs = element;
if (rs)
free_rs(rs);
}
bool verity_is_fec_opt_arg(const char *arg_name)
{
return (!strcasecmp(arg_name, DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_DEV) ||
!strcasecmp(arg_name, DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_BLOCKS) ||
!strcasecmp(arg_name, DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_START) ||
!strcasecmp(arg_name, DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_ROOTS));
}
int verity_fec_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v,
unsigned int *argc, const char *arg_name)
{
int r;
struct dm_target *ti = v->ti;
const char *arg_value;
unsigned long long num_ll;
unsigned char num_c;
char dummy;
if (!*argc) {
ti->error = "FEC feature arguments require a value";
return -EINVAL;
}
arg_value = dm_shift_arg(as);
(*argc)--;
if (!strcasecmp(arg_name, DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_DEV)) {
r = dm_get_device(ti, arg_value, BLK_OPEN_READ, &v->fec->dev);
if (r) {
ti->error = "FEC device lookup failed";
return r;
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg_name, DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_BLOCKS)) {
if (sscanf(arg_value, "%llu%c", &num_ll, &dummy) != 1 ||
((sector_t)(num_ll << (v->data_dev_block_bits - SECTOR_SHIFT))
>> (v->data_dev_block_bits - SECTOR_SHIFT) != num_ll)) {
ti->error = "Invalid " DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_BLOCKS;
return -EINVAL;
}
v->fec->blocks = num_ll;
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg_name, DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_START)) {
if (sscanf(arg_value, "%llu%c", &num_ll, &dummy) != 1 ||
((sector_t)(num_ll << (v->data_dev_block_bits - SECTOR_SHIFT)) >>
(v->data_dev_block_bits - SECTOR_SHIFT) != num_ll)) {
ti->error = "Invalid " DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_START;
return -EINVAL;
}
v->fec->start = num_ll;
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg_name, DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_ROOTS)) {
if (sscanf(arg_value, "%hhu%c", &num_c, &dummy) != 1 || !num_c ||
num_c < (DM_VERITY_FEC_RSM - DM_VERITY_FEC_MAX_RSN) ||
num_c > (DM_VERITY_FEC_RSM - DM_VERITY_FEC_MIN_RSN)) {
ti->error = "Invalid " DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_ROOTS;
return -EINVAL;
}
v->fec->roots = num_c;
} else {
ti->error = "Unrecognized verity FEC feature request";
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Allocate dm_verity_fec for v->fec. Must be called before verity_fec_ctr.
*/
int verity_fec_ctr_alloc(struct dm_verity *v)
{
struct dm_verity_fec *f;
f = kzalloc(sizeof(struct dm_verity_fec), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!f) {
v->ti->error = "Cannot allocate FEC structure";
return -ENOMEM;
}
v->fec = f;
return 0;
}
/*
* Validate arguments and preallocate memory. Must be called after arguments
* have been parsed using verity_fec_parse_opt_args.
