linux-stable/arch/arm64/include/asm/brk-imm.h

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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
/*
* Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd.
*/
#ifndef __ASM_BRK_IMM_H
#define __ASM_BRK_IMM_H
/*
* #imm16 values used for BRK instruction generation
* 0x004: for installing kprobes
* 0x005: for installing uprobes
* 0x006: for kprobe software single-step
arm64: kretprobes: acquire the regs via a BRK exception On arm64, kprobes always take an exception and so create a struct pt_regs through the usual exception entry logic. Similarly kretprobes taskes and exception for function entry, but for function returns it uses a trampoline which attempts to create a struct pt_regs without taking an exception. This is problematic for a few reasons, including: 1) The kretprobes trampoline neither saves nor restores all of the portions of PSTATE. Before invoking the handler it saves a number of portions of PSTATE, and after returning from the handler it restores NZCV before returning to the original return address provided by the handler. 2) The kretprobe trampoline constructs the PSTATE value piecemeal from special purpose registers as it cannot read all of PSTATE atomically without taking an exception. This is somewhat fragile, and it's not possible to reliably recover PSTATE information which only exists on some physical CPUs (e.g. when SSBS support is mismatched). Today the kretprobes trampoline does not record: - BTYPE - SSBS - ALLINT - SS - PAN - UAO - DIT - TCO ... and this will only get worse with future architecture extensions which add more PSTATE bits. 3) The kretprobes trampoline doesn't store portions of struct pt_regs (e.g. the PMR value when using pseudo-NMIs). Due to this, helpers which operate on a struct pt_regs, such as interrupts_enabled(), may not work correctly. 4) The function entry and function exit handlers run in different contexts. The entry handler will always be run in a debug exception context (which is currently treated as an NMI), but the return will be treated as whatever context the instrumented function was executed in. The differences between these contexts are liable to cause problems (e.g. as the two can be differently interruptible or preemptible, adversely affecting synchronization between the handlers). 5) As the kretprobes trampoline runs in the same context as the code being probed, it is subject to the same single-stepping context, which may not be desirable if this is being driven by the kprobes handlers. Overall, this is fragile, painful to maintain, and gets in the way of supporting other things (e.g. RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, FEAT_NMI). This patch addresses these issues by replacing the kretprobes trampoline with a `BRK` instruction, and using an exception boundary to acquire and restore the regs, in the same way as the regular kprobes trampoline. Ive tested this atop v6.8-rc3: | KTAP version 1 | 1..1 | KTAP version 1 | # Subtest: kprobes_test | # module: test_kprobes | 1..7 | ok 1 test_kprobe | ok 2 test_kprobes | ok 3 test_kprobe_missed | ok 4 test_kretprobe | ok 5 test_kretprobes | ok 6 test_stacktrace_on_kretprobe | ok 7 test_stacktrace_on_nested_kretprobe | # kprobes_test: pass:7 fail:0 skip:0 total:7 | # Totals: pass:7 fail:0 skip:0 total:7 | ok 1 kprobes_test Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240208145916.2004154-1-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2024-02-08 14:59:16 +00:00
* 0x007: for kretprobe return
* Allowed values for kgdb are 0x400 - 0x7ff
* 0x100: for triggering a fault on purpose (reserved)
* 0x400: for dynamic BRK instruction
* 0x401: for compile time BRK instruction
* 0x800: kernel-mode BUG() and WARN() traps
* 0x9xx: tag-based KASAN trap (allowed values 0x900 - 0x9ff)
* 0x55xx: Undefined Behavior Sanitizer traps ('U' << 8)
