linux-stable/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_xs.c

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/******************************************************************************
* xenbus_xs.c
*
* This is the kernel equivalent of the "xs" library. We don't need everything
* and we use xenbus_comms for communication.
*
* Copyright (C) 2005 Rusty Russell, IBM Corporation
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; or, when distributed
* separately from the Linux kernel or incorporated into other
* software packages, subject to the following license:
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
* of this source file (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without
* restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify,
* merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software,
* and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
* the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
* AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS
* IN THE SOFTWARE.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/unistd.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/uio.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/rwsem.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <asm/xen/hypervisor.h>
#include <xen/xenbus.h>
#include <xen/xen.h>
#include "xenbus_comms.h"
#include "xenbus_probe.h"
struct xs_stored_msg {
struct list_head list;
struct xsd_sockmsg hdr;
union {
/* Queued replies. */
struct {
char *body;
} reply;
/* Queued watch events. */
struct {
struct xenbus_watch *handle;
char **vec;
unsigned int vec_size;
} watch;
} u;
};
struct xs_handle {
/* A list of replies. Currently only one will ever be outstanding. */
struct list_head reply_list;
spinlock_t reply_lock;
wait_queue_head_t reply_waitq;
/*
* Mutex ordering: transaction_mutex -> watch_mutex -> request_mutex.
* response_mutex is never taken simultaneously with the other three.
*
* transaction_mutex must be held before incrementing
* transaction_count. The mutex is held when a suspend is in
* progress to prevent new transactions starting.
*
* When decrementing transaction_count to zero the wait queue
* should be woken up, the suspend code waits for count to
* reach zero.
*/
/* One request at a time. */
struct mutex request_mutex;
/* Protect xenbus reader thread against save/restore. */
struct mutex response_mutex;
/* Protect transactions against save/restore. */
struct mutex transaction_mutex;
atomic_t transaction_count;
wait_queue_head_t transaction_wq;
/* Protect watch (de)register against save/restore. */
struct rw_semaphore watch_mutex;
};
static struct xs_handle xs_state;
/* List of registered watches, and a lock to protect it. */
static LIST_HEAD(watches);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(watches_lock);
/* List of pending watch callback events, and a lock to protect it. */
static LIST_HEAD(watch_events);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(watch_events_lock);
/*
* Details of the xenwatch callback kernel thread. The thread waits on the
* watch_events_waitq for work to do (queued on watch_events list). When it
* wakes up it acquires the xenwatch_mutex before reading the list and
* carrying out work.
*/
static pid_t xenwatch_pid;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(xenwatch_mutex);
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(watch_events_waitq);
static int get_error(const char *errorstring)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; strcmp(errorstring, xsd_errors[i].errstring) != 0; i++) {
if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(xsd_errors) - 1) {
pr_warn("xen store gave: unknown error %s\n",
errorstring);
return EINVAL;
}
}
return xsd_errors[i].errnum;
}
static bool xenbus_ok(void)
{
switch (xen_store_domain_type) {
case XS_LOCAL:
switch (system_state) {
case SYSTEM_POWER_OFF:
case SYSTEM_RESTART:
case SYSTEM_HALT:
return false;
default:
break;
}
return true;
case XS_PV:
case XS_HVM:
/* FIXME: Could check that the remote domain is alive,
* but it is normally initial domain. */
return true;
default:
break;
}
return false;
}
static void *read_reply(enum xsd_sockmsg_type *type, unsigned int *len)
{
struct xs_stored_msg *msg;
char *body;
spin_lock(&xs_state.reply_lock);
while (list_empty(&xs_state.reply_list)) {
spin_unlock(&xs_state.reply_lock);
if (xenbus_ok())
/* XXX FIXME: Avoid synchronous wait for response here. */
wait_event_timeout(xs_state.reply_waitq,
!list_empty(&xs_state.reply_list),
msecs_to_jiffies(500));
else {
/*
* If we are in the process of being shut-down there is
* no point of trying to contact XenBus - it is either
* killed (xenstored application) or the other domain
* has been killed or is unreachable.
