linux-stable/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Landlock tests - Common user space base
*
* Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
* Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/landlock.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include "common.h"
#ifndef O_PATH
#define O_PATH 010000000
#endif
TEST(inconsistent_attr)
{
const long page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
char *const buf = malloc(page_size + 1);
struct landlock_ruleset_attr *const ruleset_attr = (void *)buf;
ASSERT_NE(NULL, buf);
/* Checks copy_from_user(). */
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr, 0, 0));
/* The size if less than sizeof(struct landlock_attr_enforce). */
ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr, 1, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr, 7, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 1, 0));
/* The size if less than sizeof(struct landlock_attr_enforce). */
ASSERT_EQ(EFAULT, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(
NULL, sizeof(struct landlock_ruleset_attr), 0));
ASSERT_EQ(EFAULT, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr, page_size + 1, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(E2BIG, errno);
/* Checks minimal valid attribute size. */
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr, 8, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(
ruleset_attr,
sizeof(struct landlock_ruleset_attr), 0));
ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr, page_size, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno);
/* Checks non-zero value. */
buf[page_size - 2] = '.';
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr, page_size, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(E2BIG, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr, page_size + 1, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(E2BIG, errno);
free(buf);
}
TEST(abi_version)
{
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features Add a new flag LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION to landlock_create_ruleset(2). This enables to retreive a Landlock ABI version that is useful to efficiently follow a best-effort security approach. Indeed, it would be a missed opportunity to abort the whole sandbox building, because some features are unavailable, instead of protecting users as much as possible with the subset of features provided by the running kernel. This new flag enables user space to identify the minimum set of Landlock features supported by the running kernel without relying on a filesystem interface (e.g. /proc/version, which might be inaccessible) nor testing multiple syscall argument combinations (i.e. syscall bisection). New Landlock features will be documented and tied to a minimum version number (greater than 1). The current version will be incremented for each new kernel release supporting new Landlock features. User space libraries can leverage this information to seamlessly restrict processes as much as possible while being compatible with newer APIs. This is a much more lighter approach than the previous landlock_get_features(2): the complexity is pushed to user space libraries. This flag meets similar needs as securityfs versions: selinux/policyvers, apparmor/features/*/version* and tomoyo/version. Supporting this flag now will be convenient for backward compatibility. Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-14-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 15:41:23 +00:00
const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
};
ASSERT_EQ(1, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features Add a new flag LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION to landlock_create_ruleset(2). This enables to retreive a Landlock ABI version that is useful to efficiently follow a best-effort security approach. Indeed, it would be a missed opportunity to abort the whole sandbox building, because some features are unavailable, instead of protecting users as much as possible with the subset of features provided by the running kernel. This new flag enables user space to identify the minimum set of Landlock features supported by the running kernel without relying on a filesystem interface (e.g. /proc/version, which might be inaccessible) nor testing multiple syscall argument combinations (i.e. syscall bisection). New Landlock features will be documented and tied to a minimum version number (greater than 1). The current version will be incremented for each new kernel release supporting new Landlock features. User space libraries can leverage this information to seamlessly restrict processes as much as possible while being compatible with newer APIs. This is a much more lighter approach than the previous landlock_get_features(2): the complexity is pushed to user space libraries. This flag meets similar needs as securityfs versions: selinux/policyvers, apparmor/features/*/version* and tomoyo/version. Supporting this flag now will be convenient for backward compatibility. Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-14-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 15:41:23 +00:00
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0,
LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features Add a new flag LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION to landlock_create_ruleset(2). This enables to retreive a Landlock ABI version that is useful to efficiently follow a best-effort security approach. Indeed, it would be a missed opportunity to abort the whole sandbox building, because some features are unavailable, instead of protecting users as much as possible with the subset of features provided by the running kernel. This new flag enables user space to identify the minimum set of Landlock features supported by the running kernel without relying on a filesystem interface (e.g. /proc/version, which might be inaccessible) nor testing multiple syscall argument combinations (i.e. syscall bisection). New Landlock features will be documented and tied to a minimum version number (greater than 1). The current version will be incremented for each new kernel release supporting new Landlock features. User space libraries can leverage this information to seamlessly restrict processes as much as possible while being compatible with newer APIs. This is a much more lighter approach than the previous landlock_get_features(2): the complexity is pushed to user space libraries. This flag meets similar needs as securityfs versions: selinux/policyvers, apparmor/features/*/version* and tomoyo/version. Supporting this flag now will be convenient for backward compatibility. Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-14-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 15:41:23 +00:00
ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, sizeof(ruleset_attr),
LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features Add a new flag LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION to landlock_create_ruleset(2). This enables to retreive a Landlock ABI version that is useful to efficiently follow a best-effort security approach. Indeed, it would be a missed opportunity to abort the whole sandbox building, because some features are unavailable, instead of protecting users as much as possible with the subset of features provided by the running kernel. This new flag enables user space to identify the minimum set of Landlock features supported by the running kernel without relying on a filesystem interface (e.g. /proc/version, which might be inaccessible) nor testing multiple syscall argument combinations (i.e. syscall bisection). New Landlock features will be documented and tied to a minimum version number (greater than 1). The current version will be incremented for each new kernel release supporting new Landlock features. User space libraries can leverage this information to seamlessly restrict processes as much as possible while being compatible with newer APIs. This is a much more lighter approach than the previous landlock_get_features(2): the complexity is pushed to user space libraries. This flag meets similar needs as securityfs versions: selinux/policyvers, apparmor/features/*/version* and tomoyo/version. Supporting this flag now will be convenient for backward compatibility. Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-14-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 15:41:23 +00:00
ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(-1,
landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr),
LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features Add a new flag LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION to landlock_create_ruleset(2). This enables to retreive a Landlock ABI version that is useful to efficiently follow a best-effort security approach. Indeed, it would be a missed opportunity to abort the whole sandbox building, because some features are unavailable, instead of protecting users as much as possible with the subset of features provided by the running kernel. This new flag enables user space to identify the minimum set of Landlock features supported by the running kernel without relying on a filesystem interface (e.g. /proc/version, which might be inaccessible) nor testing multiple syscall argument combinations (i.e. syscall bisection). New Landlock features will be documented and tied to a minimum version number (greater than 1). The current version will be incremented for each new kernel release supporting new Landlock features. User space libraries can leverage this information to seamlessly restrict processes as much as possible while being compatible with newer APIs. This is a much more lighter approach than the previous landlock_get_features(2): the complexity is pushed to user space libraries. This flag meets similar needs as securityfs versions: selinux/policyvers, apparmor/features/*/version* and tomoyo/version. Supporting this flag now will be convenient for backward compatibility. Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-14-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 15:41:23 +00:00
ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION |
1 << 31));
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features Add a new flag LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION to landlock_create_ruleset(2). This enables to retreive a Landlock ABI version that is useful to efficiently follow a best-effort security approach. Indeed, it would be a missed opportunity to abort the whole sandbox building, because some features are unavailable, instead of protecting users as much as possible with the subset of features provided by the running kernel. This new flag enables user space to identify the minimum set of Landlock features supported by the running kernel without relying on a filesystem interface (e.g. /proc/version, which might be inaccessible) nor testing multiple syscall argument combinations (i.e. syscall bisection). New Landlock features will be documented and tied to a minimum version number (greater than 1). The current version will be incremented for each new kernel release supporting new Landlock features. User space libraries can leverage this information to seamlessly restrict processes as much as possible while being compatible with newer APIs. This is a much more lighter approach than the previous landlock_get_features(2): the complexity is pushed to user space libraries. This flag meets similar needs as securityfs versions: selinux/policyvers, apparmor/features/*/version* and tomoyo/version. Supporting this flag now will be convenient for backward compatibility. Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-14-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 15:41:23 +00:00
ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
}
TEST(inval_create_ruleset_flags)
{
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features Add a new flag LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION to landlock_create_ruleset(2). This enables to retreive a Landlock ABI version that is useful to efficiently follow a best-effort security approach. Indeed, it would be a missed opportunity to abort the whole sandbox building, because some features are unavailable, instead of protecting users as much as possible with the subset of features provided by the running kernel. This new flag enables user space to identify the minimum set of Landlock features supported by the running kernel without relying on a filesystem interface (e.g. /proc/version, which might be inaccessible) nor testing multiple syscall argument combinations (i.e. syscall bisection). New Landlock features will be documented and tied to a minimum version number (greater than 1). The current version will be incremented for each new kernel release supporting new Landlock features. User space libraries can leverage this information to seamlessly restrict processes as much as possible while being compatible with newer APIs. This is a much more lighter approach than the previous landlock_get_features(2): the complexity is pushed to user space libraries. This flag meets similar needs as securityfs versions: selinux/policyvers, apparmor/features/*/version* and tomoyo/version. Supporting this flag now will be convenient for backward compatibility. Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-14-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 15:41:23 +00:00
const int last_flag = LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION;
const int invalid_flag = last_flag << 1;
const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
};
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, invalid_flag));
ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0, invalid_flag));
ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, sizeof(ruleset_attr),
invalid_flag));
