License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#ifndef _LINUX_SEQ_FILE_H
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#define _LINUX_SEQ_FILE_H
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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2011-11-24 01:12:59 +00:00
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#include <linux/bug.h>
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2006-03-23 11:00:37 +00:00
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#include <linux/mutex.h>
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2008-08-12 22:09:02 +00:00
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#include <linux/cpumask.h>
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#include <linux/nodemask.h>
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Make file credentials available to the seqfile interfaces
A lot of seqfile users seem to be using things like %pK that uses the
credentials of the current process, but that is actually completely
wrong for filesystem interfaces.
The unix semantics for permission checking files is to check permissions
at _open_ time, not at read or write time, and that is not just a small
detail: passing off stdin/stdout/stderr to a suid application and making
the actual IO happen in privileged context is a classic exploit
technique.
So if we want to be able to look at permissions at read time, we need to
use the file open credentials, not the current ones. Normal file
accesses can just use "f_cred" (or any of the helper functions that do
that, like file_ns_capable()), but the seqfile interfaces do not have
any such options.
It turns out that seq_file _does_ save away the user_ns information of
the file, though. Since user_ns is just part of the full credential
information, replace that special case with saving off the cred pointer
instead, and suddenly seq_file has all the permission information it
needs.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-14 18:22:00 +00:00
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/cred.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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struct seq_operations;
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struct seq_file {
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char *buf;
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size_t size;
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size_t from;
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size_t count;
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2013-11-14 22:31:56 +00:00
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size_t pad_until;
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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loff_t index;
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2009-02-18 22:48:16 +00:00
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loff_t read_pos;
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2006-03-23 11:00:37 +00:00
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struct mutex lock;
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2006-12-07 04:40:36 +00:00
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const struct seq_operations *op;
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2011-07-12 18:48:39 +00:00
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int poll_event;
|
Make file credentials available to the seqfile interfaces
A lot of seqfile users seem to be using things like %pK that uses the
credentials of the current process, but that is actually completely
wrong for filesystem interfaces.
The unix semantics for permission checking files is to check permissions
at _open_ time, not at read or write time, and that is not just a small
detail: passing off stdin/stdout/stderr to a suid application and making
the actual IO happen in privileged context is a classic exploit
technique.
So if we want to be able to look at permissions at read time, we need to
use the file open credentials, not the current ones. Normal file
accesses can just use "f_cred" (or any of the helper functions that do
that, like file_ns_capable()), but the seqfile interfaces do not have
any such options.
It turns out that seq_file _does_ save away the user_ns information of
the file, though. Since user_ns is just part of the full credential
information, replace that special case with saving off the cred pointer
instead, and suddenly seq_file has all the permission information it
needs.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-14 18:22:00 +00:00
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const struct file *file;
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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void *private;
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};
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struct seq_operations {
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void * (*start) (struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos);
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void (*stop) (struct seq_file *m, void *v);
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void * (*next) (struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos);
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int (*show) (struct seq_file *m, void *v);
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};
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2008-03-28 04:46:41 +00:00
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#define SEQ_SKIP 1
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2014-09-29 23:08:21 +00:00
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/**
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* seq_has_overflowed - check if the buffer has overflowed
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* @m: the seq_file handle
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*
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* seq_files have a buffer which may overflow. When this happens a larger
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* buffer is reallocated and all the data will be printed again.
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* The overflow state is true when m->count == m->size.
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*
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* Returns true if the buffer received more than it can hold.
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*/
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static inline bool seq_has_overflowed(struct seq_file *m)
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{
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return m->count == m->size;
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}
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2009-09-21 12:48:36 +00:00
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/**
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* seq_get_buf - get buffer to write arbitrary data to
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* @m: the seq_file handle
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* @bufp: the beginning of the buffer is stored here
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*
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* Return the number of bytes available in the buffer, or zero if
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* there's no space.