*/
return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
}
spin_lock(&xs_state.reply_lock);
}
msg = list_entry(xs_state.reply_list.next,
struct xs_stored_msg, list);
list_del(&msg->list);
spin_unlock(&xs_state.reply_lock);
*type = msg->hdr.type;
if (len)
*len = msg->hdr.len;
body = msg->u.reply.body;
kfree(msg);
return body;
}
static void transaction_start(void)
{
mutex_lock(&xs_state.transaction_mutex);
atomic_inc(&xs_state.transaction_count);
mutex_unlock(&xs_state.transaction_mutex);
}
static void transaction_end(void)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&xs_state.transaction_count))
wake_up(&xs_state.transaction_wq);
}
static void transaction_suspend(void)
{
mutex_lock(&xs_state.transaction_mutex);
wait_event(xs_state.transaction_wq,
atomic_read(&xs_state.transaction_count) == 0);
}
static void transaction_resume(void)
{
mutex_unlock(&xs_state.transaction_mutex);
}
void *xenbus_dev_request_and_reply(struct xsd_sockmsg *msg)
{
void *ret;
struct xsd_sockmsg req_msg = *msg;
int err;
if (req_msg.type == XS_TRANSACTION_START)
transaction_start();
mutex_lock(&xs_state.request_mutex);
err = xb_write(msg, sizeof(*msg) + msg->len);
if (err) {
msg->type = XS_ERROR;
ret = ERR_PTR(err);
} else
ret = read_reply(&msg->type, &msg->len);
mutex_unlock(&xs_state.request_mutex);
if (IS_ERR(ret))
return ret;
if ((msg->type == XS_TRANSACTION_END) ||
((req_msg.type == XS_TRANSACTION_START) &&
(msg->type == XS_ERROR)))
transaction_end();
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xenbus_dev_request_and_reply);
/* Send message to xs, get kmalloc'ed reply. ERR_PTR() on error. */
static void *xs_talkv(struct xenbus_transaction t,
enum xsd_sockmsg_type type,
const struct kvec *iovec,
unsigned int num_vecs,
unsigned int *len)
{
struct xsd_sockmsg msg;
void *ret = NULL;
unsigned int i;
int err;
msg.tx_id = t.id;
msg.req_id = 0;
msg.type = type;
msg.len = 0;
for (i = 0; i < num_vecs; i++)
msg.len += iovec[i].iov_len;
mutex_lock(&xs_state.request_mutex);
err = xb_write(&msg, sizeof(msg));
if (err) {
mutex_unlock(&xs_state.request_mutex);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
for (i = 0; i < num_vecs; i++) {
err = xb_write(iovec[i].iov_base, iovec[i].iov_len);
if (err) {
mutex_unlock(&xs_state.request_mutex);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
}
ret = read_reply(&msg.type, len);
mutex_unlock(&xs_state.request_mutex);
if (IS_ERR(ret))
return ret;
if (msg.type == XS_ERROR) {
err = get_error(ret);
kfree(ret);
return ERR_PTR(-err);
}
if (msg.type != type) {
pr_warn_ratelimited("unexpected type [%d], expected [%d]\n",
msg.type, type);
kfree(ret);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
return ret;
}
/* Simplified version of xs_talkv: single message. */
static void *xs_single(struct xenbus_transaction t,
enum xsd_sockmsg_type type,
const char *string,
unsigned int *len)
{
struct kvec iovec;
iovec.iov_base = (void *)string;
iovec.iov_len = strlen(string) + 1;
return xs_talkv(t, type, &iovec, 1, len);
}
/* Many commands only need an ack, don't care what it says. */
static int xs_error(char *reply)
{
if (IS_ERR(reply))
return PTR_ERR(reply);
kfree(reply);
return 0;
}
static unsigned int count_strings(const char *strings, unsigned int len)
{
unsigned int num;
const char *p;
for (p = strings, num = 0; p < strings + len; p += strlen(p) + 1)
num++;
return num;
}
/* Return the path to dir with /name appended. Buffer must be kfree()'ed. */
static char *join(const char *dir, const char *name)
