linux-stable/mm/secretmem.c

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mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Copyright IBM Corporation, 2021
*
* Author: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
*/
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/memfd.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/pseudo_fs.h>
#include <linux/secretmem.h>
#include <linux/set_memory.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <uapi/linux/magic.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include "internal.h"
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "secretmem: " fmt
/*
* Define mode and flag masks to allow validation of the system call
* parameters.
*/
#define SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK (0x0)
#define SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK SECRETMEM_MODE_MASK
static bool secretmem_enable __ro_after_init;
module_param_named(enable, secretmem_enable, bool, 0400);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(secretmem_enable,
"Enable secretmem and memfd_secret(2) system call");
static atomic_t secretmem_users;
PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings. Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-6-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:07 +00:00
bool secretmem_active(void)
{
return !!atomic_read(&secretmem_users);
PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings. Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-6-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:07 +00:00
}
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file);
pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff;
gfp_t gfp = vmf->gfp_mask;
unsigned long addr;
struct page *page;
secretmem: fix unhandled fault in truncate syzkaller reports the following issue: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888021f7e005 PGD 11401067 P4D 11401067 PUD 11402067 PMD 21f7d063 PTE 800fffffde081060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 3761 Comm: syz-executor281 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00014-g941e3e791269 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S:64 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000329fa90 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000ffb RDX: 0000000000000ffb RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888021f7e005 RBP: ffffea000087df80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888021f7e005 R10: ffffed10043efdff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000ffb FS: 00007fb29d8b2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff888021f7e005 CR3: 0000000026e7b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> zero_user_segments include/linux/highmem.h:272 [inline] folio_zero_range include/linux/highmem.h:428 [inline] truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x76a/0xdf0 mm/truncate.c:237 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x83b/0x1530 mm/truncate.c:381 truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:452 [inline] truncate_pagecache+0x63/0x90 mm/truncate.c:753 simple_setattr+0xed/0x110 fs/libfs.c:535 secretmem_setattr+0xae/0xf0 mm/secretmem.c:170 notify_change+0xb8c/0x12b0 fs/attr.c:424 do_truncate+0x13c/0x200 fs/open.c:65 do_sys_ftruncate+0x536/0x730 fs/open.c:193 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7fb29d900899 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb29d8b2318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb29d988408 RCX: 00007fb29d900899 RDX: 00007fb29d900899 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fb29d988400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb29d98840c R13: 00007ffca01a23bf R14: 00007fb29d8b2400 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: ffff888021f7e005 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Eric Biggers suggested that this happens when secretmem_setattr()->simple_setattr() races with secretmem_fault() so that a page that is faulted in by secretmem_fault() (and thus removed from the direct map) is zeroed by inode truncation right afterwards. Use mapping->invalidate_lock to make secretmem_fault() and secretmem_setattr() mutually exclusive. [rppt@linux.ibm.com: v3] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220714091337.412297-1-rppt@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220707165650.248088-1-rppt@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-07-07 16:56:50 +00:00
vm_fault_t ret;
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
int err;
if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode))
return vmf_error(-EINVAL);
secretmem: fix unhandled fault in truncate syzkaller reports the following issue: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888021f7e005 PGD 11401067 P4D 11401067 PUD 11402067 PMD 21f7d063 PTE 800fffffde081060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 3761 Comm: syz-executor281 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00014-g941e3e791269 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S:64 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000329fa90 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000ffb RDX: 0000000000000ffb RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888021f7e005 RBP: ffffea000087df80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888021f7e005 R10: ffffed10043efdff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000ffb FS: 00007fb29d8b2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff888021f7e005 CR3: 0000000026e7b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> zero_user_segments include/linux/highmem.h:272 [inline] folio_zero_range include/linux/highmem.h:428 [inline] truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x76a/0xdf0 mm/truncate.c:237 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x83b/0x1530 mm/truncate.c:381 truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:452 [inline] truncate_pagecache+0x63/0x90 mm/truncate.c:753 simple_setattr+0xed/0x110 fs/libfs.c:535 secretmem_setattr+0xae/0xf0 mm/secretmem.c:170 notify_change+0xb8c/0x12b0 fs/attr.c:424 do_truncate+0x13c/0x200 fs/open.c:65 do_sys_ftruncate+0x536/0x730 fs/open.c:193 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7fb29d900899 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb29d8b2318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb29d988408 RCX: 00007fb29d900899 RDX: 00007fb29d900899 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fb29d988400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb29d98840c R13: 00007ffca01a23bf R14: 00007fb29d8b2400 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: ffff888021f7e005 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Eric Biggers suggested that this happens when secretmem_setattr()->simple_setattr() races with secretmem_fault() so that a page that is faulted in by secretmem_fault() (and thus removed from the direct map) is zeroed by inode truncation right afterwards. Use mapping->invalidate_lock to make secretmem_fault() and secretmem_setattr() mutually exclusive. [rppt@linux.ibm.com: v3] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220714091337.412297-1-rppt@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220707165650.248088-1-rppt@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-07-07 16:56:50 +00:00
