License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
|
2016-11-27 01:32:46 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* fscrypt_private.h
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* This contains encryption key functions.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Written by Michael Halcrow, Ildar Muslukhov, and Uday Savagaonkar, 2015.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H
|
|
|
|
|
#define _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-09 19:15:34 +00:00
|
|
|
#define __FS_HAS_ENCRYPTION 1
|
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/fscrypt.h>
|
2017-06-19 07:27:58 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <crypto/hash.h>
|
2016-11-27 01:32:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-11-27 03:05:18 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Encryption parameters */
|
2017-06-19 07:27:58 +00:00
|
|
|
#define FS_IV_SIZE 16
|
2018-04-30 22:51:46 +00:00
|
|
|
#define FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE 16
|
2016-11-27 03:05:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
|
* Encryption context for inode
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Protector format:
|
|
|
|
|
* 1 byte: Protector format (1 = this version)
|
|
|
|
|
* 1 byte: File contents encryption mode
|
|
|
|
|
* 1 byte: File names encryption mode
|
|
|
|
|
* 1 byte: Flags
|
|
|
|
|
* 8 bytes: Master Key descriptor
|
|
|
|
|
* 16 bytes: Encryption Key derivation nonce
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_context {
|
|
|
|
|
u8 format;
|
|
|
|
|
u8 contents_encryption_mode;
|
|
|
|
|
u8 filenames_encryption_mode;
|
|
|
|
|
u8 flags;
|
|
|
|
|
u8 master_key_descriptor[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
|
u8 nonce[FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-12 04:30:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
|
* For encrypted symlinks, the ciphertext length is stored at the beginning
|
|
|
|
|
* of the string in little-endian format.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_symlink_data {
|
|
|
|
|
__le16 len;
|
|
|
|
|
char encrypted_path[1];
|
|
|
|
|
} __packed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-11-27 03:05:18 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* A pointer to this structure is stored in the file system's in-core
|
|
|
|
|
* representation of an inode.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
struct fscrypt_info {
|
|
|
|
|
u8 ci_data_mode;
|
|
|
|
|
u8 ci_filename_mode;
|
|
|
|
|
u8 ci_flags;
|
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_skcipher *ci_ctfm;
|
2017-06-19 07:27:58 +00:00
|
|
|
struct crypto_cipher *ci_essiv_tfm;
|
2016-11-27 03:05:18 +00:00
|
|
|
u8 ci_master_key[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-19 11:25:32 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef enum {
|
|
|
|
|
FS_DECRYPT = 0,
|
|
|
|
|
FS_ENCRYPT,
|
|
|
|
|
} fscrypt_direction_t;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-11-27 03:05:18 +00:00
|
|
|
#define FS_CTX_REQUIRES_FREE_ENCRYPT_FL 0x00000001
|
2016-12-06 22:53:58 +00:00
|
|
|
#define FS_CTX_HAS_BOUNCE_BUFFER_FL 0x00000002
|
2016-11-27 03:05:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-01-05 18:44:58 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline bool fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(u32 contents_mode,
|
|
|
|
|
u32 filenames_mode)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if (contents_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC &&
|
|
|
|
|
filenames_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CTS)
|
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (contents_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS &&
|
|
|
|
|
filenames_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS)
|
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
|
|
fscrypt: add Speck128/256 support
fscrypt currently only supports AES encryption. However, many low-end
mobile devices have older CPUs that don't have AES instructions, e.g.
the ARMv8 Cryptography Extensions. Currently, user data on such devices
is not encrypted at rest because AES is too slow, even when the NEON
bit-sliced implementation of AES is used. Unfortunately, it is
infeasible to encrypt these devices at all when AES is the only option.
Therefore, this patch updates fscrypt to support the Speck block cipher,
which was recently added to the crypto API. The C implementation of
Speck is not especially fast, but Speck can be implemented very
efficiently with general-purpose vector instructions, e.g. ARM NEON.
For example, on an ARMv7 processor, we measured the NEON-accelerated
Speck128/256-XTS at 69 MB/s for both encryption and decryption, while
AES-256-XTS with the NEON bit-sliced implementation was only 22 MB/s
encryption and 19 MB/s decryption.