{
char *buffer;
if (strlen(name) == 0)
buffer = kasprintf(GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH, "%s", dir);
else
buffer = kasprintf(GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH, "%s/%s", dir, name);
return (!buffer) ? ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) : buffer;
}
static char **split(char *strings, unsigned int len, unsigned int *num)
{
char *p, **ret;
/* Count the strings. */
*num = count_strings(strings, len);
/* Transfer to one big alloc for easy freeing. */
ret = kmalloc(*num * sizeof(char *) + len, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH);
if (!ret) {
kfree(strings);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
memcpy(&ret[*num], strings, len);
kfree(strings);
strings = (char *)&ret[*num];
for (p = strings, *num = 0; p < strings + len; p += strlen(p) + 1)
ret[(*num)++] = p;
return ret;
}
char **xenbus_directory(struct xenbus_transaction t,
const char *dir, const char *node, unsigned int *num)
{
char *strings, *path;
unsigned int len;
path = join(dir, node);
if (IS_ERR(path))
return (char **)path;
strings = xs_single(t, XS_DIRECTORY, path, &len);
kfree(path);
if (IS_ERR(strings))
return (char **)strings;
return split(strings, len, num);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xenbus_directory);
/* Check if a path exists. Return 1 if it does. */
int xenbus_exists(struct xenbus_transaction t,
const char *dir, const char *node)
{
char **d;
int dir_n;
d = xenbus_directory(t, dir, node, &dir_n);
if (IS_ERR(d))
return 0;
kfree(d);
return 1;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xenbus_exists);
/* Get the value of a single file.
* Returns a kmalloced value: call free() on it after use.
* len indicates length in bytes.
*/
void *xenbus_read(struct xenbus_transaction t,
const char *dir, const char *node, unsigned int *len)
{
char *path;
void *ret;
path = join(dir, node);
if (IS_ERR(path))
return (void *)path;
ret = xs_single(t, XS_READ, path, len);
kfree(path);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xenbus_read);
/* Write the value of a single file.
* Returns -err on failure.
*/
int xenbus_write(struct xenbus_transaction t,
const char *dir, const char *node, const char *string)
{
const char *path;
struct kvec iovec[2];
int ret;
path = join(dir, node);
if (IS_ERR(path))
return PTR_ERR(path);
iovec[0].iov_base = (void *)path;
iovec[0].iov_len = strlen(path) + 1;
iovec[1].iov_base = (void *)string;
iovec[1].iov_len = strlen(string);
ret = xs_error(xs_talkv(t, XS_WRITE, iovec, ARRAY_SIZE(iovec), NULL));
kfree(path);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xenbus_write);
/* Create a new directory. */
int xenbus_mkdir(struct xenbus_transaction t,
const char *dir, const char *node)
{
char *path;
int ret;
path = join(dir, node);
if (IS_ERR(path))
return PTR_ERR(path);
ret = xs_error(xs_single(t, XS_MKDIR, path, NULL));
kfree(path);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xenbus_mkdir);
/* Destroy a file or directory (directories must be empty). */
int xenbus_rm(struct xenbus_transaction t, const char *dir, const char *node)
{
char *path;
int ret;
path = join(dir, node);
if (IS_ERR(path))
return PTR_ERR(path);
ret = xs_error(xs_single(t, XS_RM, path, NULL));
kfree(path);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xenbus_rm);
/* Start a transaction: changes by others will not be seen during this
* transaction, and changes will not be visible to others until end.
