linux-stable/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/kernel.h>
mm: reorder includes after introduction of linux/pgtable.h The replacement of <asm/pgrable.h> with <linux/pgtable.h> made the include of the latter in the middle of asm includes. Fix this up with the aid of the below script and manual adjustments here and there. import sys import re if len(sys.argv) is not 3: print "USAGE: %s <file> <header>" % (sys.argv[0]) sys.exit(1) hdr_to_move="#include <linux/%s>" % sys.argv[2] moved = False in_hdrs = False with open(sys.argv[1], "r") as f: lines = f.readlines() for _line in lines: line = _line.rstrip(' ') if line == hdr_to_move: continue if line.startswith("#include <linux/"): in_hdrs = True elif not moved and in_hdrs: moved = True print hdr_to_move print line Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <ley.foon.tan@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vincent Chen <deanbo422@gmail.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200514170327.31389-4-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-09 04:32:42 +00:00
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/clock.h>
#include <linux/thread_info.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/microcode_intel.h>
#include <asm/hwcap2.h>
#include <asm/elf.h>
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/resctrl.h>
2020-08-06 12:35:11 +00:00
#include <asm/numa.h>
#include <asm/thermal.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
#include <linux/topology.h>
#endif
#include "cpu.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
#include <asm/mpspec.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#endif
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
enum split_lock_detect_state {
sld_off = 0,
sld_warn,
sld_fatal,
};
/*
* Default to sld_off because most systems do not support split lock detection
* split_lock_setup() will switch this to sld_warn on systems that support
* split lock detect, unless there is a command line override.
*/
static enum split_lock_detect_state sld_state __ro_after_init = sld_off;
static u64 msr_test_ctrl_cache __ro_after_init;
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
x86/split_lock: Don't write MSR_TEST_CTRL on CPUs that aren't whitelisted Choo! Choo! All aboard the Split Lock Express, with direct service to Wreckage! Skip split_lock_verify_msr() if the CPU isn't whitelisted as a possible SLD-enabled CPU model to avoid writing MSR_TEST_CTRL. MSR_TEST_CTRL exists, and is writable, on many generations of CPUs. Writing the MSR, even with '0', can result in bizarre, undocumented behavior. This fixes a crash on Haswell when resuming from suspend with a live KVM guest. Because APs use the standard SMP boot flow for resume, they will go through split_lock_init() and the subsequent RDMSR/WRMSR sequence, which runs even when sld_state==sld_off to ensure SLD is disabled. On Haswell (at least, my Haswell), writing MSR_TEST_CTRL with '0' will succeed and _may_ take the SMT _sibling_ out of VMX root mode. When KVM has an active guest, KVM performs VMXON as part of CPU onlining (see kvm_starting_cpu()). Because SMP boot is serialized, the resulting flow is effectively: on_each_ap_cpu() { WRMSR(MSR_TEST_CTRL, 0) VMXON } As a result, the WRMSR can disable VMX on a different CPU that has already done VMXON. This ultimately results in a #UD on VMPTRLD when KVM regains control and attempt run its vCPUs. The above voodoo was confirmed by reworking KVM's VMXON flow to write MSR_TEST_CTRL prior to VMXON, and to serialize the sequence as above. Further verification of the insanity was done by redoing VMXON on all APs after the initial WRMSR->VMXON sequence. The additional VMXON, which should VM-Fail, occasionally succeeded, and also eliminated the unexpected #UD on VMPTRLD. The damage done by writing MSR_TEST_CTRL doesn't appear to be limited to VMX, e.g. after suspend with an active KVM guest, subsequent reboots almost always hang (even when fudging VMXON), a #UD on a random Jcc was observed, suspend/resume stability is qualitatively poor, and so on and so forth. kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:386! CPU: 1 PID: 2592 Comm: CPU 6/KVM Tainted: G D Hardware name: ASUS Q87M-E/Q87M-E, BIOS 1102 03/03/2014 RIP: 0010:kvm_spurious_fault+0xf/0x20 Call Trace: vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs+0x1fb/0x2b0 vmx_vcpu_load+0x3e/0x160 kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x48/0x260 finish_task_switch+0x140/0x260 __schedule+0x460/0x720 _cond_resched+0x2d/0x40 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x82e/0x1ca0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x363/0x5c0 ksys_ioctl+0x88/0xa0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: dbaba47085b0c ("x86/split_lock: Rework the initialization flow of split lock detection") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200605192605.7439-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
2020-06-05 19:26:05 +00:00
/*
* With a name like MSR_TEST_CTL it should go without saying, but don't touch
* MSR_TEST_CTL unless the CPU is one of the whitelisted models. Writing it
* on CPUs that do not support SLD can cause fireworks, even when writing '0'.
*/
static bool cpu_model_supports_sld __ro_after_init;
/*
* Processors which have self-snooping capability can handle conflicting
* memory type across CPUs by snooping its own cache. However, there exists
* CPU models in which having conflicting memory types still leads to
* unpredictable behavior, machine check errors, or hangs. Clear this
* feature to prevent its use on machines with known erratas.
*/
static void check_memory_type_self_snoop_errata(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
switch (c->x86_model) {
case INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH:
case INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM:
case INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM_L:
case INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_PENRYN:
case INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_DUNNINGTON:
case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM:
case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_G:
case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP:
case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX:
case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE:
case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP:
case INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE:
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SELFSNOOP);
}
}
static bool ring3mwait_disabled __read_mostly;
static int __init ring3mwait_disable(char *__unused)
{
ring3mwait_disabled = true;
return 0;
}
__setup("ring3mwait=disable", ring3mwait_disable);
static void probe_xeon_phi_r3mwait(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
/*
* Ring 3 MONITOR/MWAIT feature cannot be detected without
* cpu model and family comparison.