filemap_invalidate_lock_shared(mapping);
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
retry:
page = find_lock_page(mapping, offset);
if (!page) {
page = alloc_page(gfp | __GFP_ZERO);
secretmem: fix unhandled fault in truncate syzkaller reports the following issue: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888021f7e005 PGD 11401067 P4D 11401067 PUD 11402067 PMD 21f7d063 PTE 800fffffde081060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 3761 Comm: syz-executor281 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00014-g941e3e791269 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S:64 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000329fa90 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000ffb RDX: 0000000000000ffb RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888021f7e005 RBP: ffffea000087df80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888021f7e005 R10: ffffed10043efdff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000ffb FS: 00007fb29d8b2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff888021f7e005 CR3: 0000000026e7b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> zero_user_segments include/linux/highmem.h:272 [inline] folio_zero_range include/linux/highmem.h:428 [inline] truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x76a/0xdf0 mm/truncate.c:237 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x83b/0x1530 mm/truncate.c:381 truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:452 [inline] truncate_pagecache+0x63/0x90 mm/truncate.c:753 simple_setattr+0xed/0x110 fs/libfs.c:535 secretmem_setattr+0xae/0xf0 mm/secretmem.c:170 notify_change+0xb8c/0x12b0 fs/attr.c:424 do_truncate+0x13c/0x200 fs/open.c:65 do_sys_ftruncate+0x536/0x730 fs/open.c:193 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7fb29d900899 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb29d8b2318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb29d988408 RCX: 00007fb29d900899 RDX: 00007fb29d900899 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fb29d988400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb29d98840c R13: 00007ffca01a23bf R14: 00007fb29d8b2400 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: ffff888021f7e005 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Eric Biggers suggested that this happens when secretmem_setattr()->simple_setattr() races with secretmem_fault() so that a page that is faulted in by secretmem_fault() (and thus removed from the direct map) is zeroed by inode truncation right afterwards. Use mapping->invalidate_lock to make secretmem_fault() and secretmem_setattr() mutually exclusive. [rppt@linux.ibm.com: v3] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220714091337.412297-1-rppt@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220707165650.248088-1-rppt@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-07-07 16:56:50 +00:00
if (!page) {
ret = VM_FAULT_OOM;
goto out;
}
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page);
if (err) {
put_page(page);
secretmem: fix unhandled fault in truncate syzkaller reports the following issue: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888021f7e005 PGD 11401067 P4D 11401067 PUD 11402067 PMD 21f7d063 PTE 800fffffde081060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 3761 Comm: syz-executor281 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00014-g941e3e791269 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S:64 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000329fa90 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000ffb RDX: 0000000000000ffb RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888021f7e005 RBP: ffffea000087df80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888021f7e005 R10: ffffed10043efdff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000ffb FS: 00007fb29d8b2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff888021f7e005 CR3: 0000000026e7b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> zero_user_segments include/linux/highmem.h:272 [inline] folio_zero_range include/linux/highmem.h:428 [inline] truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x76a/0xdf0 mm/truncate.c:237 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x83b/0x1530 mm/truncate.c:381 truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:452 [inline] truncate_pagecache+0x63/0x90 mm/truncate.c:753 simple_setattr+0xed/0x110 fs/libfs.c:535 secretmem_setattr+0xae/0xf0 mm/secretmem.c:170 notify_change+0xb8c/0x12b0 fs/attr.c:424 do_truncate+0x13c/0x200 fs/open.c:65 do_sys_ftruncate+0x536/0x730 fs/open.c:193 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7fb29d900899 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb29d8b2318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb29d988408 RCX: 00007fb29d900899 RDX: 00007fb29d900899 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fb29d988400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb29d98840c R13: 00007ffca01a23bf R14: 00007fb29d8b2400 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: ffff888021f7e005 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Eric Biggers suggested that this happens when secretmem_setattr()->simple_setattr() races with secretmem_fault() so that a page that is faulted in by secretmem_fault() (and thus removed from the direct map) is zeroed by inode truncation right afterwards. Use mapping->invalidate_lock to make secretmem_fault() and secretmem_setattr() mutually exclusive. [rppt@linux.ibm.com: v3] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220714091337.412297-1-rppt@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220707165650.248088-1-rppt@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-07-07 16:56:50 +00:00
ret = vmf_error(err);
goto out;
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
}
__SetPageUptodate(page);
err = add_to_page_cache_lru(page, mapping, offset, gfp);
if (unlikely(err)) {
put_page(page);
/*
* If a split of large page was required, it
* already happened when we marked the page invalid
* which guarantees that this call won't fail
*/
set_direct_map_default_noflush(page);
if (err == -EEXIST)
goto retry;
