License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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2022-02-11 11:28:33 +00:00
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#ifndef _LINUX_RANDOM_H
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#define _LINUX_RANDOM_H
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2020-02-10 13:00:13 +00:00
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#include <linux/bug.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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2015-06-09 10:19:39 +00:00
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#include <linux/list.h>
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2015-10-07 23:20:38 +00:00
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#include <linux/once.h>
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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#include <uapi/linux/random.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2022-03-01 19:03:49 +00:00
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struct notifier_block;
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2015-06-09 10:19:39 +00:00
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2022-05-13 11:18:46 +00:00
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void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
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2022-06-07 15:00:16 +00:00
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void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
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2022-05-13 10:29:38 +00:00
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void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
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unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
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void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
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2022-05-13 11:18:46 +00:00
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void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
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gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin
This adds a new gcc plugin named "latent_entropy". It is designed to
extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot time as
possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in CPU operation
(due to runtime data differences, hardware differences, SMP ordering,
thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc).
At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example for
how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals.
The need for very-early boot entropy tends to be very architecture or
system design specific, so this plugin is more suited for those sorts
of special cases. The existing kernel RNG already attempts to extract
entropy from reliable runtime variation, but this plugin takes the idea to
a logical extreme by permuting a global variable based on any variation
in code execution (e.g. a different value (and permutation function)
is used to permute the global based on loop count, case statement,
if/then/else branching, etc).
To do this, the plugin starts by inserting a local variable in every
marked function. The plugin then adds logic so that the value of this
variable is modified by randomly chosen operations (add, xor and rol) and
random values (gcc generates separate static values for each location at
compile time and also injects the stack pointer at runtime). The resulting
value depends on the control flow path (e.g., loops and branches taken).
Before the function returns, the plugin mixes this local variable into
the latent_entropy global variable. The value of this global variable
is added to the kernel entropy pool in do_one_initcall() and _do_fork(),
though it does not credit any bytes of entropy to the pool; the contents
of the global are just used to mix the pool.
Additionally, the plugin can pre-initialize arrays with build-time
random contents, so that two different kernel builds running on identical
hardware will not have the same starting values.
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
[kees: expanded commit message and code comments]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2016-06-20 18:41:19 +00:00
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2019-05-07 14:28:15 +00:00
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#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
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gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin
This adds a new gcc plugin named "latent_entropy". It is designed to
extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot time as
possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in CPU operation
(due to runtime data differences, hardware differences, SMP ordering,
thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc).
At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example for
how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals.
The need for very-early boot entropy tends to be very architecture or
system design specific, so this plugin is more suited for those sorts
of special cases. The existing kernel RNG already attempts to extract
entropy from reliable runtime variation, but this plugin takes the idea to
a logical extreme by permuting a global variable based on any variation
in code execution (e.g. a different value (and permutation function)
is used to permute the global based on loop count, case statement,
if/then/else branching, etc).
To do this, the plugin starts by inserting a local variable in every
marked function. The plugin then adds logic so that the value of this
variable is modified by randomly chosen operations (add, xor and rol) and
random values (gcc generates separate static values for each location at
compile time and also injects the stack pointer at runtime). The resulting
value depends on the control flow path (e.g., loops and branches taken).
Before the function returns, the plugin mixes this local variable into
the latent_entropy global variable. The value of this global variable
is added to the kernel entropy pool in do_one_initcall() and _do_fork(),
though it does not credit any bytes of entropy to the pool; the contents
of the global are just used to mix the pool.
Additionally, the plugin can pre-initialize arrays with build-time
random contents, so that two different kernel builds running on identical
hardware will not have the same starting values.
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
[kees: expanded commit message and code comments]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2016-06-20 18:41:19 +00:00
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static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
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{
|
2022-05-05 00:20:22 +00:00
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add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy));
|
gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin
This adds a new gcc plugin named "latent_entropy". It is designed to
extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot time as
possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in CPU operation
(due to runtime data differences, hardware differences, SMP ordering,
thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc).
