linux-stable/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
compat: Move compat_timespec/ timeval to compat_time.h All the current architecture specific defines for these are the same. Refactor these common defines to a common header file. The new common linux/compat_time.h is also useful as it will eventually be used to hold all the defines that are needed for compat time types that support non y2038 safe types. New architectures need not have to define these new types as they will only use new y2038 safe syscalls. This file can be deleted after y2038 when we stop supporting non y2038 safe syscalls. The patch also requires an operation similar to: git grep "asm/compat\.h" | cut -d ":" -f 1 | xargs -n 1 sed -i -e "s%asm/compat.h%linux/compat.h%g" Cc: acme@kernel.org Cc: benh@kernel.crashing.org Cc: borntraeger@de.ibm.com Cc: catalin.marinas@arm.com Cc: cmetcalf@mellanox.com Cc: cohuck@redhat.com Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: deller@gmx.de Cc: devel@driverdev.osuosl.org Cc: gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Cc: hoeppner@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: jejb@parisc-linux.org Cc: jwi@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com Cc: mingo@redhat.com Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au Cc: oberpar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: oprofile-list@lists.sf.net Cc: paulus@samba.org Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: ralf@linux-mips.org Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: rric@kernel.org Cc: schwidefsky@de.ibm.com Cc: sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: sth@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: ubraun@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2018-03-14 04:03:25 +00:00
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
Remove fs.h from mm.h Remove fs.h from mm.h. For this, 1) Uninline vma_wants_writenotify(). It's pretty huge anyway. 2) Add back fs.h or less bloated headers (err.h) to files that need it. As result, on x86_64 allyesconfig, fs.h dependencies cut down from 3929 files rebuilt down to 3444 (-12.3%). Cross-compile tested without regressions on my two usual configs and (sigh): alpha arm-mx1ads mips-bigsur powerpc-ebony alpha-allnoconfig arm-neponset mips-capcella powerpc-g5 alpha-defconfig arm-netwinder mips-cobalt powerpc-holly alpha-up arm-netx mips-db1000 powerpc-iseries arm arm-ns9xxx mips-db1100 powerpc-linkstation arm-assabet arm-omap_h2_1610 mips-db1200 powerpc-lite5200 arm-at91rm9200dk arm-onearm mips-db1500 powerpc-maple arm-at91rm9200ek arm-picotux200 mips-db1550 powerpc-mpc7448_hpc2 arm-at91sam9260ek arm-pleb mips-ddb5477 powerpc-mpc8272_ads arm-at91sam9261ek arm-pnx4008 mips-decstation powerpc-mpc8313_rdb arm-at91sam9263ek arm-pxa255-idp mips-e55 powerpc-mpc832x_mds arm-at91sam9rlek arm-realview mips-emma2rh powerpc-mpc832x_rdb arm-ateb9200 arm-realview-smp mips-excite powerpc-mpc834x_itx arm-badge4 arm-rpc mips-fulong powerpc-mpc834x_itxgp arm-carmeva arm-s3c2410 mips-ip22 powerpc-mpc834x_mds arm-cerfcube arm-shannon mips-ip27 powerpc-mpc836x_mds arm-clps7500 arm-shark mips-ip32 powerpc-mpc8540_ads arm-collie arm-simpad mips-jazz powerpc-mpc8544_ds arm-corgi arm-spitz mips-jmr3927 powerpc-mpc8560_ads arm-csb337 arm-trizeps4 mips-malta powerpc-mpc8568mds arm-csb637 arm-versatile mips-mipssim powerpc-mpc85xx_cds arm-ebsa110 i386 mips-mpc30x powerpc-mpc8641_hpcn arm-edb7211 i386-allnoconfig mips-msp71xx powerpc-mpc866_ads arm-em_x270 i386-defconfig mips-ocelot powerpc-mpc885_ads arm-ep93xx i386-up mips-pb1100 powerpc-pasemi arm-footbridge ia64 mips-pb1500 powerpc-pmac32 arm-fortunet ia64-allnoconfig mips-pb1550 powerpc-ppc64 arm-h3600 ia64-bigsur mips-pnx8550-jbs powerpc-prpmc2800 arm-h7201 ia64-defconfig mips-pnx8550-stb810 powerpc-ps3 arm-h7202 ia64-gensparse mips-qemu powerpc-pseries arm-hackkit ia64-sim mips-rbhma4200 powerpc-up arm-integrator ia64-sn2 mips-rbhma4500 s390 arm-iop13xx ia64-tiger mips-rm200 s390-allnoconfig arm-iop32x ia64-up mips-sb1250-swarm s390-defconfig arm-iop33x ia64-zx1 mips-sead s390-up arm-ixp2000 m68k mips-tb0219 sparc arm-ixp23xx m68k-amiga mips-tb0226 sparc-allnoconfig arm-ixp4xx m68k-apollo mips-tb0287 sparc-defconfig arm-jornada720 m68k-atari mips-workpad sparc-up arm-kafa m68k-bvme6000 mips-wrppmc sparc64 arm-kb9202 m68k-hp300 mips-yosemite sparc64-allnoconfig arm-ks8695 m68k-mac parisc sparc64-defconfig arm-lart m68k-mvme147 parisc-allnoconfig sparc64-up arm-lpd270 m68k-mvme16x parisc-defconfig um-x86_64 arm-lpd7a400 m68k-q40 parisc-up x86_64 arm-lpd7a404 m68k-sun3 powerpc x86_64-allnoconfig arm-lubbock m68k-sun3x powerpc-cell x86_64-defconfig arm-lusl7200 mips powerpc-celleb x86_64-up arm-mainstone mips-atlas powerpc-chrp32 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-29 22:36:13 +00:00