secretmem: fix unhandled fault in truncate syzkaller reports the following issue: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888021f7e005 PGD 11401067 P4D 11401067 PUD 11402067 PMD 21f7d063 PTE 800fffffde081060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 3761 Comm: syz-executor281 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00014-g941e3e791269 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S:64 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000329fa90 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000ffb RDX: 0000000000000ffb RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888021f7e005 RBP: ffffea000087df80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888021f7e005 R10: ffffed10043efdff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000ffb FS: 00007fb29d8b2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff888021f7e005 CR3: 0000000026e7b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> zero_user_segments include/linux/highmem.h:272 [inline] folio_zero_range include/linux/highmem.h:428 [inline] truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x76a/0xdf0 mm/truncate.c:237 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x83b/0x1530 mm/truncate.c:381 truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:452 [inline] truncate_pagecache+0x63/0x90 mm/truncate.c:753 simple_setattr+0xed/0x110 fs/libfs.c:535 secretmem_setattr+0xae/0xf0 mm/secretmem.c:170 notify_change+0xb8c/0x12b0 fs/attr.c:424 do_truncate+0x13c/0x200 fs/open.c:65 do_sys_ftruncate+0x536/0x730 fs/open.c:193 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7fb29d900899 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb29d8b2318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb29d988408 RCX: 00007fb29d900899 RDX: 00007fb29d900899 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fb29d988400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb29d98840c R13: 00007ffca01a23bf R14: 00007fb29d8b2400 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: ffff888021f7e005 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Eric Biggers suggested that this happens when secretmem_setattr()->simple_setattr() races with secretmem_fault() so that a page that is faulted in by secretmem_fault() (and thus removed from the direct map) is zeroed by inode truncation right afterwards. Use mapping->invalidate_lock to make secretmem_fault() and secretmem_setattr() mutually exclusive. [rppt@linux.ibm.com: v3] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220714091337.412297-1-rppt@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220707165650.248088-1-rppt@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-07-07 16:56:50 +00:00
ret = vmf_error(err);
goto out;
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
}
addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE);
}
vmf->page = page;
secretmem: fix unhandled fault in truncate syzkaller reports the following issue: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888021f7e005 PGD 11401067 P4D 11401067 PUD 11402067 PMD 21f7d063 PTE 800fffffde081060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 3761 Comm: syz-executor281 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00014-g941e3e791269 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S:64 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000329fa90 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000ffb RDX: 0000000000000ffb RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888021f7e005 RBP: ffffea000087df80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888021f7e005 R10: ffffed10043efdff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000ffb FS: 00007fb29d8b2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff888021f7e005 CR3: 0000000026e7b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> zero_user_segments include/linux/highmem.h:272 [inline] folio_zero_range include/linux/highmem.h:428 [inline] truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x76a/0xdf0 mm/truncate.c:237 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x83b/0x1530 mm/truncate.c:381 truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:452 [inline] truncate_pagecache+0x63/0x90 mm/truncate.c:753 simple_setattr+0xed/0x110 fs/libfs.c:535 secretmem_setattr+0xae/0xf0 mm/secretmem.c:170 notify_change+0xb8c/0x12b0 fs/attr.c:424 do_truncate+0x13c/0x200 fs/open.c:65 do_sys_ftruncate+0x536/0x730 fs/open.c:193 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7fb29d900899 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb29d8b2318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb29d988408 RCX: 00007fb29d900899 RDX: 00007fb29d900899 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fb29d988400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb29d98840c R13: 00007ffca01a23bf R14: 00007fb29d8b2400 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: ffff888021f7e005 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Eric Biggers suggested that this happens when secretmem_setattr()->simple_setattr() races with secretmem_fault() so that a page that is faulted in by secretmem_fault() (and thus removed from the direct map) is zeroed by inode truncation right afterwards. Use mapping->invalidate_lock to make secretmem_fault() and secretmem_setattr() mutually exclusive. [rppt@linux.ibm.com: v3] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220714091337.412297-1-rppt@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220707165650.248088-1-rppt@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-07-07 16:56:50 +00:00
ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
out:
filemap_invalidate_unlock_shared(mapping);
return ret;
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
}
static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = {
.fault = secretmem_fault,
};
PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings. Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-6-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:07 +00:00
static int secretmem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
atomic_dec(&secretmem_users);
PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings. Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-6-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:07 +00:00
return 0;
}
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
static int secretmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE)) == 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (mlock_future_check(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED, len))
return -EAGAIN;
vma->vm_flags |= VM_LOCKED | VM_DONTDUMP;
vma->vm_ops = &secretmem_vm_ops;
return 0;
}
bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
return vma->vm_ops == &secretmem_vm_ops;
}
static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = {
PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings. Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-6-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:07 +00:00
.release = secretmem_release,
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
.mmap = secretmem_mmap,
};
static int secretmem_migrate_folio(struct address_space *mapping,
struct folio *dst, struct folio *src, enum migrate_mode mode)
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
{
return -EBUSY;
}
static void secretmem_free_folio(struct folio *folio)