*/
int xenbus_transaction_start(struct xenbus_transaction *t)
{
char *id_str;
transaction_start();
id_str = xs_single(XBT_NIL, XS_TRANSACTION_START, "", NULL);
if (IS_ERR(id_str)) {
transaction_end();
return PTR_ERR(id_str);
}
t->id = simple_strtoul(id_str, NULL, 0);
kfree(id_str);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xenbus_transaction_start);
/* End a transaction.
* If abandon is true, transaction is discarded instead of committed.
*/
int xenbus_transaction_end(struct xenbus_transaction t, int abort)
{
char abortstr[2];
int err;
if (abort)
strcpy(abortstr, "F");
else
strcpy(abortstr, "T");
err = xs_error(xs_single(t, XS_TRANSACTION_END, abortstr, NULL));
transaction_end();
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xenbus_transaction_end);
/* Single read and scanf: returns -errno or num scanned. */
int xenbus_scanf(struct xenbus_transaction t,
const char *dir, const char *node, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
int ret;
char *val;
val = xenbus_read(t, dir, node, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(val))
return PTR_ERR(val);
va_start(ap, fmt);
ret = vsscanf(val, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
kfree(val);
/* Distinctive errno. */
if (ret == 0)
return -ERANGE;
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xenbus_scanf);
/* Single printf and write: returns -errno or 0. */
int xenbus_printf(struct xenbus_transaction t,
const char *dir, const char *node, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
int ret;
char *buf;
va_start(ap, fmt);
buf = kvasprintf(GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = xenbus_write(t, dir, node, buf);
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xenbus_printf);
/* Takes tuples of names, scanf-style args, and void **, NULL terminated. */
int xenbus_gather(struct xenbus_transaction t, const char *dir, ...)
{
va_list ap;
const char *name;
int ret = 0;
va_start(ap, dir);
while (ret == 0 && (name = va_arg(ap, char *)) != NULL) {
const char *fmt = va_arg(ap, char *);
void *result = va_arg(ap, void *);
char *p;
p = xenbus_read(t, dir, name, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(p)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(p);
break;
}
if (fmt) {
if (sscanf(p, fmt, result) == 0)
ret = -EINVAL;
kfree(p);
} else
*(char **)result = p;
}
va_end(ap);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xenbus_gather);
static int xs_watch(const char *path, const char *token)
{
struct kvec iov[2];
iov[0].iov_base = (void *)path;
iov[0].iov_len = strlen(path) + 1;
iov[1].iov_base = (void *)token;
iov[1].iov_len = strlen(token) + 1;
return xs_error(xs_talkv(XBT_NIL, XS_WATCH, iov,
ARRAY_SIZE(iov), NULL));
}
static int xs_unwatch(const char *path, const char *token)
{
struct kvec iov[2];
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)path;
iov[0].iov_len = strlen(path) + 1;
iov[1].iov_base = (char *)token;
iov[1].iov_len = strlen(token) + 1;
return xs_error(xs_talkv(XBT_NIL, XS_UNWATCH, iov,
ARRAY_SIZE(iov), NULL));
}
static struct xenbus_watch *find_watch(const char *token)
{
struct xenbus_watch *i, *cmp;
cmp = (void *)simple_strtoul(token, NULL, 16);
list_for_each_entry(i, &watches, list)
if (i == cmp)
return i;
return NULL;
}
xen/pv-on-hvm kexec: add quirk for Xen 3.4 and shutdown watches. The commit 254d1a3f02ebc10ccc6e4903394d8d3f484f715e, titled "xen/pv-on-hvm kexec: shutdown watches from old kernel" assumes that the XenBus backend can deal with reading of values from: "control/platform-feature-xs_reset_watches": ... a patch for xenstored is required so that it accepts the XS_RESET_WATCHES request from a client (see changeset 23839:42a45baf037d in xen-unstable.hg). Without the patch for xenstored the registration of watches will fail and some features of a PVonHVM guest are not available. The guest is still able to boot, but repeated kexec boots will fail." Sadly this is not true when using a Xen 3.4 hypervisor and booting a PVHVM guest. We end up hanging at: err = xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, "control", "platform-feature-xs_reset_watches", "%d", &supported); This can easily be seen with guests hanging at xenbus_init: NX (Execute Disable) protection: active SMBIOS 2.4 present. DMI: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 3.4.0 05/13/2011 Hypervisor detected: Xen HVM Xen version 3.4. Xen Platform PCI: I/O protocol version 1 ... snip .. calling xenbus_init+0x0/0x27e @ 1 Reverting the commit or using the attached patch fixes the issue. This fix checks whether the hypervisor is older than 4.0 and if so does not try to perform the read. Fixes-Oracle-Bug: 14708233 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de> [v2: Added a comment in the source code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-10-10 17:23:36 +00:00
/*
* Certain older XenBus toolstack cannot handle reading values that are
* not populated. Some Xen 3.4 installation are incapable of doing this
* so if we are running on anything older than 4 do not attempt to read
* control/platform-feature-xs_reset_watches.