*/
if (c->x86 != 6)
return;
switch (c->x86_model) {
case INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL:
case INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM:
break;
default:
return;
}
x86/arch_prctl: Add ARCH_[GET|SET]_CPUID Intel supports faulting on the CPUID instruction beginning with Ivy Bridge. When enabled, the processor will fault on attempts to execute the CPUID instruction with CPL>0. Exposing this feature to userspace will allow a ptracer to trap and emulate the CPUID instruction. When supported, this feature is controlled by toggling bit 0 of MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES. It is documented in detail in Section 2.3.2 of https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=243991 Implement a new pair of arch_prctls, available on both x86-32 and x86-64. ARCH_GET_CPUID: Returns the current CPUID state, either 0 if CPUID faulting is enabled (and thus the CPUID instruction is not available) or 1 if CPUID faulting is not enabled. ARCH_SET_CPUID: Set the CPUID state to the second argument. If cpuid_enabled is 0 CPUID faulting will be activated, otherwise it will be deactivated. Returns ENODEV if CPUID faulting is not supported on this system. The state of the CPUID faulting flag is propagated across forks, but reset upon exec. Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Robert O'Callahan <robert@ocallahan.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320081628.18952-9-khuey@kylehuey.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-20 08:16:26 +00:00
if (ring3mwait_disabled)
return;
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RING3MWAIT);
x86/arch_prctl: Add ARCH_[GET|SET]_CPUID Intel supports faulting on the CPUID instruction beginning with Ivy Bridge. When enabled, the processor will fault on attempts to execute the CPUID instruction with CPL>0. Exposing this feature to userspace will allow a ptracer to trap and emulate the CPUID instruction. When supported, this feature is controlled by toggling bit 0 of MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES. It is documented in detail in Section 2.3.2 of https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=243991 Implement a new pair of arch_prctls, available on both x86-32 and x86-64. ARCH_GET_CPUID: Returns the current CPUID state, either 0 if CPUID faulting is enabled (and thus the CPUID instruction is not available) or 1 if CPUID faulting is not enabled. ARCH_SET_CPUID: Set the CPUID state to the second argument. If cpuid_enabled is 0 CPUID faulting will be activated, otherwise it will be deactivated. Returns ENODEV if CPUID faulting is not supported on this system. The state of the CPUID faulting flag is propagated across forks, but reset upon exec. Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Robert O'Callahan <robert@ocallahan.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320081628.18952-9-khuey@kylehuey.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-20 08:16:26 +00:00
this_cpu_or(msr_misc_features_shadow,
1UL << MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES_RING3MWAIT_BIT);
if (c == &boot_cpu_data)
ELF_HWCAP2 |= HWCAP2_RING3MWAIT;
}
/*
* Early microcode releases for the Spectre v2 mitigation were broken.
* Information taken from;
* - https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/03/microcode-update-guidance.pdf
* - https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/52345
* - Microcode revisions observed in the wild
* - Release note from 20180108 microcode release
*/
struct sku_microcode {
u8 model;
u8 stepping;
u32 microcode;
};
static const struct sku_microcode spectre_bad_microcodes[] = {
{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE, 0x0B, 0x80 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE, 0x0A, 0x80 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE, 0x09, 0x80 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L, 0x0A, 0x80 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L, 0x09, 0x80 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x03, 0x0100013e },
{ INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x04, 0x0200003c },
{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL, 0x04, 0x28 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_G, 0x01, 0x1b },
{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D, 0x02, 0x14 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D, 0x03, 0x07000011 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, 0x01, 0x0b000025 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_L, 0x01, 0x21 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_G, 0x01, 0x18 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL, 0x03, 0x23 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x02, 0x3b },
{ INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x04, 0x10 },
{ INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X, 0x04, 0x42a },
/* Observed in the wild */
{ INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x06, 0x61b },
{ INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x07, 0x712 },
};
static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
int i;
/*
* We know that the hypervisor lie to us on the microcode version so
* we may as well hope that it is running the correct version.
*/
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
return false;
if (c->x86 != 6)
return false;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_bad_microcodes); i++) {
if (c->x86_model == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].model &&
c->x86_stepping == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping)
return (c->microcode <= spectre_bad_microcodes[i].microcode);
}
return false;
}
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-18 22:23:59 +00:00
static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 misc_enable;
/* Unmask CPUID levels if masked: */
if (c->x86 > 6 || (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model >= 0xd)) {
if (msr_clear_bit(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE,
MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID_BIT) > 0) {
c->cpuid_level = cpuid_eax(0);
get_cpu_cap(c);
}
}
if ((c->x86 == 0xf && c->x86_model >= 0x03) ||
(c->x86 == 0x6 && c->x86_model >= 0x0e))
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC);
if (c->x86 >= 6 && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IA64))
c->microcode = intel_get_microcode_revision();
/* Now if any of them are set, check the blacklist and clear the lot */
if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP) ||
cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ||
cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) {
pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling Speculation Control\n");
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
}
/*
* Atom erratum AAE44/AAF40/AAG38/AAH41:
*
* A race condition between speculative fetches and invalidating
* a large page. This is worked around in microcode, but we
* need the microcode to have already been loaded... so if it is
* not, recommend a BIOS update and disable large pages.
*/
if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 0x1c && c->x86_stepping <= 2 &&
c->microcode < 0x20e) {
pr_warn("Atom PSE erratum detected, BIOS microcode update recommended\n");
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PSE);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32);
#else
/* Netburst reports 64 bytes clflush size, but does IO in 128 bytes */
if (c->x86 == 15 && c->x86_cache_alignment == 64)
c->x86_cache_alignment = 128;
#endif
/* CPUID workaround for 0F33/0F34 CPU */
if (c->x86 == 0xF && c->x86_model == 0x3
&& (c->x86_stepping == 0x3 || c->x86_stepping == 0x4))
c->x86_phys_bits = 36;
/*
* c->x86_power is 8000_0007 edx. Bit 8 is TSC runs at constant rate
* with P/T states and does not stop in deep C-states.
*
* It is also reliable across cores and sockets. (but not across
* cabinets - we turn it off in that case explicitly.)
*/
if (c->x86_power & (1 << 8)) {
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC);
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC);
}
/* Penwell and Cloverview have the TSC which doesn't sleep on S3 */
if (c->x86 == 6) {
switch (c->x86_model) {
case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_MID:
case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET:
case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID:
case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT_NP:
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/*
* There is a known erratum on Pentium III and Core Solo
* and Core Duo CPUs.
* " Page with PAT set to WC while associated MTRR is UC
* may consolidate to UC "
* Because of this erratum, it is better to stick with
* setting WC in MTRR rather than using PAT on these CPUs.
*
* Enable PAT WC only on P4, Core 2 or later CPUs.
*/
if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model < 15)
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PAT);
/*
* If fast string is not enabled in IA32_MISC_ENABLE for any reason,
* clear the fast string and enhanced fast string CPU capabilities.
*/
if (c->x86 > 6 || (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model >= 0xd)) {
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, misc_enable);
if (!(misc_enable & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_FAST_STRING)) {
pr_info("Disabled fast string operations\n");
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ERMS);
}
}
/*
* Intel Quark Core DevMan_001.pdf section 6.4.11
* "The operating system also is required to invalidate (i.e., flush)
* the TLB when any changes are made to any of the page table entries.
* The operating system must reload CR3 to cause the TLB to be flushed"
*
* As a result, boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE) in arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
* should be false so that __flush_tlb_all() causes CR3 insted of CR4.PGE
* to be modified.