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
{
set_direct_map_default_noflush(&folio->page);
folio_zero_segment(folio, 0, folio_size(folio));
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
}
const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops = {
.dirty_folio = noop_dirty_folio,
.free_folio = secretmem_free_folio,
.migrate_folio = secretmem_migrate_folio,
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
};
mm/secretmem: fix panic when growing a memfd_secret When one tries to grow an existing memfd_secret with ftruncate, one gets a panic [1]. For example, doing the following reliably induces the panic: fd = memfd_secret(); ftruncate(fd, 10); ptr = mmap(NULL, 10, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); strcpy(ptr, "123456789"); munmap(ptr, 10); ftruncate(fd, 20); The basic reason for this is, when we grow with ftruncate, we call down into simple_setattr, and then truncate_inode_pages_range, and eventually we try to zero part of the memory. The normal truncation code does this via the direct map (i.e., it calls page_address() and hands that to memset()). For memfd_secret though, we specifically don't map our pages via the direct map (i.e. we call set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() on every fault). So the address returned by page_address() isn't useful, and when we try to memset() with it we panic. This patch avoids the panic by implementing a custom setattr for memfd_secret, which detects resizes specifically (setting the size for the first time works just fine, since there are no existing pages to try to zero), and rejects them with EINVAL. One could argue growing should be supported, but I think that will require a significantly more lengthy change. So, I propose a minimal fix for the benefit of stable kernels, and then perhaps to extend memfd_secret to support growing in a separate patch. [1]: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa0a889277028 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD afa01067 P4D afa01067 PUD 83f909067 PMD 83f8bf067 PTE 800ffffef6d88060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI CPU: 0 PID: 281 Comm: repro Not tainted 5.17.0-dbg-DEV #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffb932c09afbf0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffda63c4249dc0 RCX: 0000000000000fd8 RDX: 0000000000000fd8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa0a889277028 RBP: ffffb932c09afc00 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffffa0a889277028 R10: 0000000000020023 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffda63c4249dc0 R13: ffffa0a890d70d98 R14: 0000000000000028 R15: 0000000000000fd8 FS: 00007f7294899580(0000) GS:ffffa0af9bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffa0a889277028 CR3: 0000000107ef6006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? zero_user_segments+0x82/0x190 truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xd4/0x2a0 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x380/0x830 truncate_setsize+0x63/0x80 simple_setattr+0x37/0x60 notify_change+0x3d8/0x4d0 do_sys_ftruncate+0x162/0x1d0 __x64_sys_ftruncate+0x1c/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Modules linked in: xhci_pci xhci_hcd virtio_net net_failover failover virtio_blk virtio_balloon uhci_hcd ohci_pci ohci_hcd evdev ehci_pci ehci_hcd 9pnet_virtio 9p netfs 9pnet CR2: ffffa0a889277028 [lkp@intel.com: secretmem_iops can be static] Signed-off-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> [axelrasmussen@google.com: return EINVAL] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220324210909.1843814-1-axelrasmussen@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220412193023.279320-1-axelrasmussen@google.com Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-15 02:13:31 +00:00
static int secretmem_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
secretmem: fix unhandled fault in truncate syzkaller reports the following issue: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888021f7e005 PGD 11401067 P4D 11401067 PUD 11402067 PMD 21f7d063 PTE 800fffffde081060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 3761 Comm: syz-executor281 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00014-g941e3e791269 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S:64 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000329fa90 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000ffb RDX: 0000000000000ffb RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888021f7e005 RBP: ffffea000087df80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888021f7e005 R10: ffffed10043efdff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000ffb FS: 00007fb29d8b2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff888021f7e005 CR3: 0000000026e7b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> zero_user_segments include/linux/highmem.h:272 [inline] folio_zero_range include/linux/highmem.h:428 [inline] truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x76a/0xdf0 mm/truncate.c:237 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x83b/0x1530 mm/truncate.c:381 truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:452 [inline] truncate_pagecache+0x63/0x90 mm/truncate.c:753 simple_setattr+0xed/0x110 fs/libfs.c:535 secretmem_setattr+0xae/0xf0 mm/secretmem.c:170 notify_change+0xb8c/0x12b0 fs/attr.c:424 do_truncate+0x13c/0x200 fs/open.c:65 do_sys_ftruncate+0x536/0x730 fs/open.c:193 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7fb29d900899 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb29d8b2318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb29d988408 RCX: 00007fb29d900899 RDX: 00007fb29d900899 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fb29d988400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb29d98840c R13: 00007ffca01a23bf R14: 00007fb29d8b2400 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: ffff888021f7e005 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Eric Biggers suggested that this happens when secretmem_setattr()->simple_setattr() races with secretmem_fault() so that a page that is faulted in by secretmem_fault() (and thus removed from the direct map) is zeroed by inode truncation right afterwards. Use mapping->invalidate_lock to make secretmem_fault() and secretmem_setattr() mutually exclusive. [rppt@linux.ibm.com: v3] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220714091337.412297-1-rppt@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220707165650.248088-1-rppt@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-07-07 16:56:50 +00:00
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