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/sem.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <linux/shm.h>
#include <linux/stat.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
x86/mm: Introduce mmap_compat_base() for 32-bit mmap() mmap() uses a base address, from which it starts to look for a free space for allocation. The base address is stored in mm->mmap_base, which is calculated during exec(). The address depends on task's size, set rlimit for stack, ASLR randomization. The base depends on the task size and the number of random bits which are different for 64-bit and 32bit applications. Due to the fact, that the base address is fixed, its mmap() from a compat (32bit) syscall issued by a 64bit task will return a address which is based on the 64bit base address and does not fit into the 32bit address space (4GB). The returned pointer is truncated to 32bit, which results in an invalid address. To solve store a seperate compat address base plus a compat legacy address base in mm_struct. These bases are calculated at exec() time and can be used later to address the 32bit compat mmap() issued by 64 bit applications. As a consequence of this change 32-bit applications issuing a 64-bit syscall (after doing a long jump) will get a 64-bit mapping now. Before this change 32-bit applications always got a 32bit mapping. [ tglx: Massaged changelog and added a comment ] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: 0x7f454c46@gmail.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306141721.9188-4-dsafonov@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-06 14:17:19 +00:00
#include <asm/elf.h>
#include <asm/ia32.h>
/*
* Align a virtual address to avoid aliasing in the I$ on AMD F15h.
*/
static unsigned long get_align_mask(void)
{
/* handle 32- and 64-bit case with a single conditional */
if (va_align.flags < 0 || !(va_align.flags & (2 - mmap_is_ia32())))
return 0;
if (!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
return 0;
return va_align.mask;
}
x86/mm: Improve AMD Bulldozer ASLR workaround The ASLR implementation needs to special-case AMD F15h processors by clearing out bits [14:12] of the virtual address in order to avoid I$ cross invalidations and thus performance penalty for certain workloads. For details, see: dfb09f9b7ab0 ("x86, amd: Avoid cache aliasing penalties on AMD family 15h") This special case reduces the mmapped file's entropy by 3 bits. The following output is the run on an AMD Opteron 62xx class CPU processor under x86_64 Linux 4.0.0: $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep "r-xp.*libc" ; done b7588000-b7736000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b7570000-b771e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b75d0000-b777e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b75b0000-b775e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b7578000-b7726000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 ... Bits [12:14] are always 0, i.e. the address always ends in 0x8000 or 0x0000. 32-bit systems, as in the example above, are especially sensitive to this issue because 32-bit randomness for VA space is 8 bits (see mmap_rnd()). With the Bulldozer special case, this diminishes to only 32 different slots of mmap virtual addresses. This patch randomizes per boot the three affected bits rather than setting them to zero. Since all the shared pages have the same value at bits [12..14], there is no cache aliasing problems. This value gets generated during system boot and it is thus not known to a potential remote attacker. Therefore, the impact from the Bulldozer workaround gets diminished and ASLR randomness increased. More details at: http://hmarco.org/bugs/AMD-Bulldozer-linux-ASLR-weakness-reducing-mmaped-files-by-eight.html Original white paper by AMD dealing with the issue: http://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2012/10/SharedL1InstructionCacheonAMD15hCPU.pdf Mentored-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@disca.upv.es> Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan-Simon <dl9pf@gmx.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1427456301-3764-1-git-send-email-hecmargi@upv.es Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-03-27 11:38:21 +00:00
/*
* To avoid aliasing in the I$ on AMD F15h, the bits defined by the
* va_align.bits, [12:upper_bit), are set to a random value instead of
* zeroing them. This random value is computed once per boot. This form
* of ASLR is known as "per-boot ASLR".
*
* To achieve this, the random value is added to the info.align_offset
* value before calling vm_unmapped_area() or ORed directly to the
* address.