*/
if (c->x86 == 5 && c->x86_model == 9) {
pr_info("Disabling PGE capability bit\n");
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PGE);
}
x86/topology: Create logical package id For per package oriented services we must be able to rely on the number of CPU packages to be within bounds. Create a tracking facility, which - calculates the number of possible packages depending on nr_cpu_ids after boot - makes sure that the package id is within the number of possible packages. If the apic id is outside we map it to a logical package id if there is enough space available. Provide interfaces for drivers to query the mapping and do translations from physcial to logical ids. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Harish Chegondi <harish.chegondi@intel.com> Cc: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160222221011.541071755@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-22 22:19:15 +00:00
if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000001) {
u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
cpuid(0x00000001, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
/*
* If HTT (EDX[28]) is set EBX[16:23] contain the number of
* apicids which are reserved per package. Store the resulting
* shift value for the package management code.
*/
if (edx & (1U << 28))
c->x86_coreid_bits = get_count_order((ebx >> 16) & 0xff);
}
x86/mm/mpx: Work around MPX erratum SKD046 This erratum essentially causes the CPU to forget which privilege level it is operating on (kernel vs. user) for the purposes of MPX. This erratum can only be triggered when a system is not using Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMEP). Our workaround for the erratum is to ensure that MPX can only be used in cases where SMEP is present in the processor and is enabled. This erratum only affects Core processors. Atom is unaffected. But, there is no architectural way to determine Atom vs. Core. So, we just apply this workaround to all processors. It's possible that it will mistakenly disable MPX on some Atom processsors or future unaffected Core processors. There are currently no processors that have MPX and not SMEP. It would take something akin to a hypervisor masking SMEP out on an Atom processor for this to present itself on current hardware. More details can be found at: http://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/specification-updates/desktop-6th-gen-core-family-spec-update.pdf " SKD046 Branch Instructions May Initialize MPX Bound Registers Incorrectly Problem: Depending on the current Intel MPX (Memory Protection Extensions) configuration, execution of certain branch instructions (near CALL, near RET, near JMP, and Jcc instructions) without a BND prefix (F2H) initialize the MPX bound registers. Due to this erratum, such a branch instruction that is executed both with CPL = 3 and with CPL < 3 may not use the correct MPX configuration register (BNDCFGU or BNDCFGS, respectively) for determining whether to initialize the bound registers; it may thus initialize the bound registers when it should not, or fail to initialize them when it should. Implication: A branch instruction that has executed both in user mode and in supervisor mode (from the same linear address) may cause a #BR (bound range fault) when it should not have or may not cause a #BR when it should have. Workaround An operating system can avoid this erratum by setting CR4.SMEP[bit 20] to enable supervisor-mode execution prevention (SMEP). When SMEP is enabled, no code can be executed both with CPL = 3 and with CPL < 3. " Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160512220400.3B35F1BC@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-12 22:04:00 +00:00
check_memory_type_self_snoop_errata(c);
/*
* Get the number of SMT siblings early from the extended topology
* leaf, if available. Otherwise try the legacy SMT detection.
*/
if (detect_extended_topology_early(c) < 0)
detect_ht_early(c);
}
static void bsp_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
resctrl_cpu_detect(c);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Early probe support logic for ppro memory erratum #50
*
* This is called before we do cpu ident work
*/
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-18 22:23:59 +00:00
int ppro_with_ram_bug(void)
{
/* Uses data from early_cpu_detect now */
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6 &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 1 &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < 8) {
pr_info("Pentium Pro with Errata#50 detected. Taking evasive action.\n");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-18 22:23:59 +00:00
static void intel_smp_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
/* calling is from identify_secondary_cpu() ? */
if (!c->cpu_index)
return;
/*
* Mask B, Pentium, but not Pentium MMX
*/
if (c->x86 == 5 &&
c->x86_stepping >= 1 && c->x86_stepping <= 4 &&
c->x86_model <= 3) {
/*
* Remember we have B step Pentia with bugs
*/
WARN_ONCE(1, "WARNING: SMP operation may be unreliable"
"with B stepping processors.\n");
}
}
static int forcepae;
static int __init forcepae_setup(char *__unused)
{
forcepae = 1;
return 1;
}
__setup("forcepae", forcepae_setup);
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-18 22:23:59 +00:00
static void intel_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG
/*
* All models of Pentium and Pentium with MMX technology CPUs
* have the F0 0F bug, which lets nonprivileged users lock up the
* system. Announce that the fault handler will be checking for it.
* The Quark is also family 5, but does not have the same bug.
*/
clear_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_F00F);
x86/cpu/intel: Remove not needed paravirt_enabled() use for F00F work around The X86_BUG_F00F work around is responsible for fixing up the error generated on attempted F00F exploitation from an OOPS to a SIGILL. There is no reason why this code should not be allowed to run on PV guest on a F00F-affected CPU -- it would simply never trigger. The pv_enabled() check was there only to avoid printing the f00f workaround, so removing the check is purely a cosmetic change. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com Cc: andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: david.vrabel@citrix.com Cc: ffainelli@freebox.fr Cc: george.dunlap@citrix.com Cc: glin@suse.com Cc: jgross@suse.com Cc: jlee@suse.com Cc: josh@joshtriplett.org Cc: julien.grall@linaro.org Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com Cc: kozerkov@parallels.com Cc: lenb@kernel.org Cc: lguest@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Cc: lv.zheng@intel.com Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: mbizon@freebox.fr Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net Cc: robert.moore@intel.com Cc: rusty@rustcorp.com.au Cc: tiwai@suse.de Cc: toshi.kani@hp.com Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1460592286-300-11-git-send-email-mcgrof@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-04-14 00:04:40 +00:00
if (c->x86 == 5 && c->x86_model < 9) {
static int f00f_workaround_enabled;
set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_F00F);
if (!f00f_workaround_enabled) {
pr_notice("Intel Pentium with F0 0F bug - workaround enabled.\n");
f00f_workaround_enabled = 1;
}
}
#endif
/*
* SEP CPUID bug: Pentium Pro reports SEP but doesn't have it until
* model 3 mask 3
*/
if ((c->x86<<8 | c->x86_model<<4 | c->x86_stepping) < 0x633)
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEP);
/*
* PAE CPUID issue: many Pentium M report no PAE but may have a
* functionally usable PAE implementation.
* Forcefully enable PAE if kernel parameter "forcepae" is present.
*/
if (forcepae) {
pr_warn("PAE forced!\n");
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PAE);
add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
/*
* P4 Xeon erratum 037 workaround.
* Hardware prefetcher may cause stale data to be loaded into the cache.