mm/secretmem: fix panic when growing a memfd_secret When one tries to grow an existing memfd_secret with ftruncate, one gets a panic [1]. For example, doing the following reliably induces the panic: fd = memfd_secret(); ftruncate(fd, 10); ptr = mmap(NULL, 10, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); strcpy(ptr, "123456789"); munmap(ptr, 10); ftruncate(fd, 20); The basic reason for this is, when we grow with ftruncate, we call down into simple_setattr, and then truncate_inode_pages_range, and eventually we try to zero part of the memory. The normal truncation code does this via the direct map (i.e., it calls page_address() and hands that to memset()). For memfd_secret though, we specifically don't map our pages via the direct map (i.e. we call set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() on every fault). So the address returned by page_address() isn't useful, and when we try to memset() with it we panic. This patch avoids the panic by implementing a custom setattr for memfd_secret, which detects resizes specifically (setting the size for the first time works just fine, since there are no existing pages to try to zero), and rejects them with EINVAL. One could argue growing should be supported, but I think that will require a significantly more lengthy change. So, I propose a minimal fix for the benefit of stable kernels, and then perhaps to extend memfd_secret to support growing in a separate patch. [1]: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa0a889277028 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD afa01067 P4D afa01067 PUD 83f909067 PMD 83f8bf067 PTE 800ffffef6d88060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI CPU: 0 PID: 281 Comm: repro Not tainted 5.17.0-dbg-DEV #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffb932c09afbf0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffda63c4249dc0 RCX: 0000000000000fd8 RDX: 0000000000000fd8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa0a889277028 RBP: ffffb932c09afc00 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffffa0a889277028 R10: 0000000000020023 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffda63c4249dc0 R13: ffffa0a890d70d98 R14: 0000000000000028 R15: 0000000000000fd8 FS: 00007f7294899580(0000) GS:ffffa0af9bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffa0a889277028 CR3: 0000000107ef6006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? zero_user_segments+0x82/0x190 truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xd4/0x2a0 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x380/0x830 truncate_setsize+0x63/0x80 simple_setattr+0x37/0x60 notify_change+0x3d8/0x4d0 do_sys_ftruncate+0x162/0x1d0 __x64_sys_ftruncate+0x1c/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Modules linked in: xhci_pci xhci_hcd virtio_net net_failover failover virtio_blk virtio_balloon uhci_hcd ohci_pci ohci_hcd evdev ehci_pci ehci_hcd 9pnet_virtio 9p netfs 9pnet CR2: ffffa0a889277028 [lkp@intel.com: secretmem_iops can be static] Signed-off-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> [axelrasmussen@google.com: return EINVAL] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220324210909.1843814-1-axelrasmussen@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220412193023.279320-1-axelrasmussen@google.com Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-15 02:13:31 +00:00
unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
secretmem: fix unhandled fault in truncate syzkaller reports the following issue: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888021f7e005 PGD 11401067 P4D 11401067 PUD 11402067 PMD 21f7d063 PTE 800fffffde081060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 3761 Comm: syz-executor281 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00014-g941e3e791269 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S:64 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000329fa90 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000ffb RDX: 0000000000000ffb RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888021f7e005 RBP: ffffea000087df80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888021f7e005 R10: ffffed10043efdff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000ffb FS: 00007fb29d8b2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff888021f7e005 CR3: 0000000026e7b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> zero_user_segments include/linux/highmem.h:272 [inline] folio_zero_range include/linux/highmem.h:428 [inline] truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x76a/0xdf0 mm/truncate.c:237 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x83b/0x1530 mm/truncate.c:381 truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:452 [inline] truncate_pagecache+0x63/0x90 mm/truncate.c:753 simple_setattr+0xed/0x110 fs/libfs.c:535 secretmem_setattr+0xae/0xf0 mm/secretmem.c:170 notify_change+0xb8c/0x12b0 fs/attr.c:424 do_truncate+0x13c/0x200 fs/open.c:65 do_sys_ftruncate+0x536/0x730 fs/open.c:193 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7fb29d900899 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb29d8b2318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb29d988408 RCX: 00007fb29d900899 RDX: 00007fb29d900899 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fb29d988400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb29d98840c R13: 00007ffca01a23bf R14: 00007fb29d8b2400 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: ffff888021f7e005 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Eric Biggers suggested that this happens when secretmem_setattr()->simple_setattr() races with secretmem_fault() so that a page that is faulted in by secretmem_fault() (and thus removed from the direct map) is zeroed by inode truncation right afterwards. Use mapping->invalidate_lock to make secretmem_fault() and secretmem_setattr() mutually exclusive. [rppt@linux.ibm.com: v3] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220714091337.412297-1-rppt@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220707165650.248088-1-rppt@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-07-07 16:56:50 +00:00
int ret;
filemap_invalidate_lock(mapping);
mm/secretmem: fix panic when growing a memfd_secret When one tries to grow an existing memfd_secret with ftruncate, one gets a panic [1]. For example, doing the following reliably induces the panic: fd = memfd_secret(); ftruncate(fd, 10); ptr = mmap(NULL, 10, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); strcpy(ptr, "123456789"); munmap(ptr, 10); ftruncate(fd, 20); The basic reason for this is, when we grow with ftruncate, we call down into simple_setattr, and then truncate_inode_pages_range, and eventually we try to zero part of the memory. The normal truncation code does this via the direct map (i.e., it calls page_address() and hands that to memset()). For memfd_secret though, we specifically don't map our pages via the direct map (i.e. we call set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() on every fault). So the address returned by page_address() isn't useful, and when we try to memset() with it we panic. This patch avoids the panic by implementing a custom setattr for memfd_secret, which detects resizes specifically (setting the