At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example for
how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals.
The need for very-early boot entropy tends to be very architecture or
system design specific, so this plugin is more suited for those sorts
of special cases. The existing kernel RNG already attempts to extract
entropy from reliable runtime variation, but this plugin takes the idea to
a logical extreme by permuting a global variable based on any variation
in code execution (e.g. a different value (and permutation function)
is used to permute the global based on loop count, case statement,
if/then/else branching, etc).
To do this, the plugin starts by inserting a local variable in every
marked function. The plugin then adds logic so that the value of this
variable is modified by randomly chosen operations (add, xor and rol) and
random values (gcc generates separate static values for each location at
compile time and also injects the stack pointer at runtime). The resulting
value depends on the control flow path (e.g., loops and branches taken).
Before the function returns, the plugin mixes this local variable into
the latent_entropy global variable. The value of this global variable
is added to the kernel entropy pool in do_one_initcall() and _do_fork(),
though it does not credit any bytes of entropy to the pool; the contents
of the global are just used to mix the pool.
Additionally, the plugin can pre-initialize arrays with build-time
random contents, so that two different kernel builds running on identical
hardware will not have the same starting values.
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
[kees: expanded commit message and code comments]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2016-06-20 18:41:19 +00:00
|
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}
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#else
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2022-05-13 10:29:38 +00:00
|
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static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { }
|
gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin
This adds a new gcc plugin named "latent_entropy". It is designed to
extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot time as
possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in CPU operation
(due to runtime data differences, hardware differences, SMP ordering,
thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc).
At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example for
how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals.
The need for very-early boot entropy tends to be very architecture or
system design specific, so this plugin is more suited for those sorts
of special cases. The existing kernel RNG already attempts to extract
entropy from reliable runtime variation, but this plugin takes the idea to
a logical extreme by permuting a global variable based on any variation
in code execution (e.g. a different value (and permutation function)
is used to permute the global based on loop count, case statement,
if/then/else branching, etc).
To do this, the plugin starts by inserting a local variable in every
marked function. The plugin then adds logic so that the value of this
variable is modified by randomly chosen operations (add, xor and rol) and
random values (gcc generates separate static values for each location at
compile time and also injects the stack pointer at runtime). The resulting
value depends on the control flow path (e.g., loops and branches taken).
Before the function returns, the plugin mixes this local variable into
the latent_entropy global variable. The value of this global variable
is added to the kernel entropy pool in do_one_initcall() and _do_fork(),
though it does not credit any bytes of entropy to the pool; the contents
of the global are just used to mix the pool.
Additionally, the plugin can pre-initialize arrays with build-time
random contents, so that two different kernel builds running on identical
hardware will not have the same starting values.
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
[kees: expanded commit message and code comments]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2016-06-20 18:41:19 +00:00
|
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#endif
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random: do not export add_vmfork_randomness() unless needed
Since add_vmfork_randomness() is only called from vmgenid.o, we can
guard it in CONFIG_VMGENID, similarly to how we do with
add_disk_randomness() and CONFIG_BLOCK. If we ever have multiple things
calling into add_vmfork_randomness(), we can add another shared Kconfig
symbol for that, but for now, this is good enough. Even though
add_vmfork_randomess() is a pretty small function, removing it means
that there are only calls to crng_reseed(false) and none to
crng_reseed(true), which means the compiler can constant propagate the
false, removing branches from crng_reseed() and its descendants.
Additionally, we don't even need the symbol to be exported if
CONFIG_VMGENID is not a module, so conditionalize that too.
