linux-stable/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c

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/* Connection tracking via netlink socket. Allows for user space
* protocol helpers and general trouble making from userspace.
*
* (C) 2001 by Jay Schulist <jschlst@samba.org>
* (C) 2002-2006 by Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org>
* (C) 2003 by Patrick Mchardy <kaber@trash.net>
* (C) 2005-2012 by Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
*
* Initial connection tracking via netlink development funded and
* generally made possible by Network Robots, Inc. (www.networkrobots.com)
*
* Further development of this code funded by Astaro AG (http://www.astaro.com)
*
* This software may be used and distributed according to the terms
* of the GNU General Public License, incorporated herein by reference.
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
#include <linux/rculist_nulls.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/timer.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 08:04:11 +00:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/siphash.h>
#include <linux/netfilter.h>
#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_seqadj.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l4proto.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tuple.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_acct.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_zones.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timestamp.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_labels.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_synproxy.h>
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
#include <net/netfilter/nf_nat.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.h>
#endif
#include <linux/netfilter/nfnetlink.h>
#include <linux/netfilter/nfnetlink_conntrack.h>
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
#include "nf_internals.h"
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
struct ctnetlink_list_dump_ctx {
struct nf_conn *last;
unsigned int cpu;
bool done;
};
static int ctnetlink_dump_tuples_proto(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
const struct nf_conntrack_l4proto *l4proto)
{
int ret = 0;
struct nlattr *nest_parms;
nest_parms = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_TUPLE_PROTO);
if (!nest_parms)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_u8(skb, CTA_PROTO_NUM, tuple->dst.protonum))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (likely(l4proto->tuple_to_nlattr))
ret = l4proto->tuple_to_nlattr(skb, tuple);
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_parms);
return ret;
nla_put_failure:
return -1;
}
static int ipv4_tuple_to_nlattr(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple)
{
if (nla_put_in_addr(skb, CTA_IP_V4_SRC, tuple->src.u3.ip) ||
nla_put_in_addr(skb, CTA_IP_V4_DST, tuple->dst.u3.ip))
return -EMSGSIZE;
return 0;
}
static int ipv6_tuple_to_nlattr(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple)
{
if (nla_put_in6_addr(skb, CTA_IP_V6_SRC, &tuple->src.u3.in6) ||
nla_put_in6_addr(skb, CTA_IP_V6_DST, &tuple->dst.u3.in6))
return -EMSGSIZE;
return 0;
}
static int ctnetlink_dump_tuples_ip(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple)
{
int ret = 0;
struct nlattr *nest_parms;
nest_parms = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_TUPLE_IP);
if (!nest_parms)
goto nla_put_failure;
switch (tuple->src.l3num) {
case NFPROTO_IPV4:
ret = ipv4_tuple_to_nlattr(skb, tuple);
break;
case NFPROTO_IPV6:
ret = ipv6_tuple_to_nlattr(skb, tuple);
break;
}
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_parms);
return ret;
nla_put_failure:
return -1;
}
static int ctnetlink_dump_tuples(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple)
{
const struct nf_conntrack_l4proto *l4proto;
int ret;
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix lockep splats net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:70 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 3 locks held by conntrack/3235: nfnl_lock+0x17/0x20 netlink_dump+0x32/0x240 ctnetlink_dump_table+0x3e/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] stack backtrace: Pid: 3235, comm: conntrack Tainted: G W 3.2.0+ #511 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8108ce45>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe5/0x100 [<ffffffffa00ec6e1>] __nf_ct_l4proto_find+0x81/0xb0 [nf_conntrack] [<ffffffffa0115675>] ctnetlink_fill_info+0x215/0x5f0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115dc1>] ctnetlink_dump_table+0xd1/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff815fbdbf>] netlink_dump+0x7f/0x240 [<ffffffff81090f9d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff815fd34f>] netlink_dump_start+0xdf/0x190 [<ffffffffa0111490>] ? ctnetlink_change_nat_seq_adj+0x160/0x160 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115cf0>] ? ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x2a0/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115ad9>] ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x89/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff81603a47>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x467/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603a7c>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x49c/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603922>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x342/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81071b21>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x50 [<ffffffff816035e0>] ? nfnetlink_subsys_register+0x60/0x60 [<ffffffff815fed49>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xd0 [<ffffffff81603475>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffff815fe70e>] netlink_unicast+0x1ae/0x1f0 [<ffffffff815fea16>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c6/0x320 [<ffffffff815b2a87>] sock_sendmsg+0x117/0x130 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff811250dc>] ? might_fault+0x9c/0xb0 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff815b5991>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x71/0x80 [<ffffffff815b644e>] sys_sendto+0xfe/0x130 [<ffffffff815b5c94>] ? sys_bind+0xb4/0xd0 [<ffffffff817a8a0e>] ? retint_swapgs+0xe/0x13 [<ffffffff817afcd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com>
2012-03-05 02:24:29 +00:00
rcu_read_lock();
ret = ctnetlink_dump_tuples_ip(skb, tuple);
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix lockep splats net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:70 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 3 locks held by conntrack/3235: nfnl_lock+0x17/0x20 netlink_dump+0x32/0x240 ctnetlink_dump_table+0x3e/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] stack backtrace: Pid: 3235, comm: conntrack Tainted: G W 3.2.0+ #511 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8108ce45>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe5/0x100 [<ffffffffa00ec6e1>] __nf_ct_l4proto_find+0x81/0xb0 [nf_conntrack] [<ffffffffa0115675>] ctnetlink_fill_info+0x215/0x5f0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115dc1>] ctnetlink_dump_table+0xd1/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff815fbdbf>] netlink_dump+0x7f/0x240 [<ffffffff81090f9d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff815fd34f>] netlink_dump_start+0xdf/0x190 [<ffffffffa0111490>] ? ctnetlink_change_nat_seq_adj+0x160/0x160 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115cf0>] ? ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x2a0/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115ad9>] ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x89/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff81603a47>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x467/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603a7c>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x49c/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603922>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x342/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81071b21>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x50 [<ffffffff816035e0>] ? nfnetlink_subsys_register+0x60/0x60 [<ffffffff815fed49>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xd0 [<ffffffff81603475>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffff815fe70e>] netlink_unicast+0x1ae/0x1f0 [<ffffffff815fea16>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c6/0x320 [<ffffffff815b2a87>] sock_sendmsg+0x117/0x130 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff811250dc>] ? might_fault+0x9c/0xb0 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff815b5991>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x71/0x80 [<ffffffff815b644e>] sys_sendto+0xfe/0x130 [<ffffffff815b5c94>] ? sys_bind+0xb4/0xd0 [<ffffffff817a8a0e>] ? retint_swapgs+0xe/0x13 [<ffffffff817afcd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com>
2012-03-05 02:24:29 +00:00
if (ret >= 0) {
l4proto = nf_ct_l4proto_find(tuple->dst.protonum);
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix lockep splats net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:70 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 3 locks held by conntrack/3235: nfnl_lock+0x17/0x20 netlink_dump+0x32/0x240 ctnetlink_dump_table+0x3e/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] stack backtrace: Pid: 3235, comm: conntrack Tainted: G W 3.2.0+ #511 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8108ce45>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe5/0x100 [<ffffffffa00ec6e1>] __nf_ct_l4proto_find+0x81/0xb0 [nf_conntrack] [<ffffffffa0115675>] ctnetlink_fill_info+0x215/0x5f0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115dc1>] ctnetlink_dump_table+0xd1/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff815fbdbf>] netlink_dump+0x7f/0x240 [<ffffffff81090f9d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff815fd34f>] netlink_dump_start+0xdf/0x190 [<ffffffffa0111490>] ? ctnetlink_change_nat_seq_adj+0x160/0x160 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115cf0>] ? ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x2a0/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115ad9>] ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x89/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff81603a47>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x467/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603a7c>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x49c/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603922>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x342/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81071b21>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x50 [<ffffffff816035e0>] ? nfnetlink_subsys_register+0x60/0x60 [<ffffffff815fed49>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xd0 [<ffffffff81603475>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffff815fe70e>] netlink_unicast+0x1ae/0x1f0 [<ffffffff815fea16>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c6/0x320 [<ffffffff815b2a87>] sock_sendmsg+0x117/0x130 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff811250dc>] ? might_fault+0x9c/0xb0 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff815b5991>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x71/0x80 [<ffffffff815b644e>] sys_sendto+0xfe/0x130 [<ffffffff815b5c94>] ? sys_bind+0xb4/0xd0 [<ffffffff817a8a0e>] ? retint_swapgs+0xe/0x13 [<ffffffff817afcd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com>
2012-03-05 02:24:29 +00:00
ret = ctnetlink_dump_tuples_proto(skb, tuple, l4proto);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
static int ctnetlink_dump_zone_id(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype,
const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone, int dir)
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
{
if (zone->id == NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID || zone->dir != dir)
return 0;
if (nla_put_be16(skb, attrtype, htons(zone->id)))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -1;
}
static int ctnetlink_dump_status(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_STATUS, htonl(ct->status)))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -1;
}
static int ctnetlink_dump_timeout(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct,
bool skip_zero)
{
long timeout;
if (nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct))
timeout = nf_ct_expires(ct) / HZ;
else
timeout = ct->timeout / HZ;
if (skip_zero && timeout == 0)
return 0;
if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_TIMEOUT, htonl(timeout)))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -1;
}
static int ctnetlink_dump_protoinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct,
bool destroy)
{
const struct nf_conntrack_l4proto *l4proto;
struct nlattr *nest_proto;
int ret;
l4proto = nf_ct_l4proto_find(nf_ct_protonum(ct));
if (!l4proto->to_nlattr)
return 0;
nest_proto = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_PROTOINFO);
if (!nest_proto)
goto nla_put_failure;
ret = l4proto->to_nlattr(skb, nest_proto, ct, destroy);
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_proto);
return ret;
nla_put_failure:
return -1;
}
static int ctnetlink_dump_helpinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nlattr *nest_helper;
const struct nf_conn_help *help = nfct_help(ct);
struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper;
if (!help)
return 0;
2021-07-01 05:02:49 +00:00
rcu_read_lock();
helper = rcu_dereference(help->helper);
if (!helper)
goto out;
nest_helper = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_HELP);
if (!nest_helper)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_HELP_NAME, helper->name))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (helper->to_nlattr)
helper->to_nlattr(skb, ct);
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_helper);
out:
2021-07-01 05:02:49 +00:00
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
2021-07-01 05:02:49 +00:00
rcu_read_unlock();
return -1;
}
[NETFILTER]: Kill some supper dupper bloatry /me awards the bloatiest-of-all-net/-.c-code award to nf_conntrack_netlink.c, congratulations to all the authors :-/! Hall of (unquestionable) fame (measured per inline, top 10 under net/): -4496 ctnetlink_parse_tuple netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -2165 ctnetlink_dump_tuples netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -2115 __ip_vs_get_out_rt ipv4/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c -1924 xfrm_audit_helper_pktinfo xfrm/xfrm_state.c -1799 ctnetlink_parse_tuple_proto netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -1268 ctnetlink_parse_tuple_ip netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -1093 ctnetlink_exp_dump_expect netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -1060 void ccid3_update_send_interval dccp/ccids/ccid3.c -983 ctnetlink_dump_tuples_proto netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -827 ctnetlink_exp_dump_tuple netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c (i386 / gcc (GCC) 4.1.2 20070626 (Red Hat 4.1.2-13) / allyesconfig except CONFIG_FORCED_INLINING) ...and I left < 200 byte gains as future work item. After iterative inline removal, I finally have this: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c: ctnetlink_exp_fill_info | -1104 ctnetlink_new_expect | -1572 ctnetlink_fill_info | -1303 ctnetlink_new_conntrack | -2230 ctnetlink_get_expect | -341 ctnetlink_del_expect | -352 ctnetlink_expect_event | -1110 ctnetlink_conntrack_event | -1548 ctnetlink_del_conntrack | -729 ctnetlink_get_conntrack | -728 10 functions changed, 11017 bytes removed, diff: -11017 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c: ctnetlink_parse_tuple | +419 dump_nat_seq_adj | +183 ctnetlink_dump_counters | +166 ctnetlink_dump_tuples | +261 ctnetlink_exp_dump_expect | +633 ctnetlink_change_status | +460 6 functions changed, 2122 bytes added, diff: +2122 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.o: 16 functions changed, 2122 bytes added, 11017 bytes removed, diff: -8895 Without a number of CONFIG.*DEBUGs, I got this: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.o: 16 functions changed, 2122 bytes added, 11029 bytes removed, diff: -8907 Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-01-06 07:11:31 +00:00
static int
dump_counters(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn_acct *acct,
enum ip_conntrack_dir dir, int type)
{
enum ctattr_type attr = dir ? CTA_COUNTERS_REPLY: CTA_COUNTERS_ORIG;
struct nf_conn_counter *counter = acct->counter;
struct nlattr *nest_count;
u64 pkts, bytes;
if (type == IPCTNL_MSG_CT_GET_CTRZERO) {
pkts = atomic64_xchg(&counter[dir].packets, 0);
bytes = atomic64_xchg(&counter[dir].bytes, 0);
} else {
pkts = atomic64_read(&counter[dir].packets);
bytes = atomic64_read(&counter[dir].bytes);
}
nest_count = nla_nest_start(skb, attr);
if (!nest_count)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_be64(skb, CTA_COUNTERS_PACKETS, cpu_to_be64(pkts),
CTA_COUNTERS_PAD) ||
nla_put_be64(skb, CTA_COUNTERS_BYTES, cpu_to_be64(bytes),
CTA_COUNTERS_PAD))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_count);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -1;
}
static int
ctnetlink_dump_acct(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct, int type)
{
struct nf_conn_acct *acct = nf_conn_acct_find(ct);
if (!acct)
return 0;
if (dump_counters(skb, acct, IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL, type) < 0)
return -1;
if (dump_counters(skb, acct, IP_CT_DIR_REPLY, type) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
static int
ctnetlink_dump_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nlattr *nest_count;
const struct nf_conn_tstamp *tstamp;
tstamp = nf_conn_tstamp_find(ct);
if (!tstamp)
return 0;
nest_count = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_TIMESTAMP);
if (!nest_count)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_be64(skb, CTA_TIMESTAMP_START, cpu_to_be64(tstamp->start),
CTA_TIMESTAMP_PAD) ||
(tstamp->stop != 0 && nla_put_be64(skb, CTA_TIMESTAMP_STOP,
cpu_to_be64(tstamp->stop),
CTA_TIMESTAMP_PAD)))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_count);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -1;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MARK
static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct,
bool dump)
{
u32 mark = READ_ONCE(ct->mark);
if (!mark && !dump)
return 0;
if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_MARK, htonl(mark)))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -1;
}
#else
#define ctnetlink_dump_mark(a, b, c) (0)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
ret = -1;
nest_secctx = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_SECCTX);
if (!nest_secctx)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
return ret;
}
#else
#define ctnetlink_dump_secctx(a, b) (0)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_LABELS
static inline int ctnetlink_label_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nf_conn_labels *labels = nf_ct_labels_find(ct);
if (!labels)
return 0;
return nla_total_size(sizeof(labels->bits));
}
static int
ctnetlink_dump_labels(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nf_conn_labels *labels = nf_ct_labels_find(ct);
unsigned int i;
if (!labels)
return 0;
i = 0;
do {
if (labels->bits[i] != 0)
return nla_put(skb, CTA_LABELS, sizeof(labels->bits),
labels->bits);
i++;
} while (i < ARRAY_SIZE(labels->bits));
return 0;
}
#else
#define ctnetlink_dump_labels(a, b) (0)
#define ctnetlink_label_size(a) (0)
#endif
#define master_tuple(ct) &(ct->master->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple)
static int ctnetlink_dump_master(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nlattr *nest_parms;
if (!(ct->status & IPS_EXPECTED))
return 0;
nest_parms = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_TUPLE_MASTER);
if (!nest_parms)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_tuples(skb, master_tuple(ct)) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_parms);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -1;
}
[NETFILTER]: Kill some supper dupper bloatry /me awards the bloatiest-of-all-net/-.c-code award to nf_conntrack_netlink.c, congratulations to all the authors :-/! Hall of (unquestionable) fame (measured per inline, top 10 under net/): -4496 ctnetlink_parse_tuple netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -2165 ctnetlink_dump_tuples netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -2115 __ip_vs_get_out_rt ipv4/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c -1924 xfrm_audit_helper_pktinfo xfrm/xfrm_state.c -1799 ctnetlink_parse_tuple_proto netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -1268 ctnetlink_parse_tuple_ip netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -1093 ctnetlink_exp_dump_expect netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -1060 void ccid3_update_send_interval dccp/ccids/ccid3.c -983 ctnetlink_dump_tuples_proto netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -827 ctnetlink_exp_dump_tuple netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c (i386 / gcc (GCC) 4.1.2 20070626 (Red Hat 4.1.2-13) / allyesconfig except CONFIG_FORCED_INLINING) ...and I left < 200 byte gains as future work item. After iterative inline removal, I finally have this: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c: ctnetlink_exp_fill_info | -1104 ctnetlink_new_expect | -1572 ctnetlink_fill_info | -1303 ctnetlink_new_conntrack | -2230 ctnetlink_get_expect | -341 ctnetlink_del_expect | -352 ctnetlink_expect_event | -1110 ctnetlink_conntrack_event | -1548 ctnetlink_del_conntrack | -729 ctnetlink_get_conntrack | -728 10 functions changed, 11017 bytes removed, diff: -11017 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c: ctnetlink_parse_tuple | +419 dump_nat_seq_adj | +183 ctnetlink_dump_counters | +166 ctnetlink_dump_tuples | +261 ctnetlink_exp_dump_expect | +633 ctnetlink_change_status | +460 6 functions changed, 2122 bytes added, diff: +2122 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.o: 16 functions changed, 2122 bytes added, 11017 bytes removed, diff: -8895 Without a number of CONFIG.*DEBUGs, I got this: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.o: 16 functions changed, 2122 bytes added, 11029 bytes removed, diff: -8907 Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-01-06 07:11:31 +00:00
static int
dump_ct_seq_adj(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_ct_seqadj *seq, int type)
{
struct nlattr *nest_parms;
nest_parms = nla_nest_start(skb, type);
if (!nest_parms)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_SEQADJ_CORRECTION_POS,
htonl(seq->correction_pos)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_SEQADJ_OFFSET_BEFORE,
htonl(seq->offset_before)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_SEQADJ_OFFSET_AFTER,
htonl(seq->offset_after)))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_parms);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -1;
}
static int ctnetlink_dump_ct_seq_adj(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nf_conn_seqadj *seqadj = nfct_seqadj(ct);
struct nf_ct_seqadj *seq;
if (!(ct->status & IPS_SEQ_ADJUST) || !seqadj)
return 0;
spin_lock_bh(&ct->lock);
seq = &seqadj->seq[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL];
if (dump_ct_seq_adj(skb, seq, CTA_SEQ_ADJ_ORIG) == -1)
goto err;
seq = &seqadj->seq[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY];
if (dump_ct_seq_adj(skb, seq, CTA_SEQ_ADJ_REPLY) == -1)
goto err;
spin_unlock_bh(&ct->lock);
return 0;
err:
spin_unlock_bh(&ct->lock);
return -1;
}
static int ctnetlink_dump_ct_synproxy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nf_conn_synproxy *synproxy = nfct_synproxy(ct);
struct nlattr *nest_parms;
if (!synproxy)
return 0;
nest_parms = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_SYNPROXY);
if (!nest_parms)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_SYNPROXY_ISN, htonl(synproxy->isn)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_SYNPROXY_ITS, htonl(synproxy->its)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_SYNPROXY_TSOFF, htonl(synproxy->tsoff)))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_parms);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -1;
}
static int ctnetlink_dump_id(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
__be32 id = (__force __be32)nf_ct_get_id(ct);
if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_ID, id))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -1;
}
static int ctnetlink_dump_use(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_USE, htonl(refcount_read(&ct->ct_general.use))))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -1;
}
/* all these functions access ct->ext. Caller must either hold a reference
* on ct or prevent its deletion by holding either the bucket spinlock or
* pcpu dying list lock.