*/
if ((c->x86 == 15) && (c->x86_model == 1) && (c->x86_stepping == 1)) {
if (msr_set_bit(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE,
MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PREFETCH_DISABLE_BIT) > 0) {
pr_info("CPU: C0 stepping P4 Xeon detected.\n");
pr_info("CPU: Disabling hardware prefetching (Erratum 037)\n");
}
}
/*
* See if we have a good local APIC by checking for buggy Pentia,
* i.e. all B steppings and the C2 stepping of P54C when using their
* integrated APIC (see 11AP erratum in "Pentium Processor
* Specification Update").
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_APIC) && (c->x86<<8 | c->x86_model<<4) == 0x520 &&
(c->x86_stepping < 0x6 || c->x86_stepping == 0xb))
set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_11AP);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY
/*
* Set up the preferred alignment for movsl bulk memory moves
*/
switch (c->x86) {
case 4: /* 486: untested */
break;
case 5: /* Old Pentia: untested */
break;
case 6: /* PII/PIII only like movsl with 8-byte alignment */
movsl_mask.mask = 7;
break;
case 15: /* P4 is OK down to 8-byte alignment */
movsl_mask.mask = 7;
break;
}
#endif
intel_smp_check(c);
}
#else
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-18 22:23:59 +00:00
static void intel_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
}
#endif
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-18 22:23:59 +00:00
static void srat_detect_node(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
unsigned node;
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
/* Don't do the funky fallback heuristics the AMD version employs
for now. */
node = numa_cpu_node(cpu);
if (node == NUMA_NO_NODE || !node_online(node)) {
/* reuse the value from init_cpu_to_node() */
node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
}
numa_set_node(cpu, node);
#endif
}
#define MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE 0x982
/* Helpers to access TME_ACTIVATE MSR */
#define TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(x) (x & 0x1)
#define TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(x) (x & 0x2)
#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(x) ((x >> 4) & 0xf) /* Bits 7:4 */
#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128 0
#define TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(x) ((x >> 32) & 0xf) /* Bits 35:32 */
#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(x) ((x >> 48) & 0xffff) /* Bits 63:48 */
#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128 1
/* Values for mktme_status (SW only construct) */
#define MKTME_ENABLED 0
#define MKTME_DISABLED 1
#define MKTME_UNINITIALIZED 2
static int mktme_status = MKTME_UNINITIALIZED;
static void detect_tme(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 tme_activate, tme_policy, tme_crypto_algs;
int keyid_bits = 0, nr_keyids = 0;
static u64 tme_activate_cpu0 = 0;
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE, tme_activate);
if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) {
if (tme_activate != tme_activate_cpu0) {
/* Broken BIOS? */
pr_err_once("x86/tme: configuration is inconsistent between CPUs\n");
pr_err_once("x86/tme: MKTME is not usable\n");
mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
/* Proceed. We may need to exclude bits from x86_phys_bits. */
}
} else {
tme_activate_cpu0 = tme_activate;
}
if (!TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(tme_activate) || !TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(tme_activate)) {
pr_info_once("x86/tme: not enabled by BIOS\n");
mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
return;
}
if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED)
goto detect_keyid_bits;
pr_info("x86/tme: enabled by BIOS\n");
tme_policy = TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(tme_activate);
if (tme_policy != TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128)
pr_warn("x86/tme: Unknown policy is active: %#llx\n", tme_policy);
tme_crypto_algs = TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(tme_activate);
if (!(tme_crypto_algs & TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128)) {
pr_err("x86/mktme: No known encryption algorithm is supported: %#llx\n",
tme_crypto_algs);
mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
}
detect_keyid_bits:
keyid_bits = TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(tme_activate);
nr_keyids = (1UL << keyid_bits) - 1;
if (nr_keyids) {
pr_info_once("x86/mktme: enabled by BIOS\n");
pr_info_once("x86/mktme: %d KeyIDs available\n", nr_keyids);
} else {
pr_info_once("x86/mktme: disabled by BIOS\n");
}
if (mktme_status == MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) {
/* MKTME is usable */
mktme_status = MKTME_ENABLED;
}
/*
* KeyID bits effectively lower the number of physical address
* bits. Update cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits accordingly.
*/
c->x86_phys_bits -= keyid_bits;
}
x86/cpufeature: Detect CPUID faulting support Intel supports faulting on the CPUID instruction beginning with Ivy Bridge. When enabled, the processor will fault on attempts to execute the CPUID instruction with CPL>0. This will allow a ptracer to emulate the CPUID instruction. Bit 31 of MSR_PLATFORM_INFO advertises support for this feature. It is documented in detail in Section 2.3.2 of https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=243991 Detect support for this feature and expose it as X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULT. Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Robert O'Callahan <robert@ocallahan.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320081628.18952-8-khuey@kylehuey.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-20 08:16:25 +00:00
static void init_cpuid_fault(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 msr;
if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_PLATFORM_INFO, &msr)) {
if (msr & MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULT)
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULT);
}
}
static void init_intel_misc_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 msr;
if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES, &msr))
return;
x86/arch_prctl: Add ARCH_[GET|SET]_CPUID Intel supports faulting on the CPUID instruction beginning with Ivy Bridge. When enabled, the processor will fault on attempts to execute the CPUID instruction with CPL>0. Exposing this feature to userspace will allow a ptracer to trap and emulate the CPUID instruction. When supported, this feature is controlled by toggling bit 0 of MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES. It is documented in detail in Section 2.3.2 of https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=243991 Implement a new pair of arch_prctls, available on both x86-32 and x86-64. ARCH_GET_CPUID: Returns the current CPUID state, either 0 if CPUID faulting is enabled (and thus the CPUID instruction is not available) or 1 if CPUID faulting is not enabled. ARCH_SET_CPUID: Set the CPUID state to the second argument. If cpuid_enabled is 0 CPUID faulting will be activated, otherwise it will be deactivated. Returns ENODEV if CPUID faulting is not supported on this system. The state of the CPUID faulting flag is propagated across forks, but reset upon exec. Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Robert O'Callahan <robert@ocallahan.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320081628.18952-9-khuey@kylehuey.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-20 08:16:26 +00:00
/* Clear all MISC features */
this_cpu_write(msr_misc_features_shadow, 0);
/* Check features and update capabilities and shadow control bits */
x86/cpufeature: Detect CPUID faulting support Intel supports faulting on the CPUID instruction beginning with Ivy Bridge. When enabled, the processor will fault on attempts to execute the CPUID instruction with CPL>0. This will allow a ptracer to emulate the CPUID instruction. Bit 31 of MSR_PLATFORM_INFO advertises support for this feature. It is documented in detail in Section 2.3.2 of https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=243991 Detect support for this feature and expose it as X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULT. Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Robert O'Callahan <robert@ocallahan.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320081628.18952-8-khuey@kylehuey.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-20 08:16:25 +00:00