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-03-01 14:14:04 +00:00
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#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMGENID)
|
2022-05-13 11:18:46 +00:00
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void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t len);
|
2022-05-13 10:29:38 +00:00
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int register_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
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int unregister_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
|
2022-03-01 19:22:39 +00:00
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#else
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static inline int register_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) { return 0; }
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static inline int unregister_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) { return 0; }
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random: do not export add_vmfork_randomness() unless needed
Since add_vmfork_randomness() is only called from vmgenid.o, we can
guard it in CONFIG_VMGENID, similarly to how we do with
add_disk_randomness() and CONFIG_BLOCK. If we ever have multiple things
calling into add_vmfork_randomness(), we can add another shared Kconfig
symbol for that, but for now, this is good enough. Even though
add_vmfork_randomess() is a pretty small function, removing it means
that there are only calls to crng_reseed(false) and none to
crng_reseed(true), which means the compiler can constant propagate the
false, removing branches from crng_reseed() and its descendants.
Additionally, we don't even need the symbol to be exported if
CONFIG_VMGENID is not a module, so conditionalize that too.
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-03-01 14:14:04 +00:00
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#endif
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2022-05-13 11:18:46 +00:00
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void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len);
|
2017-01-22 15:34:08 +00:00
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u32 get_random_u32(void);
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u64 get_random_u64(void);
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static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void)
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{
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return get_random_u32();
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}
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static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)
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{
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#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
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return get_random_u64();
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#else
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return get_random_u32();
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#endif
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}
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random,stackprotect: introduce get_random_canary function
Patch series "stackprotector: ascii armor the stack canary", v2.
Zero out the first byte of the stack canary value on 64 bit systems, in
order to mitigate unterminated C string overflows.
The null byte both prevents C string functions from reading the canary,
and from writing it if the canary value were guessed or obtained through
some other means.
Reducing the entropy by 8 bits is acceptable on 64-bit systems, which
will still have 56 bits of entropy left, but not on 32 bit systems, so
the "ascii armor" canary is only implemented on 64-bit systems.
Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in execshield and Daniel Micay's
linux-hardened tree.
Also see https://github.com/thestinger/linux-hardened/
This patch (of 5):
Introduce get_random_canary(), which provides a random unsigned long
canary value with the first byte zeroed out on 64 bit architectures, in
order to mitigate non-terminated C string overflows.
The null byte both prevents C string functions from reading the canary,
and from writing it if the canary value were guessed or obtained through
some other means.
Reducing the entropy by 8 bits is acceptable on 64-bit systems, which
will still have 56 bits of entropy left, but not on 32 bit systems, so
the "ascii armor" canary is only implemented on 64-bit systems.
Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in the old execshield patches, and
Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524155751.424-2-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 21:36:17 +00:00
|
|
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/*
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* On 64-bit architectures, protect against non-terminated C string overflows
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* by zeroing out the first byte of the canary; this leaves 56 bits of entropy.
|
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*/
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#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
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# ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
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# define CANARY_MASK 0xffffffffffffff00UL
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# else /* big endian, 64 bits: */
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# define CANARY_MASK 0x00ffffffffffffffUL
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# endif
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#else /* 32 bits: */
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# define CANARY_MASK 0xffffffffUL
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#endif
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static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void)
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{
|
2022-05-13 10:29:38 +00:00
|
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return get_random_long() & CANARY_MASK;
|
random,stackprotect: introduce get_random_canary function
Patch series "stackprotector: ascii armor the stack canary", v2.
Zero out the first byte of the stack canary value on 64 bit systems, in
order to mitigate unterminated C string overflows.
The null byte both prevents C string functions from reading the canary,
and from writing it if the canary value were guessed or obtained through
some other means.
Reducing the entropy by 8 bits is acceptable on 64-bit systems, which
will still have 56 bits of entropy left, but not on 32 bit systems, so
the "ascii armor" canary is only implemented on 64-bit systems.
Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in execshield and Daniel Micay's
linux-hardened tree.
Also see https://github.com/thestinger/linux-hardened/
This patch (of 5):
Introduce get_random_canary(), which provides a random unsigned long
canary value with the first byte zeroed out on 64 bit architectures, in
order to mitigate non-terminated C string overflows.
The null byte both prevents C string functions from reading the canary,
and from writing it if the canary value were guessed or obtained through
some other means.