*/
static unsigned long get_align_bits(void)
{
return va_align.bits & get_align_mask();
}
unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
unsigned long align_mask = get_align_mask();
x86/mm: Improve AMD Bulldozer ASLR workaround The ASLR implementation needs to special-case AMD F15h processors by clearing out bits [14:12] of the virtual address in order to avoid I$ cross invalidations and thus performance penalty for certain workloads. For details, see: dfb09f9b7ab0 ("x86, amd: Avoid cache aliasing penalties on AMD family 15h") This special case reduces the mmapped file's entropy by 3 bits. The following output is the run on an AMD Opteron 62xx class CPU processor under x86_64 Linux 4.0.0: $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep "r-xp.*libc" ; done b7588000-b7736000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b7570000-b771e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b75d0000-b777e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b75b0000-b775e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b7578000-b7726000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 ... Bits [12:14] are always 0, i.e. the address always ends in 0x8000 or 0x0000. 32-bit systems, as in the example above, are especially sensitive to this issue because 32-bit randomness for VA space is 8 bits (see mmap_rnd()). With the Bulldozer special case, this diminishes to only 32 different slots of mmap virtual addresses. This patch randomizes per boot the three affected bits rather than setting them to zero. Since all the shared pages have the same value at bits [12..14], there is no cache aliasing problems. This value gets generated during system boot and it is thus not known to a potential remote attacker. Therefore, the impact from the Bulldozer workaround gets diminished and ASLR randomness increased. More details at: http://hmarco.org/bugs/AMD-Bulldozer-linux-ASLR-weakness-reducing-mmaped-files-by-eight.html Original white paper by AMD dealing with the issue: http://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2012/10/SharedL1InstructionCacheonAMD15hCPU.pdf Mentored-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@disca.upv.es> Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan-Simon <dl9pf@gmx.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1427456301-3764-1-git-send-email-hecmargi@upv.es Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-03-27 11:38:21 +00:00
addr = (addr + align_mask) & ~align_mask;
return addr | get_align_bits();
}
static int __init control_va_addr_alignment(char *str)
{
/* guard against enabling this on other CPU families */
if (va_align.flags < 0)
return 1;
if (*str == 0)
return 1;
if (*str == '=')
str++;
if (!strcmp(str, "32"))
va_align.flags = ALIGN_VA_32;
else if (!strcmp(str, "64"))
va_align.flags = ALIGN_VA_64;
else if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
va_align.flags = 0;
else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
va_align.flags = ALIGN_VA_32 | ALIGN_VA_64;
else
return 0;
return 1;
}
__setup("align_va_addr", control_va_addr_alignment);
SYSCALL_DEFINE6(mmap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, len,
unsigned long, prot, unsigned long, flags,
unsigned long, fd, unsigned long, off)
{
if (off & ~PAGE_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
return ksys_mmap_pgoff(addr, len, prot, flags, fd, off >> PAGE_SHIFT);
}
x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace On x86, 5-level paging enables 56-bit userspace virtual address space. Not all user space is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their information. It collides with valid pointers with 5-level paging and leads to crashes. To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space above 47-bit by default. But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 47-bits. If hint address set above 47-bit, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than from 47-bit window. A high hint address would only affect the allocation in question, but not any future mmap()s. Specifying high hint address on older kernel or on machine without 5-level paging support is safe. The hint will be ignored and kernel will fall back to allocation from 47-bit address space. This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual address space. The patch puts all machinery in place, but not yet allows userspace to have mappings above 47-bit -- TASK_SIZE_MAX has to be raised to get the effect. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170716225954.74185-7-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-16 22:59:52 +00:00
static void find_start_end(unsigned long addr, unsigned long flags,
unsigned long *begin, unsigned long *end)
{
x86/compat: Adjust in_compat_syscall() to generic code under !COMPAT The result of in_compat_syscall() can be pictured as: x86 platform: --------------------------------------------------- | Arch\syscall | 64-bit | ia32 | x32 | |-------------------------------------------------| | x86_64 | false | true | true | |-------------------------------------------------| | i686 | | <true> | | --------------------------------------------------- Other platforms: ------------------------------------------- | Arch\syscall | 64-bit | compat | |-----------------------------------------| | 64-bit | false | true | |-----------------------------------------| | 32-bit(?) | | <false> | ------------------------------------------- As seen, the result of in_compat_syscall() on generic 32-bit platform differs from i686. There is no reason for in_compat_syscall() == true on native i686. It also easy to misread code if the result on native 32-bit platform differs between arches. Because of that non arch-specific code has many places with: if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT) && in_compat_syscall()) in different variations. It looks-like the only non-x86 code which uses in_compat_syscall() not under CONFIG_COMPAT guard is in amd/amdkfd. But according to the commit a18069c132cb ("amdkfd: Disable support for 32-bit user processes"), it actually should be disabled on native i686. Rename in_compat_syscall() to in_32bit_syscall() for x86-specific code and make in_compat_syscall() false under !CONFIG_COMPAT. A follow on patch will clean up generic users which were forced to check IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT) with in_compat_syscall(). Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181012134253.23266-2-dima@arista.com
2018-10-12 13:42:52 +00:00
if (!in_32bit_syscall() && (flags & MAP_32BIT)) {
/* This is usually used needed to map code in small
model, so it needs to be in the first 31bit. Limit
it to that. This means we need to move the
unmapped base down for this case. This can give
conflicts with the heap, but we assume that glibc
malloc knows how to fall back to mmap. Give it 1GB
of playground for now. -AK */
*begin = 0x40000000;
*end = 0x80000000;
if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) {
*begin = randomize_page(*begin, 0x02000000);
}