init_cpuid_fault(c);
probe_xeon_phi_r3mwait(c);
x86/arch_prctl: Add ARCH_[GET|SET]_CPUID Intel supports faulting on the CPUID instruction beginning with Ivy Bridge. When enabled, the processor will fault on attempts to execute the CPUID instruction with CPL>0. Exposing this feature to userspace will allow a ptracer to trap and emulate the CPUID instruction. When supported, this feature is controlled by toggling bit 0 of MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES. It is documented in detail in Section 2.3.2 of https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=243991 Implement a new pair of arch_prctls, available on both x86-32 and x86-64. ARCH_GET_CPUID: Returns the current CPUID state, either 0 if CPUID faulting is enabled (and thus the CPUID instruction is not available) or 1 if CPUID faulting is not enabled. ARCH_SET_CPUID: Set the CPUID state to the second argument. If cpuid_enabled is 0 CPUID faulting will be activated, otherwise it will be deactivated. Returns ENODEV if CPUID faulting is not supported on this system. The state of the CPUID faulting flag is propagated across forks, but reset upon exec. Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Robert O'Callahan <robert@ocallahan.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320081628.18952-9-khuey@kylehuey.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-20 08:16:26 +00:00
msr = this_cpu_read(msr_misc_features_shadow);
wrmsrl(MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES, msr);
x86/cpufeature: Detect CPUID faulting support Intel supports faulting on the CPUID instruction beginning with Ivy Bridge. When enabled, the processor will fault on attempts to execute the CPUID instruction with CPL>0. This will allow a ptracer to emulate the CPUID instruction. Bit 31 of MSR_PLATFORM_INFO advertises support for this feature. It is documented in detail in Section 2.3.2 of https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=243991 Detect support for this feature and expose it as X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULT. Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Robert O'Callahan <robert@ocallahan.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320081628.18952-8-khuey@kylehuey.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-20 08:16:25 +00:00
}
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
static void split_lock_init(void);
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-18 22:23:59 +00:00
static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
early_init_intel(c);
intel_workarounds(c);
/*
* Detect the extended topology information if available. This
* will reinitialise the initial_apicid which will be used
* in init_intel_cacheinfo()
*/
detect_extended_topology(c);
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XTOPOLOGY)) {
/*
* let's use the legacy cpuid vector 0x1 and 0x4 for topology
* detection.
*/
detect_num_cpu_cores(c);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
detect_ht(c);
#endif
}
init_intel_cacheinfo(c);
if (c->cpuid_level > 9) {
unsigned eax = cpuid_eax(10);
/* Check for version and the number of counters */
if ((eax & 0xff) && (((eax>>8) & 0xff) > 1))
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON);
}
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XMM2))
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DS)) {
unsigned int l1, l2;
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, l1, l2);
if (!(l1 & (1<<11)))
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_BTS);
if (!(l1 & (1<<12)))
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PEBS);
}
if (c->x86 == 6 && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH) &&
(c->x86_model == 29 || c->x86_model == 46 || c->x86_model == 47))
set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MONITOR);
if (c->x86 == 6 && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MWAIT) &&
((c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT)))
set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_MONITOR);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (c->x86 == 15)
c->x86_cache_alignment = c->x86_clflush_size * 2;
if (c->x86 == 6)
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD);
#else
/*
* Names for the Pentium II/Celeron processors
* detectable only by also checking the cache size.
* Dixon is NOT a Celeron.
*/
if (c->x86 == 6) {
unsigned int l2 = c->x86_cache_size;
char *p = NULL;
switch (c->x86_model) {
case 5:
if (l2 == 0)
p = "Celeron (Covington)";
else if (l2 == 256)
p = "Mobile Pentium II (Dixon)";
break;
case 6:
if (l2 == 128)
p = "Celeron (Mendocino)";
else if (c->x86_stepping == 0 || c->x86_stepping == 5)
p = "Celeron-A";
break;
case 8:
if (l2 == 128)
p = "Celeron (Coppermine)";
break;
}
if (p)
strcpy(c->x86_model_id, p);
}
if (c->x86 == 15)
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_P4);
if (c->x86 == 6)
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_P3);
#endif
/* Work around errata */
srat_detect_node(c);
x86/intel: Initialize IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR at boot Opportunistically initialize IA32_FEAT_CTL to enable VMX when the MSR is left unlocked by BIOS. Configuring feature control at boot time paves the way for similar enabling of other features, e.g. Software Guard Extensions (SGX). Temporarily leave equivalent KVM code in place in order to avoid introducing a regression on Centaur and Zhaoxin CPUs, e.g. removing KVM's code would leave the MSR unlocked on those CPUs and would break existing functionality if people are loading kvm_intel on Centaur and/or Zhaoxin. Defer enablement of the boot-time configuration on Centaur and Zhaoxin to future patches to aid bisection. Note, Local Machine Check Exceptions (LMCE) are also supported by the kernel and enabled via feature control, but the kernel currently uses LMCE if and only if the feature is explicitly enabled by BIOS. Keep the current behavior to avoid introducing bugs, future patches can opt in to opportunistic enabling if it's deemed desirable to do so. Always lock IA32_FEAT_CTL if it exists, even if the CPU doesn't support VMX, so that other existing and future kernel code that queries the MSR can assume it's locked. Start from a clean slate when constructing the value to write to IA32_FEAT_CTL, i.e. ignore whatever value BIOS left in the MSR so as not to enable random features or fault on the WRMSR. Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-5-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
2019-12-21 04:44:58 +00:00
init_ia32_feat_ctl(c);
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TME))
detect_tme(c);
x86/cpufeature: Detect CPUID faulting support Intel supports faulting on the CPUID instruction beginning with Ivy Bridge. When enabled, the processor will fault on attempts to execute the CPUID instruction with CPL>0. This will allow a ptracer to emulate the CPUID instruction. Bit 31 of MSR_PLATFORM_INFO advertises support for this feature. It is documented in detail in Section 2.3.2 of https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=243991 Detect support for this feature and expose it as X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULT. Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Robert O'Callahan <robert@ocallahan.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320081628.18952-8-khuey@kylehuey.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-20 08:16:25 +00:00
init_intel_misc_features(c);
if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_ENABLE)
tsx_enable();
if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_DISABLE)
tsx_disable();
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
split_lock_init();
intel_init_thermal(c);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-18 22:23:59 +00:00
static unsigned int intel_size_cache(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int size)
{
/*
* Intel PIII Tualatin. This comes in two flavours.