Reducing the entropy by 8 bits is acceptable on 64-bit systems, which
will still have 56 bits of entropy left, but not on 32 bit systems, so
the "ascii armor" canary is only implemented on 64-bit systems.
Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in the old execshield patches, and
Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524155751.424-2-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 21:36:17 +00:00
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}
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2022-05-13 10:29:38 +00:00
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int __init random_init(const char *command_line);
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bool rng_is_initialized(void);
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int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
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|
2017-06-08 00:05:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes).
|
|
|
|
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* Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */
|
2022-02-09 13:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
|
2017-06-08 00:05:02 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
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|
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
|
2018-02-04 22:07:46 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2017-06-08 00:05:02 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
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|
|
|
2022-05-13 10:32:23 +00:00
|
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|
#define declare_get_random_var_wait(name, ret_type) \
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|
|
|
|
static inline int get_random_ ## name ## _wait(ret_type *out) { \
|
2017-06-08 00:05:02 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \
|
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(ret)) \
|
|
|
|
|
return ret; \
|
2022-05-13 10:32:23 +00:00
|
|
|
*out = get_random_ ## name(); \
|
2017-06-08 00:05:02 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0; \
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-05-13 10:32:23 +00:00
|
|
|
declare_get_random_var_wait(u32, u32)
|
|
|
|
|
declare_get_random_var_wait(u64, u32)
|
|
|
|
|
declare_get_random_var_wait(int, unsigned int)
|
|
|
|
|
declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long)
|
2017-06-08 00:05:02 +00:00
|
|
|
#undef declare_get_random_var
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-26 21:44:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2020-07-31 05:51:14 +00:00
|
|
|
* This is designed to be standalone for just prandom
|
|
|
|
|
* users, but for now we include it from <linux/random.h>
|
|
|
|
|
* for legacy reasons.
|
2010-05-26 21:44:13 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-07-31 05:51:14 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/prandom.h>
|
2010-05-26 21:44:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-07-31 20:54:50 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
|
|
|
|
|
# include <asm/archrandom.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
2022-05-13 10:29:38 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
|
|
|
|
|
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
|
|
|
|
|
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
|
|
|
|
|
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
|
2011-07-31 20:54:50 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-10 13:00:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Called from the boot CPU during startup; not valid to call once
|
|
|
|
|
* secondary CPUs are up and preemption is possible.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef arch_get_random_seed_long_early
|
|
|
|
|
static inline bool __init arch_get_random_seed_long_early(unsigned long *v)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING);
|
|
|
|
|
return arch_get_random_seed_long(v);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef arch_get_random_long_early
|
|
|
|
|
static inline bool __init arch_get_random_long_early(unsigned long *v)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING);
|
|
|
|
|
return arch_get_random_long(v);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up
For the irq randomness fast pool, rather than having to use expensive
atomics, which were visibly the most expensive thing in the entire irq
handler, simply take care of the extreme edge case of resetting count to
zero in the cpuhp online handler, just after workqueues have been
reenabled. This simplifies the code a bit and lets us use vanilla
variables rather than atomics, and performance should be improved.
As well, very early on when the CPU comes up, while interrupts are still
disabled, we clear out the per-cpu crng and its batches, so that it
always starts with fresh randomness.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-13 21:48:04 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
|
2022-05-13 10:29:38 +00:00
|
|
|
int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
|
|
|
|
|
int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef MODULE
|
|
|
|
|
extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
|
random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up
For the irq randomness fast pool, rather than having to use expensive
atomics, which were visibly the most expensive thing in the entire irq
handler, simply take care of the extreme edge case of resetting count to
zero in the cpuhp online handler, just after workqueues have been
reenabled. This simplifies the code a bit and lets us use vanilla
variables rather than atomics, and performance should be improved.
As well, very early on when the CPU comes up, while interrupts are still
disabled, we clear out the per-cpu crng and its batches, so that it
always starts with fresh randomness.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-13 21:48:04 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */
|