There are multiple variants of Speck. This patch only adds support for
Speck128/256, which is the variant with a 128-bit block size and 256-bit
key size -- the same as AES-256. This is believed to be the most secure
variant of Speck, and it's only about 6% slower than Speck128/128.
Speck64/128 would be at least 20% faster because it has 20% rounds, and
it can be even faster on CPUs that can't efficiently do the 64-bit
operations needed for Speck128. However, Speck64's 64-bit block size is
not preferred security-wise. ARM NEON also supports the needed 64-bit
operations even on 32-bit CPUs, resulting in Speck128 being fast enough
for our targeted use cases so far.
The chosen modes of operation are XTS for contents and CTS-CBC for
filenames. These are the same modes of operation that fscrypt defaults
to for AES. Note that as with the other fscrypt modes, Speck will not
be used unless userspace chooses to use it. Nor are any of the existing
modes (which are all AES-based) being removed, of course.
We intentionally don't make CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION select
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK, so people will have to enable Speck support
themselves if they need it. This is because we shouldn't bloat the
FS_ENCRYPTION dependencies with every new cipher, especially ones that
aren't recommended for most users. Moreover, CRYPTO_SPECK is just the
generic implementation, which won't be fast enough for many users; in
practice, they'll need to enable CRYPTO_SPECK_NEON to get acceptable
performance.
More details about our choice of Speck can be found in our patches that
added Speck to the crypto API, and the follow-on discussion threads.
We're planning a publication that explains the choice in more detail.
But briefly, we can't use ChaCha20 as we previously proposed, since it
would be insecure to use a stream cipher in this context, with potential
IV reuse during writes on f2fs and/or on wear-leveling flash storage.
We also evaluated many other lightweight and/or ARX-based block ciphers
such as Chaskey-LTS, RC5, LEA, CHAM, Threefish, RC6, NOEKEON, SPARX, and
XTEA. However, all had disadvantages vs. Speck, such as insufficient
performance with NEON, much less published cryptanalysis, or an
insufficient security level. Various design choices in Speck make it
perform better with NEON than competing ciphers while still having a
security margin similar to AES, and in the case of Speck128 also the
same available security levels. Unfortunately, Speck does have some
political baggage attached -- it's an NSA designed cipher, and was
rejected from an ISO standard (though for context, as far as I know none
of the above-mentioned alternatives are ISO standards either).
Nevertheless, we believe it is a good solution to the problem from a
technical perspective.
Certain algorithms constructed from ChaCha or the ChaCha permutation,
such as MEM (Masked Even-Mansour) or HPolyC, may also meet our
performance requirements. However, these are new constructions that
need more time to receive the cryptographic review and acceptance needed
to be confident in their security. HPolyC hasn't been published yet,
and we are concerned that MEM makes stronger assumptions about the
underlying permutation than the ChaCha stream cipher does. In contrast,
the XTS mode of operation is relatively well accepted, and Speck has
over 70 cryptanalysis papers. Of course, these ChaCha-based algorithms
can still be added later if they become ready.
The best known attack on Speck128/256 is a differential cryptanalysis
attack on 25 of 34 rounds with 2^253 time complexity and 2^125 chosen
plaintexts, i.e. only marginally faster than brute force. There is no
known attack on the full 34 rounds.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2018-05-08 00:22:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if (contents_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_SPECK128_256_XTS &&
|
|
|
|
|
filenames_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_SPECK128_256_CTS)
|
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-05 18:44:58 +00:00
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-11-27 01:43:09 +00:00
|
|
|
/* crypto.c */
|
2018-01-05 18:44:54 +00:00
|
|
|
extern struct kmem_cache *fscrypt_info_cachep;
|
2016-12-19 11:25:32 +00:00
|
|
|
extern int fscrypt_initialize(unsigned int cop_flags);
|
|
|
|
|
extern int fscrypt_do_page_crypto(const struct inode *inode,
|
|
|
|
|
fscrypt_direction_t rw, u64 lblk_num,
|
|
|
|
|
struct page *src_page,
|
|
|
|
|
struct page *dest_page,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int len, unsigned int offs,
|
|
|
|
|
gfp_t gfp_flags);
|
|
|
|
|
extern struct page *fscrypt_alloc_bounce_page(struct fscrypt_ctx *ctx,
|
|
|
|
|
gfp_t gfp_flags);
|
2018-04-30 22:51:36 +00:00
|
|
|
extern const struct dentry_operations fscrypt_d_ops;
|
2016-11-27 01:43:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-04-30 22:51:47 +00:00
|
|
|
extern void __printf(3, 4) __cold
|
|
|
|
|
fscrypt_msg(struct super_block *sb, const char *level, const char *fmt, ...);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define fscrypt_warn(sb, fmt, ...) \
|
|
|
|
|
fscrypt_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
|
|
|
|
|
#define fscrypt_err(sb, fmt, ...) \
|
|
|
|
|
fscrypt_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
|
|
|
|
|
|
fscrypt: new helper functions for ->symlink()
Currently, filesystems supporting fscrypt need to implement some tricky
logic when creating encrypted symlinks, including handling a peculiar
on-disk format (struct fscrypt_symlink_data) and correctly calculating
the size of the encrypted symlink. Introduce helper functions to make
things a bit easier:
- fscrypt_prepare_symlink() computes and validates the size the symlink
target will require on-disk.