* One has 256kb of cache, the other 512. We have no way
* to determine which, so we use a boottime override
* for the 512kb model, and assume 256 otherwise.
*/
if ((c->x86 == 6) && (c->x86_model == 11) && (size == 0))
size = 256;
/*
* Intel Quark SoC X1000 contains a 4-way set associative
* 16K cache with a 16 byte cache line and 256 lines per tag
*/
if ((c->x86 == 5) && (c->x86_model == 9))
size = 16;
return size;
}
#endif
#define TLB_INST_4K 0x01
#define TLB_INST_4M 0x02
#define TLB_INST_2M_4M 0x03
#define TLB_INST_ALL 0x05
#define TLB_INST_1G 0x06
#define TLB_DATA_4K 0x11
#define TLB_DATA_4M 0x12
#define TLB_DATA_2M_4M 0x13
#define TLB_DATA_4K_4M 0x14
#define TLB_DATA_1G 0x16
#define TLB_DATA0_4K 0x21
#define TLB_DATA0_4M 0x22
#define TLB_DATA0_2M_4M 0x23
#define STLB_4K 0x41
#define STLB_4K_2M 0x42
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-18 22:23:59 +00:00
static const struct _tlb_table intel_tlb_table[] = {
{ 0x01, TLB_INST_4K, 32, " TLB_INST 4 KByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
{ 0x02, TLB_INST_4M, 2, " TLB_INST 4 MByte pages, full associative" },
{ 0x03, TLB_DATA_4K, 64, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
{ 0x04, TLB_DATA_4M, 8, " TLB_DATA 4 MByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
{ 0x05, TLB_DATA_4M, 32, " TLB_DATA 4 MByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
{ 0x0b, TLB_INST_4M, 4, " TLB_INST 4 MByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
{ 0x4f, TLB_INST_4K, 32, " TLB_INST 4 KByte pages" },
{ 0x50, TLB_INST_ALL, 64, " TLB_INST 4 KByte and 2-MByte or 4-MByte pages" },
{ 0x51, TLB_INST_ALL, 128, " TLB_INST 4 KByte and 2-MByte or 4-MByte pages" },
{ 0x52, TLB_INST_ALL, 256, " TLB_INST 4 KByte and 2-MByte or 4-MByte pages" },
{ 0x55, TLB_INST_2M_4M, 7, " TLB_INST 2-MByte or 4-MByte pages, fully associative" },
{ 0x56, TLB_DATA0_4M, 16, " TLB_DATA0 4 MByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
{ 0x57, TLB_DATA0_4K, 16, " TLB_DATA0 4 KByte pages, 4-way associative" },
{ 0x59, TLB_DATA0_4K, 16, " TLB_DATA0 4 KByte pages, fully associative" },
{ 0x5a, TLB_DATA0_2M_4M, 32, " TLB_DATA0 2-MByte or 4 MByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
{ 0x5b, TLB_DATA_4K_4M, 64, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte and 4 MByte pages" },
{ 0x5c, TLB_DATA_4K_4M, 128, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte and 4 MByte pages" },
{ 0x5d, TLB_DATA_4K_4M, 256, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte and 4 MByte pages" },
{ 0x61, TLB_INST_4K, 48, " TLB_INST 4 KByte pages, full associative" },
{ 0x63, TLB_DATA_1G, 4, " TLB_DATA 1 GByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
{ 0x6b, TLB_DATA_4K, 256, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte pages, 8-way associative" },
{ 0x6c, TLB_DATA_2M_4M, 128, " TLB_DATA 2 MByte or 4 MByte pages, 8-way associative" },
{ 0x6d, TLB_DATA_1G, 16, " TLB_DATA 1 GByte pages, fully associative" },
{ 0x76, TLB_INST_2M_4M, 8, " TLB_INST 2-MByte or 4-MByte pages, fully associative" },
{ 0xb0, TLB_INST_4K, 128, " TLB_INST 4 KByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
{ 0xb1, TLB_INST_2M_4M, 4, " TLB_INST 2M pages, 4-way, 8 entries or 4M pages, 4-way entries" },
{ 0xb2, TLB_INST_4K, 64, " TLB_INST 4KByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
{ 0xb3, TLB_DATA_4K, 128, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
{ 0xb4, TLB_DATA_4K, 256, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte pages, 4-way associative" },
{ 0xb5, TLB_INST_4K, 64, " TLB_INST 4 KByte pages, 8-way set associative" },
{ 0xb6, TLB_INST_4K, 128, " TLB_INST 4 KByte pages, 8-way set associative" },
{ 0xba, TLB_DATA_4K, 64, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte pages, 4-way associative" },
{ 0xc0, TLB_DATA_4K_4M, 8, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte and 4 MByte pages, 4-way associative" },
{ 0xc1, STLB_4K_2M, 1024, " STLB 4 KByte and 2 MByte pages, 8-way associative" },
{ 0xc2, TLB_DATA_2M_4M, 16, " TLB_DATA 2 MByte/4MByte pages, 4-way associative" },
{ 0xca, STLB_4K, 512, " STLB 4 KByte pages, 4-way associative" },
{ 0x00, 0, 0 }
};
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-18 22:23:59 +00:00
static void intel_tlb_lookup(const unsigned char desc)
{
unsigned char k;
if (desc == 0)
return;
/* look up this descriptor in the table */
for (k = 0; intel_tlb_table[k].descriptor != desc &&
intel_tlb_table[k].descriptor != 0; k++)
;
if (intel_tlb_table[k].tlb_type == 0)
return;
switch (intel_tlb_table[k].tlb_type) {
case STLB_4K:
if (tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
if (tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
break;
case STLB_4K_2M:
if (tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
if (tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
if (tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
if (tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
if (tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
if (tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
break;
case TLB_INST_ALL:
if (tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
if (tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
if (tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
break;
case TLB_INST_4K:
if (tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
break;
case TLB_INST_4M:
if (tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
break;
case TLB_INST_2M_4M:
if (tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
if (tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
break;
case TLB_DATA_4K:
case TLB_DATA0_4K:
if (tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
break;
case TLB_DATA_4M:
case TLB_DATA0_4M:
if (tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
break;
case TLB_DATA_2M_4M:
case TLB_DATA0_2M_4M:
if (tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
if (tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
break;
case TLB_DATA_4K_4M:
if (tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
if (tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
break;
case TLB_DATA_1G:
if (tlb_lld_1g[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
tlb_lld_1g[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
break;
}
}
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-18 22:23:59 +00:00
static void intel_detect_tlb(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
int i, j, n;
unsigned int regs[4];
unsigned char *desc = (unsigned char *)regs;
if (c->cpuid_level < 2)
return;
/* Number of times to iterate */
n = cpuid_eax(2) & 0xFF;
for (i = 0 ; i < n ; i++) {
cpuid(2, &regs[0], &regs[1], &regs[2], &regs[3]);
/* If bit 31 is set, this is an unknown format */
for (j = 0 ; j < 3 ; j++)
if (regs[j] & (1 << 31))
regs[j] = 0;
/* Byte 0 is level count, not a descriptor */
for (j = 1 ; j < 16 ; j++)
intel_tlb_lookup(desc[j]);
}
}
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-18 22:23:59 +00:00
static const struct cpu_dev intel_cpu_dev = {
.c_vendor = "Intel",
.c_ident = { "GenuineIntel" },
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
.legacy_models = {
{ .family = 4, .model_names =
{
[0] = "486 DX-25/33",
[1] = "486 DX-50",
[2] = "486 SX",
[3] = "486 DX/2",