*/
static bool xen_strict_xenbus_quirk(void)
xen/pv-on-hvm kexec: add quirk for Xen 3.4 and shutdown watches. The commit 254d1a3f02ebc10ccc6e4903394d8d3f484f715e, titled "xen/pv-on-hvm kexec: shutdown watches from old kernel" assumes that the XenBus backend can deal with reading of values from: "control/platform-feature-xs_reset_watches": ... a patch for xenstored is required so that it accepts the XS_RESET_WATCHES request from a client (see changeset 23839:42a45baf037d in xen-unstable.hg). Without the patch for xenstored the registration of watches will fail and some features of a PVonHVM guest are not available. The guest is still able to boot, but repeated kexec boots will fail." Sadly this is not true when using a Xen 3.4 hypervisor and booting a PVHVM guest. We end up hanging at: err = xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, "control", "platform-feature-xs_reset_watches", "%d", &supported); This can easily be seen with guests hanging at xenbus_init: NX (Execute Disable) protection: active SMBIOS 2.4 present. DMI: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 3.4.0 05/13/2011 Hypervisor detected: Xen HVM Xen version 3.4. Xen Platform PCI: I/O protocol version 1 ... snip .. calling xenbus_init+0x0/0x27e @ 1 Reverting the commit or using the attached patch fixes the issue. This fix checks whether the hypervisor is older than 4.0 and if so does not try to perform the read. Fixes-Oracle-Bug: 14708233 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de> [v2: Added a comment in the source code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-10-10 17:23:36 +00:00
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
xen/pv-on-hvm kexec: add quirk for Xen 3.4 and shutdown watches. The commit 254d1a3f02ebc10ccc6e4903394d8d3f484f715e, titled "xen/pv-on-hvm kexec: shutdown watches from old kernel" assumes that the XenBus backend can deal with reading of values from: "control/platform-feature-xs_reset_watches": ... a patch for xenstored is required so that it accepts the XS_RESET_WATCHES request from a client (see changeset 23839:42a45baf037d in xen-unstable.hg). Without the patch for xenstored the registration of watches will fail and some features of a PVonHVM guest are not available. The guest is still able to boot, but repeated kexec boots will fail." Sadly this is not true when using a Xen 3.4 hypervisor and booting a PVHVM guest. We end up hanging at: err = xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, "control", "platform-feature-xs_reset_watches", "%d", &supported); This can easily be seen with guests hanging at xenbus_init: NX (Execute Disable) protection: active SMBIOS 2.4 present. DMI: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 3.4.0 05/13/2011 Hypervisor detected: Xen HVM Xen version 3.4. Xen Platform PCI: I/O protocol version 1 ... snip .. calling xenbus_init+0x0/0x27e @ 1 Reverting the commit or using the attached patch fixes the issue. This fix checks whether the hypervisor is older than 4.0 and if so does not try to perform the read. Fixes-Oracle-Bug: 14708233 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de> [v2: Added a comment in the source code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-10-10 17:23:36 +00:00
uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx, base;
base = xen_cpuid_base();
cpuid(base + 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