*/
static int ctnetlink_dump_extinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct nf_conn *ct, u32 type)
{
if (ctnetlink_dump_acct(skb, ct, type) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_timestamp(skb, ct) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_helpinfo(skb, ct) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_labels(skb, ct) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_ct_seq_adj(skb, ct) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_ct_synproxy(skb, ct) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
static int ctnetlink_dump_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct)
{
if (ctnetlink_dump_status(skb, ct) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_mark(skb, ct, true) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_secctx(skb, ct) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_id(skb, ct) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_use(skb, ct) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_master(skb, ct) < 0)
return -1;
if (!test_bit(IPS_OFFLOAD_BIT, &ct->status) &&
(ctnetlink_dump_timeout(skb, ct, false) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_protoinfo(skb, ct, false) < 0))
return -1;
return 0;
}
static int
ctnetlink_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 portid, u32 seq, u32 type,
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
struct nf_conn *ct, bool extinfo, unsigned int flags)
{
const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct nlattr *nest_parms;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
unsigned int event;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
if (portid)
flags |= NLM_F_MULTI;
event = nfnl_msg_type(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTNETLINK, IPCTNL_MSG_CT_NEW);
nlh = nfnl_msg_put(skb, portid, seq, event, flags, nf_ct_l3num(ct),
NFNETLINK_V0, 0);
if (!nlh)
goto nlmsg_failure;
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
zone = nf_ct_zone(ct);
nest_parms = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_TUPLE_ORIG);
if (!nest_parms)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_tuples(skb, nf_ct_tuple(ct, IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL)) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
if (ctnetlink_dump_zone_id(skb, CTA_TUPLE_ZONE, zone,
NF_CT_ZONE_DIR_ORIG) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_parms);
nest_parms = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_TUPLE_REPLY);
if (!nest_parms)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_tuples(skb, nf_ct_tuple(ct, IP_CT_DIR_REPLY)) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
if (ctnetlink_dump_zone_id(skb, CTA_TUPLE_ZONE, zone,
NF_CT_ZONE_DIR_REPL) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_parms);
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
if (ctnetlink_dump_zone_id(skb, CTA_ZONE, zone,
NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_info(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (extinfo && ctnetlink_dump_extinfo(skb, ct, type) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return skb->len;
nlmsg_failure:
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -1;
}
static const struct nla_policy cta_ip_nla_policy[CTA_IP_MAX + 1] = {
[CTA_IP_V4_SRC] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[CTA_IP_V4_DST] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[CTA_IP_V6_SRC] = { .len = sizeof(__be32) * 4 },
[CTA_IP_V6_DST] = { .len = sizeof(__be32) * 4 },
};
#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_GLUE_CT) || defined(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS)
static size_t ctnetlink_proto_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
const struct nf_conntrack_l4proto *l4proto;
size_t len, len4 = 0;
len = nla_policy_len(cta_ip_nla_policy, CTA_IP_MAX + 1);
len *= 3u; /* ORIG, REPLY, MASTER */
l4proto = nf_ct_l4proto_find(nf_ct_protonum(ct));
len += l4proto->nlattr_size;
if (l4proto->nlattr_tuple_size) {
len4 = l4proto->nlattr_tuple_size();
len4 *= 3u; /* ORIG, REPLY, MASTER */
}
return len + len4;
}
#endif
static inline size_t ctnetlink_acct_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
if (!nf_ct_ext_exist(ct, NF_CT_EXT_ACCT))
return 0;
return 2 * nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_COUNTERS_ORIG|REPL */
+ 2 * nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(uint64_t)) /* CTA_COUNTERS_PACKETS */
+ 2 * nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(uint64_t)) /* CTA_COUNTERS_BYTES */
;
}
static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
int len, ret;
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
return nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(char) * len); /* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
static inline size_t ctnetlink_timestamp_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_TIMESTAMP
if (!nf_ct_ext_exist(ct, NF_CT_EXT_TSTAMP))
return 0;
return nla_total_size(0) + 2 * nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(uint64_t));
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS
static size_t ctnetlink_nlmsg_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
return NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct nfgenmsg))
+ 3 * nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_TUPLE_ORIG|REPL|MASTER */
+ 3 * nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_TUPLE_IP */
+ 3 * nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_TUPLE_PROTO */
+ 3 * nla_total_size(sizeof(u_int8_t)) /* CTA_PROTO_NUM */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(u_int32_t)) /* CTA_ID */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(u_int32_t)) /* CTA_STATUS */
+ ctnetlink_acct_size(ct)
+ ctnetlink_timestamp_size(ct)
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(u_int32_t)) /* CTA_TIMEOUT */
+ nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_PROTOINFO */
+ nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_HELP */
+ nla_total_size(NF_CT_HELPER_NAME_LEN) /* CTA_HELP_NAME */
+ ctnetlink_secctx_size(ct)
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
+ 2 * nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_NAT_SEQ_ADJ_ORIG|REPL */
+ 6 * nla_total_size(sizeof(u_int32_t)) /* CTA_NAT_SEQ_OFFSET */
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MARK
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(u_int32_t)) /* CTA_MARK */
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_ZONES
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(u_int16_t)) /* CTA_ZONE|CTA_TUPLE_ZONE */
#endif
+ ctnetlink_proto_size(ct)
+ ctnetlink_label_size(ct)
;
}
static int
ctnetlink_conntrack_event(unsigned int events, const struct nf_ct_event *item)
{
const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone;
struct net *net;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct nlattr *nest_parms;
struct nf_conn *ct = item->ct;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int type;
unsigned int flags = 0, group;
netfilter: conntrack: optional reliable conntrack event delivery This patch improves ctnetlink event reliability if one broadcast listener has set the NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket option. The logic is the following: if an event delivery fails, we keep the undelivered events in the missed event cache. Once the next packet arrives, we add the new events (if any) to the missed events in the cache and we try a new delivery, and so on. Thus, if ctnetlink fails to deliver an event, we try to deliver them once we see a new packet. Therefore, we may lose state transitions but the userspace process gets in sync at some point. At worst case, if no events were delivered to userspace, we make sure that destroy events are successfully delivered. Basically, if ctnetlink fails to deliver the destroy event, we remove the conntrack entry from the hashes and we insert them in the dying list, which contains inactive entries. Then, the conntrack timer is added with an extra grace timeout of random32() % 15 seconds to trigger the event again (this grace timeout is tunable via /proc). The use of a limited random timeout value allows distributing the "destroy" resends, thus, avoiding accumulating lots "destroy" events at the same time. Event delivery may re-order but we can identify them by means of the tuple plus the conntrack ID. The maximum number of conntrack entries (active or inactive) is still handled by nf_conntrack_max. Thus, we may start dropping packets at some point if we accumulate a lot of inactive conntrack entries that did not successfully report the destroy event to userspace. During my stress tests consisting of setting a very small buffer of 2048 bytes for conntrackd and the NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket flag, and generating lots of very small connections, I noticed very few destroy entries on the fly waiting to be resend. A simple way to test this patch consist of creating a lot of entries, set a very small Netlink buffer in conntrackd (+ a patch which is not in the git tree to set the BROADCAST_ERROR flag) and invoke `conntrack -F'. For expectations, no changes are introduced in this patch. Currently, event delivery is only done for new expectations (no events from expectation expiration, removal and confirmation). In that case, they need a per-expectation event cache to implement the same idea that is exposed in this patch. This patch can be useful to provide reliable flow-accouting. We still have to add a new conntrack extension to store the creation and destroy time. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
2009-06-13 10:30:52 +00:00
int err;
if (events & (1 << IPCT_DESTROY)) {
type = IPCTNL_MSG_CT_DELETE;
group = NFNLGRP_CONNTRACK_DESTROY;
} else if (events & ((1 << IPCT_NEW) | (1 << IPCT_RELATED))) {
type = IPCTNL_MSG_CT_NEW;
flags = NLM_F_CREATE|NLM_F_EXCL;
group = NFNLGRP_CONNTRACK_NEW;
} else if (events) {
type = IPCTNL_MSG_CT_NEW;
group = NFNLGRP_CONNTRACK_UPDATE;
} else
return 0;
net = nf_ct_net(ct);
if (!item->report && !nfnetlink_has_listeners(net, group))
return 0;
skb = nlmsg_new(ctnetlink_nlmsg_size(ct), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
goto errout;
type = nfnl_msg_type(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTNETLINK, type);
nlh = nfnl_msg_put(skb, item->portid, 0, type, flags, nf_ct_l3num(ct),
NFNETLINK_V0, 0);
if (!nlh)
goto nlmsg_failure;
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
zone = nf_ct_zone(ct);
nest_parms = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_TUPLE_ORIG);
if (!nest_parms)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_tuples(skb, nf_ct_tuple(ct, IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL)) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
if (ctnetlink_dump_zone_id(skb, CTA_TUPLE_ZONE, zone,
NF_CT_ZONE_DIR_ORIG) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_parms);
nest_parms = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_TUPLE_REPLY);
if (!nest_parms)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_tuples(skb, nf_ct_tuple(ct, IP_CT_DIR_REPLY)) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
if (ctnetlink_dump_zone_id(skb, CTA_TUPLE_ZONE, zone,
NF_CT_ZONE_DIR_REPL) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_parms);
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
if (ctnetlink_dump_zone_id(skb, CTA_ZONE, zone,
NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_id(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_status(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (events & (1 << IPCT_DESTROY)) {
if (ctnetlink_dump_timeout(skb, ct, true) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_acct(skb, ct, type) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_timestamp(skb, ct) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_protoinfo(skb, ct, true) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
} else {
if (ctnetlink_dump_timeout(skb, ct, false) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (events & (1 << IPCT_PROTOINFO) &&
ctnetlink_dump_protoinfo(skb, ct, false) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if ((events & (1 << IPCT_HELPER) || nfct_help(ct))
&& ctnetlink_dump_helpinfo(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
if ((events & (1 << IPCT_SECMARK) || ct->secmark)
&& ctnetlink_dump_secctx(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
#endif
if (events & (1 << IPCT_LABEL) &&
ctnetlink_dump_labels(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (events & (1 << IPCT_RELATED) &&
ctnetlink_dump_master(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (events & (1 << IPCT_SEQADJ) &&
ctnetlink_dump_ct_seq_adj(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (events & (1 << IPCT_SYNPROXY) &&
ctnetlink_dump_ct_synproxy(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MARK
if (ctnetlink_dump_mark(skb, ct, events & (1 << IPCT_MARK)))
goto nla_put_failure;
#endif
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
err = nfnetlink_send(skb, net, item->portid, group, item->report,
GFP_ATOMIC);
netfilter: conntrack: optional reliable conntrack event delivery This patch improves ctnetlink event reliability if one broadcast listener has set the NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket option. The logic is the following: if an event delivery fails, we keep the undelivered events in the missed event cache. Once the next packet arrives, we add the new events (if any) to the missed events in the cache and we try a new delivery, and so on. Thus, if ctnetlink fails to deliver an event, we try to deliver them once we see a new packet. Therefore, we may lose state transitions but the userspace process gets in sync at some point. At worst case, if no events were delivered to userspace, we make sure that destroy events are successfully delivered. Basically, if ctnetlink fails to deliver the destroy event, we remove the conntrack entry from the hashes and we insert them in the dying list, which contains inactive entries. Then, the conntrack timer is added with an extra grace timeout of random32() % 15 seconds to trigger the event again (this grace timeout is tunable via /proc). The use of a limited random timeout value allows distributing the "destroy" resends, thus, avoiding accumulating lots "destroy" events at the same time. Event delivery may re-order but we can identify them by means of the tuple plus the conntrack ID. The maximum number of conntrack entries (active or inactive) is still handled by nf_conntrack_max. Thus, we may start dropping packets at some point if we accumulate a lot of inactive conntrack entries that did not successfully report the destroy event to userspace. During my stress tests consisting of setting a very small buffer of 2048 bytes for conntrackd and the NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket flag, and generating lots of very small connections, I noticed very few destroy entries on the fly waiting to be resend. A simple way to test this patch consist of creating a lot of entries, set a very small Netlink buffer in conntrackd (+ a patch which is not in the git tree to set the BROADCAST_ERROR flag) and invoke `conntrack -F'. For expectations, no changes are introduced in this patch. Currently, event delivery is only done for new expectations (no events from expectation expiration, removal and confirmation). In that case, they need a per-expectation event cache to implement the same idea that is exposed in this patch. This patch can be useful to provide reliable flow-accouting. We still have to add a new conntrack extension to store the creation and destroy time. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
2009-06-13 10:30:52 +00:00
if (err == -ENOBUFS || err == -EAGAIN)
return -ENOBUFS;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
nlmsg_failure:
kfree_skb(skb);
errout:
if (nfnetlink_set_err(net, 0, group, -ENOBUFS) > 0)
return -ENOBUFS;
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS */
static int ctnetlink_done(struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
if (cb->args[1])
nf_ct_put((struct nf_conn *)cb->args[1]);
kfree(cb->data);
return 0;
}
struct ctnetlink_filter_u32 {
u32 val;
u32 mask;
};
struct ctnetlink_filter {
u8 family;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
u_int32_t orig_flags;
u_int32_t reply_flags;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple orig;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple reply;
struct nf_conntrack_zone zone;
struct ctnetlink_filter_u32 mark;
struct ctnetlink_filter_u32 status;
};
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
static const struct nla_policy cta_filter_nla_policy[CTA_FILTER_MAX + 1] = {
[CTA_FILTER_ORIG_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[CTA_FILTER_REPLY_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
};
static int ctnetlink_parse_filter(const struct nlattr *attr,
struct ctnetlink_filter *filter)
{
struct nlattr *tb[CTA_FILTER_MAX + 1];
int ret = 0;
ret = nla_parse_nested(tb, CTA_FILTER_MAX, attr, cta_filter_nla_policy,
NULL);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (tb[CTA_FILTER_ORIG_FLAGS]) {
filter->orig_flags = nla_get_u32(tb[CTA_FILTER_ORIG_FLAGS]);
if (filter->orig_flags & ~CTA_FILTER_F_ALL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
if (tb[CTA_FILTER_REPLY_FLAGS]) {
filter->reply_flags = nla_get_u32(tb[CTA_FILTER_REPLY_FLAGS]);
if (filter->reply_flags & ~CTA_FILTER_F_ALL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
return 0;
}
static int ctnetlink_parse_zone(const struct nlattr *attr,
struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone);
static int ctnetlink_parse_tuple_filter(const struct nlattr * const cda[],
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
u32 type, u_int8_t l3num,
struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone,
u_int32_t flags);
static int ctnetlink_filter_parse_mark(struct ctnetlink_filter_u32 *mark,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MARK
if (cda[CTA_MARK]) {
mark->val = ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_MARK]));
if (cda[CTA_MARK_MASK])
mark->mask = ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_MARK_MASK]));
else
mark->mask = 0xffffffff;
} else if (cda[CTA_MARK_MASK]) {
return -EINVAL;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
static int ctnetlink_filter_parse_status(struct ctnetlink_filter_u32 *status,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
if (cda[CTA_STATUS]) {
status->val = ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_STATUS]));
if (cda[CTA_STATUS_MASK])
status->mask = ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_STATUS_MASK]));
else
status->mask = status->val;
/* status->val == 0? always true, else always false. */
if (status->mask == 0)
return -EINVAL;
} else if (cda[CTA_STATUS_MASK]) {
return -EINVAL;
}
/* CTA_STATUS is NLA_U32, if this fires UAPI needs to be extended */
BUILD_BUG_ON(__IPS_MAX_BIT >= 32);
return 0;
}
static struct ctnetlink_filter *
ctnetlink_alloc_filter(const struct nlattr * const cda[], u8 family)
{
struct ctnetlink_filter *filter;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
int err;
#ifndef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MARK
if (cda[CTA_MARK] || cda[CTA_MARK_MASK])
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
#endif
filter = kzalloc(sizeof(*filter), GFP_KERNEL);
if (filter == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
filter->family = family;
err = ctnetlink_filter_parse_mark(&filter->mark, cda);
if (err)
goto err_filter;
err = ctnetlink_filter_parse_status(&filter->status, cda);
if (err)
goto err_filter;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
if (!cda[CTA_FILTER])
return filter;
err = ctnetlink_parse_zone(cda[CTA_ZONE], &filter->zone);
if (err < 0)
goto err_filter;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_filter(cda[CTA_FILTER], filter);
if (err < 0)
goto err_filter;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
if (filter->orig_flags) {
if (!cda[CTA_TUPLE_ORIG]) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_filter;
}
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple_filter(cda, &filter->orig,
CTA_TUPLE_ORIG,
filter->family,
&filter->zone,
filter->orig_flags);
if (err < 0)
goto err_filter;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
}
if (filter->reply_flags) {
if (!cda[CTA_TUPLE_REPLY]) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_filter;
}
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple_filter(cda, &filter->reply,
CTA_TUPLE_REPLY,
filter->family,
&filter->zone,
filter->reply_flags);
if (err < 0)
goto err_filter;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
}
return filter;
err_filter:
kfree(filter);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
static bool ctnetlink_needs_filter(u8 family, const struct nlattr * const *cda)
{
return family || cda[CTA_MARK] || cda[CTA_FILTER] || cda[CTA_STATUS];
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
}
static int ctnetlink_start(struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
const struct nlattr * const *cda = cb->data;
struct ctnetlink_filter *filter = NULL;
struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg = nlmsg_data(cb->nlh);
u8 family = nfmsg->nfgen_family;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
if (ctnetlink_needs_filter(family, cda)) {
filter = ctnetlink_alloc_filter(cda, family);
if (IS_ERR(filter))
return PTR_ERR(filter);
}
cb->data = filter;
return 0;
}
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
static int ctnetlink_filter_match_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *filter_tuple,
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *ct_tuple,
u_int32_t flags, int family)
{
switch (family) {
case NFPROTO_IPV4:
if ((flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_IP_SRC)) &&
filter_tuple->src.u3.ip != ct_tuple->src.u3.ip)
return 0;
if ((flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_IP_DST)) &&
filter_tuple->dst.u3.ip != ct_tuple->dst.u3.ip)
return 0;
break;
case NFPROTO_IPV6:
if ((flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_IP_SRC)) &&
!ipv6_addr_cmp(&filter_tuple->src.u3.in6,
&ct_tuple->src.u3.in6))
return 0;
if ((flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_IP_DST)) &&
!ipv6_addr_cmp(&filter_tuple->dst.u3.in6,
&ct_tuple->dst.u3.in6))
return 0;
break;
}
if ((flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_PROTO_NUM)) &&
filter_tuple->dst.protonum != ct_tuple->dst.protonum)
return 0;
switch (ct_tuple->dst.protonum) {
case IPPROTO_TCP:
case IPPROTO_UDP:
if ((flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_PROTO_SRC_PORT)) &&
filter_tuple->src.u.tcp.port != ct_tuple->src.u.tcp.port)
return 0;
if ((flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_PROTO_DST_PORT)) &&
filter_tuple->dst.u.tcp.port != ct_tuple->dst.u.tcp.port)
return 0;
break;
case IPPROTO_ICMP:
if ((flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_PROTO_ICMP_TYPE)) &&
filter_tuple->dst.u.icmp.type != ct_tuple->dst.u.icmp.type)
return 0;
if ((flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_PROTO_ICMP_CODE)) &&
filter_tuple->dst.u.icmp.code != ct_tuple->dst.u.icmp.code)
return 0;
if ((flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_PROTO_ICMP_ID)) &&
filter_tuple->src.u.icmp.id != ct_tuple->src.u.icmp.id)
return 0;
break;
case IPPROTO_ICMPV6:
if ((flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_PROTO_ICMPV6_TYPE)) &&
filter_tuple->dst.u.icmp.type != ct_tuple->dst.u.icmp.type)
return 0;
if ((flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_PROTO_ICMPV6_CODE)) &&
filter_tuple->dst.u.icmp.code != ct_tuple->dst.u.icmp.code)
return 0;
if ((flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_PROTO_ICMPV6_ID)) &&
filter_tuple->src.u.icmp.id != ct_tuple->src.u.icmp.id)
return 0;
break;
}
return 1;
}
static int ctnetlink_filter_match(struct nf_conn *ct, void *data)
{
struct ctnetlink_filter *filter = data;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple;
u32 status;
if (filter == NULL)
goto out;
/* Match entries of a given L3 protocol number.
* If it is not specified, ie. l3proto == 0,
* then match everything.