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features Add a new flag LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION to landlock_create_ruleset(2). This enables to retreive a Landlock ABI version that is useful to efficiently follow a best-effort security approach. Indeed, it would be a missed opportunity to abort the whole sandbox building, because some features are unavailable, instead of protecting users as much as possible with the subset of features provided by the running kernel. This new flag enables user space to identify the minimum set of Landlock features supported by the running kernel without relying on a filesystem interface (e.g. /proc/version, which might be inaccessible) nor testing multiple syscall argument combinations (i.e. syscall bisection). New Landlock features will be documented and tied to a minimum version number (greater than 1). The current version will be incremented for each new kernel release supporting new Landlock features. User space libraries can leverage this information to seamlessly restrict processes as much as possible while being compatible with newer APIs. This is a much more lighter approach than the previous landlock_get_features(2): the complexity is pushed to user space libraries. This flag meets similar needs as securityfs versions: selinux/policyvers, apparmor/features/*/version* and tomoyo/version. Supporting this flag now will be convenient for backward compatibility. Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-14-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 15:41:23 +00:00
ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(-1,
landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr),
invalid_flag));
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features Add a new flag LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION to landlock_create_ruleset(2). This enables to retreive a Landlock ABI version that is useful to efficiently follow a best-effort security approach. Indeed, it would be a missed opportunity to abort the whole sandbox building, because some features are unavailable, instead of protecting users as much as possible with the subset of features provided by the running kernel. This new flag enables user space to identify the minimum set of Landlock features supported by the running kernel without relying on a filesystem interface (e.g. /proc/version, which might be inaccessible) nor testing multiple syscall argument combinations (i.e. syscall bisection). New Landlock features will be documented and tied to a minimum version number (greater than 1). The current version will be incremented for each new kernel release supporting new Landlock features. User space libraries can leverage this information to seamlessly restrict processes as much as possible while being compatible with newer APIs. This is a much more lighter approach than the previous landlock_get_features(2): the complexity is pushed to user space libraries. This flag meets similar needs as securityfs versions: selinux/policyvers, apparmor/features/*/version* and tomoyo/version. Supporting this flag now will be convenient for backward compatibility. Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-14-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 15:41:23 +00:00
ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
}
TEST(empty_path_beneath_attr)
{
const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
};
const int ruleset_fd =
landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
/* Similar to struct landlock_path_beneath_attr.parent_fd = 0 */
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,
NULL, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(EFAULT, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
}
TEST(inval_fd_enforce)
{
ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_restrict_self(-1, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(EBADF, errno);
}
TEST(unpriv_enforce_without_no_new_privs)
{
int err;
drop_caps(_metadata);
err = landlock_restrict_self(-1, 0);
ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(err, -1);
}
TEST(ruleset_fd_io)
{
struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
};
int ruleset_fd;
char buf;
drop_caps(_metadata);
ruleset_fd =
landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, write(ruleset_fd, ".", 1));
ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, read(ruleset_fd, &buf, 1));
ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
}
/* Tests enforcement of a ruleset FD transferred through a UNIX socket. */
TEST(ruleset_fd_transfer)
{
struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR,
};
struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr = {
.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR,
};
int ruleset_fd_tx, dir_fd;
union {
/* Aligned ancillary data buffer. */
char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx))];
struct cmsghdr _align;
} cmsg_tx = {};
char data_tx = '.';
struct iovec io = {
.iov_base = &data_tx,
.iov_len = sizeof(data_tx),
};
struct msghdr msg = {
.msg_iov = &io,
.msg_iovlen = 1,
.msg_control = &cmsg_tx.buf,
.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsg_tx.buf),
};
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
int socket_fds[2];
pid_t child;
int status;
drop_caps(_metadata);
/* Creates a test ruleset with a simple rule. */
ruleset_fd_tx =
landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_tx);
path_beneath_attr.parent_fd =
open("/tmp", O_PATH | O_NOFOLLOW | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
ASSERT_LE(0, path_beneath_attr.parent_fd);
ASSERT_EQ(0,
landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_tx, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,
&path_beneath_attr, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd));
cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
ASSERT_NE(NULL, cmsg);
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx));
cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), &ruleset_fd_tx, sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx));
/* Sends the ruleset FD over a socketpair and then close it. */
ASSERT_EQ(0, socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0,
socket_fds));
ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(data_tx), sendmsg(socket_fds[0], &msg, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(socket_fds[0]));
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_tx));
child = fork();
ASSERT_LE(0, child);
if (child == 0) {
int ruleset_fd_rx;
*(char *)msg.msg_iov->iov_base = '\0';
ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(data_tx),
recvmsg(socket_fds[1], &msg, MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC));
ASSERT_EQ('.', *(char *)msg.msg_iov->iov_base);
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(socket_fds[1]));
cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
ASSERT_EQ(cmsg->cmsg_len, CMSG_LEN(sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx)));
memcpy(&ruleset_fd_rx, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx));
/* Enforces the received ruleset on the child. */
ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd_rx, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_rx));
/* Checks that the ruleset enforcement. */
ASSERT_EQ(-1, open("/", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC));
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
dir_fd = open("/tmp", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
ASSERT_LE(0, dir_fd);
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(dir_fd));
_exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
return;
}
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(socket_fds[1]));
/* Checks that the parent is unrestricted. */
dir_fd = open("/", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
ASSERT_LE(0, dir_fd);
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(dir_fd));
dir_fd = open("/tmp", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
ASSERT_LE(0, dir_fd);
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(dir_fd));
ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
TEST_HARNESS_MAIN