xen/pv-on-hvm kexec: add quirk for Xen 3.4 and shutdown watches. The commit 254d1a3f02ebc10ccc6e4903394d8d3f484f715e, titled "xen/pv-on-hvm kexec: shutdown watches from old kernel" assumes that the XenBus backend can deal with reading of values from: "control/platform-feature-xs_reset_watches": ... a patch for xenstored is required so that it accepts the XS_RESET_WATCHES request from a client (see changeset 23839:42a45baf037d in xen-unstable.hg). Without the patch for xenstored the registration of watches will fail and some features of a PVonHVM guest are not available. The guest is still able to boot, but repeated kexec boots will fail." Sadly this is not true when using a Xen 3.4 hypervisor and booting a PVHVM guest. We end up hanging at: err = xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, "control", "platform-feature-xs_reset_watches", "%d", &supported); This can easily be seen with guests hanging at xenbus_init: NX (Execute Disable) protection: active SMBIOS 2.4 present. DMI: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 3.4.0 05/13/2011 Hypervisor detected: Xen HVM Xen version 3.4. Xen Platform PCI: I/O protocol version 1 ... snip .. calling xenbus_init+0x0/0x27e @ 1 Reverting the commit or using the attached patch fixes the issue. This fix checks whether the hypervisor is older than 4.0 and if so does not try to perform the read. Fixes-Oracle-Bug: 14708233 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de> [v2: Added a comment in the source code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-10-10 17:23:36 +00:00
if ((eax >> 16) < 4)
return true;
#endif
xen/pv-on-hvm kexec: add quirk for Xen 3.4 and shutdown watches. The commit 254d1a3f02ebc10ccc6e4903394d8d3f484f715e, titled "xen/pv-on-hvm kexec: shutdown watches from old kernel" assumes that the XenBus backend can deal with reading of values from: "control/platform-feature-xs_reset_watches": ... a patch for xenstored is required so that it accepts the XS_RESET_WATCHES request from a client (see changeset 23839:42a45baf037d in xen-unstable.hg). Without the patch for xenstored the registration of watches will fail and some features of a PVonHVM guest are not available. The guest is still able to boot, but repeated kexec boots will fail." Sadly this is not true when using a Xen 3.4 hypervisor and booting a PVHVM guest. We end up hanging at: err = xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, "control", "platform-feature-xs_reset_watches", "%d", &supported); This can easily be seen with guests hanging at xenbus_init: NX (Execute Disable) protection: active SMBIOS 2.4 present. DMI: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 3.4.0 05/13/2011 Hypervisor detected: Xen HVM Xen version 3.4. Xen Platform PCI: I/O protocol version 1 ... snip .. calling xenbus_init+0x0/0x27e @ 1 Reverting the commit or using the attached patch fixes the issue. This fix checks whether the hypervisor is older than 4.0 and if so does not try to perform the read. Fixes-Oracle-Bug: 14708233 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de> [v2: Added a comment in the source code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-10-10 17:23:36 +00:00
return false;
}
static void xs_reset_watches(void)
{
int err, supported = 0;
if (!xen_hvm_domain() || xen_initial_domain())
return;
xen/pv-on-hvm kexec: add quirk for Xen 3.4 and shutdown watches. The commit 254d1a3f02ebc10ccc6e4903394d8d3f484f715e, titled "xen/pv-on-hvm kexec: shutdown watches from old kernel" assumes that the XenBus backend can deal with reading of values from: "control/platform-feature-xs_reset_watches": ... a patch for xenstored is required so that it accepts the XS_RESET_WATCHES request from a client (see changeset 23839:42a45baf037d in xen-unstable.hg). Without the patch for xenstored the registration of watches will fail and some features of a PVonHVM guest are not available. The guest is still able to boot, but repeated kexec boots will fail." Sadly this is not true when using a Xen 3.4 hypervisor and booting a PVHVM guest. We end up hanging at: err = xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, "control", "platform-feature-xs_reset_watches", "%d", &supported); This can easily be seen with guests hanging at xenbus_init: NX (Execute Disable) protection: active SMBIOS 2.4 present. DMI: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 3.4.0 05/13/2011 Hypervisor detected: Xen HVM Xen version 3.4. Xen Platform PCI: I/O protocol version 1 ... snip .. calling xenbus_init+0x0/0x27e @ 1 Reverting the commit or using the attached patch fixes the issue. This fix checks whether the hypervisor is older than 4.0 and if so does not try to perform the read. Fixes-Oracle-Bug: 14708233 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de> [v2: Added a comment in the source code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-10-10 17:23:36 +00:00