*/
if (filter->family && nf_ct_l3num(ct) != filter->family)
goto ignore_entry;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
if (filter->orig_flags) {
tuple = nf_ct_tuple(ct, IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL);
if (!ctnetlink_filter_match_tuple(&filter->orig, tuple,
filter->orig_flags,
filter->family))
goto ignore_entry;
}
if (filter->reply_flags) {
tuple = nf_ct_tuple(ct, IP_CT_DIR_REPLY);
if (!ctnetlink_filter_match_tuple(&filter->reply, tuple,
filter->reply_flags,
filter->family))
goto ignore_entry;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MARK
if ((READ_ONCE(ct->mark) & filter->mark.mask) != filter->mark.val)
goto ignore_entry;
#endif
status = (u32)READ_ONCE(ct->status);
if ((status & filter->status.mask) != filter->status.val)
goto ignore_entry;
out:
return 1;
ignore_entry:
return 0;
}
static int
ctnetlink_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
unsigned int flags = cb->data ? NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED : 0;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct nf_conn *ct, *last;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *h;
struct hlist_nulls_node *n;
struct nf_conn *nf_ct_evict[8];
int res, i;
netfilter: conntrack: remove central spinlock nf_conntrack_lock nf_conntrack_lock is a monolithic lock and suffers from huge contention on current generation servers (8 or more core/threads). Perf locking congestion is clear on base kernel: - 72.56% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] _raw_spin_lock_bh - _raw_spin_lock_bh + 25.33% init_conntrack + 24.86% nf_ct_delete_from_lists + 24.62% __nf_conntrack_confirm + 24.38% destroy_conntrack + 0.70% tcp_packet + 2.21% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] fib_table_lookup + 1.15% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __slab_free + 0.77% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] inet_getpeer + 0.70% ksoftirqd/6 [nf_conntrack] [k] nf_ct_delete + 0.55% ksoftirqd/6 [ip_tables] [k] ipt_do_table This patch change conntrack locking and provides a huge performance improvement. SYN-flood attack tested on a 24-core E5-2695v2(ES) with 10Gbit/s ixgbe (with tool trafgen): Base kernel: 810.405 new conntrack/sec After patch: 2.233.876 new conntrack/sec Notice other floods attack (SYN+ACK or ACK) can easily be deflected using: # iptables -A INPUT -m state --state INVALID -j DROP # sysctl -w net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp_loose=0 Use an array of hashed spinlocks to protect insertions/deletions of conntracks into the hash table. 1024 spinlocks seem to give good results, at minimal cost (4KB memory). Due to lockdep max depth, 1024 becomes 8 if CONFIG_LOCKDEP=y The hash resize is a bit tricky, because we need to take all locks in the array. A seqcount_t is used to synchronize the hash table users with the resizing process. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2014-03-03 13:46:13 +00:00
spinlock_t *lockp;
last = (struct nf_conn *)cb->args[1];
i = 0;
netfilter: conntrack: remove central spinlock nf_conntrack_lock nf_conntrack_lock is a monolithic lock and suffers from huge contention on current generation servers (8 or more core/threads). Perf locking congestion is clear on base kernel: - 72.56% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] _raw_spin_lock_bh - _raw_spin_lock_bh + 25.33% init_conntrack + 24.86% nf_ct_delete_from_lists + 24.62% __nf_conntrack_confirm + 24.38% destroy_conntrack + 0.70% tcp_packet + 2.21% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] fib_table_lookup + 1.15% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __slab_free + 0.77% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] inet_getpeer + 0.70% ksoftirqd/6 [nf_conntrack] [k] nf_ct_delete + 0.55% ksoftirqd/6 [ip_tables] [k] ipt_do_table This patch change conntrack locking and provides a huge performance improvement. SYN-flood attack tested on a 24-core E5-2695v2(ES) with 10Gbit/s ixgbe (with tool trafgen): Base kernel: 810.405 new conntrack/sec After patch: 2.233.876 new conntrack/sec Notice other floods attack (SYN+ACK or ACK) can easily be deflected using: # iptables -A INPUT -m state --state INVALID -j DROP # sysctl -w net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp_loose=0 Use an array of hashed spinlocks to protect insertions/deletions of conntracks into the hash table. 1024 spinlocks seem to give good results, at minimal cost (4KB memory). Due to lockdep max depth, 1024 becomes 8 if CONFIG_LOCKDEP=y The hash resize is a bit tricky, because we need to take all locks in the array. A seqcount_t is used to synchronize the hash table users with the resizing process. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2014-03-03 13:46:13 +00:00
local_bh_disable();
for (; cb->args[0] < nf_conntrack_htable_size; cb->args[0]++) {
restart:
while (i) {
i--;
if (nf_ct_should_gc(nf_ct_evict[i]))
nf_ct_kill(nf_ct_evict[i]);
nf_ct_put(nf_ct_evict[i]);
}
netfilter: conntrack: remove central spinlock nf_conntrack_lock nf_conntrack_lock is a monolithic lock and suffers from huge contention on current generation servers (8 or more core/threads). Perf locking congestion is clear on base kernel: - 72.56% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] _raw_spin_lock_bh - _raw_spin_lock_bh + 25.33% init_conntrack + 24.86% nf_ct_delete_from_lists + 24.62% __nf_conntrack_confirm + 24.38% destroy_conntrack + 0.70% tcp_packet + 2.21% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] fib_table_lookup + 1.15% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __slab_free + 0.77% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] inet_getpeer + 0.70% ksoftirqd/6 [nf_conntrack] [k] nf_ct_delete + 0.55% ksoftirqd/6 [ip_tables] [k] ipt_do_table This patch change conntrack locking and provides a huge performance improvement. SYN-flood attack tested on a 24-core E5-2695v2(ES) with 10Gbit/s ixgbe (with tool trafgen): Base kernel: 810.405 new conntrack/sec After patch: 2.233.876 new conntrack/sec Notice other floods attack (SYN+ACK or ACK) can easily be deflected using: # iptables -A INPUT -m state --state INVALID -j DROP # sysctl -w net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp_loose=0 Use an array of hashed spinlocks to protect insertions/deletions of conntracks into the hash table. 1024 spinlocks seem to give good results, at minimal cost (4KB memory). Due to lockdep max depth, 1024 becomes 8 if CONFIG_LOCKDEP=y The hash resize is a bit tricky, because we need to take all locks in the array. A seqcount_t is used to synchronize the hash table users with the resizing process. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2014-03-03 13:46:13 +00:00
lockp = &nf_conntrack_locks[cb->args[0] % CONNTRACK_LOCKS];
nf_conntrack_lock(lockp);
if (cb->args[0] >= nf_conntrack_htable_size) {
netfilter: conntrack: remove central spinlock nf_conntrack_lock nf_conntrack_lock is a monolithic lock and suffers from huge contention on current generation servers (8 or more core/threads). Perf locking congestion is clear on base kernel: - 72.56% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] _raw_spin_lock_bh - _raw_spin_lock_bh + 25.33% init_conntrack + 24.86% nf_ct_delete_from_lists + 24.62% __nf_conntrack_confirm + 24.38% destroy_conntrack + 0.70% tcp_packet + 2.21% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] fib_table_lookup + 1.15% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __slab_free + 0.77% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] inet_getpeer + 0.70% ksoftirqd/6 [nf_conntrack] [k] nf_ct_delete + 0.55% ksoftirqd/6 [ip_tables] [k] ipt_do_table This patch change conntrack locking and provides a huge performance improvement. SYN-flood attack tested on a 24-core E5-2695v2(ES) with 10Gbit/s ixgbe (with tool trafgen): Base kernel: 810.405 new conntrack/sec After patch: 2.233.876 new conntrack/sec Notice other floods attack (SYN+ACK or ACK) can easily be deflected using: # iptables -A INPUT -m state --state INVALID -j DROP # sysctl -w net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp_loose=0 Use an array of hashed spinlocks to protect insertions/deletions of conntracks into the hash table. 1024 spinlocks seem to give good results, at minimal cost (4KB memory). Due to lockdep max depth, 1024 becomes 8 if CONFIG_LOCKDEP=y The hash resize is a bit tricky, because we need to take all locks in the array. A seqcount_t is used to synchronize the hash table users with the resizing process. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2014-03-03 13:46:13 +00:00
spin_unlock(lockp);
goto out;
}
hlist_nulls_for_each_entry(h, n, &nf_conntrack_hash[cb->args[0]],
hnnode) {
ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h);
if (nf_ct_is_expired(ct)) {
netfilter: conntrack: fix crash due to confirmed bit load reordering Kajetan Puchalski reports crash on ARM, with backtrace of: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists nf_ct_delete early_drop __nf_conntrack_alloc Unlike atomic_inc_not_zero, refcount_inc_not_zero is not a full barrier. conntrack uses SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, i.e. it is possible that a 'newly' allocated object is still in use on another CPU: CPU1 CPU2 encounter 'ct' during hlist walk delete_from_lists refcount drops to 0 kmem_cache_free(ct); __nf_conntrack_alloc() // returns same object refcount_inc_not_zero(ct); /* might fail */ /* If set, ct is public/in the hash table */ test_bit(IPS_CONFIRMED_BIT, &ct->status); In case CPU1 already set refcount back to 1, refcount_inc_not_zero() will succeed. The expected possibilities for a CPU that obtained the object 'ct' (but no reference so far) are: 1. refcount_inc_not_zero() fails. CPU2 ignores the object and moves to the next entry in the list. This happens for objects that are about to be free'd, that have been free'd, or that have been reallocated by __nf_conntrack_alloc(), but where the refcount has not been increased back to 1 yet. 2. refcount_inc_not_zero() succeeds. CPU2 checks the CONFIRMED bit in ct->status. If set, the object is public/in the table. If not, the object must be skipped; CPU2 calls nf_ct_put() to un-do the refcount increment and moves to the next object. Parallel deletion from the hlists is prevented by a 'test_and_set_bit(IPS_DYING_BIT, &ct->status);' check, i.e. only one cpu will do the unlink, the other one will only drop its reference count. Because refcount_inc_not_zero is not a full barrier, CPU2 may try to delete an object that is not on any list: 1. refcount_inc_not_zero() successful (refcount inited to 1 on other CPU) 2. CONFIRMED test also successful (load was reordered or zeroing of ct->status not yet visible) 3. delete_from_lists unlinks entry not on the hlist, because IPS_DYING_BIT is 0 (already cleared). 2) is already wrong: CPU2 will handle a partially initited object that is supposed to be private to CPU1. Add needed barriers when refcount_inc_not_zero() is successful. It also inserts a smp_wmb() before the refcount is set to 1 during allocation. Because other CPU might still see the object, refcount_set(1) "resurrects" it, so we need to make sure that other CPUs will also observe the right content. In particular, the CONFIRMED bit test must only pass once the object is fully initialised and either in the hash or about to be inserted (with locks held to delay possible unlink from early_drop or gc worker). I did not change flow_offload_alloc(), as far as I can see it should call refcount_inc(), not refcount_inc_not_zero(): the ct object is attached to the skb so its refcount should be >= 1 in all cases. v2: prefer smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep to smp_rmb (Will Deacon). v3: keep smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep close to refcount_inc_not_zero call add comment in nf_conntrack_netlink, no control dependency there due to locks. Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Yr7WTfd6AVTQkLjI@e126311.manchester.arm.com/ Reported-by: Kajetan Puchalski <kajetan.puchalski@arm.com> Diagnosed-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Fixes: 719774377622 ("netfilter: conntrack: convert to refcount_t api") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2022-07-06 14:50:04 +00:00
/* need to defer nf_ct_kill() until lock is released */
if (i < ARRAY_SIZE(nf_ct_evict) &&
refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct->ct_general.use))
nf_ct_evict[i++] = ct;
continue;
}
if (!net_eq(net, nf_ct_net(ct)))
continue;
if (NF_CT_DIRECTION(h) != IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL)
continue;
if (cb->args[1]) {
if (ct != last)
continue;
cb->args[1] = 0;
}
if (!ctnetlink_filter_match(ct, cb->data))
continue;
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix lockep splats net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:70 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 3 locks held by conntrack/3235: nfnl_lock+0x17/0x20 netlink_dump+0x32/0x240 ctnetlink_dump_table+0x3e/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] stack backtrace: Pid: 3235, comm: conntrack Tainted: G W 3.2.0+ #511 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8108ce45>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe5/0x100 [<ffffffffa00ec6e1>] __nf_ct_l4proto_find+0x81/0xb0 [nf_conntrack] [<ffffffffa0115675>] ctnetlink_fill_info+0x215/0x5f0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115dc1>] ctnetlink_dump_table+0xd1/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff815fbdbf>] netlink_dump+0x7f/0x240 [<ffffffff81090f9d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff815fd34f>] netlink_dump_start+0xdf/0x190 [<ffffffffa0111490>] ? ctnetlink_change_nat_seq_adj+0x160/0x160 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115cf0>] ? ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x2a0/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115ad9>] ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x89/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff81603a47>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x467/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603a7c>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x49c/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603922>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x342/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81071b21>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x50 [<ffffffff816035e0>] ? nfnetlink_subsys_register+0x60/0x60 [<ffffffff815fed49>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xd0 [<ffffffff81603475>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffff815fe70e>] netlink_unicast+0x1ae/0x1f0 [<ffffffff815fea16>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c6/0x320 [<ffffffff815b2a87>] sock_sendmsg+0x117/0x130 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff811250dc>] ? might_fault+0x9c/0xb0 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff815b5991>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x71/0x80 [<ffffffff815b644e>] sys_sendto+0xfe/0x130 [<ffffffff815b5c94>] ? sys_bind+0xb4/0xd0 [<ffffffff817a8a0e>] ? retint_swapgs+0xe/0x13 [<ffffffff817afcd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com>
2012-03-05 02:24:29 +00:00
res =
ctnetlink_fill_info(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix lockep splats net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:70 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 3 locks held by conntrack/3235: nfnl_lock+0x17/0x20 netlink_dump+0x32/0x240 ctnetlink_dump_table+0x3e/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] stack backtrace: Pid: 3235, comm: conntrack Tainted: G W 3.2.0+ #511 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8108ce45>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe5/0x100 [<ffffffffa00ec6e1>] __nf_ct_l4proto_find+0x81/0xb0 [nf_conntrack] [<ffffffffa0115675>] ctnetlink_fill_info+0x215/0x5f0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115dc1>] ctnetlink_dump_table+0xd1/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff815fbdbf>] netlink_dump+0x7f/0x240 [<ffffffff81090f9d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff815fd34f>] netlink_dump_start+0xdf/0x190 [<ffffffffa0111490>] ? ctnetlink_change_nat_seq_adj+0x160/0x160 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115cf0>] ? ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x2a0/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115ad9>] ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x89/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff81603a47>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x467/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603a7c>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x49c/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603922>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x342/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81071b21>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x50 [<ffffffff816035e0>] ? nfnetlink_subsys_register+0x60/0x60 [<ffffffff815fed49>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xd0 [<ffffffff81603475>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffff815fe70e>] netlink_unicast+0x1ae/0x1f0 [<ffffffff815fea16>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c6/0x320 [<ffffffff815b2a87>] sock_sendmsg+0x117/0x130 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff811250dc>] ? might_fault+0x9c/0xb0 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff815b5991>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x71/0x80 [<ffffffff815b644e>] sys_sendto+0xfe/0x130 [<ffffffff815b5c94>] ? sys_bind+0xb4/0xd0 [<ffffffff817a8a0e>] ? retint_swapgs+0xe/0x13 [<ffffffff817afcd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com>
2012-03-05 02:24:29 +00:00
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
NFNL_MSG_TYPE(cb->nlh->nlmsg_type),
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
ct, true, flags);
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix lockep splats net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:70 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 3 locks held by conntrack/3235: nfnl_lock+0x17/0x20 netlink_dump+0x32/0x240 ctnetlink_dump_table+0x3e/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] stack backtrace: Pid: 3235, comm: conntrack Tainted: G W 3.2.0+ #511 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8108ce45>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe5/0x100 [<ffffffffa00ec6e1>] __nf_ct_l4proto_find+0x81/0xb0 [nf_conntrack] [<ffffffffa0115675>] ctnetlink_fill_info+0x215/0x5f0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115dc1>] ctnetlink_dump_table+0xd1/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff815fbdbf>] netlink_dump+0x7f/0x240 [<ffffffff81090f9d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff815fd34f>] netlink_dump_start+0xdf/0x190 [<ffffffffa0111490>] ? ctnetlink_change_nat_seq_adj+0x160/0x160 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115cf0>] ? ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x2a0/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115ad9>] ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x89/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff81603a47>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x467/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603a7c>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x49c/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603922>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x342/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81071b21>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x50 [<ffffffff816035e0>] ? nfnetlink_subsys_register+0x60/0x60 [<ffffffff815fed49>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xd0 [<ffffffff81603475>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffff815fe70e>] netlink_unicast+0x1ae/0x1f0 [<ffffffff815fea16>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c6/0x320 [<ffffffff815b2a87>] sock_sendmsg+0x117/0x130 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff811250dc>] ? might_fault+0x9c/0xb0 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff815b5991>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x71/0x80 [<ffffffff815b644e>] sys_sendto+0xfe/0x130 [<ffffffff815b5c94>] ? sys_bind+0xb4/0xd0 [<ffffffff817a8a0e>] ? retint_swapgs+0xe/0x13 [<ffffffff817afcd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com>
2012-03-05 02:24:29 +00:00
if (res < 0) {
nf_conntrack_get(&ct->ct_general);
cb->args[1] = (unsigned long)ct;
netfilter: conntrack: remove central spinlock nf_conntrack_lock nf_conntrack_lock is a monolithic lock and suffers from huge contention on current generation servers (8 or more core/threads). Perf locking congestion is clear on base kernel: - 72.56% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] _raw_spin_lock_bh - _raw_spin_lock_bh + 25.33% init_conntrack + 24.86% nf_ct_delete_from_lists + 24.62% __nf_conntrack_confirm + 24.38% destroy_conntrack + 0.70% tcp_packet + 2.21% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] fib_table_lookup + 1.15% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __slab_free + 0.77% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] inet_getpeer + 0.70% ksoftirqd/6 [nf_conntrack] [k] nf_ct_delete + 0.55% ksoftirqd/6 [ip_tables] [k] ipt_do_table This patch change conntrack locking and provides a huge performance improvement. SYN-flood attack tested on a 24-core E5-2695v2(ES) with 10Gbit/s ixgbe (with tool trafgen): Base kernel: 810.405 new conntrack/sec After patch: 2.233.876 new conntrack/sec Notice other floods attack (SYN+ACK or ACK) can easily be deflected using: # iptables -A INPUT -m state --state INVALID -j DROP # sysctl -w net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp_loose=0 Use an array of hashed spinlocks to protect insertions/deletions of conntracks into the hash table. 1024 spinlocks seem to give good results, at minimal cost (4KB memory). Due to lockdep max depth, 1024 becomes 8 if CONFIG_LOCKDEP=y The hash resize is a bit tricky, because we need to take all locks in the array. A seqcount_t is used to synchronize the hash table users with the resizing process. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2014-03-03 13:46:13 +00:00
spin_unlock(lockp);
goto out;
}
}