- fscrypt_encrypt_symlink() creates the encrypted target if needed.
The new helpers actually fix some subtle bugs. First, when checking
whether the symlink target was too long, filesystems didn't account for
the fact that the NUL padding is meant to be truncated if it would cause
the maximum length to be exceeded, as is done for filenames in
directories. Consequently users would receive ENAMETOOLONG when
creating symlinks close to what is supposed to be the maximum length.
For example, with EXT4 with a 4K block size, the maximum symlink target
length in an encrypted directory is supposed to be 4093 bytes (in
comparison to 4095 in an unencrypted directory), but in
FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32-mode only up to 4064 bytes were accepted.
Second, symlink targets of "." and ".." were not being encrypted, even
though they should be, as these names are special in *directory entries*
but not in symlink targets. Fortunately, we can fix this simply by
starting to encrypt them, as old kernels already accept them in
encrypted form.
Third, the output string length the filesystems were providing when
doing the actual encryption was incorrect, as it was forgotten to
exclude 'sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data)'. Fortunately though, this
bug didn't make a difference.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2018-01-05 18:45:01 +00:00
|
|
|
/* fname.c */
|
2018-01-12 04:30:08 +00:00
|
|
|
extern int fname_encrypt(struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *iname,
|
|
|
|
|
u8 *out, unsigned int olen);
|
2018-01-12 04:30:08 +00:00
|
|
|
extern bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const struct inode *inode,
|
|
|
|
|
u32 orig_len, u32 max_len,
|
|
|
|
|
u32 *encrypted_len_ret);
|
fscrypt: new helper functions for ->symlink()
Currently, filesystems supporting fscrypt need to implement some tricky
logic when creating encrypted symlinks, including handling a peculiar
on-disk format (struct fscrypt_symlink_data) and correctly calculating
the size of the encrypted symlink. Introduce helper functions to make
things a bit easier:
- fscrypt_prepare_symlink() computes and validates the size the symlink
target will require on-disk.
- fscrypt_encrypt_symlink() creates the encrypted target if needed.
The new helpers actually fix some subtle bugs. First, when checking
whether the symlink target was too long, filesystems didn't account for
the fact that the NUL padding is meant to be truncated if it would cause
the maximum length to be exceeded, as is done for filenames in
directories. Consequently users would receive ENAMETOOLONG when
creating symlinks close to what is supposed to be the maximum length.
For example, with EXT4 with a 4K block size, the maximum symlink target
length in an encrypted directory is supposed to be 4093 bytes (in
comparison to 4095 in an unencrypted directory), but in
FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32-mode only up to 4064 bytes were accepted.
Second, symlink targets of "." and ".." were not being encrypted, even
though they should be, as these names are special in *directory entries*
but not in symlink targets. Fortunately, we can fix this simply by
starting to encrypt them, as old kernels already accept them in
encrypted form.
Third, the output string length the filesystems were providing when
doing the actual encryption was incorrect, as it was forgotten to
exclude 'sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data)'. Fortunately though, this
bug didn't make a difference.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2018-01-05 18:45:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-06-19 07:27:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/* keyinfo.c */
|
|
|
|
|
extern void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-11-27 01:32:46 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H */
|