x86/mm: Introduce mmap_compat_base() for 32-bit mmap() mmap() uses a base address, from which it starts to look for a free space for allocation. The base address is stored in mm->mmap_base, which is calculated during exec(). The address depends on task's size, set rlimit for stack, ASLR randomization. The base depends on the task size and the number of random bits which are different for 64-bit and 32bit applications. Due to the fact, that the base address is fixed, its mmap() from a compat (32bit) syscall issued by a 64bit task will return a address which is based on the 64bit base address and does not fit into the 32bit address space (4GB). The returned pointer is truncated to 32bit, which results in an invalid address. To solve store a seperate compat address base plus a compat legacy address base in mm_struct. These bases are calculated at exec() time and can be used later to address the 32bit compat mmap() issued by 64 bit applications. As a consequence of this change 32-bit applications issuing a 64-bit syscall (after doing a long jump) will get a 64-bit mapping now. Before this change 32-bit applications always got a 32bit mapping. [ tglx: Massaged changelog and added a comment ] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: 0x7f454c46@gmail.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306141721.9188-4-dsafonov@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-06 14:17:19 +00:00
return;
}
x86/mm: Introduce mmap_compat_base() for 32-bit mmap() mmap() uses a base address, from which it starts to look for a free space for allocation. The base address is stored in mm->mmap_base, which is calculated during exec(). The address depends on task's size, set rlimit for stack, ASLR randomization. The base depends on the task size and the number of random bits which are different for 64-bit and 32bit applications. Due to the fact, that the base address is fixed, its mmap() from a compat (32bit) syscall issued by a 64bit task will return a address which is based on the 64bit base address and does not fit into the 32bit address space (4GB). The returned pointer is truncated to 32bit, which results in an invalid address. To solve store a seperate compat address base plus a compat legacy address base in mm_struct. These bases are calculated at exec() time and can be used later to address the 32bit compat mmap() issued by 64 bit applications. As a consequence of this change 32-bit applications issuing a 64-bit syscall (after doing a long jump) will get a 64-bit mapping now. Before this change 32-bit applications always got a 32bit mapping. [ tglx: Massaged changelog and added a comment ] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: 0x7f454c46@gmail.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306141721.9188-4-dsafonov@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-06 14:17:19 +00:00
*begin = get_mmap_base(1);
x86/compat: Adjust in_compat_syscall() to generic code under !COMPAT The result of in_compat_syscall() can be pictured as: x86 platform: --------------------------------------------------- | Arch\syscall | 64-bit | ia32 | x32 | |-------------------------------------------------| | x86_64 | false | true | true | |-------------------------------------------------| | i686 | | <true> | | --------------------------------------------------- Other platforms: ------------------------------------------- | Arch\syscall | 64-bit | compat | |-----------------------------------------| | 64-bit | false | true | |-----------------------------------------| | 32-bit(?) | | <false> | ------------------------------------------- As seen, the result of in_compat_syscall() on generic 32-bit platform differs from i686. There is no reason for in_compat_syscall() == true on native i686. It also easy to misread code if the result on native 32-bit platform differs between arches. Because of that non arch-specific code has many places with: if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT) && in_compat_syscall()) in different variations. It looks-like the only non-x86 code which uses in_compat_syscall() not under CONFIG_COMPAT guard is in amd/amdkfd. But according to the commit a18069c132cb ("amdkfd: Disable support for 32-bit user processes"), it actually should be disabled on native i686. Rename in_compat_syscall() to in_32bit_syscall() for x86-specific code and make in_compat_syscall() false under !CONFIG_COMPAT. A follow on patch will clean up generic users which were forced to check IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT) with in_compat_syscall(). Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181012134253.23266-2-dima@arista.com
2018-10-12 13:42:52 +00:00
if (in_32bit_syscall())
x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace On x86, 5-level paging enables 56-bit userspace virtual address space. Not all user space is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their information. It collides with valid pointers with 5-level paging and leads to crashes. To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space above 47-bit by default. But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 47-bits. If hint address set above 47-bit, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than from 47-bit window. A high hint address would only affect the allocation in question, but not any future mmap()s. Specifying high hint address on older kernel or on machine without 5-level paging support is safe. The hint will be ignored and kernel will fall back to allocation from 47-bit address space. This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual address space. The patch puts all machinery in place, but not yet allows userspace to have mappings above 47-bit -- TASK_SIZE_MAX has to be raised to get the effect. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170716225954.74185-7-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-16 22:59:52 +00:00
*end = task_size_32bit();
else
*end = task_size_64bit(addr > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW);
}
unsigned long
arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
unsigned long begin, end;
if (flags & MAP_FIXED)
return addr;
x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace On x86, 5-level paging enables 56-bit userspace virtual address space. Not all user space is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their information. It collides with valid pointers with 5-level paging and leads to crashes. To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space above 47-bit by default. But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 47-bits. If hint address set above 47-bit, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than from 47-bit window. A high hint address would only affect the allocation in question, but not any future mmap()s. Specifying high hint address on older kernel or on machine without 5-level paging support is safe. The hint will be ignored and kernel will fall back to allocation from 47-bit address space. This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual address space. The patch puts all machinery in place, but not yet allows userspace to have mappings above 47-bit -- TASK_SIZE_MAX has to be raised to get the effect. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170716225954.74185-7-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-16 22:59:52 +00:00
find_start_end(addr, flags, &begin, &end);
if (len > end)
return -ENOMEM;
if (addr) {
addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
if (end - len >= addr &&
mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping. But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX] which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN. This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical, unfortunatelly. Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot. One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace, but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units). Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page: because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point, a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK and strict non-overcommit mode. Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start (or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(), and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that. Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-06-19 11:03:24 +00:00
(!vma || addr + len <= vm_start_gap(vma)))
return addr;
}
[PATCH] Avoiding mmap fragmentation Ingo recently introduced a great speedup for allocating new mmaps using the free_area_cache pointer which boosts the specweb SSL benchmark by 4-5% and causes huge performance increases in thread creation. The downside of this patch is that it does lead to fragmentation in the mmap-ed areas (visible via /proc/self/maps), such that some applications that work fine under 2.4 kernels quickly run out of memory on any 2.6 kernel. The problem is twofold: 1) the free_area_cache is used to continue a search for memory where the last search ended. Before the change new areas were always searched from the base address on. So now new small areas are cluttering holes of all sizes throughout the whole mmap-able region whereas before small holes tended to close holes near the base leaving holes far from the base large and available for larger requests. 2) the free_area_cache also is set to the location of the last munmap-ed area so in scenarios where we allocate e.g. five regions of 1K each, then free regions 4 2 3 in this order the next request for 1K will be placed in the position of the old region 3, whereas before we appended it to the still active region 1, placing it at the location of the old region 2. Before we had 1 free region of 2K, now we only get two free regions of 1K -> fragmentation. The patch addresses thes issues by introducing yet another cache descriptor cached_hole_size that contains the largest known hole size below the current free_area_cache. If a new request comes in the size is compared against the cached_hole_size and if the request can be filled with a hole below free_area_cache the search is started from the base instead. The results look promising: Whereas 2.6.12-rc4 fragments quickly and my (earlier posted) leakme.c test program terminates after 50000+ iterations with 96 distinct and fragmented maps in /proc/self/maps it performs nicely (as expected) with thread creation, Ingo's test_str02 with 20000 threads requires 0.7s system time. Taking out Ingo's patch (un-patch available per request) by basically deleting all mentions of free_area_cache from the kernel and starting the search for new memory always at the respective bases we observe: leakme terminates successfully with 11 distinctive hardly fragmented areas in /proc/self/maps but thread creating is gringdingly slow: 30+s(!) system time for Ingo's test_str02 with 20000 threads. Now - drumroll ;-) the appended patch works fine with leakme: it ends with only 7 distinct areas in /proc/self/maps and also thread creation seems sufficiently fast with 0.71s for 20000 threads. Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Wander <wwc@rentec.com> Credit-to: "Richard Purdie" <rpurdie@rpsys.net> Signed-off-by: Ken Chen <kenneth.w.chen@intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> (partly) Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-22 00:14:49 +00:00
info.flags = 0;
info.length = len;
info.low_limit = begin;
info.high_limit = end;
x86/mm: Improve AMD Bulldozer ASLR workaround The ASLR implementation needs to special-case AMD F15h processors by clearing out bits [14:12] of the virtual address in order to avoid I$ cross invalidations and thus performance penalty for certain workloads. For details, see: dfb09f9b7ab0 ("x86, amd: Avoid cache aliasing penalties on AMD family 15h") This special case reduces the mmapped file's entropy by 3 bits. The following output is the run on an AMD Opteron 62xx class CPU processor under x86_64 Linux 4.0.0: $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep "r-xp.*libc" ; done b7588000-b7736000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b7570000-b771e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b75d0000-b777e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b75b0000-b775e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b7578000-b7726000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 ... Bits [12:14] are always 0, i.e. the address always ends in 0x8000 or 0x0000. 32-bit systems, as in the example above, are especially sensitive to this issue because 32-bit randomness for VA space is 8 bits (see mmap_rnd()). With the Bulldozer special case, this diminishes to only 32 different slots of mmap virtual addresses. This patch randomizes per boot the three affected bits rather than setting them to zero. Since all the shared pages have the same value at bits [12..14], there is no cache aliasing problems. This value gets generated during system boot and it is thus not known to a potential remote attacker. Therefore, the impact from the Bulldozer workaround gets diminished and ASLR randomness increased. More details at: http://hmarco.org/bugs/AMD-Bulldozer-linux-ASLR-weakness-reducing-mmaped-files-by-eight.html Original white paper by AMD dealing with the issue: http://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2012/10/SharedL1InstructionCacheonAMD15hCPU.pdf Mentored-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@disca.upv.es> Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan-Simon <dl9pf@gmx.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1427456301-3764-1-git-send-email-hecmargi@upv.es Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-03-27 11:38:21 +00:00
info.align_mask = 0;
info.align_offset = pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