netfilter: conntrack: remove central spinlock nf_conntrack_lock nf_conntrack_lock is a monolithic lock and suffers from huge contention on current generation servers (8 or more core/threads). Perf locking congestion is clear on base kernel: - 72.56% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] _raw_spin_lock_bh - _raw_spin_lock_bh + 25.33% init_conntrack + 24.86% nf_ct_delete_from_lists + 24.62% __nf_conntrack_confirm + 24.38% destroy_conntrack + 0.70% tcp_packet + 2.21% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] fib_table_lookup + 1.15% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __slab_free + 0.77% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] inet_getpeer + 0.70% ksoftirqd/6 [nf_conntrack] [k] nf_ct_delete + 0.55% ksoftirqd/6 [ip_tables] [k] ipt_do_table This patch change conntrack locking and provides a huge performance improvement. SYN-flood attack tested on a 24-core E5-2695v2(ES) with 10Gbit/s ixgbe (with tool trafgen): Base kernel: 810.405 new conntrack/sec After patch: 2.233.876 new conntrack/sec Notice other floods attack (SYN+ACK or ACK) can easily be deflected using: # iptables -A INPUT -m state --state INVALID -j DROP # sysctl -w net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp_loose=0 Use an array of hashed spinlocks to protect insertions/deletions of conntracks into the hash table. 1024 spinlocks seem to give good results, at minimal cost (4KB memory). Due to lockdep max depth, 1024 becomes 8 if CONFIG_LOCKDEP=y The hash resize is a bit tricky, because we need to take all locks in the array. A seqcount_t is used to synchronize the hash table users with the resizing process. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2014-03-03 13:46:13 +00:00
spin_unlock(lockp);
if (cb->args[1]) {
cb->args[1] = 0;
goto restart;
}
}
out:
netfilter: conntrack: remove central spinlock nf_conntrack_lock nf_conntrack_lock is a monolithic lock and suffers from huge contention on current generation servers (8 or more core/threads). Perf locking congestion is clear on base kernel: - 72.56% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] _raw_spin_lock_bh - _raw_spin_lock_bh + 25.33% init_conntrack + 24.86% nf_ct_delete_from_lists + 24.62% __nf_conntrack_confirm + 24.38% destroy_conntrack + 0.70% tcp_packet + 2.21% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] fib_table_lookup + 1.15% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __slab_free + 0.77% ksoftirqd/6 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] inet_getpeer + 0.70% ksoftirqd/6 [nf_conntrack] [k] nf_ct_delete + 0.55% ksoftirqd/6 [ip_tables] [k] ipt_do_table This patch change conntrack locking and provides a huge performance improvement. SYN-flood attack tested on a 24-core E5-2695v2(ES) with 10Gbit/s ixgbe (with tool trafgen): Base kernel: 810.405 new conntrack/sec After patch: 2.233.876 new conntrack/sec Notice other floods attack (SYN+ACK or ACK) can easily be deflected using: # iptables -A INPUT -m state --state INVALID -j DROP # sysctl -w net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp_loose=0 Use an array of hashed spinlocks to protect insertions/deletions of conntracks into the hash table. 1024 spinlocks seem to give good results, at minimal cost (4KB memory). Due to lockdep max depth, 1024 becomes 8 if CONFIG_LOCKDEP=y The hash resize is a bit tricky, because we need to take all locks in the array. A seqcount_t is used to synchronize the hash table users with the resizing process. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2014-03-03 13:46:13 +00:00
local_bh_enable();
if (last) {
/* nf ct hash resize happened, now clear the leftover. */
if ((struct nf_conn *)cb->args[1] == last)
cb->args[1] = 0;
nf_ct_put(last);
}
while (i) {
i--;
if (nf_ct_should_gc(nf_ct_evict[i]))
nf_ct_kill(nf_ct_evict[i]);
nf_ct_put(nf_ct_evict[i]);
}
return skb->len;
}
static int ipv4_nlattr_to_tuple(struct nlattr *tb[],
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *t,
u_int32_t flags)
{
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
if (flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_IP_SRC)) {
if (!tb[CTA_IP_V4_SRC])
return -EINVAL;
t->src.u3.ip = nla_get_in_addr(tb[CTA_IP_V4_SRC]);
}
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
if (flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_IP_DST)) {
if (!tb[CTA_IP_V4_DST])
return -EINVAL;
t->dst.u3.ip = nla_get_in_addr(tb[CTA_IP_V4_DST]);
}
return 0;
}
static int ipv6_nlattr_to_tuple(struct nlattr *tb[],
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *t,
u_int32_t flags)
{
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
if (flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_IP_SRC)) {
if (!tb[CTA_IP_V6_SRC])
return -EINVAL;
t->src.u3.in6 = nla_get_in6_addr(tb[CTA_IP_V6_SRC]);
}
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
if (flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_IP_DST)) {
if (!tb[CTA_IP_V6_DST])
return -EINVAL;
t->dst.u3.in6 = nla_get_in6_addr(tb[CTA_IP_V6_DST]);
}
return 0;
}
static int ctnetlink_parse_tuple_ip(struct nlattr *attr,
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
u_int32_t flags)
{
struct nlattr *tb[CTA_IP_MAX+1];
int ret = 0;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 12:07:28 +00:00
ret = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(tb, CTA_IP_MAX, attr, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 12:07:28 +00:00
ret = nla_validate_nested_deprecated(attr, CTA_IP_MAX,
cta_ip_nla_policy, NULL);
if (ret)
return ret;
switch (tuple->src.l3num) {
case NFPROTO_IPV4:
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
ret = ipv4_nlattr_to_tuple(tb, tuple, flags);
break;
case NFPROTO_IPV6:
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
ret = ipv6_nlattr_to_tuple(tb, tuple, flags);
break;
}
return ret;
}
static const struct nla_policy proto_nla_policy[CTA_PROTO_MAX+1] = {
[CTA_PROTO_NUM] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
};
static int ctnetlink_parse_tuple_proto(struct nlattr *attr,
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
u_int32_t flags)
{
const struct nf_conntrack_l4proto *l4proto;
struct nlattr *tb[CTA_PROTO_MAX+1];
int ret = 0;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 12:07:28 +00:00
ret = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(tb, CTA_PROTO_MAX, attr,
proto_nla_policy, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
if (!(flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_PROTO_NUM)))
return 0;
if (!tb[CTA_PROTO_NUM])
return -EINVAL;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
tuple->dst.protonum = nla_get_u8(tb[CTA_PROTO_NUM]);
rcu_read_lock();
l4proto = nf_ct_l4proto_find(tuple->dst.protonum);
if (likely(l4proto->nlattr_to_tuple)) {
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 12:07:28 +00:00
ret = nla_validate_nested_deprecated(attr, CTA_PROTO_MAX,
l4proto->nla_policy,
NULL);
if (ret == 0)
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
ret = l4proto->nlattr_to_tuple(tb, tuple, flags);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
static int
ctnetlink_parse_zone(const struct nlattr *attr,
struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone)
{
nf_ct_zone_init(zone, NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID,
NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR, 0);
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_ZONES
if (attr)
zone->id = ntohs(nla_get_be16(attr));
#else
if (attr)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
return 0;
}
static int
ctnetlink_parse_tuple_zone(struct nlattr *attr, enum ctattr_type type,
struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone)
{
int ret;
if (zone->id != NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID)
return -EINVAL;
ret = ctnetlink_parse_zone(attr, zone);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (type == CTA_TUPLE_REPLY)
zone->dir = NF_CT_ZONE_DIR_REPL;
else
zone->dir = NF_CT_ZONE_DIR_ORIG;
return 0;
}
static const struct nla_policy tuple_nla_policy[CTA_TUPLE_MAX+1] = {
[CTA_TUPLE_IP] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[CTA_TUPLE_PROTO] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
[CTA_TUPLE_ZONE] = { .type = NLA_U16 },
};
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
#define CTA_FILTER_F_ALL_CTA_PROTO \
(CTA_FILTER_F_CTA_PROTO_SRC_PORT | \
CTA_FILTER_F_CTA_PROTO_DST_PORT | \
CTA_FILTER_F_CTA_PROTO_ICMP_TYPE | \
CTA_FILTER_F_CTA_PROTO_ICMP_CODE | \
CTA_FILTER_F_CTA_PROTO_ICMP_ID | \
CTA_FILTER_F_CTA_PROTO_ICMPV6_TYPE | \
CTA_FILTER_F_CTA_PROTO_ICMPV6_CODE | \
CTA_FILTER_F_CTA_PROTO_ICMPV6_ID)
[NETFILTER]: Kill some supper dupper bloatry /me awards the bloatiest-of-all-net/-.c-code award to nf_conntrack_netlink.c, congratulations to all the authors :-/! Hall of (unquestionable) fame (measured per inline, top 10 under net/): -4496 ctnetlink_parse_tuple netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -2165 ctnetlink_dump_tuples netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -2115 __ip_vs_get_out_rt ipv4/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c -1924 xfrm_audit_helper_pktinfo xfrm/xfrm_state.c -1799 ctnetlink_parse_tuple_proto netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -1268 ctnetlink_parse_tuple_ip netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -1093 ctnetlink_exp_dump_expect netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -1060 void ccid3_update_send_interval dccp/ccids/ccid3.c -983 ctnetlink_dump_tuples_proto netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -827 ctnetlink_exp_dump_tuple netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c (i386 / gcc (GCC) 4.1.2 20070626 (Red Hat 4.1.2-13) / allyesconfig except CONFIG_FORCED_INLINING) ...and I left < 200 byte gains as future work item. After iterative inline removal, I finally have this: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c: ctnetlink_exp_fill_info | -1104 ctnetlink_new_expect | -1572 ctnetlink_fill_info | -1303 ctnetlink_new_conntrack | -2230 ctnetlink_get_expect | -341 ctnetlink_del_expect | -352 ctnetlink_expect_event | -1110 ctnetlink_conntrack_event | -1548 ctnetlink_del_conntrack | -729 ctnetlink_get_conntrack | -728 10 functions changed, 11017 bytes removed, diff: -11017 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c: ctnetlink_parse_tuple | +419 dump_nat_seq_adj | +183 ctnetlink_dump_counters | +166 ctnetlink_dump_tuples | +261 ctnetlink_exp_dump_expect | +633 ctnetlink_change_status | +460 6 functions changed, 2122 bytes added, diff: +2122 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.o: 16 functions changed, 2122 bytes added, 11017 bytes removed, diff: -8895 Without a number of CONFIG.*DEBUGs, I got this: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.o: 16 functions changed, 2122 bytes added, 11029 bytes removed, diff: -8907 Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-01-06 07:11:31 +00:00
static int
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
ctnetlink_parse_tuple_filter(const struct nlattr * const cda[],
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, u32 type,
u_int8_t l3num, struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone,
u_int32_t flags)
{
struct nlattr *tb[CTA_TUPLE_MAX+1];
int err;
memset(tuple, 0, sizeof(*tuple));
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 12:07:28 +00:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(tb, CTA_TUPLE_MAX, cda[type],
tuple_nla_policy, NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add a range check for l3/l4 protonum The indexes to the nf_nat_l[34]protos arrays come from userspace. So check the tuple's family, e.g. l3num, when creating the conntrack in order to prevent an OOB memory access during setup. Here is an example kernel panic on 4.14.180 when userspace passes in an index greater than NFPROTO_NUMPROTO. Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in:... Process poc (pid: 5614, stack limit = 0x00000000a3933121) CPU: 4 PID: 5614 Comm: poc Tainted: G S W O 4.14.180-g051355490483 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM task: 000000002a3dfffe task.stack: 00000000a3933121 pc : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 lr : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 ... Call trace: __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 name_to_dev_t+0x0/0x468 nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x234/0x258 ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x4c/0x228 ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x590/0xc40 nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x31c/0x4d4 netlink_rcv_skb+0x100/0x184 nfnetlink_rcv+0xf4/0x180 netlink_unicast+0x360/0x770 netlink_sendmsg+0x5a0/0x6a4 ___sys_sendmsg+0x314/0x46c SyS_sendmsg+0xb4/0x108 el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38 This crash is not happening since 5.4+, however, ctnetlink still allows for creating entries with unsupported layer 3 protocol number. Fixes: c1d10adb4a521 ("[NETFILTER]: Add ctnetlink port for nf_conntrack") Signed-off-by: Will McVicker <willmcvicker@google.com> [pablo@netfilter.org: rebased original patch on top of nf.git] Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-08-24 19:38:32 +00:00
if (l3num != NFPROTO_IPV4 && l3num != NFPROTO_IPV6)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
tuple->src.l3num = l3num;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
if (flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_IP_DST) ||
flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_IP_SRC)) {
if (!tb[CTA_TUPLE_IP])
return -EINVAL;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple_ip(tb[CTA_TUPLE_IP], tuple, flags);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
if (flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_PROTO_NUM)) {
if (!tb[CTA_TUPLE_PROTO])
return -EINVAL;
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple_proto(tb[CTA_TUPLE_PROTO], tuple, flags);
if (err < 0)
return err;
} else if (flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(ALL_CTA_PROTO)) {
/* Can't manage proto flags without a protonum */
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((flags & CTA_FILTER_FLAG(CTA_TUPLE_ZONE)) && tb[CTA_TUPLE_ZONE]) {
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
if (!zone)
return -EINVAL;
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple_zone(tb[CTA_TUPLE_ZONE],
type, zone);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
/* orig and expect tuples get DIR_ORIGINAL */
if (type == CTA_TUPLE_REPLY)
tuple->dst.dir = IP_CT_DIR_REPLY;
else
tuple->dst.dir = IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL;
return 0;
}
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
static int
ctnetlink_parse_tuple(const struct nlattr * const cda[],
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, u32 type,
u_int8_t l3num, struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone)
{
return ctnetlink_parse_tuple_filter(cda, tuple, type, l3num, zone,
CTA_FILTER_FLAG(ALL));
}
static const struct nla_policy help_nla_policy[CTA_HELP_MAX+1] = {
[CTA_HELP_NAME] = { .type = NLA_NUL_STRING,
.len = NF_CT_HELPER_NAME_LEN - 1 },
};
static int ctnetlink_parse_help(const struct nlattr *attr, char **helper_name,
struct nlattr **helpinfo)
{
int err;
struct nlattr *tb[CTA_HELP_MAX+1];
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 12:07:28 +00:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(tb, CTA_HELP_MAX, attr,
help_nla_policy, NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (!tb[CTA_HELP_NAME])
return -EINVAL;
*helper_name = nla_data(tb[CTA_HELP_NAME]);
if (tb[CTA_HELP_INFO])
*helpinfo = tb[CTA_HELP_INFO];
return 0;
}
static const struct nla_policy ct_nla_policy[CTA_MAX+1] = {
[CTA_TUPLE_ORIG] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[CTA_TUPLE_REPLY] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[CTA_STATUS] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[CTA_PROTOINFO] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[CTA_HELP] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[CTA_NAT_SRC] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[CTA_TIMEOUT] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[CTA_MARK] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[CTA_ID] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[CTA_NAT_DST] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[CTA_TUPLE_MASTER] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[CTA_NAT_SEQ_ADJ_ORIG] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[CTA_NAT_SEQ_ADJ_REPLY] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[CTA_ZONE] = { .type = NLA_U16 },
[CTA_MARK_MASK] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[CTA_LABELS] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
.len = NF_CT_LABELS_MAX_SIZE },
[CTA_LABELS_MASK] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
.len = NF_CT_LABELS_MAX_SIZE },
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
[CTA_FILTER] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[CTA_STATUS_MASK] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
};
static int ctnetlink_flush_iterate(struct nf_conn *ct, void *data)
{
return ctnetlink_filter_match(ct, data);
}
static int ctnetlink_flush_conntrack(struct net *net,
const struct nlattr * const cda[],
u32 portid, int report, u8 family)
{
struct ctnetlink_filter *filter = NULL;
struct nf_ct_iter_data iter = {
.net = net,
.portid = portid,
.report = report,
};
netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump Conntrack dump does not support kernel side filtering (only get exists, but it returns only one entry. And user has to give a full valid tuple) It means that userspace has to implement filtering after receiving many irrelevant entries, consuming resources (conntrack table is sometimes very huge, much more than a routing table for example). This patch adds filtering in kernel side. To achieve this goal, we: * Add a new CTA_FILTER netlink attributes, actually a flag list to parametize filtering * Convert some *nlattr_to_tuple() functions, to allow a partial parsing of CTA_TUPLE_ORIG and CTA_TUPLE_REPLY (so nf_conntrack_tuple it not fully set) Filtering is now possible on: * IP SRC/DST values * Ports for TCP and UDP flows * IMCP(v6) codes types and IDs Filtering is done as an "AND" operator. For example, when flags PROTO_SRC_PORT, PROTO_NUM and IP_SRC are sets, only entries matching all values are dumped. Changes since v1: Set NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED in nlm flags if entries are filtered Changes since v2: Move several constants to nf_internals.h Move a fix on netlink values check in a separate patch Add a check on not-supported flags Return EOPNOTSUPP if CDA_FILTER is set in ctnetlink_flush_conntrack (not yet implemented) Code style issues Changes since v3: Fix compilation warning reported by kbuild test robot Changes since v4: Fix a regression introduced in v3 (returned EINVAL for valid netlink messages without CTA_MARK) Changes since v5: Change definition of CTA_FILTER_F_ALL Fix a regression when CTA_TUPLE_ZONE is not set Signed-off-by: Romain Bellan <romain.bellan@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@wifirst.fr> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2020-05-04 19:34:29 +00:00
if (ctnetlink_needs_filter(family, cda)) {
if (cda[CTA_FILTER])
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
filter = ctnetlink_alloc_filter(cda, family);
if (IS_ERR(filter))
return PTR_ERR(filter);
iter.data = filter;
}
nf_ct_iterate_cleanup_net(ctnetlink_flush_iterate, &iter);
kfree(filter);
return 0;
}
static int ctnetlink_del_conntrack(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nfnl_info *info,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
u8 family = info->nfmsg->nfgen_family;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *h;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple;
struct nf_conntrack_zone zone;
struct nf_conn *ct;
int err;
err = ctnetlink_parse_zone(cda[CTA_ZONE], &zone);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (cda[CTA_TUPLE_ORIG])
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &tuple, CTA_TUPLE_ORIG,
family, &zone);
else if (cda[CTA_TUPLE_REPLY])
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &tuple, CTA_TUPLE_REPLY,
family, &zone);
else {
u_int8_t u3 = info->nfmsg->version ? family : AF_UNSPEC;
return ctnetlink_flush_conntrack(info->net, cda,
NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
nlmsg_report(info->nlh), u3);
}
if (err < 0)
return err;
h = nf_conntrack_find_get(info->net, &zone, &tuple);
if (!h)
return -ENOENT;
ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h);
if (cda[CTA_ID]) {
__be32 id = nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_ID]);
if (id != (__force __be32)nf_ct_get_id(ct)) {
nf_ct_put(ct);
return -ENOENT;
}
}
nf_ct_delete(ct, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, nlmsg_report(info->nlh));
nf_ct_put(ct);
return 0;
}
static int ctnetlink_get_conntrack(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nfnl_info *info,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
u_int8_t u3 = info->nfmsg->nfgen_family;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *h;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple;
struct nf_conntrack_zone zone;
struct sk_buff *skb2;
struct nf_conn *ct;
int err;
if (info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
.start = ctnetlink_start,
.dump = ctnetlink_dump_table,
.done = ctnetlink_done,
.data = (void *)cda,
};
return netlink_dump_start(info->sk, skb, info->nlh, &c);
}
err = ctnetlink_parse_zone(cda[CTA_ZONE], &zone);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (cda[CTA_TUPLE_ORIG])
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &tuple, CTA_TUPLE_ORIG,
u3, &zone);
else if (cda[CTA_TUPLE_REPLY])
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &tuple, CTA_TUPLE_REPLY,
u3, &zone);
else
return -EINVAL;
if (err < 0)
return err;
h = nf_conntrack_find_get(info->net, &zone, &tuple);
if (!h)
return -ENOENT;
ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h);
skb2 = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb2) {
nf_ct_put(ct);
return -ENOMEM;
}
err = ctnetlink_fill_info(skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
info->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
NFNL_MSG_TYPE(info->nlh->nlmsg_type), ct,
true, 0);
nf_ct_put(ct);
if (err <= 0) {
kfree_skb(skb2);
return -ENOMEM;
}
return nfnetlink_unicast(skb2, info->net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
}
static int ctnetlink_done_list(struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct ctnetlink_list_dump_ctx *ctx = (void *)cb->ctx;
if (ctx->last)
nf_ct_put(ctx->last);
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS
static int ctnetlink_dump_one_entry(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb,
struct nf_conn *ct,
bool dying)
{
struct ctnetlink_list_dump_ctx *ctx = (void *)cb->ctx;
struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg = nlmsg_data(cb->nlh);
u8 l3proto = nfmsg->nfgen_family;
int res;
if (l3proto && nf_ct_l3num(ct) != l3proto)
return 0;
if (ctx->last) {
if (ct != ctx->last)
return 0;
ctx->last = NULL;
}
/* We can't dump extension info for the unconfirmed
* list because unconfirmed conntracks can have
* ct->ext reallocated (and thus freed).
*
* In the dying list case ct->ext can't be free'd
* until after we drop pcpu->lock.