[4] = "486 SL",
[5] = "486 SX/2",
[7] = "486 DX/2-WB",
[8] = "486 DX/4",
[9] = "486 DX/4-WB"
}
},
{ .family = 5, .model_names =
{
[0] = "Pentium 60/66 A-step",
[1] = "Pentium 60/66",
[2] = "Pentium 75 - 200",
[3] = "OverDrive PODP5V83",
[4] = "Pentium MMX",
[7] = "Mobile Pentium 75 - 200",
[8] = "Mobile Pentium MMX",
[9] = "Quark SoC X1000",
}
},
{ .family = 6, .model_names =
{
[0] = "Pentium Pro A-step",
[1] = "Pentium Pro",
[3] = "Pentium II (Klamath)",
[4] = "Pentium II (Deschutes)",
[5] = "Pentium II (Deschutes)",
[6] = "Mobile Pentium II",
[7] = "Pentium III (Katmai)",
[8] = "Pentium III (Coppermine)",
[10] = "Pentium III (Cascades)",
[11] = "Pentium III (Tualatin)",
}
},
{ .family = 15, .model_names =
{
[0] = "Pentium 4 (Unknown)",
[1] = "Pentium 4 (Willamette)",
[2] = "Pentium 4 (Northwood)",
[4] = "Pentium 4 (Foster)",
[5] = "Pentium 4 (Foster)",
}
},
},
.legacy_cache_size = intel_size_cache,
#endif
.c_detect_tlb = intel_detect_tlb,
.c_early_init = early_init_intel,
.c_bsp_init = bsp_init_intel,
.c_init = init_intel,
.c_x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL,
};
cpu_dev_register(intel_cpu_dev);
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "x86/split lock detection: " fmt
static const struct {
const char *option;
enum split_lock_detect_state state;
} sld_options[] __initconst = {
{ "off", sld_off },
{ "warn", sld_warn },
{ "fatal", sld_fatal },
};
static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
{
int len = strlen(opt);
return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
}
static bool split_lock_verify_msr(bool on)
{
u64 ctrl, tmp;
if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_TEST_CTRL, &ctrl))
return false;
if (on)
ctrl |= MSR_TEST_CTRL_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT;
else
ctrl &= ~MSR_TEST_CTRL_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT;
if (wrmsrl_safe(MSR_TEST_CTRL, ctrl))
return false;
rdmsrl(MSR_TEST_CTRL, tmp);
return ctrl == tmp;
}
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
static void __init split_lock_setup(void)
{
enum split_lock_detect_state state = sld_warn;
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
char arg[20];
int i, ret;
if (!split_lock_verify_msr(false)) {
pr_info("MSR access failed: Disabled\n");
return;
}
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "split_lock_detect",
arg, sizeof(arg));
if (ret >= 0) {
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sld_options); i++) {
if (match_option(arg, ret, sld_options[i].option)) {
state = sld_options[i].state;
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
break;
}
}
}
switch (state) {
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
case sld_off:
pr_info("disabled\n");
return;
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
case sld_warn:
pr_info("warning about user-space split_locks\n");
break;
case sld_fatal:
pr_info("sending SIGBUS on user-space split_locks\n");
break;
}
rdmsrl(MSR_TEST_CTRL, msr_test_ctrl_cache);
if (!split_lock_verify_msr(true)) {
pr_info("MSR access failed: Disabled\n");
return;
}
sld_state = state;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT);
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
}
/*
* MSR_TEST_CTRL is per core, but we treat it like a per CPU MSR. Locking
* is not implemented as one thread could undo the setting of the other
* thread immediately after dropping the lock anyway.
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
*/
static void sld_update_msr(bool on)
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
{
u64 test_ctrl_val = msr_test_ctrl_cache;
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
if (on)
test_ctrl_val |= MSR_TEST_CTRL_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT;
wrmsrl(MSR_TEST_CTRL, test_ctrl_val);
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
}
static void split_lock_init(void)
{
x86/split_lock: Don't write MSR_TEST_CTRL on CPUs that aren't whitelisted Choo! Choo! All aboard the Split Lock Express, with direct service to Wreckage! Skip split_lock_verify_msr() if the CPU isn't whitelisted as a possible SLD-enabled CPU model to avoid writing MSR_TEST_CTRL. MSR_TEST_CTRL exists, and is writable, on many generations of CPUs. Writing the MSR, even with '0', can result in bizarre, undocumented behavior. This fixes a crash on Haswell when resuming from suspend with a live KVM guest. Because APs use the standard SMP boot flow for resume, they will go through split_lock_init() and the subsequent RDMSR/WRMSR sequence, which runs even when sld_state==sld_off to ensure SLD is disabled. On Haswell (at least, my Haswell), writing MSR_TEST_CTRL with '0' will succeed and _may_ take the SMT _sibling_ out of VMX root mode. When KVM has an active guest, KVM performs VMXON as part of CPU onlining (see kvm_starting_cpu()). Because SMP boot is serialized, the resulting flow is effectively: on_each_ap_cpu() { WRMSR(MSR_TEST_CTRL, 0) VMXON } As a result, the WRMSR can disable VMX on a different CPU that has already done VMXON. This ultimately results in a #UD on VMPTRLD when KVM regains control and attempt run its vCPUs. The above voodoo was confirmed by reworking KVM's VMXON flow to write MSR_TEST_CTRL prior to VMXON, and to serialize the sequence as above. Further verification of the insanity was done by redoing VMXON on all APs after the initial WRMSR->VMXON sequence. The additional VMXON, which should VM-Fail, occasionally succeeded, and also eliminated the unexpected #UD on VMPTRLD. The damage done by writing MSR_TEST_CTRL doesn't appear to be limited to VMX, e.g. after suspend with an active KVM guest, subsequent reboots almost always hang (even when fudging VMXON), a #UD on a random Jcc was observed, suspend/resume stability is qualitatively poor, and so on and so forth. kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:386! CPU: 1 PID: 2592 Comm: CPU 6/KVM Tainted: G D Hardware name: ASUS Q87M-E/Q87M-E, BIOS 1102 03/03/2014 RIP: 0010:kvm_spurious_fault+0xf/0x20 Call Trace: vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs+0x1fb/0x2b0 vmx_vcpu_load+0x3e/0x160 kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x48/0x260 finish_task_switch+0x140/0x260 __schedule+0x460/0x720 _cond_resched+0x2d/0x40 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x82e/0x1ca0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x363/0x5c0 ksys_ioctl+0x88/0xa0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: dbaba47085b0c ("x86/split_lock: Rework the initialization flow of split lock detection") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200605192605.7439-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
2020-06-05 19:26:05 +00:00
if (cpu_model_supports_sld)
split_lock_verify_msr(sld_state != sld_off);
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
}
static void split_lock_warn(unsigned long ip)
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
{
pr_warn_ratelimited("#AC: %s/%d took a split_lock trap at address: 0x%lx\n",
current->comm, current->pid, ip);
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
/*
* Disable the split lock detection for this task so it can make
* progress and set TIF_SLD so the detection is re-enabled via
* switch_to_sld() when the task is scheduled out.