if (xen_strict_xenbus_quirk())
return;
err = xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, "control",
"platform-feature-xs_reset_watches", "%d", &supported);
if (err != 1 || !supported)
return;
err = xs_error(xs_single(XBT_NIL, XS_RESET_WATCHES, "", NULL));
if (err && err != -EEXIST)
pr_warn("xs_reset_watches failed: %d\n", err);
}
/* Register callback to watch this node. */
int register_xenbus_watch(struct xenbus_watch *watch)
{
/* Pointer in ascii is the token. */
char token[sizeof(watch) * 2 + 1];
int err;
sprintf(token, "%lX", (long)watch);
down_read(&xs_state.watch_mutex);
spin_lock(&watches_lock);
BUG_ON(find_watch(token));
list_add(&watch->list, &watches);
spin_unlock(&watches_lock);
err = xs_watch(watch->node, token);
if (err) {
spin_lock(&watches_lock);
list_del(&watch->list);
spin_unlock(&watches_lock);
}
up_read(&xs_state.watch_mutex);
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_xenbus_watch);
void unregister_xenbus_watch(struct xenbus_watch *watch)
{
struct xs_stored_msg *msg, *tmp;
char token[sizeof(watch) * 2 + 1];
int err;
sprintf(token, "%lX", (long)watch);
down_read(&xs_state.watch_mutex);
spin_lock(&watches_lock);
BUG_ON(!find_watch(token));
list_del(&watch->list);
spin_unlock(&watches_lock);
err = xs_unwatch(watch->node, token);
if (err)
pr_warn("Failed to release watch %s: %i\n", watch->node, err);
up_read(&xs_state.watch_mutex);
/* Make sure there are no callbacks running currently (unless
its us) */
if (current->pid != xenwatch_pid)
mutex_lock(&xenwatch_mutex);
/* Cancel pending watch events. */
spin_lock(&watch_events_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(msg, tmp, &watch_events, list) {
if (msg->u.watch.handle != watch)
continue;
list_del(&msg->list);
kfree(msg->u.watch.vec);
kfree(msg);
}
spin_unlock(&watch_events_lock);
if (current->pid != xenwatch_pid)
mutex_unlock(&xenwatch_mutex);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_xenbus_watch);
void xs_suspend(void)
{
transaction_suspend();
down_write(&xs_state.watch_mutex);
mutex_lock(&xs_state.request_mutex);
mutex_lock(&xs_state.response_mutex);
}
void xs_resume(void)
{
struct xenbus_watch *watch;
char token[sizeof(watch) * 2 + 1];
xb_init_comms();
mutex_unlock(&xs_state.response_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&xs_state.request_mutex);
transaction_resume();
/* No need for watches_lock: the watch_mutex is sufficient. */
list_for_each_entry(watch, &watches, list) {
sprintf(token, "%lX", (long)watch);
xs_watch(watch->node, token);
}
up_write(&xs_state.watch_mutex);
}
void xs_suspend_cancel(void)
{
mutex_unlock(&xs_state.response_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&xs_state.request_mutex);
up_write(&xs_state.watch_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&xs_state.transaction_mutex);
}
static int xenwatch_thread(void *unused)
{
struct list_head *ent;
struct xs_stored_msg *msg;
for (;;) {
wait_event_interruptible(watch_events_waitq,
!list_empty(&watch_events));
if (kthread_should_stop())
break;
mutex_lock(&xenwatch_mutex);
spin_lock(&watch_events_lock);
ent = watch_events.next;
if (ent != &watch_events)
list_del(ent);
spin_unlock(&watch_events_lock);
if (ent != &watch_events) {
msg = list_entry(ent, struct xs_stored_msg, list);
msg->u.watch.handle->callback(
msg->u.watch.handle,
(const char **)msg->u.watch.vec,
msg->u.watch.vec_size);
kfree(msg->u.watch.vec);
kfree(msg);
}
mutex_unlock(&xenwatch_mutex);
}
return 0;
}
static int process_msg(void)
{
struct xs_stored_msg *msg;
char *body;
int err;
/*
* We must disallow save/restore while reading a xenstore message.