*/
res = ctnetlink_fill_info(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
NFNL_MSG_TYPE(cb->nlh->nlmsg_type),
ct, dying, 0);
if (res < 0) {
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct->ct_general.use))
return 0;
ctx->last = ct;
}
return res;
}
#endif
static int
ctnetlink_dump_unconfirmed(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
return 0;
}
static int
ctnetlink_dump_dying(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct ctnetlink_list_dump_ctx *ctx = (void *)cb->ctx;
struct nf_conn *last = ctx->last;
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS
const struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct nf_conntrack_net_ecache *ecache_net;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *h;
struct hlist_nulls_node *n;
#endif
if (ctx->done)
return 0;
ctx->last = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS
ecache_net = nf_conn_pernet_ecache(net);
spin_lock_bh(&ecache_net->dying_lock);
hlist_nulls_for_each_entry(h, n, &ecache_net->dying_list, hnnode) {
struct nf_conn *ct;
int res;
ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h);
if (last && last != ct)
continue;
res = ctnetlink_dump_one_entry(skb, cb, ct, true);
if (res < 0) {
spin_unlock_bh(&ecache_net->dying_lock);
nf_ct_put(last);
return skb->len;
}
nf_ct_put(last);
last = NULL;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&ecache_net->dying_lock);
#endif
ctx->done = true;
nf_ct_put(last);
return skb->len;
}
static int ctnetlink_get_ct_dying(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nfnl_info *info,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
if (info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
.dump = ctnetlink_dump_dying,
.done = ctnetlink_done_list,
};
return netlink_dump_start(info->sk, skb, info->nlh, &c);
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static int ctnetlink_get_ct_unconfirmed(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nfnl_info *info,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
if (info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
.dump = ctnetlink_dump_unconfirmed,
.done = ctnetlink_done_list,
};
return netlink_dump_start(info->sk, skb, info->nlh, &c);
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
static int
ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup(struct nf_conn *ct,
enum nf_nat_manip_type manip,
const struct nlattr *attr)
__must_hold(RCU)
{
const struct nf_nat_hook *nat_hook;
int err;
nat_hook = rcu_dereference(nf_nat_hook);
if (!nat_hook) {
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
rcu_read_unlock();
nfnl_unlock(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTNETLINK);
if (request_module("nf-nat") < 0) {
nfnl_lock(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTNETLINK);
rcu_read_lock();
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
nfnl_lock(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTNETLINK);
rcu_read_lock();
nat_hook = rcu_dereference(nf_nat_hook);
if (nat_hook)
return -EAGAIN;
#endif
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
err = nat_hook->parse_nat_setup(ct, manip, attr);
if (err == -EAGAIN) {
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
rcu_read_unlock();
nfnl_unlock(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTNETLINK);
if (request_module("nf-nat-%u", nf_ct_l3num(ct)) < 0) {
nfnl_lock(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTNETLINK);
rcu_read_lock();
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
nfnl_lock(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTNETLINK);
rcu_read_lock();
#else
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
return err;
}
#endif
[NETFILTER]: Kill some supper dupper bloatry /me awards the bloatiest-of-all-net/-.c-code award to nf_conntrack_netlink.c, congratulations to all the authors :-/! Hall of (unquestionable) fame (measured per inline, top 10 under net/): -4496 ctnetlink_parse_tuple netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -2165 ctnetlink_dump_tuples netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -2115 __ip_vs_get_out_rt ipv4/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c -1924 xfrm_audit_helper_pktinfo xfrm/xfrm_state.c -1799 ctnetlink_parse_tuple_proto netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -1268 ctnetlink_parse_tuple_ip netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -1093 ctnetlink_exp_dump_expect netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -1060 void ccid3_update_send_interval dccp/ccids/ccid3.c -983 ctnetlink_dump_tuples_proto netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -827 ctnetlink_exp_dump_tuple netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c (i386 / gcc (GCC) 4.1.2 20070626 (Red Hat 4.1.2-13) / allyesconfig except CONFIG_FORCED_INLINING) ...and I left < 200 byte gains as future work item. After iterative inline removal, I finally have this: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c: ctnetlink_exp_fill_info | -1104 ctnetlink_new_expect | -1572 ctnetlink_fill_info | -1303 ctnetlink_new_conntrack | -2230 ctnetlink_get_expect | -341 ctnetlink_del_expect | -352 ctnetlink_expect_event | -1110 ctnetlink_conntrack_event | -1548 ctnetlink_del_conntrack | -729 ctnetlink_get_conntrack | -728 10 functions changed, 11017 bytes removed, diff: -11017 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c: ctnetlink_parse_tuple | +419 dump_nat_seq_adj | +183 ctnetlink_dump_counters | +166 ctnetlink_dump_tuples | +261 ctnetlink_exp_dump_expect | +633 ctnetlink_change_status | +460 6 functions changed, 2122 bytes added, diff: +2122 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.o: 16 functions changed, 2122 bytes added, 11017 bytes removed, diff: -8895 Without a number of CONFIG.*DEBUGs, I got this: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.o: 16 functions changed, 2122 bytes added, 11029 bytes removed, diff: -8907 Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-01-06 07:11:31 +00:00
static int
ctnetlink_change_status(struct nf_conn *ct, const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
return nf_ct_change_status_common(ct, ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_STATUS])));
}
static int
ctnetlink_setup_nat(struct nf_conn *ct, const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
int ret;
if (!cda[CTA_NAT_DST] && !cda[CTA_NAT_SRC])
return 0;
ret = ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup(ct, NF_NAT_MANIP_DST,
cda[CTA_NAT_DST]);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
return ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup(ct, NF_NAT_MANIP_SRC,
cda[CTA_NAT_SRC]);
#else
if (!cda[CTA_NAT_DST] && !cda[CTA_NAT_SRC])
return 0;
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
static int ctnetlink_change_helper(struct nf_conn *ct,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper;
struct nf_conn_help *help = nfct_help(ct);
char *helpname = NULL;
struct nlattr *helpinfo = NULL;
int err;
err = ctnetlink_parse_help(cda[CTA_HELP], &helpname, &helpinfo);
if (err < 0)
return err;
/* don't change helper of sibling connections */
if (ct->master) {
/* If we try to change the helper to the same thing twice,
* treat the second attempt as a no-op instead of returning
* an error.
*/
err = -EBUSY;
if (help) {
rcu_read_lock();
helper = rcu_dereference(help->helper);
if (helper && !strcmp(helper->name, helpname))
err = 0;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
return err;
}
if (!strcmp(helpname, "")) {
if (help && help->helper) {
/* we had a helper before ... */
nf_ct_remove_expectations(ct);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(help->helper, NULL);
}
return 0;
}
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix deadlock due to acquire _expect_lock twice Currently, ctnetlink_change_conntrack is always protected by _expect_lock, but this will cause a deadlock when deleting the helper from a conntrack, as the _expect_lock will be acquired again by nf_ct_remove_expectations: CPU0 ---- lock(nf_conntrack_expect_lock); lock(nf_conntrack_expect_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 2 locks held by lt-conntrack_gr/12853: #0: (&table[i].mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa05e2009>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x399/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] #1: (nf_conntrack_expect_lock){+.....}, at: [<ffffffffa05f2c1f>] ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x17f/0x408 [nf_conntrack_netlink] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x85/0xc2 __lock_acquire+0x1608/0x1680 ? ctnetlink_parse_tuple_proto+0x10f/0x1c0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] lock_acquire+0x100/0x1f0 ? nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x3f/0x50 ? nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] ctnetlink_change_helper+0xc6/0x190 [nf_conntrack_netlink] ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x1b2/0x408 [nf_conntrack_netlink] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x60a/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1b9/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] ? nfnetlink_bind+0x1a0/0x1a0 [nfnetlink] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa4/0xc0 nfnetlink_rcv+0x87/0x770 [nfnetlink] Since the operations are unrelated to nf_ct_expect, so we can drop the _expect_lock. Also note, after removing the _expect_lock protection, another CPU may invoke nf_conntrack_helper_unregister, so we should use rcu_read_lock to protect __nf_conntrack_helper_find invoked by ctnetlink_change_helper. Fixes: ca7433df3a67 ("netfilter: conntrack: seperate expect locking from nf_conntrack_lock") Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2017-04-17 13:18:56 +00:00
rcu_read_lock();
helper = __nf_conntrack_helper_find(helpname, nf_ct_l3num(ct),
nf_ct_protonum(ct));
if (helper == NULL) {
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix deadlock due to acquire _expect_lock twice Currently, ctnetlink_change_conntrack is always protected by _expect_lock, but this will cause a deadlock when deleting the helper from a conntrack, as the _expect_lock will be acquired again by nf_ct_remove_expectations: CPU0 ---- lock(nf_conntrack_expect_lock); lock(nf_conntrack_expect_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 2 locks held by lt-conntrack_gr/12853: #0: (&table[i].mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa05e2009>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x399/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] #1: (nf_conntrack_expect_lock){+.....}, at: [<ffffffffa05f2c1f>] ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x17f/0x408 [nf_conntrack_netlink] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x85/0xc2 __lock_acquire+0x1608/0x1680 ? ctnetlink_parse_tuple_proto+0x10f/0x1c0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] lock_acquire+0x100/0x1f0 ? nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x3f/0x50 ? nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] ctnetlink_change_helper+0xc6/0x190 [nf_conntrack_netlink] ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x1b2/0x408 [nf_conntrack_netlink] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x60a/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1b9/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] ? nfnetlink_bind+0x1a0/0x1a0 [nfnetlink] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa4/0xc0 nfnetlink_rcv+0x87/0x770 [nfnetlink] Since the operations are unrelated to nf_ct_expect, so we can drop the _expect_lock. Also note, after removing the _expect_lock protection, another CPU may invoke nf_conntrack_helper_unregister, so we should use rcu_read_lock to protect __nf_conntrack_helper_find invoked by ctnetlink_change_helper. Fixes: ca7433df3a67 ("netfilter: conntrack: seperate expect locking from nf_conntrack_lock") Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2017-04-17 13:18:56 +00:00
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
if (help) {
if (rcu_access_pointer(help->helper) == helper) {
/* update private helper data if allowed. */
if (helper->from_nlattr)
helper->from_nlattr(helpinfo, ct);
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix deadlock due to acquire _expect_lock twice Currently, ctnetlink_change_conntrack is always protected by _expect_lock, but this will cause a deadlock when deleting the helper from a conntrack, as the _expect_lock will be acquired again by nf_ct_remove_expectations: CPU0 ---- lock(nf_conntrack_expect_lock); lock(nf_conntrack_expect_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 2 locks held by lt-conntrack_gr/12853: #0: (&table[i].mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa05e2009>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x399/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] #1: (nf_conntrack_expect_lock){+.....}, at: [<ffffffffa05f2c1f>] ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x17f/0x408 [nf_conntrack_netlink] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x85/0xc2 __lock_acquire+0x1608/0x1680 ? ctnetlink_parse_tuple_proto+0x10f/0x1c0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] lock_acquire+0x100/0x1f0 ? nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x3f/0x50 ? nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] ctnetlink_change_helper+0xc6/0x190 [nf_conntrack_netlink] ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x1b2/0x408 [nf_conntrack_netlink] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x60a/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1b9/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] ? nfnetlink_bind+0x1a0/0x1a0 [nfnetlink] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa4/0xc0 nfnetlink_rcv+0x87/0x770 [nfnetlink] Since the operations are unrelated to nf_ct_expect, so we can drop the _expect_lock. Also note, after removing the _expect_lock protection, another CPU may invoke nf_conntrack_helper_unregister, so we should use rcu_read_lock to protect __nf_conntrack_helper_find invoked by ctnetlink_change_helper. Fixes: ca7433df3a67 ("netfilter: conntrack: seperate expect locking from nf_conntrack_lock") Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2017-04-17 13:18:56 +00:00
err = 0;
} else
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix deadlock due to acquire _expect_lock twice Currently, ctnetlink_change_conntrack is always protected by _expect_lock, but this will cause a deadlock when deleting the helper from a conntrack, as the _expect_lock will be acquired again by nf_ct_remove_expectations: CPU0 ---- lock(nf_conntrack_expect_lock); lock(nf_conntrack_expect_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 2 locks held by lt-conntrack_gr/12853: #0: (&table[i].mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa05e2009>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x399/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] #1: (nf_conntrack_expect_lock){+.....}, at: [<ffffffffa05f2c1f>] ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x17f/0x408 [nf_conntrack_netlink] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x85/0xc2 __lock_acquire+0x1608/0x1680 ? ctnetlink_parse_tuple_proto+0x10f/0x1c0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] lock_acquire+0x100/0x1f0 ? nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x3f/0x50 ? nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] ctnetlink_change_helper+0xc6/0x190 [nf_conntrack_netlink] ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x1b2/0x408 [nf_conntrack_netlink] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x60a/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1b9/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] ? nfnetlink_bind+0x1a0/0x1a0 [nfnetlink] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa4/0xc0 nfnetlink_rcv+0x87/0x770 [nfnetlink] Since the operations are unrelated to nf_ct_expect, so we can drop the _expect_lock. Also note, after removing the _expect_lock protection, another CPU may invoke nf_conntrack_helper_unregister, so we should use rcu_read_lock to protect __nf_conntrack_helper_find invoked by ctnetlink_change_helper. Fixes: ca7433df3a67 ("netfilter: conntrack: seperate expect locking from nf_conntrack_lock") Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2017-04-17 13:18:56 +00:00
err = -EBUSY;
} else {
/* we cannot set a helper for an existing conntrack */
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix deadlock due to acquire _expect_lock twice Currently, ctnetlink_change_conntrack is always protected by _expect_lock, but this will cause a deadlock when deleting the helper from a conntrack, as the _expect_lock will be acquired again by nf_ct_remove_expectations: CPU0 ---- lock(nf_conntrack_expect_lock); lock(nf_conntrack_expect_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 2 locks held by lt-conntrack_gr/12853: #0: (&table[i].mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa05e2009>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x399/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] #1: (nf_conntrack_expect_lock){+.....}, at: [<ffffffffa05f2c1f>] ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x17f/0x408 [nf_conntrack_netlink] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x85/0xc2 __lock_acquire+0x1608/0x1680 ? ctnetlink_parse_tuple_proto+0x10f/0x1c0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] lock_acquire+0x100/0x1f0 ? nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x3f/0x50 ? nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] ctnetlink_change_helper+0xc6/0x190 [nf_conntrack_netlink] ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x1b2/0x408 [nf_conntrack_netlink] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x60a/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1b9/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] ? nfnetlink_bind+0x1a0/0x1a0 [nfnetlink] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa4/0xc0 nfnetlink_rcv+0x87/0x770 [nfnetlink] Since the operations are unrelated to nf_ct_expect, so we can drop the _expect_lock. Also note, after removing the _expect_lock protection, another CPU may invoke nf_conntrack_helper_unregister, so we should use rcu_read_lock to protect __nf_conntrack_helper_find invoked by ctnetlink_change_helper. Fixes: ca7433df3a67 ("netfilter: conntrack: seperate expect locking from nf_conntrack_lock") Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2017-04-17 13:18:56 +00:00
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
}
static int ctnetlink_change_timeout(struct nf_conn *ct,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
return __nf_ct_change_timeout(ct, (u64)ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_TIMEOUT])) * HZ);
}
#if defined(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MARK)
static void ctnetlink_change_mark(struct nf_conn *ct,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
u32 mark, newmark, mask = 0;
if (cda[CTA_MARK_MASK])
mask = ~ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_MARK_MASK]));
mark = ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_MARK]));
newmark = (READ_ONCE(ct->mark) & mask) ^ mark;
if (newmark != READ_ONCE(ct->mark))
WRITE_ONCE(ct->mark, newmark);
}
#endif
static const struct nla_policy protoinfo_policy[CTA_PROTOINFO_MAX+1] = {
[CTA_PROTOINFO_TCP] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[CTA_PROTOINFO_DCCP] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[CTA_PROTOINFO_SCTP] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
};
static int ctnetlink_change_protoinfo(struct nf_conn *ct,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
const struct nlattr *attr = cda[CTA_PROTOINFO];
const struct nf_conntrack_l4proto *l4proto;
struct nlattr *tb[CTA_PROTOINFO_MAX+1];
int err = 0;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 12:07:28 +00:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(tb, CTA_PROTOINFO_MAX, attr,
protoinfo_policy, NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
l4proto = nf_ct_l4proto_find(nf_ct_protonum(ct));
if (l4proto->from_nlattr)
err = l4proto->from_nlattr(tb, ct);
return err;
}
static const struct nla_policy seqadj_policy[CTA_SEQADJ_MAX+1] = {
[CTA_SEQADJ_CORRECTION_POS] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[CTA_SEQADJ_OFFSET_BEFORE] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[CTA_SEQADJ_OFFSET_AFTER] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
};
static int change_seq_adj(struct nf_ct_seqadj *seq,
const struct nlattr * const attr)
{
int err;
struct nlattr *cda[CTA_SEQADJ_MAX+1];
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 12:07:28 +00:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(cda, CTA_SEQADJ_MAX, attr,
seqadj_policy, NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (!cda[CTA_SEQADJ_CORRECTION_POS])
return -EINVAL;
seq->correction_pos =
ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_SEQADJ_CORRECTION_POS]));
if (!cda[CTA_SEQADJ_OFFSET_BEFORE])
return -EINVAL;
seq->offset_before =
ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_SEQADJ_OFFSET_BEFORE]));
if (!cda[CTA_SEQADJ_OFFSET_AFTER])
return -EINVAL;
seq->offset_after =
ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_SEQADJ_OFFSET_AFTER]));
return 0;
}
static int
ctnetlink_change_seq_adj(struct nf_conn *ct,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
struct nf_conn_seqadj *seqadj = nfct_seqadj(ct);
int ret = 0;
if (!seqadj)
return 0;
spin_lock_bh(&ct->lock);
if (cda[CTA_SEQ_ADJ_ORIG]) {
ret = change_seq_adj(&seqadj->seq[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL],
cda[CTA_SEQ_ADJ_ORIG]);
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
set_bit(IPS_SEQ_ADJUST_BIT, &ct->status);
}
if (cda[CTA_SEQ_ADJ_REPLY]) {
ret = change_seq_adj(&seqadj->seq[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY],
cda[CTA_SEQ_ADJ_REPLY]);
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
set_bit(IPS_SEQ_ADJUST_BIT, &ct->status);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&ct->lock);
return 0;
err:
spin_unlock_bh(&ct->lock);
return ret;
}
static const struct nla_policy synproxy_policy[CTA_SYNPROXY_MAX + 1] = {
[CTA_SYNPROXY_ISN] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[CTA_SYNPROXY_ITS] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[CTA_SYNPROXY_TSOFF] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
};
static int ctnetlink_change_synproxy(struct nf_conn *ct,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
struct nf_conn_synproxy *synproxy = nfct_synproxy(ct);
struct nlattr *tb[CTA_SYNPROXY_MAX + 1];
int err;
if (!synproxy)
return 0;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 12:07:28 +00:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(tb, CTA_SYNPROXY_MAX,
cda[CTA_SYNPROXY], synproxy_policy,
NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (!tb[CTA_SYNPROXY_ISN] ||
!tb[CTA_SYNPROXY_ITS] ||
!tb[CTA_SYNPROXY_TSOFF])
return -EINVAL;
synproxy->isn = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[CTA_SYNPROXY_ISN]));
synproxy->its = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[CTA_SYNPROXY_ITS]));
synproxy->tsoff = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[CTA_SYNPROXY_TSOFF]));
return 0;
}
static int
ctnetlink_attach_labels(struct nf_conn *ct, const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_LABELS
size_t len = nla_len(cda[CTA_LABELS]);
const void *mask = cda[CTA_LABELS_MASK];
if (len & (sizeof(u32)-1)) /* must be multiple of u32 */
return -EINVAL;
if (mask) {
if (nla_len(cda[CTA_LABELS_MASK]) == 0 ||
nla_len(cda[CTA_LABELS_MASK]) != len)
return -EINVAL;
mask = nla_data(cda[CTA_LABELS_MASK]);
}
len /= sizeof(u32);
return nf_connlabels_replace(ct, nla_data(cda[CTA_LABELS]), mask, len);
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
static int
ctnetlink_change_conntrack(struct nf_conn *ct,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
int err;
/* only allow NAT changes and master assignation for new conntracks */
if (cda[CTA_NAT_SRC] || cda[CTA_NAT_DST] || cda[CTA_TUPLE_MASTER])
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (cda[CTA_HELP]) {
err = ctnetlink_change_helper(ct, cda);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (cda[CTA_TIMEOUT]) {
err = ctnetlink_change_timeout(ct, cda);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (cda[CTA_STATUS]) {
err = ctnetlink_change_status(ct, cda);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (cda[CTA_PROTOINFO]) {
err = ctnetlink_change_protoinfo(ct, cda);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
#if defined(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MARK)
if (cda[CTA_MARK])
ctnetlink_change_mark(ct, cda);
#endif
if (cda[CTA_SEQ_ADJ_ORIG] || cda[CTA_SEQ_ADJ_REPLY]) {