arm64: Add CFI error handling With -fsanitize=kcfi, CFI always traps. Add arm64 support for handling CFI failures. The registers containing the target address and the expected type are encoded in the first ten bits of the ESR as follows: - 0-4: n, where the register Xn contains the target address - 5-9: m, where the register Wm contains the type hash This produces the following oops on CFI failure (generated using lkdtm): [ 21.885179] CFI failure at lkdtm_indirect_call+0x2c/0x44 [lkdtm] (target: lkdtm_increment_int+0x0/0x1c [lkdtm]; expected type: 0x7e0c52a) [ 21.886593] Internal error: Oops - CFI: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 21.891060] Modules linked in: lkdtm [ 21.893363] CPU: 0 PID: 151 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.19.0-rc1-00021-g852f4e48dbab #1 [ 21.895560] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 21.896543] pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 21.897583] pc : lkdtm_indirect_call+0x2c/0x44 [lkdtm] [ 21.898551] lr : lkdtm_CFI_FORWARD_PROTO+0x3c/0x6c [lkdtm] [ 21.899520] sp : ffff8000083a3c50 [ 21.900191] x29: ffff8000083a3c50 x28: ffff0000027e0ec0 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 21.902453] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffffc2aa3d07e7b0 x24: 0000000000000002 [ 21.903736] x23: ffffc2aa3d079088 x22: ffffc2aa3d07e7b0 x21: ffff000003379000 [ 21.905062] x20: ffff8000083a3dc0 x19: 0000000000000012 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 21.906371] x17: 000000007e0c52a5 x16: 000000003ad55aca x15: ffffc2aa60d92138 [ 21.907662] x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: 2e2e2e2065707974 x12: 0000000000000018 [ 21.909775] x11: ffffc2aa62322b88 x10: ffffc2aa62322aa0 x9 : c7e305fb5195d200 [ 21.911898] x8 : ffffc2aa3d077e20 x7 : 6d20676e696c6c61 x6 : 43203a6d74646b6c [ 21.913108] x5 : ffffc2aa6266c9df x4 : ffffc2aa6266c9e1 x3 : ffff8000083a3968 [ 21.914358] x2 : 80000000fffff122 x1 : 00000000fffff122 x0 : ffffc2aa3d07e8f8 [ 21.915827] Call trace: [ 21.916375] lkdtm_indirect_call+0x2c/0x44 [lkdtm] [ 21.918060] lkdtm_CFI_FORWARD_PROTO+0x3c/0x6c [lkdtm] [ 21.919030] lkdtm_do_action+0x34/0x4c [lkdtm] [ 21.919920] direct_entry+0x170/0x1ac [lkdtm] [ 21.920772] full_proxy_write+0x84/0x104 [ 21.921759] vfs_write+0x188/0x3d8 [ 21.922387] ksys_write+0x78/0xe8 [ 21.922986] __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x2c [ 21.923696] invoke_syscall+0x58/0x134 [ 21.924554] el0_svc_common+0xb4/0xf4 [ 21.925603] do_el0_svc+0x2c/0xb4 [ 21.926563] el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c [ 21.927147] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 [ 21.927985] el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 [ 21.929133] Code: 728a54b1 72afc191 6b11021f 54000040 (d4304500) [ 21.930690] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 21.930971] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - CFI: Fatal exception Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220908215504.3686827-11-samitolvanen@google.com
2022-09-08 21:54:52 +00:00
* 0x8xxx: Control-Flow Integrity traps
*/
#define KPROBES_BRK_IMM 0x004
#define UPROBES_BRK_IMM 0x005
#define KPROBES_BRK_SS_IMM 0x006
arm64: kretprobes: acquire the regs via a BRK exception On arm64, kprobes always take an exception and so create a struct pt_regs through the usual exception entry logic. Similarly kretprobes taskes and exception for function entry, but for function returns it uses a trampoline which attempts to create a struct pt_regs without taking an exception. This is problematic for a few reasons, including: 1) The kretprobes trampoline neither saves nor restores all of the portions of PSTATE. Before invoking the handler it saves a number of portions of PSTATE, and after returning from the handler it restores NZCV before returning to the original return address provided by the handler. 2) The kretprobe trampoline constructs the PSTATE value piecemeal from special purpose registers as it cannot read all of PSTATE atomically without taking an exception. This is somewhat fragile, and it's not possible to reliably recover PSTATE information which only exists on some physical CPUs (e.g. when SSBS support is mismatched). Today the kretprobes trampoline does not record: - BTYPE - SSBS - ALLINT - SS - PAN - UAO - DIT - TCO ... and this will only get worse with future architecture extensions which add more PSTATE bits. 3) The kretprobes trampoline doesn't store portions of struct pt_regs (e.g. the PMR value when using pseudo-NMIs). Due to this, helpers which operate on a struct pt_regs, such as interrupts_enabled(), may not work correctly. 4) The function entry and function exit handlers run in different contexts. The entry handler will always be run in a debug exception context (which is currently treated as an NMI), but the return will be treated as whatever context the instrumented function was executed in. The differences between these contexts are liable to cause problems (e.g. as the two can be differently interruptible or preemptible, adversely affecting synchronization between the handlers). 