linux-stable/arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h

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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
/*
* Security related feature bit definitions.
*
* Copyright 2018, Michael Ellerman, IBM Corporation.
*/
#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H
#define _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H
extern u64 powerpc_security_features;
extern bool rfi_flush;
/* These are bit flags */
enum stf_barrier_type {
STF_BARRIER_NONE = 0x1,
STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK = 0x2,
STF_BARRIER_EIEIO = 0x4,
STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI = 0x8,
};
void setup_stf_barrier(void);
void do_stf_barrier_fixups(enum stf_barrier_type types);
void setup_count_cache_flush(void);
static inline void security_ftr_set(u64 feature)
{
powerpc_security_features |= feature;
}
static inline void security_ftr_clear(u64 feature)
{
powerpc_security_features &= ~feature;
}
static inline bool security_ftr_enabled(u64 feature)
{
return !!(powerpc_security_features & feature);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
enum stf_barrier_type stf_barrier_type_get(void);
#else
static inline enum stf_barrier_type stf_barrier_type_get(void) { return STF_BARRIER_NONE; }
#endif
// Features indicating support for Spectre/Meltdown mitigations
// The L1-D cache can be flushed with ori r30,r30,0
#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 0x0000000000000001ull
// The L1-D cache can be flushed with mtspr 882,r0 (aka SPRN_TRIG2)
#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 0x0000000000000002ull
// ori r31,r31,0 acts as a speculation barrier
#define SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 0x0000000000000004ull
// Speculation past bctr is disabled
#define SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED 0x0000000000000008ull
// Entries in L1-D are private to a SMT thread
#define SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV 0x0000000000000010ull
// Indirect branch prediction cache disabled
#define SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED 0x0000000000000020ull
// bcctr 2,0,0 triggers a hardware assisted count cache flush
#define SEC_FTR_BCCTR_FLUSH_ASSIST 0x0000000000000800ull
// bcctr 2,0,0 triggers a hardware assisted link stack flush
#define SEC_FTR_BCCTR_LINK_FLUSH_ASSIST 0x0000000000002000ull
// Features indicating need for Spectre/Meltdown mitigations
// The L1-D cache should be flushed on MSR[HV] 1->0 transition (hypervisor to guest)
#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV 0x0000000000000040ull
// The L1-D cache should be flushed on MSR[PR] 0->1 transition (kernel to userspace)
#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR 0x0000000000000080ull
// A speculation barrier should be used for bounds checks (Spectre variant 1)
#define SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR 0x0000000000000100ull
// Firmware configuration indicates user favours security over performance
#define SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY 0x0000000000000200ull
// Software required to flush count cache on context switch
#define SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE 0x0000000000000400ull
powerpc/book3s64: Fix link stack flush on context switch In commit ee13cb249fab ("powerpc/64s: Add support for software count cache flush"), I added support for software to flush the count cache (indirect branch cache) on context switch if firmware told us that was the required mitigation for Spectre v2. As part of that code we also added a software flush of the link stack (return address stack), which protects against Spectre-RSB between user processes. That is all correct for CPUs that activate that mitigation, which is currently Power9 Nimbus DD2.3. What I got wrong is that on older CPUs, where firmware has disabled the count cache, we also need to flush the link stack on context switch. To fix it we create a new feature bit which is not set by firmware, which tells us we need to flush the link stack. We set that when firmware tells us that either of the existing Spectre v2 mitigations are enabled. Then we adjust the patching code so that if we see that feature bit we enable the link stack flush. If we're also told to flush the count cache in software then we fall through and do that also. On the older CPUs we don't need to do do the software count cache flush, firmware has disabled it, so in that case we patch in an early return after the link stack flush. The naming of some of the functions is awkward after this patch, because they're called "count cache" but they also do link stack. But we'll fix that up in a later commit to ease backporting. This is the fix for CVE-2019-18660. Reported-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com> Fixes: ee13cb249fab ("powerpc/64s: Add support for software count cache flush") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+ Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2019-11-13 10:05:41 +00:00
// Software required to flush link stack on context switch
#define SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK 0x0000000000001000ull
// The L1-D cache should be flushed when entering the kernel
#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY 0x0000000000004000ull
// The L1-D cache should be flushed after user accesses from the kernel
#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS 0x0000000000008000ull
// The STF flush should be executed on privilege state switch
#define SEC_FTR_STF_BARRIER 0x0000000000010000ull
// Features enabled by default
#define SEC_FTR_DEFAULT \
(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV | \
SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR | \
SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR | \
SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY | \
SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS | \
SEC_FTR_STF_BARRIER | \
SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY)
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H */