err = ctnetlink_change_seq_adj(ct, cda);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (cda[CTA_SYNPROXY]) {
err = ctnetlink_change_synproxy(ct, cda);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (cda[CTA_LABELS]) {
err = ctnetlink_attach_labels(ct, cda);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
static struct nf_conn *
ctnetlink_create_conntrack(struct net *net,
const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone,
const struct nlattr * const cda[],
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *otuple,
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *rtuple,
u8 u3)
{
struct nf_conn *ct;
int err = -EINVAL;
struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper;
struct nf_conn_tstamp *tstamp;
u64 timeout;
ct = nf_conntrack_alloc(net, zone, otuple, rtuple, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (IS_ERR(ct))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (!cda[CTA_TIMEOUT])
goto err1;
rcu_read_lock();
if (cda[CTA_HELP]) {
char *helpname = NULL;
struct nlattr *helpinfo = NULL;
err = ctnetlink_parse_help(cda[CTA_HELP], &helpname, &helpinfo);
if (err < 0)
goto err2;
helper = __nf_conntrack_helper_find(helpname, nf_ct_l3num(ct),
nf_ct_protonum(ct));
if (helper == NULL) {
rcu_read_unlock();
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
if (request_module("nfct-helper-%s", helpname) < 0) {
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto err1;
}
rcu_read_lock();
helper = __nf_conntrack_helper_find(helpname,
nf_ct_l3num(ct),
nf_ct_protonum(ct));
if (helper) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto err2;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
#endif
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto err1;
} else {
struct nf_conn_help *help;
help = nf_ct_helper_ext_add(ct, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (help == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err2;
}
/* set private helper data if allowed. */
if (helper->from_nlattr)
helper->from_nlattr(helpinfo, ct);
/* disable helper auto-assignment for this entry */
ct->status |= IPS_HELPER;
RCU_INIT_POINTER(help->helper, helper);
}
}
err = ctnetlink_setup_nat(ct, cda);
if (err < 0)
goto err2;
nf_ct_acct_ext_add(ct, GFP_ATOMIC);
nf_ct_tstamp_ext_add(ct, GFP_ATOMIC);
nf_ct_ecache_ext_add(ct, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
nf_ct_labels_ext_add(ct);
nfct_seqadj_ext_add(ct);
nfct_synproxy_ext_add(ct);
/* we must add conntrack extensions before confirmation. */
ct->status |= IPS_CONFIRMED;
timeout = (u64)ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_TIMEOUT])) * HZ;
__nf_ct_set_timeout(ct, timeout);
if (cda[CTA_STATUS]) {
err = ctnetlink_change_status(ct, cda);
if (err < 0)
goto err2;
}
if (cda[CTA_SEQ_ADJ_ORIG] || cda[CTA_SEQ_ADJ_REPLY]) {
err = ctnetlink_change_seq_adj(ct, cda);
if (err < 0)
goto err2;
}
memset(&ct->proto, 0, sizeof(ct->proto));
if (cda[CTA_PROTOINFO]) {
err = ctnetlink_change_protoinfo(ct, cda);
if (err < 0)
goto err2;
}
if (cda[CTA_SYNPROXY]) {
err = ctnetlink_change_synproxy(ct, cda);
if (err < 0)
goto err2;
}
#if defined(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MARK)
if (cda[CTA_MARK])
ctnetlink_change_mark(ct, cda);
#endif
/* setup master conntrack: this is a confirmed expectation */
if (cda[CTA_TUPLE_MASTER]) {
struct nf_conntrack_tuple master;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *master_h;
struct nf_conn *master_ct;
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &master, CTA_TUPLE_MASTER,
u3, NULL);
if (err < 0)
goto err2;
master_h = nf_conntrack_find_get(net, zone, &master);
if (master_h == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto err2;
}
master_ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(master_h);
__set_bit(IPS_EXPECTED_BIT, &ct->status);
ct->master = master_ct;
}
tstamp = nf_conn_tstamp_find(ct);
if (tstamp)
tstamp->start = ktime_get_real_ns();
err = nf_conntrack_hash_check_insert(ct);
if (err < 0)
goto err3;
rcu_read_unlock();
return ct;
err3:
if (ct->master)
nf_ct_put(ct->master);
err2:
rcu_read_unlock();
err1:
nf_conntrack_free(ct);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
static int ctnetlink_new_conntrack(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nfnl_info *info,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
struct nf_conntrack_tuple otuple, rtuple;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *h = NULL;
u_int8_t u3 = info->nfmsg->nfgen_family;
struct nf_conntrack_zone zone;
struct nf_conn *ct;
int err;
err = ctnetlink_parse_zone(cda[CTA_ZONE], &zone);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (cda[CTA_TUPLE_ORIG]) {
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &otuple, CTA_TUPLE_ORIG,
u3, &zone);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (cda[CTA_TUPLE_REPLY]) {
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &rtuple, CTA_TUPLE_REPLY,
u3, &zone);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (cda[CTA_TUPLE_ORIG])
h = nf_conntrack_find_get(info->net, &zone, &otuple);
else if (cda[CTA_TUPLE_REPLY])
h = nf_conntrack_find_get(info->net, &zone, &rtuple);
if (h == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
if (info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CREATE) {
enum ip_conntrack_events events;
if (!cda[CTA_TUPLE_ORIG] || !cda[CTA_TUPLE_REPLY])
return -EINVAL;
if (otuple.dst.protonum != rtuple.dst.protonum)
return -EINVAL;
ct = ctnetlink_create_conntrack(info->net, &zone, cda,
&otuple, &rtuple, u3);
if (IS_ERR(ct))
return PTR_ERR(ct);
err = 0;
if (test_bit(IPS_EXPECTED_BIT, &ct->status))
events = 1 << IPCT_RELATED;
else
events = 1 << IPCT_NEW;
if (cda[CTA_LABELS] &&
ctnetlink_attach_labels(ct, cda) == 0)
events |= (1 << IPCT_LABEL);
nf_conntrack_eventmask_report((1 << IPCT_REPLY) |
(1 << IPCT_ASSURED) |
(1 << IPCT_HELPER) |
(1 << IPCT_PROTOINFO) |
(1 << IPCT_SEQADJ) |
(1 << IPCT_MARK) |
(1 << IPCT_SYNPROXY) |
events,
ct, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
nlmsg_report(info->nlh));
nf_ct_put(ct);
}
return err;
}
/* implicit 'else' */
err = -EEXIST;
ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h);
if (!(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL)) {
err = ctnetlink_change_conntrack(ct, cda);
if (err == 0) {
nf_conntrack_eventmask_report((1 << IPCT_REPLY) |
(1 << IPCT_ASSURED) |
(1 << IPCT_HELPER) |
(1 << IPCT_LABEL) |
(1 << IPCT_PROTOINFO) |
(1 << IPCT_SEQADJ) |
(1 << IPCT_MARK) |
(1 << IPCT_SYNPROXY),
ct, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
nlmsg_report(info->nlh));
}
}
nf_ct_put(ct);
return err;
}
static int
ctnetlink_ct_stat_cpu_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 portid, u32 seq,
__u16 cpu, const struct ip_conntrack_stat *st)
{
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
unsigned int flags = portid ? NLM_F_MULTI : 0, event;
event = nfnl_msg_type(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTNETLINK,
IPCTNL_MSG_CT_GET_STATS_CPU);
nlh = nfnl_msg_put(skb, portid, seq, event, flags, AF_UNSPEC,
NFNETLINK_V0, htons(cpu));
if (!nlh)
goto nlmsg_failure;
if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_STATS_FOUND, htonl(st->found)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_STATS_INVALID, htonl(st->invalid)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_STATS_INSERT, htonl(st->insert)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_STATS_INSERT_FAILED,
htonl(st->insert_failed)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_STATS_DROP, htonl(st->drop)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_STATS_EARLY_DROP, htonl(st->early_drop)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_STATS_ERROR, htonl(st->error)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_STATS_SEARCH_RESTART,
htonl(st->search_restart)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_STATS_CLASH_RESOLVE,
htonl(st->clash_resolve)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_STATS_CHAIN_TOOLONG,
htonl(st->chaintoolong)))
goto nla_put_failure;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return skb->len;
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -1;
}
static int
ctnetlink_ct_stat_cpu_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
int cpu;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
if (cb->args[0] == nr_cpu_ids)
return 0;
for (cpu = cb->args[0]; cpu < nr_cpu_ids; cpu++) {
const struct ip_conntrack_stat *st;
if (!cpu_possible(cpu))
continue;
st = per_cpu_ptr(net->ct.stat, cpu);
if (ctnetlink_ct_stat_cpu_fill_info(skb,
NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
cpu, st) < 0)
break;
}
cb->args[0] = cpu;
return skb->len;
}
static int ctnetlink_stat_ct_cpu(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nfnl_info *info,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
if (info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
.dump = ctnetlink_ct_stat_cpu_dump,
};
return netlink_dump_start(info->sk, skb, info->nlh, &c);
}
return 0;
}
static int
ctnetlink_stat_ct_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 portid, u32 seq, u32 type,
struct net *net)
{
unsigned int flags = portid ? NLM_F_MULTI : 0, event;
unsigned int nr_conntracks;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
event = nfnl_msg_type(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTNETLINK, IPCTNL_MSG_CT_GET_STATS);
nlh = nfnl_msg_put(skb, portid, seq, event, flags, AF_UNSPEC,
NFNETLINK_V0, 0);
if (!nlh)
goto nlmsg_failure;
nr_conntracks = nf_conntrack_count(net);
if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_STATS_GLOBAL_ENTRIES, htonl(nr_conntracks)))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_STATS_GLOBAL_MAX_ENTRIES, htonl(nf_conntrack_max)))
goto nla_put_failure;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return skb->len;
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -1;
}
static int ctnetlink_stat_ct(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nfnl_info *info,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
struct sk_buff *skb2;
int err;
skb2 = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb2 == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
err = ctnetlink_stat_ct_fill_info(skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
info->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
NFNL_MSG_TYPE(info->nlh->nlmsg_type),
sock_net(skb->sk));
if (err <= 0) {
kfree_skb(skb2);
return -ENOMEM;
}
return nfnetlink_unicast(skb2, info->net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
}
static const struct nla_policy exp_nla_policy[CTA_EXPECT_MAX+1] = {
[CTA_EXPECT_MASTER] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[CTA_EXPECT_TUPLE] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[CTA_EXPECT_MASK] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[CTA_EXPECT_TIMEOUT] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[CTA_EXPECT_ID] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[CTA_EXPECT_HELP_NAME] = { .type = NLA_NUL_STRING,
.len = NF_CT_HELPER_NAME_LEN - 1 },
[CTA_EXPECT_ZONE] = { .type = NLA_U16 },
[CTA_EXPECT_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[CTA_EXPECT_CLASS] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[CTA_EXPECT_NAT] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
[CTA_EXPECT_FN] = { .type = NLA_NUL_STRING },
};
static struct nf_conntrack_expect *
ctnetlink_alloc_expect(const struct nlattr *const cda[], struct nf_conn *ct,
struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper,
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *mask);
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_GLUE_CT
static size_t
ctnetlink_glue_build_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
return 3 * nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_TUPLE_ORIG|REPL|MASTER */
+ 3 * nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_TUPLE_IP */
+ 3 * nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_TUPLE_PROTO */
+ 3 * nla_total_size(sizeof(u_int8_t)) /* CTA_PROTO_NUM */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(u_int32_t)) /* CTA_ID */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(u_int32_t)) /* CTA_STATUS */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(u_int32_t)) /* CTA_TIMEOUT */
+ nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_PROTOINFO */
+ nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_HELP */
+ nla_total_size(NF_CT_HELPER_NAME_LEN) /* CTA_HELP_NAME */
+ ctnetlink_secctx_size(ct)
+ ctnetlink_acct_size(ct)
+ ctnetlink_timestamp_size(ct)
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
+ 2 * nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_NAT_SEQ_ADJ_ORIG|REPL */
+ 6 * nla_total_size(sizeof(u_int32_t)) /* CTA_NAT_SEQ_OFFSET */
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MARK
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(u_int32_t)) /* CTA_MARK */
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_ZONES
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(u_int16_t)) /* CTA_ZONE|CTA_TUPLE_ZONE */
#endif
+ ctnetlink_proto_size(ct)
;
}
static int __ctnetlink_glue_build(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct)
{
const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone;
struct nlattr *nest_parms;
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
zone = nf_ct_zone(ct);
nest_parms = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_TUPLE_ORIG);
if (!nest_parms)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_tuples(skb, nf_ct_tuple(ct, IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL)) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
if (ctnetlink_dump_zone_id(skb, CTA_TUPLE_ZONE, zone,
NF_CT_ZONE_DIR_ORIG) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_parms);
nest_parms = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_TUPLE_REPLY);
if (!nest_parms)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_tuples(skb, nf_ct_tuple(ct, IP_CT_DIR_REPLY)) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
if (ctnetlink_dump_zone_id(skb, CTA_TUPLE_ZONE, zone,
NF_CT_ZONE_DIR_REPL) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_parms);
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
if (ctnetlink_dump_zone_id(skb, CTA_ZONE, zone,
NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_id(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_status(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_timeout(skb, ct, false) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_protoinfo(skb, ct, false) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_acct(skb, ct, IPCTNL_MSG_CT_GET) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_timestamp(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_helpinfo(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
if (ct->secmark && ctnetlink_dump_secctx(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
#endif
if (ct->master && ctnetlink_dump_master(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if ((ct->status & IPS_SEQ_ADJUST) &&
ctnetlink_dump_ct_seq_adj(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_ct_synproxy(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MARK
if (ctnetlink_dump_mark(skb, ct, true) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
#endif
if (ctnetlink_dump_labels(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -ENOSPC;
}
static int
ctnetlink_glue_build(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct,
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo,
u_int16_t ct_attr, u_int16_t ct_info_attr)
{
struct nlattr *nest_parms;
nest_parms = nla_nest_start(skb, ct_attr);
if (!nest_parms)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (__ctnetlink_glue_build(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_parms);
if (nla_put_be32(skb, ct_info_attr, htonl(ctinfo)))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -ENOSPC;
}
static int
ctnetlink_update_status(struct nf_conn *ct, const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
unsigned int status = ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_STATUS]));
unsigned long d = ct->status ^ status;
if (d & IPS_SEEN_REPLY && !(status & IPS_SEEN_REPLY))
/* SEEN_REPLY bit can only be set */
return -EBUSY;
if (d & IPS_ASSURED && !(status & IPS_ASSURED))
/* ASSURED bit can only be set */
return -EBUSY;
/* This check is less strict than ctnetlink_change_status()
* because callers often flip IPS_EXPECTED bits when sending
* an NFQA_CT attribute to the kernel. So ignore the
* unchangeable bits but do not error out. Also user programs
* are allowed to clear the bits that they are allowed to change.
*/
__nf_ct_change_status(ct, status, ~status);
return 0;
}
static int
ctnetlink_glue_parse_ct(const struct nlattr *cda[], struct nf_conn *ct)
{
int err;
if (cda[CTA_TIMEOUT]) {
err = ctnetlink_change_timeout(ct, cda);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (cda[CTA_STATUS]) {
err = ctnetlink_update_status(ct, cda);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (cda[CTA_HELP]) {
err = ctnetlink_change_helper(ct, cda);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (cda[CTA_LABELS]) {
err = ctnetlink_attach_labels(ct, cda);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
#if defined(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MARK)
if (cda[CTA_MARK]) {
ctnetlink_change_mark(ct, cda);
}
#endif
return 0;
}
static int
ctnetlink_glue_parse(const struct nlattr *attr, struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nlattr *cda[CTA_MAX+1];
int ret;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 12:07:28 +00:00
ret = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(cda, CTA_MAX, attr, ct_nla_policy,
NULL);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix deadlock due to acquire _expect_lock twice Currently, ctnetlink_change_conntrack is always protected by _expect_lock, but this will cause a deadlock when deleting the helper from a conntrack, as the _expect_lock will be acquired again by nf_ct_remove_expectations: CPU0 ---- lock(nf_conntrack_expect_lock); lock(nf_conntrack_expect_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 2 locks held by lt-conntrack_gr/12853: #0: (&table[i].mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa05e2009>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x399/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] #1: (nf_conntrack_expect_lock){+.....}, at: [<ffffffffa05f2c1f>] ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x17f/0x408 [nf_conntrack_netlink] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x85/0xc2 __lock_acquire+0x1608/0x1680 ? ctnetlink_parse_tuple_proto+0x10f/0x1c0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] lock_acquire+0x100/0x1f0 ? nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x3f/0x50 ? nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] nf_ct_remove_expectations+0x32/0x90 [nf_conntrack] ctnetlink_change_helper+0xc6/0x190 [nf_conntrack_netlink] ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x1b2/0x408 [nf_conntrack_netlink] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x60a/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1b9/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] ? nfnetlink_bind+0x1a0/0x1a0 [nfnetlink] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa4/0xc0 nfnetlink_rcv+0x87/0x770 [nfnetlink] Since the operations are unrelated to nf_ct_expect, so we can drop the _expect_lock. Also note, after removing the _expect_lock protection, another CPU may invoke nf_conntrack_helper_unregister, so we should use rcu_read_lock to protect __nf_conntrack_helper_find invoked by ctnetlink_change_helper. Fixes: ca7433df3a67 ("netfilter: conntrack: seperate expect locking from nf_conntrack_lock") Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2017-04-17 13:18:56 +00:00
return ctnetlink_glue_parse_ct((const struct nlattr **)cda, ct);
}
static int ctnetlink_glue_exp_parse(const struct nlattr * const *cda,
const struct nf_conn *ct,
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *mask)
{
int err;
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, tuple, CTA_EXPECT_TUPLE,
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
nf_ct_l3num(ct), NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
return ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, mask, CTA_EXPECT_MASK,
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
nf_ct_l3num(ct), NULL);
}
static int
ctnetlink_glue_attach_expect(const struct nlattr *attr, struct nf_conn *ct,
u32 portid, u32 report)
{
struct nlattr *cda[CTA_EXPECT_MAX+1];
struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple, mask;
struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper = NULL;
struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp;
int err;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 12:07:28 +00:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(cda, CTA_EXPECT_MAX, attr,
exp_nla_policy, NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = ctnetlink_glue_exp_parse((const struct nlattr * const *)cda,
ct, &tuple, &mask);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_HELP_NAME]) {
const char *helpname = nla_data(cda[CTA_EXPECT_HELP_NAME]);
helper = __nf_conntrack_helper_find(helpname, nf_ct_l3num(ct),
nf_ct_protonum(ct));
if (helper == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
exp = ctnetlink_alloc_expect((const struct nlattr * const *)cda, ct,
helper, &tuple, &mask);
if (IS_ERR(exp))
return PTR_ERR(exp);
netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: fix expectation clash When conntracks change during a dialog, SDP messages may be sent from different conntracks to establish expects with identical tuples. In this case expects conflict may be detected for the 2nd SDP message and end up with a process failure. The fixing here is to reuse an existing expect who has the same tuple for a different conntrack if any. Here are two scenarios for the case. 1) SERVER CPE | INVITE SDP | 5060 |<----------------------|5060 | 100 Trying | 5060 |---------------------->|5060 | 183 SDP | 5060 |---------------------->|5060 ===> Conntrack 1 | PRACK | 50601 |<----------------------|5060 | 200 OK (PRACK) | 50601 |---------------------->|5060 | 200 OK (INVITE) | 5060 |---------------------->|5060 | ACK | 50601 |<----------------------|5060 | | |<--- RTP stream ------>| | | | INVITE SDP (t38) | 50601 |---------------------->|5060 ===> Conntrack 2 With a certain configuration in the CPE, SIP messages "183 with SDP" and "re-INVITE with SDP t38" will go through the sip helper to create expects for RTP and RTCP. It is okay to create RTP and RTCP expects for "183", whose master connection source port is 5060, and destination port is 5060. In the "183" message, port in Contact header changes to 50601 (from the original 5060). So the following requests e.g. PRACK and ACK are sent to port 50601. It is a different conntrack (let call Conntrack 2) from the original INVITE (let call Conntrack 1) due to the port difference. In this example, after the call is established, there is RTP stream but no RTCP stream for Conntrack 1, so the RTP expect created upon "183" is cleared, and RTCP expect created for Conntrack 1 retains. When "re-INVITE with SDP t38" arrives to create RTP&RTCP expects, current ALG implementation will call nf_ct_expect_related() for RTP and RTCP. The expects tuples are identical to those for Conntrack 1. RTP expect for Conntrack 2 succeeds in creation as the one for Conntrack 1 has been removed. RTCP expect for Conntrack 2 fails in creation because it has idential tuples and 'conflict' with the one retained for Conntrack 1. And then result in a failure in processing of the re-INVITE. 2) SERVER A CPE | REGISTER | 5060 |<------------------| 5060 ==> CT1 | 200 | 5060 |------------------>| 5060 | | | INVITE SDP(1) | 5060 |<------------------| 5060 | 300(multi choice) | 5060 |------------------>| 5060 SERVER B | ACK | 5060 |<------------------| 5060 | INVITE SDP(2) | 5060 |-------------------->| 5060 ==> CT2 | 100 | 5060 |<--------------------| 5060 | 200(contact changes)| 5060 |<--------------------| 5060 | ACK | 5060 |-------------------->| 50601 ==> CT3 | | |<--- RTP stream ---->| | | | BYE | 5060 |<--------------------| 50601 | 200 | 5060 |-------------------->| 50601 | INVITE SDP(3) | 5060 |<------------------| 5060 ==> CT1 CPE sends an INVITE request(1) to Server A, and creates a RTP&RTCP expect pair for this Conntrack 1 (CT1). Server A responds 300 to redirect to Server B. The RTP&RTCP expect pairs created on CT1 are removed upon 300 response. CPE sends the INVITE request(2) to Server B, and creates an expect pair for the new conntrack (due to destination address difference), let call CT2. Server B changes the port to 50601 in 200 OK response, and the following requests ACK and BYE from CPE are sent to 50601. The call is established. There is RTP stream and no RTCP stream. So RTP expect is removed and RTCP expect for CT2 retains. As BYE request is sent from port 50601, it is another conntrack, let call CT3, different from CT2 due to the port difference. So the BYE request will not remove the RTCP expect for CT2. Then another outgoing call is made, with the same RTP port being used (not definitely but possibly). CPE firstly sends the INVITE request(3) to Server A, and tries to create a RTP&RTCP expect pairs for this CT1. In current ALG implementation, the RTCP expect for CT1 fails in creation because it 'conflicts' with the residual one for CT2. As a result the INVITE request fails to send. Signed-off-by: xiao ruizhu <katrina.xiaorz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2019-07-04 03:31:13 +00:00