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*/
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static inline size_t seq_get_buf(struct seq_file *m, char **bufp)
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{
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BUG_ON(m->count > m->size);
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if (m->count < m->size)
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*bufp = m->buf + m->count;
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else
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*bufp = NULL;
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return m->size - m->count;
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}
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/**
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* seq_commit - commit data to the buffer
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* @m: the seq_file handle
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* @num: the number of bytes to commit
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*
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* Commit @num bytes of data written to a buffer previously acquired
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* by seq_buf_get. To signal an error condition, or that the data
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* didn't fit in the available space, pass a negative @num value.
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*/
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static inline void seq_commit(struct seq_file *m, int num)
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{
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if (num < 0) {
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m->count = m->size;
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} else {
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BUG_ON(m->count + num > m->size);
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m->count += num;
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}
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}
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2013-11-14 22:31:56 +00:00
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/**
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* seq_setwidth - set padding width
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* @m: the seq_file handle
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* @size: the max number of bytes to pad.
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*
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* Call seq_setwidth() for setting max width, then call seq_printf() etc. and
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* finally call seq_pad() to pad the remaining bytes.
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*/
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static inline void seq_setwidth(struct seq_file *m, size_t size)
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{
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m->pad_until = m->count + size;
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}
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void seq_pad(struct seq_file *m, char c);
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2011-12-09 01:18:57 +00:00
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char *mangle_path(char *s, const char *p, const char *esc);
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2006-12-07 04:40:36 +00:00
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int seq_open(struct file *, const struct seq_operations *);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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ssize_t seq_read(struct file *, char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
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2020-11-04 08:27:33 +00:00
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ssize_t seq_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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loff_t seq_lseek(struct file *, loff_t, int);
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int seq_release(struct inode *, struct file *);
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2009-06-17 23:28:05 +00:00
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int seq_write(struct seq_file *seq, const void *data, size_t len);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2015-09-11 20:07:48 +00:00
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__printf(2, 0)
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void seq_vprintf(struct seq_file *m, const char *fmt, va_list args);
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__printf(2, 3)
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void seq_printf(struct seq_file *m, const char *fmt, ...);
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void seq_putc(struct seq_file *m, char c);
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void seq_puts(struct seq_file *m, const char *s);
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2018-04-10 23:31:16 +00:00
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void seq_put_decimal_ull_width(struct seq_file *m, const char *delimiter,
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unsigned long long num, unsigned int width);
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2016-10-08 00:02:20 +00:00
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void seq_put_decimal_ull(struct seq_file *m, const char *delimiter,
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2015-09-11 20:07:48 +00:00
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unsigned long long num);
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2016-10-08 00:02:20 +00:00
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void seq_put_decimal_ll(struct seq_file *m, const char *delimiter, long long num);
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2018-04-10 23:30:44 +00:00
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void seq_put_hex_ll(struct seq_file *m, const char *delimiter,
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unsigned long long v, unsigned int width);
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2015-09-11 20:07:48 +00:00
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void seq_escape(struct seq_file *m, const char *s, const char *esc);
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2019-06-19 16:30:13 +00:00
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void seq_escape_mem_ascii(struct seq_file *m, const char *src, size_t isz);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2015-09-09 22:38:33 +00:00
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void seq_hex_dump(struct seq_file *m, const char *prefix_str, int prefix_type,
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int rowsize, int groupsize, const void *buf, size_t len,
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bool ascii);
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2011-12-09 01:18:57 +00:00
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int seq_path(struct seq_file *, const struct path *, const char *);
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2015-06-19 08:30:28 +00:00
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int seq_file_path(struct seq_file *, struct file *, const char *);
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2011-12-09 01:18:57 +00:00
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int seq_dentry(struct seq_file *, struct dentry *, const char *);
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int seq_path_root(struct seq_file *m, const struct path *path,