x86/mm: Improve AMD Bulldozer ASLR workaround The ASLR implementation needs to special-case AMD F15h processors by clearing out bits [14:12] of the virtual address in order to avoid I$ cross invalidations and thus performance penalty for certain workloads. For details, see: dfb09f9b7ab0 ("x86, amd: Avoid cache aliasing penalties on AMD family 15h") This special case reduces the mmapped file's entropy by 3 bits. The following output is the run on an AMD Opteron 62xx class CPU processor under x86_64 Linux 4.0.0: $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep "r-xp.*libc" ; done b7588000-b7736000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b7570000-b771e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b75d0000-b777e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b75b0000-b775e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b7578000-b7726000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 ... Bits [12:14] are always 0, i.e. the address always ends in 0x8000 or 0x0000. 32-bit systems, as in the example above, are especially sensitive to this issue because 32-bit randomness for VA space is 8 bits (see mmap_rnd()). With the Bulldozer special case, this diminishes to only 32 different slots of mmap virtual addresses. This patch randomizes per boot the three affected bits rather than setting them to zero. Since all the shared pages have the same value at bits [12..14], there is no cache aliasing problems. This value gets generated during system boot and it is thus not known to a potential remote attacker. Therefore, the impact from the Bulldozer workaround gets diminished and ASLR randomness increased. More details at: http://hmarco.org/bugs/AMD-Bulldozer-linux-ASLR-weakness-reducing-mmaped-files-by-eight.html Original white paper by AMD dealing with the issue: http://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2012/10/SharedL1InstructionCacheonAMD15hCPU.pdf Mentored-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@disca.upv.es> Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan-Simon <dl9pf@gmx.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1427456301-3764-1-git-send-email-hecmargi@upv.es Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-03-27 11:38:21 +00:00
if (filp) {
info.align_mask = get_align_mask();
info.align_offset += get_align_bits();
}
return vm_unmapped_area(&info);
}
unsigned long
arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0,
const unsigned long len, const unsigned long pgoff,
const unsigned long flags)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
unsigned long addr = addr0;
struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
/* requested length too big for entire address space */
if (len > TASK_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
2017-11-15 14:36:06 +00:00
/* No address checking. See comment at mmap_address_hint_valid() */
if (flags & MAP_FIXED)
return addr;
/* for MAP_32BIT mappings we force the legacy mmap base */
x86/compat: Adjust in_compat_syscall() to generic code under !COMPAT The result of in_compat_syscall() can be pictured as: x86 platform: --------------------------------------------------- | Arch\syscall | 64-bit | ia32 | x32 | |-------------------------------------------------| | x86_64 | false | true | true | |-------------------------------------------------| | i686 | | <true> | | --------------------------------------------------- Other platforms: ------------------------------------------- | Arch\syscall | 64-bit | compat | |-----------------------------------------| | 64-bit | false | true | |-----------------------------------------| | 32-bit(?) | | <false> | ------------------------------------------- As seen, the result of in_compat_syscall() on generic 32-bit platform differs from i686. There is no reason for in_compat_syscall() == true on native i686. It also easy to misread code if the result on native 32-bit platform differs between arches. Because of that non arch-specific code has many places with: if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT) && in_compat_syscall()) in different variations. It looks-like the only non-x86 code which uses in_compat_syscall() not under CONFIG_COMPAT guard is in amd/amdkfd. But according to the commit a18069c132cb ("amdkfd: Disable support for 32-bit user processes"), it actually should be disabled on native i686. Rename in_compat_syscall() to in_32bit_syscall() for x86-specific code and make in_compat_syscall() false under !CONFIG_COMPAT. A follow on patch will clean up generic users which were forced to check IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT) with in_compat_syscall(). Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181012134253.23266-2-dima@arista.com
2018-10-12 13:42:52 +00:00
if (!in_32bit_syscall() && (flags & MAP_32BIT))
goto bottomup;
/* requesting a specific address */
if (addr) {
2017-11-15 14:36:06 +00:00
addr &= PAGE_MASK;
if (!mmap_address_hint_valid(addr, len))
goto get_unmapped_area;
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
2017-11-15 14:36:06 +00:00
if (!vma || addr + len <= vm_start_gap(vma))
return addr;
}
2017-11-15 14:36:06 +00:00
get_unmapped_area:
info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN;
info.length = len;
info.low_limit = PAGE_SIZE;
x86/mm: Introduce mmap_compat_base() for 32-bit mmap() mmap() uses a base address, from which it starts to look for a free space for allocation. The base address is stored in mm->mmap_base, which is calculated during exec(). The address depends on task's size, set rlimit for stack, ASLR randomization. The base depends on the task size and the number of random bits which are different for 64-bit and 32bit applications. Due to the fact, that the base address is fixed, its mmap() from a compat (32bit) syscall issued by a 64bit task will return a address which is based on the 64bit base address and does not fit into the 32bit address space (4GB). The returned pointer is truncated to 32bit, which results in an invalid address. To solve store a seperate compat address base plus a compat legacy address base in mm_struct. These bases are calculated at exec() time and can be used later to address the 32bit compat mmap() issued by 64 bit applications. As a consequence of this change 32-bit applications issuing a 64-bit syscall (after doing a long jump) will get a 64-bit mapping now. Before this change 32-bit applications always got a 32bit mapping. [ tglx: Massaged changelog and added a comment ] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: 0x7f454c46@gmail.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306141721.9188-4-dsafonov@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-06 14:17:19 +00:00
info.high_limit = get_mmap_base(0);
x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace On x86, 5-level paging enables 56-bit userspace virtual address space. Not all user space is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their information. It collides with valid pointers with 5-level paging and leads to crashes. To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space above 47-bit by default. But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 47-bits. If hint address set above 47-bit, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than from 47-bit window. A high hint address would only affect the allocation in question, but not any future mmap()s. Specifying high hint address on older kernel or on machine without 5-level paging support is safe. The hint will be ignored and kernel will fall back to allocation from 47-bit address space. This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual address space. The patch puts all machinery in place, but not yet allows userspace to have mappings above 47-bit -- TASK_SIZE_MAX has to be raised to get the effect. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170716225954.74185-7-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-16 22:59:52 +00:00
/*
* If hint address is above DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW, look for unmapped area
* in the full address space.