size for the first time works just fine, since there are no existing pages to try to zero), and rejects them with EINVAL. One could argue growing should be supported, but I think that will require a significantly more lengthy change. So, I propose a minimal fix for the benefit of stable kernels, and then perhaps to extend memfd_secret to support growing in a separate patch. [1]: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa0a889277028 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD afa01067 P4D afa01067 PUD 83f909067 PMD 83f8bf067 PTE 800ffffef6d88060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI CPU: 0 PID: 281 Comm: repro Not tainted 5.17.0-dbg-DEV #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffb932c09afbf0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffda63c4249dc0 RCX: 0000000000000fd8 RDX: 0000000000000fd8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa0a889277028 RBP: ffffb932c09afc00 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffffa0a889277028 R10: 0000000000020023 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffda63c4249dc0 R13: ffffa0a890d70d98 R14: 0000000000000028 R15: 0000000000000fd8 FS: 00007f7294899580(0000) GS:ffffa0af9bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffa0a889277028 CR3: 0000000107ef6006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? zero_user_segments+0x82/0x190 truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xd4/0x2a0 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x380/0x830 truncate_setsize+0x63/0x80 simple_setattr+0x37/0x60 notify_change+0x3d8/0x4d0 do_sys_ftruncate+0x162/0x1d0 __x64_sys_ftruncate+0x1c/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Modules linked in: xhci_pci xhci_hcd virtio_net net_failover failover virtio_blk virtio_balloon uhci_hcd ohci_pci ohci_hcd evdev ehci_pci ehci_hcd 9pnet_virtio 9p netfs 9pnet CR2: ffffa0a889277028 [lkp@intel.com: secretmem_iops can be static] Signed-off-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> [axelrasmussen@google.com: return EINVAL] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220324210909.1843814-1-axelrasmussen@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220412193023.279320-1-axelrasmussen@google.com Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-15 02:13:31 +00:00
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) && inode->i_size)
secretmem: fix unhandled fault in truncate syzkaller reports the following issue: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888021f7e005 PGD 11401067 P4D 11401067 PUD 11402067 PMD 21f7d063 PTE 800fffffde081060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 3761 Comm: syz-executor281 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00014-g941e3e791269 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S:64 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000329fa90 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000ffb RDX: 0000000000000ffb RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888021f7e005 RBP: ffffea000087df80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888021f7e005 R10: ffffed10043efdff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000ffb FS: 00007fb29d8b2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff888021f7e005 CR3: 0000000026e7b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> zero_user_segments include/linux/highmem.h:272 [inline] folio_zero_range include/linux/highmem.h:428 [inline] truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x76a/0xdf0 mm/truncate.c:237 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x83b/0x1530 mm/truncate.c:381 truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:452 [inline] truncate_pagecache+0x63/0x90 mm/truncate.c:753 simple_setattr+0xed/0x110 fs/libfs.c:535 secretmem_setattr+0xae/0xf0 mm/secretmem.c:170 notify_change+0xb8c/0x12b0 fs/attr.c:424 do_truncate+0x13c/0x200 fs/open.c:65 do_sys_ftruncate+0x536/0x730 fs/open.c:193 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7fb29d900899 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb29d8b2318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb29d988408 RCX: 00007fb29d900899 RDX: 00007fb29d900899 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fb29d988400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb29d98840c R13: 00007ffca01a23bf R14: 00007fb29d8b2400 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: ffff888021f7e005 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Eric Biggers suggested that this happens when secretmem_setattr()->simple_setattr() races with secretmem_fault() so that a page that is faulted in by secretmem_fault() (and thus removed from the direct map) is zeroed by inode truncation right afterwards. Use mapping->invalidate_lock to make secretmem_fault() and secretmem_setattr() mutually exclusive. [rppt@linux.ibm.com: v3] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220714091337.412297-1-rppt@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220707165650.248088-1-rppt@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-07-07 16:56:50 +00:00
ret = -EINVAL;
else
ret = simple_setattr(mnt_userns, dentry, iattr);
filemap_invalidate_unlock(mapping);
mm/secretmem: fix panic when growing a memfd_secret When one tries to grow an existing memfd_secret with ftruncate, one gets a panic [1]. For example, doing the following reliably induces the panic: fd = memfd_secret(); ftruncate(fd, 10); ptr = mmap(NULL, 10, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); strcpy(ptr, "123456789"); munmap(ptr, 10); ftruncate(fd, 20); The basic reason for this is, when we grow with ftruncate, we call down into simple_setattr, and then truncate_inode_pages_range, and eventually we try to zero part of the memory. The normal truncation code does this via the direct map (i.e., it calls page_address() and hands that to memset()). For memfd_secret though, we specifically don't map our pages via the direct map (i.e. we call set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() on every fault). So the address returned by page_address() isn't useful, and when we try to memset() with it we panic. This patch avoids the panic by implementing a custom setattr for memfd_secret, which detects resizes specifically (setting the size for the first time works just fine, since there are no existing pages to try to zero), and rejects them with EINVAL. One could argue growing should be supported, but I think that will require a significantly more lengthy change. So, I propose a minimal fix for the benefit of stable kernels, and then perhaps to extend memfd_secret to support growing in a separate patch. [1]: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa0a889277028 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD afa01067 P4D afa01067 PUD 83f909067 PMD 83f8bf067 PTE 800ffffef6d88060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI CPU: 0 PID: 281 Comm: repro Not tainted 5.17.0-dbg-DEV #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffb932c09afbf0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffda63c4249dc0 RCX: 0000000000000fd8 RDX: 0000000000000fd8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa0a889277028 RBP: ffffb932c09afc00 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffffa0a889277028 R10: 0000000000020023 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffda63c4249dc0 R13: ffffa0a890d70d98 R14: 0000000000000028 R15: 0000000000000fd8 FS: 00007f7294899580(0000) GS:ffffa0af9bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffa0a889277028 CR3: 0000000107ef6006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? zero_user_segments+0x82/0x190 truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xd4/0x2a0 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x380/0x830 truncate_setsize+0x63/0x80 simple_setattr+0x37/0x60 notify_change+0x3d8/0x4d0 do_sys_ftruncate+0x162/0x1d0 __x64_sys_ftruncate+0x1c/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Modules linked in: xhci_pci xhci_hcd virtio_net net_failover failover virtio_blk virtio_balloon uhci_hcd ohci_pci ohci_hcd evdev ehci_pci ehci_hcd 9pnet_virtio 9p netfs 9pnet CR2: ffffa0a889277028 [lkp@intel.com: secretmem_iops can be static] Signed-off-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> [axelrasmussen@google.com: return EINVAL] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220324210909.1843814-1-axelrasmussen@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220412193023.279320-1-axelrasmussen@google.com Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-15 02:13:31 +00:00
secretmem: fix unhandled fault in truncate syzkaller reports the following issue: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888021f7e005 PGD 11401067 P4D 11401067 PUD 11402067 PMD 21f7d063 PTE 800fffffde081060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 3761 Comm: syz-executor281 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00014-g941e3e791269 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S:64 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000329fa90 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000ffb RDX: 0000000000000ffb RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888021f7e005 RBP: ffffea000087df80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888021f7e005 R10: ffffed10043efdff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000ffb FS: 00007fb29d8b2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff888021f7e005 CR3: 0000000026e7b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> zero_user_segments include/linux/highmem.h:272 [inline] folio_zero_range include/linux/highmem.h:428 [inline] truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x76a/0xdf0 mm/truncate.c:237 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x83b/0x1530 mm/truncate.c:381 truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:452 [inline] truncate_pagecache+0x63/0x90 mm/truncate.c:753 simple_setattr+0xed/0x110 fs/libfs.c:535 secretmem_setattr+0xae/0xf0 mm/secretmem.c:170 notify_change+0xb8c/0x12b0 fs/attr.c:424 do_truncate+0x13c/0x200 fs/open.c:65 do_sys_ftruncate+0x536/0x730 fs/open.c:193 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7fb29d900899 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb29d8b2318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb29d988408 RCX: 00007fb29d900899 RDX: 00007fb29d900899 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fb29d988400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb29d98840c R13: 00007ffca01a23bf R14: 00007fb29d8b2400 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: ffff888021f7e005 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Eric Biggers suggested that this happens when secretmem_setattr()->simple_setattr() races with secretmem_fault() so that a page that is faulted in by secretmem_fault() (and thus removed from the direct map) is zeroed by inode truncation right afterwards. Use mapping->invalidate_lock to make secretmem_fault() and secretmem_setattr() mutually exclusive. [rppt@linux.ibm.com: v3] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220714091337.412297-1-rppt@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220707165650.248088-1-rppt@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-07-07 16:56:50 +00:00
return ret;
mm/secretmem: fix panic when growing a memfd_secret When one tries to grow an existing memfd_secret with ftruncate, one gets a panic [1]. For example, doing the following reliably induces the panic: fd = memfd_secret(); ftruncate(fd, 10); ptr = mmap(NULL, 10, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); strcpy(ptr, "123456789"); munmap(ptr, 10); ftruncate(fd, 20); The basic reason for this is, when we grow with ftruncate, we call down into simple_setattr, and then truncate_inode_pages_range, and eventually we try to zero part of the memory. The normal truncation code does this via the direct map (i.e., it calls page_address() and hands that to memset()). For memfd_secret though, we specifically don't map our pages via the direct map (i.e. we call set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() on every fault). So the address returned by page_address() isn't useful, and when we try to memset() with it we panic. This patch avoids the panic by implementing a custom setattr for memfd_secret, which detects resizes specifically (setting the size for the first time works just fine, since there are no existing pages to try to zero), and rejects them with EINVAL. One could argue growing should be supported, but I think that will require a significantly more lengthy change. So, I propose a minimal fix for the benefit of stable kernels, and then perhaps to extend memfd_secret to support growing in a separate patch. [1]: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa0a889277028 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD afa01067 P4D afa01067 PUD 83f909067 PMD 83f8bf067 PTE 800ffffef6d88060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI CPU: 0 PID: 281 Comm: repro Not tainted 5.17.0-dbg-DEV #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffb932c09afbf0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffda63c4249dc0 RCX: 0000000000000fd8 RDX: 0000000000000fd8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa0a889277028 RBP: ffffb932c09afc00 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffffa0a889277028 R10: 0000000000020023 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffda63c4249dc0 R13: ffffa0a890d70d98 R14: 0000000000000028 R15: 0000000000000fd8 FS: 00007f7294899580(0000) GS:ffffa0af9bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffa0a889277028 CR3: 0000000107ef6006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? zero_user_segments+0x82/0x190 truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xd4/0x2a0 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x380/0x830 truncate_setsize+0x63/0x80 simple_setattr+0x37/0x60 notify_change+0x3d8/0x4d0 do_sys_ftruncate+0x162/0x1d0 __x64_sys_ftruncate+0x1c/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Modules linked in: xhci_pci xhci_hcd virtio_net net_failover failover virtio_blk virtio_balloon uhci_hcd ohci_pci ohci_hcd evdev ehci_pci ehci_hcd 9pnet_virtio 9p netfs 9pnet CR2: ffffa0a889277028 [lkp@intel.com: secretmem_iops can be static] Signed-off-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> [axelrasmussen@google.com: return EINVAL] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220324210909.1843814-1-axelrasmussen@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220412193023.279320-1-axelrasmussen@google.com Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-15 02:13:31 +00:00