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const struct path *root, const char *esc);
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2008-10-19 03:28:19 +00:00
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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int single_open(struct file *, int (*)(struct seq_file *, void *), void *);
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2013-03-31 17:43:23 +00:00
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int single_open_size(struct file *, int (*)(struct seq_file *, void *), void *, size_t);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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int single_release(struct inode *, struct file *);
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2007-10-10 09:28:42 +00:00
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void *__seq_open_private(struct file *, const struct seq_operations *, int);
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int seq_open_private(struct file *, const struct seq_operations *, int);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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int seq_release_private(struct inode *, struct file *);
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2020-06-04 23:51:05 +00:00
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#define DEFINE_SEQ_ATTRIBUTE(__name) \
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static int __name ## _open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) \
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{ \
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int ret = seq_open(file, &__name ## _sops); \
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if (!ret && inode->i_private) { \
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struct seq_file *seq_f = file->private_data; \
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seq_f->private = inode->i_private; \
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} \
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return ret; \
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} \
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\
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static const struct file_operations __name ## _fops = { \
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.owner = THIS_MODULE, \
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.open = __name ## _open, \
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.read = seq_read, \
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.llseek = seq_lseek, \
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.release = seq_release, \
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}
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2018-01-22 16:05:43 +00:00
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#define DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(__name) \
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static int __name ## _open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) \
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{ \
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return single_open(file, __name ## _show, inode->i_private); \
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} \
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\
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static const struct file_operations __name ## _fops = { \
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.owner = THIS_MODULE, \
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.open = __name ## _open, \
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.read = seq_read, \
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.llseek = seq_lseek, \
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.release = single_release, \
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}
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2020-02-04 01:37:17 +00:00
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#define DEFINE_PROC_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(__name) \
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static int __name ## _open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) \
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{ \
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2021-11-09 02:35:19 +00:00
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return single_open(file, __name ## _show, PDE_DATA(inode)); \
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2020-02-04 01:37:17 +00:00
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} \
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\
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static const struct proc_ops __name ## _proc_ops = { \
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.proc_open = __name ## _open, \
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.proc_read = seq_read, \
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.proc_lseek = seq_lseek, \
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.proc_release = single_release, \
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}
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2012-05-24 00:01:20 +00:00
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static inline struct user_namespace *seq_user_ns(struct seq_file *seq)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
|
Make file credentials available to the seqfile interfaces
A lot of seqfile users seem to be using things like %pK that uses the
credentials of the current process, but that is actually completely
wrong for filesystem interfaces.
The unix semantics for permission checking files is to check permissions
at _open_ time, not at read or write time, and that is not just a small
detail: passing off stdin/stdout/stderr to a suid application and making
the actual IO happen in privileged context is a classic exploit
technique.
So if we want to be able to look at permissions at read time, we need to
use the file open credentials, not the current ones. Normal file
accesses can just use "f_cred" (or any of the helper functions that do
that, like file_ns_capable()), but the seqfile interfaces do not have
any such options.
It turns out that seq_file _does_ save away the user_ns information of
the file, though. Since user_ns is just part of the full credential
information, replace that special case with saving off the cred pointer
instead, and suddenly seq_file has all the permission information it
needs.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-14 18:22:00 +00:00
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return seq->file->f_cred->user_ns;
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2012-05-24 00:01:20 +00:00
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#else
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extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
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return &init_user_ns;
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#endif
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}
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fs: create and use seq_show_option for escaping
Many file systems that implement the show_options hook fail to correctly
escape their output which could lead to unescaped characters (e.g. new
lines) leaking into /proc/mounts and /proc/[pid]/mountinfo files. This
could lead to confusion, spoofed entries (resulting in things like
systemd issuing false d-bus "mount" notifications), and who knows what
else. This looks like it would only be the root user stepping on
themselves, but it's possible weird things could happen in containers or
in other situations with delegated mount privileges.