5) As the kretprobes trampoline runs in the same context as the code being probed, it is subject to the same single-stepping context, which may not be desirable if this is being driven by the kprobes handlers. Overall, this is fragile, painful to maintain, and gets in the way of supporting other things (e.g. RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, FEAT_NMI). This patch addresses these issues by replacing the kretprobes trampoline with a `BRK` instruction, and using an exception boundary to acquire and restore the regs, in the same way as the regular kprobes trampoline. Ive tested this atop v6.8-rc3: | KTAP version 1 | 1..1 | KTAP version 1 | # Subtest: kprobes_test | # module: test_kprobes | 1..7 | ok 1 test_kprobe | ok 2 test_kprobes | ok 3 test_kprobe_missed | ok 4 test_kretprobe | ok 5 test_kretprobes | ok 6 test_stacktrace_on_kretprobe | ok 7 test_stacktrace_on_nested_kretprobe | # kprobes_test: pass:7 fail:0 skip:0 total:7 | # Totals: pass:7 fail:0 skip:0 total:7 | ok 1 kprobes_test Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240208145916.2004154-1-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2024-02-08 14:59:16 +00:00
#define KRETPROBES_BRK_IMM 0x007
#define FAULT_BRK_IMM 0x100
#define KGDB_DYN_DBG_BRK_IMM 0x400
#define KGDB_COMPILED_DBG_BRK_IMM 0x401
#define BUG_BRK_IMM 0x800
#define KASAN_BRK_IMM 0x900
#define KASAN_BRK_MASK 0x0ff
#define UBSAN_BRK_IMM 0x5500
#define UBSAN_BRK_MASK 0x00ff
arm64: Add CFI error handling With -fsanitize=kcfi, CFI always traps. Add arm64 support for handling CFI failures. The registers containing the target address and the expected type are encoded in the first ten bits of the ESR as follows: - 0-4: n, where the register Xn contains the target address - 5-9: m, where the register Wm contains the type hash This produces the following oops on CFI failure (generated using lkdtm): [ 21.885179] CFI failure at lkdtm_indirect_call+0x2c/0x44 [lkdtm] (target: lkdtm_increment_int+0x0/0x1c [lkdtm]; expected type: 0x7e0c52a) [ 21.886593] Internal error: Oops - CFI: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 21.891060] Modules linked in: lkdtm [ 21.893363] CPU: 0 PID: 151 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.19.0-rc1-00021-g852f4e48dbab #1 [ 21.895560] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 21.896543] pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 21.897583] pc : lkdtm_indirect_call+0x2c/0x44 [lkdtm] [ 21.898551] lr : lkdtm_CFI_FORWARD_PROTO+0x3c/0x6c [lkdtm] [ 21.899520] sp : ffff8000083a3c50 [ 21.900191] x29: ffff8000083a3c50 x28: ffff0000027e0ec0 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 21.902453] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffffc2aa3d07e7b0 x24: 0000000000000002 [ 21.903736] x23: ffffc2aa3d079088 x22: ffffc2aa3d07e7b0 x21: ffff000003379000 [ 21.905062] x20: ffff8000083a3dc0 x19: 0000000000000012 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 21.906371] x17: 000000007e0c52a5 x16: 000000003ad55aca x15: ffffc2aa60d92138 [ 21.907662] x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: 2e2e2e2065707974 x12: 0000000000000018 [ 21.909775] x11: ffffc2aa62322b88 x10: ffffc2aa62322aa0 x9 : c7e305fb5195d200 [ 21.911898] x8 : ffffc2aa3d077e20 x7 : 6d20676e696c6c61 x6 : 43203a6d74646b6c [ 21.913108] x5 : ffffc2aa6266c9df x4 : ffffc2aa6266c9e1 x3 : ffff8000083a3968 [ 21.914358] x2 : 80000000fffff122 x1 : 00000000fffff122 x0 : ffffc2aa3d07e8f8 [ 21.915827] Call trace: [ 21.916375] lkdtm_indirect_call+0x2c/0x44 [lkdtm] [ 21.918060] lkdtm_CFI_FORWARD_PROTO+0x3c/0x6c [lkdtm] [ 21.919030] lkdtm_do_action+0x34/0x4c [lkdtm] [ 21.919920] direct_entry+0x170/0x1ac [lkdtm] [ 21.920772] full_proxy_write+0x84/0x104 [ 21.921759] vfs_write+0x188/0x3d8 [ 21.922387] ksys_write+0x78/0xe8 [ 21.922986] __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x2c [ 21.923696] invoke_syscall+0x58/0x134 [ 21.924554] el0_svc_common+0xb4/0xf4 [ 21.925603] do_el0_svc+0x2c/0xb4 [ 21.926563] el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c [ 21.927147] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 [ 21.927985] el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 [ 21.929133] Code: 728a54b1 72afc191 6b11021f 54000040 (d4304500) [ 21.930690] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 21.930971] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - CFI: Fatal exception Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220908215504.3686827-11-samitolvanen@google.com
2022-09-08 21:54:52 +00:00
#define CFI_BRK_IMM_TARGET GENMASK(4, 0)
#define CFI_BRK_IMM_TYPE GENMASK(9, 5)
#define CFI_BRK_IMM_BASE 0x8000
#define CFI_BRK_IMM_MASK (CFI_BRK_IMM_TARGET | CFI_BRK_IMM_TYPE)
#endif