}
static const struct inode_operations secretmem_iops = {
.setattr = secretmem_setattr,
};
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
static struct vfsmount *secretmem_mnt;
static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
{
struct file *file = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
struct inode *inode;
const char *anon_name = "[secretmem]";
const struct qstr qname = QSTR_INIT(anon_name, strlen(anon_name));
int err;
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
inode = alloc_anon_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
return ERR_CAST(inode);
err = security_inode_init_security_anon(inode, &qname, NULL);
if (err) {
file = ERR_PTR(err);
goto err_free_inode;
}
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem",
O_RDWR, &secretmem_fops);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto err_free_inode;
mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_HIGHUSER);
mapping_set_unevictable(inode->i_mapping);
mm/secretmem: fix panic when growing a memfd_secret When one tries to grow an existing memfd_secret with ftruncate, one gets a panic [1]. For example, doing the following reliably induces the panic: fd = memfd_secret(); ftruncate(fd, 10); ptr = mmap(NULL, 10, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); strcpy(ptr, "123456789"); munmap(ptr, 10); ftruncate(fd, 20); The basic reason for this is, when we grow with ftruncate, we call down into simple_setattr, and then truncate_inode_pages_range, and eventually we try to zero part of the memory. The normal truncation code does this via the direct map (i.e., it calls page_address() and hands that to memset()). For memfd_secret though, we specifically don't map our pages via the direct map (i.e. we call set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() on every fault). So the address returned by page_address() isn't useful, and when we try to memset() with it we panic. This patch avoids the panic by implementing a custom setattr for memfd_secret, which detects resizes specifically (setting the size for the first time works just fine, since there are no existing pages to try to zero), and rejects them with EINVAL. One could argue growing should be supported, but I think that will require a significantly more lengthy change. So, I propose a minimal fix for the benefit of stable kernels, and then perhaps to extend memfd_secret to support growing in a separate patch. [1]: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa0a889277028 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD afa01067 P4D afa01067 PUD 83f909067 PMD 83f8bf067 PTE 800ffffef6d88060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI CPU: 0 PID: 281 Comm: repro Not tainted 5.17.0-dbg-DEV #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffb932c09afbf0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffda63c4249dc0 RCX: 0000000000000fd8 RDX: 0000000000000fd8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa0a889277028 RBP: ffffb932c09afc00 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffffa0a889277028 R10: 0000000000020023 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffda63c4249dc0 R13: ffffa0a890d70d98 R14: 0000000000000028 R15: 0000000000000fd8 FS: 00007f7294899580(0000) GS:ffffa0af9bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffa0a889277028 CR3: 0000000107ef6006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? zero_user_segments+0x82/0x190 truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xd4/0x2a0 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x380/0x830 truncate_setsize+0x63/0x80 simple_setattr+0x37/0x60 notify_change+0x3d8/0x4d0 do_sys_ftruncate+0x162/0x1d0 __x64_sys_ftruncate+0x1c/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Modules linked in: xhci_pci xhci_hcd virtio_net net_failover failover virtio_blk virtio_balloon uhci_hcd ohci_pci ohci_hcd evdev ehci_pci ehci_hcd 9pnet_virtio 9p netfs 9pnet CR2: ffffa0a889277028 [lkp@intel.com: secretmem_iops can be static] Signed-off-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> [axelrasmussen@google.com: return EINVAL] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220324210909.1843814-1-axelrasmussen@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220412193023.279320-1-axelrasmussen@google.com Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-15 02:13:31 +00:00
inode->i_op = &secretmem_iops;
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &secretmem_aops;
/* pretend we are a normal file with zero size */
inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
inode->i_size = 0;
return file;
err_free_inode:
iput(inode);
return file;
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned int, flags)
{
struct file *file;
int fd, err;
/* make sure local flags do not confict with global fcntl.h */
BUILD_BUG_ON(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK & O_CLOEXEC);
if (!secretmem_enable)
return -ENOSYS;
if (flags & ~(SECRETMEM_FLAGS_MASK | O_CLOEXEC))
return -EINVAL;
if (atomic_read(&secretmem_users) < 0)
return -ENFILE;
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
fd = get_unused_fd_flags(flags & O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0)
return fd;
file = secretmem_file_create(flags);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
err = PTR_ERR(file);
goto err_put_fd;
}
file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
atomic_inc(&secretmem_users);
fd_install(fd, file);
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
return fd;
err_put_fd:
put_unused_fd(fd);
return err;
}
static int secretmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
{
return init_pseudo(fc, SECRETMEM_MAGIC) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
}
static struct file_system_type secretmem_fs = {
.name = "secretmem",
.init_fs_context = secretmem_init_fs_context,
.kill_sb = kill_anon_super,
};
static int secretmem_init(void)
{
int ret = 0;
if (!secretmem_enable)
return ret;
secretmem_mnt = kern_mount(&secretmem_fs);
if (IS_ERR(secretmem_mnt))
ret = PTR_ERR(secretmem_mnt);
/* prevent secretmem mappings from ever getting PROT_EXEC */
secretmem_mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_NOEXEC;
return ret;
}
fs_initcall(secretmem_init);