*/
int verity_fec_ctr(struct dm_verity *v)
{
struct dm_verity_fec *f = v->fec;
struct dm_target *ti = v->ti;
dm verity: fix FEC for RS roots unaligned to block size Optional Forward Error Correction (FEC) code in dm-verity uses Reed-Solomon code and should support roots from 2 to 24. The error correction parity bytes (of roots lengths per RS block) are stored on a separate device in sequence without any padding. Currently, to access FEC device, the dm-verity-fec code uses dm-bufio client with block size set to verity data block (usually 4096 or 512 bytes). Because this block size is not divisible by some (most!) of the roots supported lengths, data repair cannot work for partially stored parity bytes. This fix changes FEC device dm-bufio block size to "roots << SECTOR_SHIFT" where we can be sure that the full parity data is always available. (There cannot be partial FEC blocks because parity must cover whole sectors.) Because the optional FEC starting offset could be unaligned to this new block size, we have to use dm_bufio_set_sector_offset() to configure it. The problem is easily reproduced using veritysetup, e.g. for roots=13: # create verity device with RS FEC dd if=/dev/urandom of=data.img bs=4096 count=8 status=none veritysetup format data.img hash.img --fec-device=fec.img --fec-roots=13 | awk '/^Root hash/{ print $3 }' >roothash # create an erasure that should be always repairable with this roots setting dd if=/dev/zero of=data.img conv=notrunc bs=1 count=8 seek=4088 status=none # try to read it through dm-verity veritysetup open data.img test hash.img --fec-device=fec.img --fec-roots=13 $(cat roothash) dd if=/dev/mapper/test of=/dev/null bs=4096 status=noxfer # wait for possible recursive recovery in kernel udevadm settle veritysetup close test With this fix, errors are properly repaired. device-mapper: verity-fec: 7:1: FEC 0: corrected 8 errors ... Without it, FEC code usually ends on unrecoverable failure in RS decoder: device-mapper: verity-fec: 7:1: FEC 0: failed to correct: -74 ... This problem is present in all kernels since the FEC code's introduction (kernel 4.5). It is thought that this problem is not visible in Android ecosystem because it always uses a default RS roots=2. Depends-on: a14e5ec66a7a ("dm bufio: subtract the number of initial sectors in dm_bufio_get_device_size") Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Tested-by: Jérôme Carretero <cJ-ko@zougloub.eu> Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5+ Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2021-02-23 20:21:21 +00:00
u64 hash_blocks, fec_blocks;
int ret;
if (!verity_fec_is_enabled(v)) {
verity_fec_dtr(v);
return 0;
}
/*
* FEC is computed over data blocks, possible metadata, and
* hash blocks. In other words, FEC covers total of fec_blocks
* blocks consisting of the following:
*
* data blocks | hash blocks | metadata (optional)
*
* We allow metadata after hash blocks to support a use case
* where all data is stored on the same device and FEC covers
* the entire area.
*
* If metadata is included, we require it to be available on the
* hash device after the hash blocks.
*/
hash_blocks = v->hash_blocks - v->hash_start;
/*
* Require matching block sizes for data and hash devices for
* simplicity.
*/
if (v->data_dev_block_bits != v->hash_dev_block_bits) {
ti->error = "Block sizes must match to use FEC";
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!f->roots) {
ti->error = "Missing " DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_ROOTS;
return -EINVAL;
}
f->rsn = DM_VERITY_FEC_RSM - f->roots;
if (!f->blocks) {
ti->error = "Missing " DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_BLOCKS;
return -EINVAL;
}
f->rounds = f->blocks;
if (sector_div(f->rounds, f->rsn))
f->rounds++;
/*
* Due to optional metadata, f->blocks can be larger than
* data_blocks and hash_blocks combined.
*/
if (f->blocks < v->data_blocks + hash_blocks || !f->rounds) {
ti->error = "Invalid " DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_BLOCKS;
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* Metadata is accessed through the hash device, so we require
* it to be large enough.