*
x86/compat: Adjust in_compat_syscall() to generic code under !COMPAT The result of in_compat_syscall() can be pictured as: x86 platform: --------------------------------------------------- | Arch\syscall | 64-bit | ia32 | x32 | |-------------------------------------------------| | x86_64 | false | true | true | |-------------------------------------------------| | i686 | | <true> | | --------------------------------------------------- Other platforms: ------------------------------------------- | Arch\syscall | 64-bit | compat | |-----------------------------------------| | 64-bit | false | true | |-----------------------------------------| | 32-bit(?) | | <false> | ------------------------------------------- As seen, the result of in_compat_syscall() on generic 32-bit platform differs from i686. There is no reason for in_compat_syscall() == true on native i686. It also easy to misread code if the result on native 32-bit platform differs between arches. Because of that non arch-specific code has many places with: if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT) && in_compat_syscall()) in different variations. It looks-like the only non-x86 code which uses in_compat_syscall() not under CONFIG_COMPAT guard is in amd/amdkfd. But according to the commit a18069c132cb ("amdkfd: Disable support for 32-bit user processes"), it actually should be disabled on native i686. Rename in_compat_syscall() to in_32bit_syscall() for x86-specific code and make in_compat_syscall() false under !CONFIG_COMPAT. A follow on patch will clean up generic users which were forced to check IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT) with in_compat_syscall(). Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181012134253.23266-2-dima@arista.com
2018-10-12 13:42:52 +00:00
* !in_32bit_syscall() check to avoid high addresses for x32
* (and make it no op on native i386).
x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace On x86, 5-level paging enables 56-bit userspace virtual address space. Not all user space is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their information. It collides with valid pointers with 5-level paging and leads to crashes. To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space above 47-bit by default. But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 47-bits. If hint address set above 47-bit, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than from 47-bit window. A high hint address would only affect the allocation in question, but not any future mmap()s. Specifying high hint address on older kernel or on machine without 5-level paging support is safe. The hint will be ignored and kernel will fall back to allocation from 47-bit address space. This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual address space. The patch puts all machinery in place, but not yet allows userspace to have mappings above 47-bit -- TASK_SIZE_MAX has to be raised to get the effect. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170716225954.74185-7-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-16 22:59:52 +00:00
*/
x86/compat: Adjust in_compat_syscall() to generic code under !COMPAT The result of in_compat_syscall() can be pictured as: x86 platform: --------------------------------------------------- | Arch\syscall | 64-bit | ia32 | x32 | |-------------------------------------------------| | x86_64 | false | true | true | |-------------------------------------------------| | i686 | | <true> | | --------------------------------------------------- Other platforms: ------------------------------------------- | Arch\syscall | 64-bit | compat | |-----------------------------------------| | 64-bit | false | true | |-----------------------------------------| | 32-bit(?) | | <false> | ------------------------------------------- As seen, the result of in_compat_syscall() on generic 32-bit platform differs from i686. There is no reason for in_compat_syscall() == true on native i686. It also easy to misread code if the result on native 32-bit platform differs between arches. Because of that non arch-specific code has many places with: if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT) && in_compat_syscall()) in different variations. It looks-like the only non-x86 code which uses in_compat_syscall() not under CONFIG_COMPAT guard is in amd/amdkfd. But according to the commit a18069c132cb ("amdkfd: Disable support for 32-bit user processes"), it actually should be disabled on native i686. Rename in_compat_syscall() to in_32bit_syscall() for x86-specific code and make in_compat_syscall() false under !CONFIG_COMPAT. A follow on patch will clean up generic users which were forced to check IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT) with in_compat_syscall(). Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181012134253.23266-2-dima@arista.com
2018-10-12 13:42:52 +00:00
if (addr > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW && !in_32bit_syscall())
x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace On x86, 5-level paging enables 56-bit userspace virtual address space. Not all user space is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their information. It collides with valid pointers with 5-level paging and leads to crashes. To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space above 47-bit by default. But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 47-bits. If hint address set above 47-bit, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than from 47-bit window. A high hint address would only affect the allocation in question, but not any future mmap()s. Specifying high hint address on older kernel or on machine without 5-level paging support is safe. The hint will be ignored and kernel will fall back to allocation from 47-bit address space. This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual address space. The patch puts all machinery in place, but not yet allows userspace to have mappings above 47-bit -- TASK_SIZE_MAX has to be raised to get the effect. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170716225954.74185-7-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-16 22:59:52 +00:00