* A partial read across s/r leaves us out of sync with xenstored.
*/
for (;;) {
err = xb_wait_for_data_to_read();
if (err)
return err;
mutex_lock(&xs_state.response_mutex);
if (xb_data_to_read())
break;
/* We raced with save/restore: pending data 'disappeared'. */
mutex_unlock(&xs_state.response_mutex);
}
msg = kmalloc(sizeof(*msg), GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH);
if (msg == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
err = xb_read(&msg->hdr, sizeof(msg->hdr));
if (err) {
kfree(msg);
goto out;
}
if (msg->hdr.len > XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX) {
kfree(msg);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
body = kmalloc(msg->hdr.len + 1, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH);
if (body == NULL) {
kfree(msg);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
err = xb_read(body, msg->hdr.len);
if (err) {
kfree(body);
kfree(msg);
goto out;
}
body[msg->hdr.len] = '\0';
if (msg->hdr.type == XS_WATCH_EVENT) {
msg->u.watch.vec = split(body, msg->hdr.len,
&msg->u.watch.vec_size);
if (IS_ERR(msg->u.watch.vec)) {
err = PTR_ERR(msg->u.watch.vec);
kfree(msg);
goto out;
}
spin_lock(&watches_lock);
msg->u.watch.handle = find_watch(
msg->u.watch.vec[XS_WATCH_TOKEN]);
if (msg->u.watch.handle != NULL) {
spin_lock(&watch_events_lock);
list_add_tail(&msg->list, &watch_events);
wake_up(&watch_events_waitq);
spin_unlock(&watch_events_lock);
} else {
kfree(msg->u.watch.vec);
kfree(msg);
}
spin_unlock(&watches_lock);
} else {
msg->u.reply.body = body;
spin_lock(&xs_state.reply_lock);
list_add_tail(&msg->list, &xs_state.reply_list);
spin_unlock(&xs_state.reply_lock);
wake_up(&xs_state.reply_waitq);
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&xs_state.response_mutex);
return err;
}
static int xenbus_thread(void *unused)
{
int err;
for (;;) {
err = process_msg();
if (err)
pr_warn("error %d while reading message\n", err);
if (kthread_should_stop())
break;
}
return 0;
}
int xs_init(void)
{
int err;
struct task_struct *task;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xs_state.reply_list);
spin_lock_init(&xs_state.reply_lock);
init_waitqueue_head(&xs_state.reply_waitq);
mutex_init(&xs_state.request_mutex);
mutex_init(&xs_state.response_mutex);
mutex_init(&xs_state.transaction_mutex);
init_rwsem(&xs_state.watch_mutex);
atomic_set(&xs_state.transaction_count, 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&xs_state.transaction_wq);
/* Initialize the shared memory rings to talk to xenstored */
err = xb_init_comms();
if (err)
return err;
task = kthread_run(xenwatch_thread, NULL, "xenwatch");
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
xenwatch_pid = task->pid;
task = kthread_run(xenbus_thread, NULL, "xenbus");
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
/* shutdown watches for kexec boot */
xs_reset_watches();
return 0;
}