Here's an example using overlay with setuid fusermount trusting the
contents of /proc/mounts (via the /etc/mtab symlink). Imagine the use
of "sudo" is something more sneaky:
$ BASE="ovl"
$ MNT="$BASE/mnt"
$ LOW="$BASE/lower"
$ UP="$BASE/upper"
$ WORK="$BASE/work/ 0 0
none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000"
$ mkdir -p "$LOW" "$UP" "$WORK"
$ sudo mount -t overlay -o "lowerdir=$LOW,upperdir=$UP,workdir=$WORK" none /mnt
$ cat /proc/mounts
none /root/ovl/mnt overlay rw,relatime,lowerdir=ovl/lower,upperdir=ovl/upper,workdir=ovl/work/ 0 0
none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000 0 0
$ fusermount -u /proc
$ cat /proc/mounts
cat: /proc/mounts: No such file or directory
This fixes the problem by adding new seq_show_option and
seq_show_option_n helpers, and updating the vulnerable show_option
handlers to use them as needed. Some, like SELinux, need to be open
coded due to unusual existing escape mechanisms.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lost chunk, per Kees]
[keescook@chromium.org: seq_show_option should be using const parameters]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05g@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-04 22:44:57 +00:00
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/**
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* seq_show_options - display mount options with appropriate escapes.
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* @m: the seq_file handle
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* @name: the mount option name
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* @value: the mount option name's value, can be NULL
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*/
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static inline void seq_show_option(struct seq_file *m, const char *name,
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const char *value)
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{
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seq_putc(m, ',');
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seq_escape(m, name, ",= \t\n\\");
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if (value) {
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seq_putc(m, '=');
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|
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seq_escape(m, value, ", \t\n\\");
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|
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}
|
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|
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}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* seq_show_option_n - display mount options with appropriate escapes
|
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* where @value must be a specific length.
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|
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* @m: the seq_file handle
|
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|
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* @name: the mount option name
|
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|
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* @value: the mount option name's value, cannot be NULL
|
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|
|
* @length: the length of @value to display
|
|
|
|
*
|
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|
|
* This is a macro since this uses "length" to define the size of the
|
|
|
|
* stack buffer.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define seq_show_option_n(m, name, value, length) { \
|
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|
|
char val_buf[length + 1]; \
|
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|
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strncpy(val_buf, value, length); \
|
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|
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val_buf[length] = '\0'; \
|
|
|
|
seq_show_option(m, name, val_buf); \
|
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|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#define SEQ_START_TOKEN ((void *)1)
|
2007-07-11 00:22:26 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Helpers for iteration over list_head-s in seq_files
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
extern struct list_head *seq_list_start(struct list_head *head,
|
|
|
|
loff_t pos);
|
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|
|
extern struct list_head *seq_list_start_head(struct list_head *head,
|
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|
|
loff_t pos);
|
|
|
|
extern struct list_head *seq_list_next(void *v, struct list_head *head,
|
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|
|
loff_t *ppos);
|
|
|
|
|
2010-02-08 23:18:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Helpers for iteration over hlist_head-s in seq_files
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
extern struct hlist_node *seq_hlist_start(struct hlist_head *head,
|
2010-02-22 07:57:17 +00:00
|
|
|
loff_t pos);
|
2010-02-08 23:18:22 +00:00
|
|
|
extern struct hlist_node *seq_hlist_start_head(struct hlist_head *head,
|
2010-02-22 07:57:17 +00:00
|
|
|
loff_t pos);
|
2010-02-08 23:18:22 +00:00
|
|
|
extern struct hlist_node *seq_hlist_next(void *v, struct hlist_head *head,
|
2010-02-22 07:57:17 +00:00
|
|
|
loff_t *ppos);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
extern struct hlist_node *seq_hlist_start_rcu(struct hlist_head *head,
|
|
|
|
loff_t pos);
|
|
|
|
extern struct hlist_node *seq_hlist_start_head_rcu(struct hlist_head *head,
|
|
|
|
loff_t pos);
|
|
|
|
extern struct hlist_node *seq_hlist_next_rcu(void *v,
|
|
|
|
struct hlist_head *head,
|
|
|
|
loff_t *ppos);
|
2013-06-21 12:58:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Helpers for iterating over per-cpu hlist_head-s in seq_files */
|
|
|
|
extern struct hlist_node *seq_hlist_start_percpu(struct hlist_head __percpu *head, int *cpu, loff_t pos);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
extern struct hlist_node *seq_hlist_next_percpu(void *v, struct hlist_head __percpu *head, int *cpu, loff_t *pos);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-10 23:34:45 +00:00
|
|
|
void seq_file_init(void);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|