err = nf_ct_expect_related_report(exp, portid, report, 0);
nf_ct_expect_put(exp);
return err;
}
static void ctnetlink_glue_seqadj(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct,
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo, int diff)
{
if (!(ct->status & IPS_NAT_MASK))
return;
nf_ct_tcp_seqadj_set(skb, ct, ctinfo, diff);
}
static const struct nfnl_ct_hook ctnetlink_glue_hook = {
.build_size = ctnetlink_glue_build_size,
.build = ctnetlink_glue_build,
.parse = ctnetlink_glue_parse,
.attach_expect = ctnetlink_glue_attach_expect,
.seq_adjust = ctnetlink_glue_seqadj,
};
#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_GLUE_CT */
/***********************************************************************
* EXPECT
***********************************************************************/
static int ctnetlink_exp_dump_tuple(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
u32 type)
{
struct nlattr *nest_parms;
nest_parms = nla_nest_start(skb, type);
if (!nest_parms)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_dump_tuples(skb, tuple) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_parms);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -1;
}
static int ctnetlink_exp_dump_mask(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
const struct nf_conntrack_tuple_mask *mask)
{
const struct nf_conntrack_l4proto *l4proto;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple m;
struct nlattr *nest_parms;
int ret;
memset(&m, 0xFF, sizeof(m));
memcpy(&m.src.u3, &mask->src.u3, sizeof(m.src.u3));
m.src.u.all = mask->src.u.all;
m.src.l3num = tuple->src.l3num;
m.dst.protonum = tuple->dst.protonum;
nest_parms = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_EXPECT_MASK);
if (!nest_parms)
goto nla_put_failure;
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix lockep splats net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:70 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 3 locks held by conntrack/3235: nfnl_lock+0x17/0x20 netlink_dump+0x32/0x240 ctnetlink_dump_table+0x3e/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] stack backtrace: Pid: 3235, comm: conntrack Tainted: G W 3.2.0+ #511 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8108ce45>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe5/0x100 [<ffffffffa00ec6e1>] __nf_ct_l4proto_find+0x81/0xb0 [nf_conntrack] [<ffffffffa0115675>] ctnetlink_fill_info+0x215/0x5f0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115dc1>] ctnetlink_dump_table+0xd1/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff815fbdbf>] netlink_dump+0x7f/0x240 [<ffffffff81090f9d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff815fd34f>] netlink_dump_start+0xdf/0x190 [<ffffffffa0111490>] ? ctnetlink_change_nat_seq_adj+0x160/0x160 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115cf0>] ? ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x2a0/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115ad9>] ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x89/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff81603a47>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x467/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603a7c>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x49c/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603922>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x342/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81071b21>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x50 [<ffffffff816035e0>] ? nfnetlink_subsys_register+0x60/0x60 [<ffffffff815fed49>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xd0 [<ffffffff81603475>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffff815fe70e>] netlink_unicast+0x1ae/0x1f0 [<ffffffff815fea16>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c6/0x320 [<ffffffff815b2a87>] sock_sendmsg+0x117/0x130 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff811250dc>] ? might_fault+0x9c/0xb0 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff815b5991>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x71/0x80 [<ffffffff815b644e>] sys_sendto+0xfe/0x130 [<ffffffff815b5c94>] ? sys_bind+0xb4/0xd0 [<ffffffff817a8a0e>] ? retint_swapgs+0xe/0x13 [<ffffffff817afcd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com>
2012-03-05 02:24:29 +00:00
rcu_read_lock();
ret = ctnetlink_dump_tuples_ip(skb, &m);
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix lockep splats net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:70 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 3 locks held by conntrack/3235: nfnl_lock+0x17/0x20 netlink_dump+0x32/0x240 ctnetlink_dump_table+0x3e/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] stack backtrace: Pid: 3235, comm: conntrack Tainted: G W 3.2.0+ #511 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8108ce45>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe5/0x100 [<ffffffffa00ec6e1>] __nf_ct_l4proto_find+0x81/0xb0 [nf_conntrack] [<ffffffffa0115675>] ctnetlink_fill_info+0x215/0x5f0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115dc1>] ctnetlink_dump_table+0xd1/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff815fbdbf>] netlink_dump+0x7f/0x240 [<ffffffff81090f9d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff815fd34f>] netlink_dump_start+0xdf/0x190 [<ffffffffa0111490>] ? ctnetlink_change_nat_seq_adj+0x160/0x160 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115cf0>] ? ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x2a0/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115ad9>] ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x89/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff81603a47>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x467/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603a7c>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x49c/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603922>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x342/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81071b21>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x50 [<ffffffff816035e0>] ? nfnetlink_subsys_register+0x60/0x60 [<ffffffff815fed49>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xd0 [<ffffffff81603475>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffff815fe70e>] netlink_unicast+0x1ae/0x1f0 [<ffffffff815fea16>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c6/0x320 [<ffffffff815b2a87>] sock_sendmsg+0x117/0x130 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff811250dc>] ? might_fault+0x9c/0xb0 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff815b5991>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x71/0x80 [<ffffffff815b644e>] sys_sendto+0xfe/0x130 [<ffffffff815b5c94>] ? sys_bind+0xb4/0xd0 [<ffffffff817a8a0e>] ? retint_swapgs+0xe/0x13 [<ffffffff817afcd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com>
2012-03-05 02:24:29 +00:00
if (ret >= 0) {
l4proto = nf_ct_l4proto_find(tuple->dst.protonum);
ret = ctnetlink_dump_tuples_proto(skb, &m, l4proto);
netfilter: ctnetlink: fix lockep splats net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:70 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 3 locks held by conntrack/3235: nfnl_lock+0x17/0x20 netlink_dump+0x32/0x240 ctnetlink_dump_table+0x3e/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] stack backtrace: Pid: 3235, comm: conntrack Tainted: G W 3.2.0+ #511 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8108ce45>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe5/0x100 [<ffffffffa00ec6e1>] __nf_ct_l4proto_find+0x81/0xb0 [nf_conntrack] [<ffffffffa0115675>] ctnetlink_fill_info+0x215/0x5f0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115dc1>] ctnetlink_dump_table+0xd1/0x170 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff815fbdbf>] netlink_dump+0x7f/0x240 [<ffffffff81090f9d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff815fd34f>] netlink_dump_start+0xdf/0x190 [<ffffffffa0111490>] ? ctnetlink_change_nat_seq_adj+0x160/0x160 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115cf0>] ? ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x2a0/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffffa0115ad9>] ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x89/0x2a0 [nf_conntrack_netlink] [<ffffffff81603a47>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x467/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603a7c>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x49c/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81603922>] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x342/0x5f0 [<ffffffff81071b21>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x50 [<ffffffff816035e0>] ? nfnetlink_subsys_register+0x60/0x60 [<ffffffff815fed49>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xd0 [<ffffffff81603475>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffff815fe70e>] netlink_unicast+0x1ae/0x1f0 [<ffffffff815fea16>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c6/0x320 [<ffffffff815b2a87>] sock_sendmsg+0x117/0x130 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff811250dc>] ? might_fault+0x9c/0xb0 [<ffffffff81125093>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xb0 [<ffffffff815b5991>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x71/0x80 [<ffffffff815b644e>] sys_sendto+0xfe/0x130 [<ffffffff815b5c94>] ? sys_bind+0xb4/0xd0 [<ffffffff817a8a0e>] ? retint_swapgs+0xe/0x13 [<ffffffff817afcd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@ericsson.com>
2012-03-05 02:24:29 +00:00
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_parms);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -1;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
static const union nf_inet_addr any_addr;
#endif
static __be32 nf_expect_get_id(const struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp)
{
static siphash_aligned_key_t exp_id_seed;
unsigned long a, b, c, d;
net_get_random_once(&exp_id_seed, sizeof(exp_id_seed));
a = (unsigned long)exp;
b = (unsigned long)exp->helper;
c = (unsigned long)exp->master;
d = (unsigned long)siphash(&exp->tuple, sizeof(exp->tuple), &exp_id_seed);
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
return (__force __be32)siphash_4u64((u64)a, (u64)b, (u64)c, (u64)d, &exp_id_seed);
#else
return (__force __be32)siphash_4u32((u32)a, (u32)b, (u32)c, (u32)d, &exp_id_seed);
#endif
}
[NETFILTER]: Kill some supper dupper bloatry /me awards the bloatiest-of-all-net/-.c-code award to nf_conntrack_netlink.c, congratulations to all the authors :-/! Hall of (unquestionable) fame (measured per inline, top 10 under net/): -4496 ctnetlink_parse_tuple netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -2165 ctnetlink_dump_tuples netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -2115 __ip_vs_get_out_rt ipv4/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c -1924 xfrm_audit_helper_pktinfo xfrm/xfrm_state.c -1799 ctnetlink_parse_tuple_proto netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -1268 ctnetlink_parse_tuple_ip netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -1093 ctnetlink_exp_dump_expect netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -1060 void ccid3_update_send_interval dccp/ccids/ccid3.c -983 ctnetlink_dump_tuples_proto netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c -827 ctnetlink_exp_dump_tuple netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c (i386 / gcc (GCC) 4.1.2 20070626 (Red Hat 4.1.2-13) / allyesconfig except CONFIG_FORCED_INLINING) ...and I left < 200 byte gains as future work item. After iterative inline removal, I finally have this: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c: ctnetlink_exp_fill_info | -1104 ctnetlink_new_expect | -1572 ctnetlink_fill_info | -1303 ctnetlink_new_conntrack | -2230 ctnetlink_get_expect | -341 ctnetlink_del_expect | -352 ctnetlink_expect_event | -1110 ctnetlink_conntrack_event | -1548 ctnetlink_del_conntrack | -729 ctnetlink_get_conntrack | -728 10 functions changed, 11017 bytes removed, diff: -11017 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c: ctnetlink_parse_tuple | +419 dump_nat_seq_adj | +183 ctnetlink_dump_counters | +166 ctnetlink_dump_tuples | +261 ctnetlink_exp_dump_expect | +633 ctnetlink_change_status | +460 6 functions changed, 2122 bytes added, diff: +2122 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.o: 16 functions changed, 2122 bytes added, 11017 bytes removed, diff: -8895 Without a number of CONFIG.*DEBUGs, I got this: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.o: 16 functions changed, 2122 bytes added, 11029 bytes removed, diff: -8907 Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-01-06 07:11:31 +00:00
static int
ctnetlink_exp_dump_expect(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp)
{
struct nf_conn *master = exp->master;
long timeout = ((long)exp->timeout.expires - (long)jiffies) / HZ;
struct nf_conn_help *help;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
struct nlattr *nest_parms;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple nat_tuple = {};
#endif
struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn *expfn;
if (timeout < 0)
timeout = 0;
if (ctnetlink_exp_dump_tuple(skb, &exp->tuple, CTA_EXPECT_TUPLE) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_exp_dump_mask(skb, &exp->tuple, &exp->mask) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ctnetlink_exp_dump_tuple(skb,
&master->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple,
CTA_EXPECT_MASTER) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
if (!nf_inet_addr_cmp(&exp->saved_addr, &any_addr) ||
exp->saved_proto.all) {
nest_parms = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_EXPECT_NAT);
if (!nest_parms)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_EXPECT_NAT_DIR, htonl(exp->dir)))
goto nla_put_failure;
nat_tuple.src.l3num = nf_ct_l3num(master);
nat_tuple.src.u3 = exp->saved_addr;
nat_tuple.dst.protonum = nf_ct_protonum(master);
nat_tuple.src.u = exp->saved_proto;
if (ctnetlink_exp_dump_tuple(skb, &nat_tuple,
CTA_EXPECT_NAT_TUPLE) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_parms);
}
#endif
if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_EXPECT_TIMEOUT, htonl(timeout)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_EXPECT_ID, nf_expect_get_id(exp)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_EXPECT_FLAGS, htonl(exp->flags)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_EXPECT_CLASS, htonl(exp->class)))
goto nla_put_failure;
help = nfct_help(master);
if (help) {
struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper;
helper = rcu_dereference(help->helper);
if (helper &&
nla_put_string(skb, CTA_EXPECT_HELP_NAME, helper->name))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
expfn = nf_ct_helper_expectfn_find_by_symbol(exp->expectfn);
if (expfn != NULL &&
nla_put_string(skb, CTA_EXPECT_FN, expfn->name))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -1;
}
static int
ctnetlink_exp_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 portid, u32 seq,
int event, const struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp)
{
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
unsigned int flags = portid ? NLM_F_MULTI : 0;
event = nfnl_msg_type(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTNETLINK_EXP, event);
nlh = nfnl_msg_put(skb, portid, seq, event, flags,
exp->tuple.src.l3num, NFNETLINK_V0, 0);
if (!nlh)
goto nlmsg_failure;
if (ctnetlink_exp_dump_expect(skb, exp) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return skb->len;
nlmsg_failure:
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -1;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS
static int
ctnetlink_expect_event(unsigned int events, const struct nf_exp_event *item)
{
struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp = item->exp;
struct net *net = nf_ct_exp_net(exp);
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int type, group;
int flags = 0;
if (events & (1 << IPEXP_DESTROY)) {
type = IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_DELETE;
group = NFNLGRP_CONNTRACK_EXP_DESTROY;
} else if (events & (1 << IPEXP_NEW)) {
type = IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_NEW;
flags = NLM_F_CREATE|NLM_F_EXCL;
group = NFNLGRP_CONNTRACK_EXP_NEW;
} else
return 0;
if (!item->report && !nfnetlink_has_listeners(net, group))
return 0;
skb = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
goto errout;
type = nfnl_msg_type(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTNETLINK_EXP, type);
nlh = nfnl_msg_put(skb, item->portid, 0, type, flags,
exp->tuple.src.l3num, NFNETLINK_V0, 0);
if (!nlh)
goto nlmsg_failure;
if (ctnetlink_exp_dump_expect(skb, exp) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
nfnetlink_send(skb, net, item->portid, group, item->report, GFP_ATOMIC);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
nlmsg_failure:
kfree_skb(skb);
errout:
nfnetlink_set_err(net, 0, 0, -ENOBUFS);
return 0;
}
#endif
static int ctnetlink_exp_done(struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
if (cb->args[1])
nf_ct_expect_put((struct nf_conntrack_expect *)cb->args[1]);
return 0;
}
static int
ctnetlink_exp_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp, *last;
struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg = nlmsg_data(cb->nlh);
u_int8_t l3proto = nfmsg->nfgen_family;
rcu_read_lock();
last = (struct nf_conntrack_expect *)cb->args[1];
for (; cb->args[0] < nf_ct_expect_hsize; cb->args[0]++) {
restart:
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(exp, &nf_ct_expect_hash[cb->args[0]],
hnode) {
if (l3proto && exp->tuple.src.l3num != l3proto)
continue;
if (!net_eq(nf_ct_net(exp->master), net))
continue;
if (cb->args[1]) {
if (exp != last)
continue;
cb->args[1] = 0;
}
if (ctnetlink_exp_fill_info(skb,
NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_NEW,
exp) < 0) {
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&exp->use))
continue;
cb->args[1] = (unsigned long)exp;
goto out;
}
}
if (cb->args[1]) {
cb->args[1] = 0;
goto restart;
}
}
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (last)
nf_ct_expect_put(last);
return skb->len;
}
static int
ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp, *last;
struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg = nlmsg_data(cb->nlh);
struct nf_conn *ct = cb->data;
struct nf_conn_help *help = nfct_help(ct);
u_int8_t l3proto = nfmsg->nfgen_family;
if (cb->args[0])
return 0;
rcu_read_lock();
last = (struct nf_conntrack_expect *)cb->args[1];
restart:
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(exp, &help->expectations, lnode) {
if (l3proto && exp->tuple.src.l3num != l3proto)
continue;
if (cb->args[1]) {
if (exp != last)
continue;
cb->args[1] = 0;
}
if (ctnetlink_exp_fill_info(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_NEW,
exp) < 0) {
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&exp->use))
continue;
cb->args[1] = (unsigned long)exp;
goto out;
}
}
if (cb->args[1]) {
cb->args[1] = 0;
goto restart;
}
cb->args[0] = 1;
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (last)
nf_ct_expect_put(last);
return skb->len;
}
static int ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
const struct nlattr * const cda[],
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
int err;
struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
u_int8_t u3 = nfmsg->nfgen_family;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *h;
struct nf_conn *ct;
struct nf_conntrack_zone zone;
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
.dump = ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table,
.done = ctnetlink_exp_done,
};
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &tuple, CTA_EXPECT_MASTER,
u3, NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = ctnetlink_parse_zone(cda[CTA_EXPECT_ZONE], &zone);
if (err < 0)
return err;
h = nf_conntrack_find_get(net, &zone, &tuple);
if (!h)
return -ENOENT;
ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h);
/* No expectation linked to this connection tracking. */
if (!nfct_help(ct)) {
nf_ct_put(ct);
return 0;
}
c.data = ct;
err = netlink_dump_start(ctnl, skb, nlh, &c);
nf_ct_put(ct);
return err;
}
static int ctnetlink_get_expect(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nfnl_info *info,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
u_int8_t u3 = info->nfmsg->nfgen_family;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple;
struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp;
struct nf_conntrack_zone zone;
struct sk_buff *skb2;
int err;
if (info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_MASTER])
return ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct(info->net, info->sk, skb,
info->nlh, cda,
info->extack);
else {
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
.dump = ctnetlink_exp_dump_table,
.done = ctnetlink_exp_done,
};
return netlink_dump_start(info->sk, skb, info->nlh, &c);
}
}
err = ctnetlink_parse_zone(cda[CTA_EXPECT_ZONE], &zone);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_TUPLE])
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &tuple, CTA_EXPECT_TUPLE,
u3, NULL);
else if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_MASTER])
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &tuple, CTA_EXPECT_MASTER,
u3, NULL);
else
return -EINVAL;
if (err < 0)
return err;
exp = nf_ct_expect_find_get(info->net, &zone, &tuple);
if (!exp)
return -ENOENT;
if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_ID]) {
__be32 id = nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_EXPECT_ID]);
if (id != nf_expect_get_id(exp)) {
nf_ct_expect_put(exp);
return -ENOENT;
}
}
skb2 = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb2) {
nf_ct_expect_put(exp);
return -ENOMEM;
}
rcu_read_lock();
err = ctnetlink_exp_fill_info(skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
info->nlh->nlmsg_seq, IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_NEW,
exp);
rcu_read_unlock();
nf_ct_expect_put(exp);
if (err <= 0) {
kfree_skb(skb2);
return -ENOMEM;
}
return nfnetlink_unicast(skb2, info->net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
}
static bool expect_iter_name(struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp, void *data)
{
struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper;
const struct nf_conn_help *m_help;
const char *name = data;
m_help = nfct_help(exp->master);
helper = rcu_dereference(m_help->helper);
if (!helper)
return false;
return strcmp(helper->name, name) == 0;
}
static bool expect_iter_all(struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp, void *data)
{
return true;
}
static int ctnetlink_del_expect(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nfnl_info *info,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
u_int8_t u3 = info->nfmsg->nfgen_family;
struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple;
struct nf_conntrack_zone zone;
int err;
if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_TUPLE]) {
/* delete a single expect by tuple */
err = ctnetlink_parse_zone(cda[CTA_EXPECT_ZONE], &zone);
if (err < 0)
return err;
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &tuple, CTA_EXPECT_TUPLE,
u3, NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
/* bump usage count to 2 */
exp = nf_ct_expect_find_get(info->net, &zone, &tuple);
if (!exp)
return -ENOENT;
if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_ID]) {
__be32 id = nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_EXPECT_ID]);
if (ntohl(id) != (u32)(unsigned long)exp) {
nf_ct_expect_put(exp);
return -ENOENT;
}
}
/* after list removal, usage count == 1 */
spin_lock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock);
if (del_timer(&exp->timeout)) {
nf_ct_unlink_expect_report(exp, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
nlmsg_report(info->nlh));
nf_ct_expect_put(exp);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock);
/* have to put what we 'get' above.