*/
f->hash_blocks = f->blocks - v->data_blocks;
if (dm_bufio_get_device_size(v->bufio) < f->hash_blocks) {
ti->error = "Hash device is too small for "
DM_VERITY_OPT_FEC_BLOCKS;
return -E2BIG;
}
if ((f->roots << SECTOR_SHIFT) & ((1 << v->data_dev_block_bits) - 1))
f->io_size = 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits;
else
f->io_size = v->fec->roots << SECTOR_SHIFT;
f->bufio = dm_bufio_client_create(f->dev->bdev,
f->io_size,
1, 0, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (IS_ERR(f->bufio)) {
ti->error = "Cannot initialize FEC bufio client";
return PTR_ERR(f->bufio);
}
dm verity: fix FEC for RS roots unaligned to block size Optional Forward Error Correction (FEC) code in dm-verity uses Reed-Solomon code and should support roots from 2 to 24. The error correction parity bytes (of roots lengths per RS block) are stored on a separate device in sequence without any padding. Currently, to access FEC device, the dm-verity-fec code uses dm-bufio client with block size set to verity data block (usually 4096 or 512 bytes). Because this block size is not divisible by some (most!) of the roots supported lengths, data repair cannot work for partially stored parity bytes. This fix changes FEC device dm-bufio block size to "roots << SECTOR_SHIFT" where we can be sure that the full parity data is always available. (There cannot be partial FEC blocks because parity must cover whole sectors.) Because the optional FEC starting offset could be unaligned to this new block size, we have to use dm_bufio_set_sector_offset() to configure it. The problem is easily reproduced using veritysetup, e.g. for roots=13: # create verity device with RS FEC dd if=/dev/urandom of=data.img bs=4096 count=8 status=none veritysetup format data.img hash.img --fec-device=fec.img --fec-roots=13 | awk '/^Root hash/{ print $3 }' >roothash # create an erasure that should be always repairable with this roots setting dd if=/dev/zero of=data.img conv=notrunc bs=1 count=8 seek=4088 status=none # try to read it through dm-verity veritysetup open data.img test hash.img --fec-device=fec.img --fec-roots=13 $(cat roothash) dd if=/dev/mapper/test of=/dev/null bs=4096 status=noxfer # wait for possible recursive recovery in kernel udevadm settle veritysetup close test With this fix, errors are properly repaired. device-mapper: verity-fec: 7:1: FEC 0: corrected 8 errors ... Without it, FEC code usually ends on unrecoverable failure in RS decoder: device-mapper: verity-fec: 7:1: FEC 0: failed to correct: -74 ... This problem is present in all kernels since the FEC code's introduction (kernel 4.5). It is thought that this problem is not visible in Android ecosystem because it always uses a default RS roots=2. Depends-on: a14e5ec66a7a ("dm bufio: subtract the number of initial sectors in dm_bufio_get_device_size") Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Tested-by: Jérôme Carretero <cJ-ko@zougloub.eu> Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5+ Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
2021-02-23 20:21:21 +00:00
dm_bufio_set_sector_offset(f->bufio, f->start << (v->data_dev_block_bits - SECTOR_SHIFT));
fec_blocks = div64_u64(f->rounds * f->roots, v->fec->roots << SECTOR_SHIFT);
if (dm_bufio_get_device_size(f->bufio) < fec_blocks) {
ti->error = "FEC device is too small";
return -E2BIG;
}
f->data_bufio = dm_bufio_client_create(v->data_dev->bdev,
1 << v->data_dev_block_bits,
1, 0, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (IS_ERR(f->data_bufio)) {
ti->error = "Cannot initialize FEC data bufio client";
return PTR_ERR(f->data_bufio);
}
if (dm_bufio_get_device_size(f->data_bufio) < v->data_blocks) {
ti->error = "Data device is too small";
return -E2BIG;
}
/* Preallocate an rs_control structure for each worker thread */
ret = mempool_init(&f->rs_pool, num_online_cpus(), fec_rs_alloc,
fec_rs_free, (void *) v);
if (ret) {
ti->error = "Cannot allocate RS pool";
return ret;
}
f->cache = kmem_cache_create("dm_verity_fec_buffers",
f->rsn << DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_RS_BITS,
0, 0, NULL);
if (!f->cache) {
ti->error = "Cannot create FEC buffer cache";
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Preallocate DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_PREALLOC buffers for each thread */
ret = mempool_init_slab_pool(&f->prealloc_pool, num_online_cpus() *
DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_PREALLOC,
f->cache);
if (ret) {
ti->error = "Cannot allocate FEC buffer prealloc pool";
return ret;
}
ret = mempool_init_slab_pool(&f->extra_pool, 0, f->cache);
if (ret) {
ti->error = "Cannot allocate FEC buffer extra pool";
return ret;
}
/* Preallocate an output buffer for each thread */
ret = mempool_init_kmalloc_pool(&f->output_pool, num_online_cpus(),
1 << v->data_dev_block_bits);
if (ret) {
ti->error = "Cannot allocate FEC output pool";
return ret;
}
/* Reserve space for our per-bio data */
ti->per_io_data_size += sizeof(struct dm_verity_fec_io);
return 0;
}