*/
sld_update_msr(false);
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
set_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_SLD);
}
bool handle_guest_split_lock(unsigned long ip)
{
if (sld_state == sld_warn) {
split_lock_warn(ip);
return true;
}
pr_warn_once("#AC: %s/%d %s split_lock trap at address: 0x%lx\n",
current->comm, current->pid,
sld_state == sld_fatal ? "fatal" : "bogus", ip);
current->thread.error_code = 0;
current->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_AC;
force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, NULL);
return false;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(handle_guest_split_lock);
bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
if ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_AC) || sld_state == sld_fatal)
return false;
split_lock_warn(regs->ip);
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
return true;
}
/*
* This function is called only when switching between tasks with
* different split-lock detection modes. It sets the MSR for the
* mode of the new task. This is right most of the time, but since
* the MSR is shared by hyperthreads on a physical core there can
* be glitches when the two threads need different modes.
*/
void switch_to_sld(unsigned long tifn)
{
sld_update_msr(!(tifn & _TIF_SLD));
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
}
/*
* Bits in the IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES are not architectural, so they should
* only be trusted if it is confirmed that a CPU model implements a
* specific feature at a particular bit position.
*
* The possible driver data field values:
*
* - 0: CPU models that are known to have the per-core split-lock detection
* feature even though they do not enumerate IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES.
*
* - 1: CPU models which may enumerate IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES and if so use
* bit 5 to enumerate the per-core split-lock detection feature.
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
*/
static const struct x86_cpu_id split_lock_cpu_ids[] __initconst = {
X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ICELAKE_X, 0),
X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ICELAKE_L, 0),
X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ICELAKE_D, 0),
X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ATOM_TREMONT, 1),
X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D, 1),
X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ATOM_TREMONT_L, 1),
X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(TIGERLAKE_L, 1),
X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(TIGERLAKE, 1),
X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X, 1),
X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ALDERLAKE, 1),
X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ALDERLAKE_L, 1),
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
{}
};
void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
const struct x86_cpu_id *m;
u64 ia32_core_caps;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
return;
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
m = x86_match_cpu(split_lock_cpu_ids);
if (!m)
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
return;
switch (m->driver_data) {
case 0:
break;
case 1:
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CORE_CAPABILITIES))
return;
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_CORE_CAPS, ia32_core_caps);
if (!(ia32_core_caps & MSR_IA32_CORE_CAPS_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT))
return;
break;
default:
return;
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
}
x86/split_lock: Don't write MSR_TEST_CTRL on CPUs that aren't whitelisted Choo! Choo! All aboard the Split Lock Express, with direct service to Wreckage! Skip split_lock_verify_msr() if the CPU isn't whitelisted as a possible SLD-enabled CPU model to avoid writing MSR_TEST_CTRL. MSR_TEST_CTRL exists, and is writable, on many generations of CPUs. Writing the MSR, even with '0', can result in bizarre, undocumented behavior. This fixes a crash on Haswell when resuming from suspend with a live KVM guest. Because APs use the standard SMP boot flow for resume, they will go through split_lock_init() and the subsequent RDMSR/WRMSR sequence, which runs even when sld_state==sld_off to ensure SLD is disabled. On Haswell (at least, my Haswell), writing MSR_TEST_CTRL with '0' will succeed and _may_ take the SMT _sibling_ out of VMX root mode. When KVM has an active guest, KVM performs VMXON as part of CPU onlining (see kvm_starting_cpu()). Because SMP boot is serialized, the resulting flow is effectively: on_each_ap_cpu() { WRMSR(MSR_TEST_CTRL, 0) VMXON } As a result, the WRMSR can disable VMX on a different CPU that has already done VMXON. This ultimately results in a #UD on VMPTRLD when KVM regains control and attempt run its vCPUs. The above voodoo was confirmed by reworking KVM's VMXON flow to write MSR_TEST_CTRL prior to VMXON, and to serialize the sequence as above. Further verification of the insanity was done by redoing VMXON on all APs after the initial WRMSR->VMXON sequence. The additional VMXON, which should VM-Fail, occasionally succeeded, and also eliminated the unexpected #UD on VMPTRLD. The damage done by writing MSR_TEST_CTRL doesn't appear to be limited to VMX, e.g. after suspend with an active KVM guest, subsequent reboots almost always hang (even when fudging VMXON), a #UD on a random Jcc was observed, suspend/resume stability is qualitatively poor, and so on and so forth. kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:386! CPU: 1 PID: 2592 Comm: CPU 6/KVM Tainted: G D Hardware name: ASUS Q87M-E/Q87M-E, BIOS 1102 03/03/2014 RIP: 0010:kvm_spurious_fault+0xf/0x20 Call Trace: vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs+0x1fb/0x2b0 vmx_vcpu_load+0x3e/0x160 kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x48/0x260 finish_task_switch+0x140/0x260 __schedule+0x460/0x720 _cond_resched+0x2d/0x40 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x82e/0x1ca0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x363/0x5c0 ksys_ioctl+0x88/0xa0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: dbaba47085b0c ("x86/split_lock: Rework the initialization flow of split lock detection") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200605192605.7439-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
2020-06-05 19:26:05 +00:00
cpu_model_supports_sld = true;
split_lock_setup();
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
2020-01-26 20:05:35 +00:00
}