* after this line usage count == 0 */
nf_ct_expect_put(exp);
} else if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_HELP_NAME]) {
char *name = nla_data(cda[CTA_EXPECT_HELP_NAME]);
nf_ct_expect_iterate_net(info->net, expect_iter_name, name,
NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
nlmsg_report(info->nlh));
} else {
/* This basically means we have to flush everything*/
nf_ct_expect_iterate_net(info->net, expect_iter_all, NULL,
NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
nlmsg_report(info->nlh));
}
return 0;
}
static int
ctnetlink_change_expect(struct nf_conntrack_expect *x,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_TIMEOUT]) {
if (!del_timer(&x->timeout))
return -ETIME;
x->timeout.expires = jiffies +
ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_EXPECT_TIMEOUT])) * HZ;
add_timer(&x->timeout);
}
return 0;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
static const struct nla_policy exp_nat_nla_policy[CTA_EXPECT_NAT_MAX+1] = {
[CTA_EXPECT_NAT_DIR] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
[CTA_EXPECT_NAT_TUPLE] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
};
#endif
static int
ctnetlink_parse_expect_nat(const struct nlattr *attr,
struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp,
u_int8_t u3)
{
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
struct nlattr *tb[CTA_EXPECT_NAT_MAX+1];
struct nf_conntrack_tuple nat_tuple = {};
int err;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 12:07:28 +00:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(tb, CTA_EXPECT_NAT_MAX, attr,
exp_nat_nla_policy, NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (!tb[CTA_EXPECT_NAT_DIR] || !tb[CTA_EXPECT_NAT_TUPLE])
return -EINVAL;
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple((const struct nlattr * const *)tb,
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
&nat_tuple, CTA_EXPECT_NAT_TUPLE,
u3, NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
exp->saved_addr = nat_tuple.src.u3;
exp->saved_proto = nat_tuple.src.u;
exp->dir = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[CTA_EXPECT_NAT_DIR]));
return 0;
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
static struct nf_conntrack_expect *
ctnetlink_alloc_expect(const struct nlattr * const cda[], struct nf_conn *ct,
struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper,
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *mask)
{
u_int32_t class = 0;
struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp;
struct nf_conn_help *help;
int err;
help = nfct_help(ct);
if (!help)
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_CLASS] && helper) {
class = ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_EXPECT_CLASS]));
if (class > helper->expect_class_max)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
exp = nf_ct_expect_alloc(ct);
if (!exp)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_FLAGS]) {
exp->flags = ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_EXPECT_FLAGS]));
exp->flags &= ~NF_CT_EXPECT_USERSPACE;
} else {
exp->flags = 0;
}
if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_FN]) {
const char *name = nla_data(cda[CTA_EXPECT_FN]);
struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn *expfn;
expfn = nf_ct_helper_expectfn_find_by_name(name);
if (expfn == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_out;
}
exp->expectfn = expfn->expectfn;
} else
exp->expectfn = NULL;
exp->class = class;
exp->master = ct;
exp->helper = helper;
exp->tuple = *tuple;
exp->mask.src.u3 = mask->src.u3;
exp->mask.src.u.all = mask->src.u.all;
if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_NAT]) {
err = ctnetlink_parse_expect_nat(cda[CTA_EXPECT_NAT],
exp, nf_ct_l3num(ct));
if (err < 0)
goto err_out;
}
return exp;
err_out:
nf_ct_expect_put(exp);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
static int
ctnetlink_create_expect(struct net *net,
const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone,
const struct nlattr * const cda[],
u_int8_t u3, u32 portid, int report)
{
struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple, mask, master_tuple;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *h = NULL;
struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper = NULL;
struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp;
struct nf_conn *ct;
int err;
/* caller guarantees that those three CTA_EXPECT_* exist */
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &tuple, CTA_EXPECT_TUPLE,
u3, NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &mask, CTA_EXPECT_MASK,
u3, NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &master_tuple, CTA_EXPECT_MASTER,
u3, NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
/* Look for master conntrack of this expectation */
h = nf_conntrack_find_get(net, zone, &master_tuple);
if (!h)
return -ENOENT;
ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h);
rcu_read_lock();
if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_HELP_NAME]) {
const char *helpname = nla_data(cda[CTA_EXPECT_HELP_NAME]);
helper = __nf_conntrack_helper_find(helpname, u3,
nf_ct_protonum(ct));
if (helper == NULL) {
rcu_read_unlock();
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
if (request_module("nfct-helper-%s", helpname) < 0) {
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto err_ct;
}
rcu_read_lock();
helper = __nf_conntrack_helper_find(helpname, u3,
nf_ct_protonum(ct));
if (helper) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto err_rcu;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
#endif
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto err_ct;
}
}
exp = ctnetlink_alloc_expect(cda, ct, helper, &tuple, &mask);
if (IS_ERR(exp)) {
err = PTR_ERR(exp);
goto err_rcu;
}
netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: fix expectation clash When conntracks change during a dialog, SDP messages may be sent from different conntracks to establish expects with identical tuples. In this case expects conflict may be detected for the 2nd SDP message and end up with a process failure. The fixing here is to reuse an existing expect who has the same tuple for a different conntrack if any. Here are two scenarios for the case. 1) SERVER CPE | INVITE SDP | 5060 |<----------------------|5060 | 100 Trying | 5060 |---------------------->|5060 | 183 SDP | 5060 |---------------------->|5060 ===> Conntrack 1 | PRACK | 50601 |<----------------------|5060 | 200 OK (PRACK) | 50601 |---------------------->|5060 | 200 OK (INVITE) | 5060 |---------------------->|5060 | ACK | 50601 |<----------------------|5060 | | |<--- RTP stream ------>| | | | INVITE SDP (t38) | 50601 |---------------------->|5060 ===> Conntrack 2 With a certain configuration in the CPE, SIP messages "183 with SDP" and "re-INVITE with SDP t38" will go through the sip helper to create expects for RTP and RTCP. It is okay to create RTP and RTCP expects for "183", whose master connection source port is 5060, and destination port is 5060. In the "183" message, port in Contact header changes to 50601 (from the original 5060). So the following requests e.g. PRACK and ACK are sent to port 50601. It is a different conntrack (let call Conntrack 2) from the original INVITE (let call Conntrack 1) due to the port difference. In this example, after the call is established, there is RTP stream but no RTCP stream for Conntrack 1, so the RTP expect created upon "183" is cleared, and RTCP expect created for Conntrack 1 retains. When "re-INVITE with SDP t38" arrives to create RTP&RTCP expects, current ALG implementation will call nf_ct_expect_related() for RTP and RTCP. The expects tuples are identical to those for Conntrack 1. RTP expect for Conntrack 2 succeeds in creation as the one for Conntrack 1 has been removed. RTCP expect for Conntrack 2 fails in creation because it has idential tuples and 'conflict' with the one retained for Conntrack 1. And then result in a failure in processing of the re-INVITE. 2) SERVER A CPE | REGISTER | 5060 |<------------------| 5060 ==> CT1 | 200 | 5060 |------------------>| 5060 | | | INVITE SDP(1) | 5060 |<------------------| 5060 | 300(multi choice) | 5060 |------------------>| 5060 SERVER B | ACK | 5060 |<------------------| 5060 | INVITE SDP(2) | 5060 |-------------------->| 5060 ==> CT2 | 100 | 5060 |<--------------------| 5060 | 200(contact changes)| 5060 |<--------------------| 5060 | ACK | 5060 |-------------------->| 50601 ==> CT3 | | |<--- RTP stream ---->| | | | BYE | 5060 |<--------------------| 50601 | 200 | 5060 |-------------------->| 50601 | INVITE SDP(3) | 5060 |<------------------| 5060 ==> CT1 CPE sends an INVITE request(1) to Server A, and creates a RTP&RTCP expect pair for this Conntrack 1 (CT1). Server A responds 300 to redirect to Server B. The RTP&RTCP expect pairs created on CT1 are removed upon 300 response. CPE sends the INVITE request(2) to Server B, and creates an expect pair for the new conntrack (due to destination address difference), let call CT2. Server B changes the port to 50601 in 200 OK response, and the following requests ACK and BYE from CPE are sent to 50601. The call is established. There is RTP stream and no RTCP stream. So RTP expect is removed and RTCP expect for CT2 retains. As BYE request is sent from port 50601, it is another conntrack, let call CT3, different from CT2 due to the port difference. So the BYE request will not remove the RTCP expect for CT2. Then another outgoing call is made, with the same RTP port being used (not definitely but possibly). CPE firstly sends the INVITE request(3) to Server A, and tries to create a RTP&RTCP expect pairs for this CT1. In current ALG implementation, the RTCP expect for CT1 fails in creation because it 'conflicts' with the residual one for CT2. As a result the INVITE request fails to send. Signed-off-by: xiao ruizhu <katrina.xiaorz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2019-07-04 03:31:13 +00:00
err = nf_ct_expect_related_report(exp, portid, report, 0);
nf_ct_expect_put(exp);
err_rcu:
rcu_read_unlock();
err_ct:
nf_ct_put(ct);
return err;
}
static int ctnetlink_new_expect(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nfnl_info *info,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
u_int8_t u3 = info->nfmsg->nfgen_family;
struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple;
struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp;
struct nf_conntrack_zone zone;
int err;
if (!cda[CTA_EXPECT_TUPLE]
|| !cda[CTA_EXPECT_MASK]
|| !cda[CTA_EXPECT_MASTER])
return -EINVAL;
err = ctnetlink_parse_zone(cda[CTA_EXPECT_ZONE], &zone);
if (err < 0)
return err;
netfilter: nf_conntrack: add direction support for zones This work adds a direction parameter to netfilter zones, so identity separation can be performed only in original/reply or both directions (default). This basically opens up the possibility of doing NAT with conflicting IP address/port tuples from multiple, isolated tenants on a host (e.g. from a netns) without requiring each tenant to NAT twice resp. to use its own dedicated IP address to SNAT to, meaning overlapping tuples can be made unique with the zone identifier in original direction, where the NAT engine will then allocate a unique tuple in the commonly shared default zone for the reply direction. In some restricted, local DNAT cases, also port redirection could be used for making the reply traffic unique w/o requiring SNAT. The consensus we've reached and discussed at NFWS and since the initial implementation [1] was to directly integrate the direction meta data into the existing zones infrastructure, as opposed to the ct->mark approach we proposed initially. As we pass the nf_conntrack_zone object directly around, we don't have to touch all call-sites, but only those, that contain equality checks of zones. Thus, based on the current direction (original or reply), we either return the actual id, or the default NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_ID. CT expectations are direction-agnostic entities when expectations are being compared among themselves, so we can only use the identifier in this case. Note that zone identifiers can not be included into the hash mix anymore as they don't contain a "stable" value that would be equal for both directions at all times, f.e. if only zone->id would unconditionally be xor'ed into the table slot hash, then replies won't find the corresponding conntracking entry anymore. If no particular direction is specified when configuring zones, the behaviour is exactly as we expect currently (both directions). Support has been added for the CT netlink interface as well as the x_tables raw CT target, which both already offer existing interfaces to user space for the configuration of zones. Below a minimal, simplified collision example (script in [2]) with netperf sessions: +--- tenant-1 ---+ mark := 1 | netperf |--+ +----------------+ | CT zone := mark [ORIGINAL] [ip,sport] := X +--------------+ +--- gateway ---+ | mark routing |--| SNAT |-- ... + +--------------+ +---------------+ | +--- tenant-2 ---+ | ~~~|~~~ | netperf |--+ +-----------+ | +----------------+ mark := 2 | netserver |------ ... + [ip,sport] := X +-----------+ [ip,port] := Y On the gateway netns, example: iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -j CT --zone mark --zone-dir ORIGINAL iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o <dev> -j SNAT --to-source <ip> --random-fully iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir ORIGINAL -j CONNMARK --save-mark iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m conntrack --ctdir REPLY -j CONNMARK --restore-mark conntrack dump from gateway netns: netperf -H 10.1.1.2 -t TCP_STREAM -l60 -p12865,5555 from each tenant netns tcp 6 431995 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=1024 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 431994 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=5555 dport=12865 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=12865 dport=5555 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 299 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=39438 dport=33768 zone-orig=1 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=33768 dport=39438 [ASSURED] mark=1 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=1 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=40.1.1.1 dst=10.1.1.2 sport=32889 dport=40206 zone-orig=2 src=10.1.1.2 dst=10.1.1.1 sport=40206 dport=32889 [ASSURED] mark=2 secctx=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 use=2 Taking this further, test script in [2] creates 200 tenants and runs original-tuple colliding netperf sessions each. A conntrack -L dump in the gateway netns also confirms 200 overlapping entries, all in ESTABLISHED state as expected. I also did run various other tests with some permutations of the script, to mention some: SNAT in random/random-fully/persistent mode, no zones (no overlaps), static zones (original, reply, both directions), etc. [1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel/57412/ [2] https://paste.fedoraproject.org/242835/65657871/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-08-14 14:03:39 +00:00
err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &tuple, CTA_EXPECT_TUPLE,
u3, NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
spin_lock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock);
exp = __nf_ct_expect_find(info->net, &zone, &tuple);
if (!exp) {
spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock);
err = -ENOENT;
if (info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CREATE) {
err = ctnetlink_create_expect(info->net, &zone, cda, u3,
NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
nlmsg_report(info->nlh));
}
return err;
}
err = -EEXIST;
if (!(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL))
err = ctnetlink_change_expect(exp, cda);
spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock);
return err;
}
static int
ctnetlink_exp_stat_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 portid, u32 seq, int cpu,
const struct ip_conntrack_stat *st)
{
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
unsigned int flags = portid ? NLM_F_MULTI : 0, event;
event = nfnl_msg_type(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTNETLINK,
IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_GET_STATS_CPU);
nlh = nfnl_msg_put(skb, portid, seq, event, flags, AF_UNSPEC,
NFNETLINK_V0, htons(cpu));
if (!nlh)
goto nlmsg_failure;
if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_STATS_EXP_NEW, htonl(st->expect_new)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_STATS_EXP_CREATE, htonl(st->expect_create)) ||
nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_STATS_EXP_DELETE, htonl(st->expect_delete)))
goto nla_put_failure;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return skb->len;
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -1;
}
static int
ctnetlink_exp_stat_cpu_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
int cpu;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
if (cb->args[0] == nr_cpu_ids)
return 0;
for (cpu = cb->args[0]; cpu < nr_cpu_ids; cpu++) {
const struct ip_conntrack_stat *st;
if (!cpu_possible(cpu))
continue;
st = per_cpu_ptr(net->ct.stat, cpu);
if (ctnetlink_exp_stat_fill_info(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
cpu, st) < 0)
break;
}
cb->args[0] = cpu;
return skb->len;
}
static int ctnetlink_stat_exp_cpu(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nfnl_info *info,
const struct nlattr * const cda[])
{
if (info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
.dump = ctnetlink_exp_stat_cpu_dump,
};
return netlink_dump_start(info->sk, skb, info->nlh, &c);
}
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS
static struct nf_ct_event_notifier ctnl_notifier = {
.ct_event = ctnetlink_conntrack_event,
.exp_event = ctnetlink_expect_event,
};
#endif
static const struct nfnl_callback ctnl_cb[IPCTNL_MSG_MAX] = {
[IPCTNL_MSG_CT_NEW] = {
.call = ctnetlink_new_conntrack,
.type = NFNL_CB_MUTEX,
.attr_count = CTA_MAX,
.policy = ct_nla_policy
},
[IPCTNL_MSG_CT_GET] = {
.call = ctnetlink_get_conntrack,
.type = NFNL_CB_MUTEX,
.attr_count = CTA_MAX,
.policy = ct_nla_policy
},
[IPCTNL_MSG_CT_DELETE] = {
.call = ctnetlink_del_conntrack,
.type = NFNL_CB_MUTEX,
.attr_count = CTA_MAX,
.policy = ct_nla_policy
},
[IPCTNL_MSG_CT_GET_CTRZERO] = {
.call = ctnetlink_get_conntrack,
.type = NFNL_CB_MUTEX,
.attr_count = CTA_MAX,
.policy = ct_nla_policy
},
[IPCTNL_MSG_CT_GET_STATS_CPU] = {
.call = ctnetlink_stat_ct_cpu,
.type = NFNL_CB_MUTEX,
},
[IPCTNL_MSG_CT_GET_STATS] = {
.call = ctnetlink_stat_ct,
.type = NFNL_CB_MUTEX,
},
[IPCTNL_MSG_CT_GET_DYING] = {
.call = ctnetlink_get_ct_dying,
.type = NFNL_CB_MUTEX,
},
[IPCTNL_MSG_CT_GET_UNCONFIRMED] = {
.call = ctnetlink_get_ct_unconfirmed,
.type = NFNL_CB_MUTEX,
},
};
static const struct nfnl_callback ctnl_exp_cb[IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_MAX] = {
[IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_GET] = {
.call = ctnetlink_get_expect,
.type = NFNL_CB_MUTEX,
.attr_count = CTA_EXPECT_MAX,
.policy = exp_nla_policy
},
[IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_NEW] = {
.call = ctnetlink_new_expect,
.type = NFNL_CB_MUTEX,
.attr_count = CTA_EXPECT_MAX,
.policy = exp_nla_policy
},
[IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_DELETE] = {
.call = ctnetlink_del_expect,
.type = NFNL_CB_MUTEX,
.attr_count = CTA_EXPECT_MAX,
.policy = exp_nla_policy
},
[IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_GET_STATS_CPU] = {
.call = ctnetlink_stat_exp_cpu,
.type = NFNL_CB_MUTEX,
},
};
static const struct nfnetlink_subsystem ctnl_subsys = {
.name = "conntrack",
.subsys_id = NFNL_SUBSYS_CTNETLINK,
.cb_count = IPCTNL_MSG_MAX,
.cb = ctnl_cb,
};
static const struct nfnetlink_subsystem ctnl_exp_subsys = {
.name = "conntrack_expect",
.subsys_id = NFNL_SUBSYS_CTNETLINK_EXP,
.cb_count = IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_MAX,
.cb = ctnl_exp_cb,
};
MODULE_ALIAS("ip_conntrack_netlink");
MODULE_ALIAS_NFNL_SUBSYS(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTNETLINK);
MODULE_ALIAS_NFNL_SUBSYS(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTNETLINK_EXP);
static int __net_init ctnetlink_net_init(struct net *net)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS
nf_conntrack_register_notifier(net, &ctnl_notifier);
#endif
return 0;
}
static void ctnetlink_net_pre_exit(struct net *net)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS
nf_conntrack_unregister_notifier(net);
#endif
}
static struct pernet_operations ctnetlink_net_ops = {
.init = ctnetlink_net_init,
.pre_exit = ctnetlink_net_pre_exit,
};
static int __init ctnetlink_init(void)
{
int ret;
NL_ASSERT_DUMP_CTX_FITS(struct ctnetlink_list_dump_ctx);
ret = nfnetlink_subsys_register(&ctnl_subsys);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("ctnetlink_init: cannot register with nfnetlink.\n");
goto err_out;
}
ret = nfnetlink_subsys_register(&ctnl_exp_subsys);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("ctnetlink_init: cannot register exp with nfnetlink.\n");
goto err_unreg_subsys;
}
ret = register_pernet_subsys(&ctnetlink_net_ops);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("ctnetlink_init: cannot register pernet operations\n");
goto err_unreg_exp_subsys;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_GLUE_CT
/* setup interaction between nf_queue and nf_conntrack_netlink. */
RCU_INIT_POINTER(nfnl_ct_hook, &ctnetlink_glue_hook);
#endif
return 0;
err_unreg_exp_subsys:
nfnetlink_subsys_unregister(&ctnl_exp_subsys);
err_unreg_subsys:
nfnetlink_subsys_unregister(&ctnl_subsys);
err_out:
return ret;
}
static void __exit ctnetlink_exit(void)
{
unregister_pernet_subsys(&ctnetlink_net_ops);
nfnetlink_subsys_unregister(&ctnl_exp_subsys);
nfnetlink_subsys_unregister(&ctnl_subsys);
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_GLUE_CT
RCU_INIT_POINTER(nfnl_ct_hook, NULL);
#endif
synchronize_rcu();
}
module_init(ctnetlink_init);
module_exit(ctnetlink_exit);