info.high_limit += TASK_SIZE_MAX - DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW;
x86/mm: Improve AMD Bulldozer ASLR workaround The ASLR implementation needs to special-case AMD F15h processors by clearing out bits [14:12] of the virtual address in order to avoid I$ cross invalidations and thus performance penalty for certain workloads. For details, see: dfb09f9b7ab0 ("x86, amd: Avoid cache aliasing penalties on AMD family 15h") This special case reduces the mmapped file's entropy by 3 bits. The following output is the run on an AMD Opteron 62xx class CPU processor under x86_64 Linux 4.0.0: $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep "r-xp.*libc" ; done b7588000-b7736000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b7570000-b771e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b75d0000-b777e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b75b0000-b775e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b7578000-b7726000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 ... Bits [12:14] are always 0, i.e. the address always ends in 0x8000 or 0x0000. 32-bit systems, as in the example above, are especially sensitive to this issue because 32-bit randomness for VA space is 8 bits (see mmap_rnd()). With the Bulldozer special case, this diminishes to only 32 different slots of mmap virtual addresses. This patch randomizes per boot the three affected bits rather than setting them to zero. Since all the shared pages have the same value at bits [12..14], there is no cache aliasing problems. This value gets generated during system boot and it is thus not known to a potential remote attacker. Therefore, the impact from the Bulldozer workaround gets diminished and ASLR randomness increased. More details at: http://hmarco.org/bugs/AMD-Bulldozer-linux-ASLR-weakness-reducing-mmaped-files-by-eight.html Original white paper by AMD dealing with the issue: http://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2012/10/SharedL1InstructionCacheonAMD15hCPU.pdf Mentored-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@disca.upv.es> Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan-Simon <dl9pf@gmx.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1427456301-3764-1-git-send-email-hecmargi@upv.es Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-03-27 11:38:21 +00:00
info.align_mask = 0;
info.align_offset = pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
x86/mm: Improve AMD Bulldozer ASLR workaround The ASLR implementation needs to special-case AMD F15h processors by clearing out bits [14:12] of the virtual address in order to avoid I$ cross invalidations and thus performance penalty for certain workloads. For details, see: dfb09f9b7ab0 ("x86, amd: Avoid cache aliasing penalties on AMD family 15h") This special case reduces the mmapped file's entropy by 3 bits. The following output is the run on an AMD Opteron 62xx class CPU processor under x86_64 Linux 4.0.0: $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep "r-xp.*libc" ; done b7588000-b7736000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b7570000-b771e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b75d0000-b777e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b75b0000-b775e000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 b7578000-b7726000 r-xp 00000000 00:01 4924 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 ... Bits [12:14] are always 0, i.e. the address always ends in 0x8000 or 0x0000. 32-bit systems, as in the example above, are especially sensitive to this issue because 32-bit randomness for VA space is 8 bits (see mmap_rnd()). With the Bulldozer special case, this diminishes to only 32 different slots of mmap virtual addresses. This patch randomizes per boot the three affected bits rather than setting them to zero. Since all the shared pages have the same value at bits [12..14], there is no cache aliasing problems. This value gets generated during system boot and it is thus not known to a potential remote attacker. Therefore, the impact from the Bulldozer workaround gets diminished and ASLR randomness increased. More details at: http://hmarco.org/bugs/AMD-Bulldozer-linux-ASLR-weakness-reducing-mmaped-files-by-eight.html Original white paper by AMD dealing with the issue: http://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2012/10/SharedL1InstructionCacheonAMD15hCPU.pdf Mentored-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@disca.upv.es> Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan-Simon <dl9pf@gmx.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1427456301-3764-1-git-send-email-hecmargi@upv.es Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-03-27 11:38:21 +00:00
if (filp) {
info.align_mask = get_align_mask();
info.align_offset += get_align_bits();
}
addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
if (!(addr & ~PAGE_MASK))
return addr;
VM_BUG_ON(addr != -ENOMEM);
bottomup:
/*
* A failed mmap() very likely causes application failure,
* so fall back to the bottom-up function here. This scenario
* can happen with large stack limits and large mmap()
* allocations.
*/
return arch_get_unmapped_area(filp, addr0, len, pgoff, flags);
}