2019-06-03 05:44:50 +00:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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/*
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* arm64 callchain support
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2015 ARM Limited
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*/
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#include <linux/perf_event.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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2018-12-07 18:39:27 +00:00
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#include <asm/pointer_auth.h>
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
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struct frame_tail {
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struct frame_tail __user *fp;
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unsigned long lr;
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} __attribute__((packed));
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/*
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* Get the return address for a single stackframe and return a pointer to the
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* next frame tail.
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*/
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static struct frame_tail __user *
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user_backtrace(struct frame_tail __user *tail,
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2016-04-28 15:30:53 +00:00
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struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry)
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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{
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struct frame_tail buftail;
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unsigned long err;
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2018-12-07 18:39:27 +00:00
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unsigned long lr;
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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/* Also check accessibility of one struct frame_tail beyond */
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Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 02:57:57 +00:00
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if (!access_ok(tail, sizeof(buftail)))
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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return NULL;
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pagefault_disable();
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err = __copy_from_user_inatomic(&buftail, tail, sizeof(buftail));
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pagefault_enable();
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if (err)
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return NULL;
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2018-12-07 18:39:27 +00:00
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lr = ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(buftail.lr);
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perf_callchain_store(entry, lr);
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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/*
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* Frame pointers should strictly progress back up the stack
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* (towards higher addresses).
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*/
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if (tail >= buftail.fp)
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return NULL;
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return buftail.fp;
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
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/*
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* The registers we're interested in are at the end of the variable
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* length saved register structure. The fp points at the end of this
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* structure so the address of this struct is:
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* (struct compat_frame_tail *)(xxx->fp)-1
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*
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* This code has been adapted from the ARM OProfile support.
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*/
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struct compat_frame_tail {
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compat_uptr_t fp; /* a (struct compat_frame_tail *) in compat mode */
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u32 sp;
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u32 lr;
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} __attribute__((packed));
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static struct compat_frame_tail __user *
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compat_user_backtrace(struct compat_frame_tail __user *tail,
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2016-04-28 15:30:53 +00:00
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struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry)
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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{
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struct compat_frame_tail buftail;
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unsigned long err;
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/* Also check accessibility of one struct frame_tail beyond */
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Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 02:57:57 +00:00
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if (!access_ok(tail, sizeof(buftail)))
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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return NULL;
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pagefault_disable();
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err = __copy_from_user_inatomic(&buftail, tail, sizeof(buftail));
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pagefault_enable();
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if (err)
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return NULL;
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perf_callchain_store(entry, buftail.lr);
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/*
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* Frame pointers should strictly progress back up the stack
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* (towards higher addresses).
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*/
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if (tail + 1 >= (struct compat_frame_tail __user *)
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compat_ptr(buftail.fp))
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return NULL;
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return (struct compat_frame_tail __user *)compat_ptr(buftail.fp) - 1;
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
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2016-04-28 15:30:53 +00:00
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void perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry,
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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perf: Protect perf_guest_cbs with RCU
Protect perf_guest_cbs with RCU to fix multiple possible errors. Luckily,
all paths that read perf_guest_cbs already require RCU protection, e.g. to
protect the callback chains, so only the direct perf_guest_cbs touchpoints
need to be modified.
Bug #1 is a simple lack of WRITE_ONCE/READ_ONCE behavior to ensure
perf_guest_cbs isn't reloaded between a !NULL check and a dereference.
Fixed via the READ_ONCE() in rcu_dereference().
Bug #2 is that on weakly-ordered architectures, updates to the callbacks
themselves are not guaranteed to be visible before the pointer is made
visible to readers. Fixed by the smp_store_release() in
rcu_assign_pointer() when the new pointer is non-NULL.
Bug #3 is that, because the callbacks are global, it's possible for
readers to run in parallel with an unregisters, and thus a module
implementing the callbacks can be unloaded while readers are in flight,
resulting in a use-after-free. Fixed by a synchronize_rcu() call when
unregistering callbacks.
Bug #1 escaped notice because it's extremely unlikely a compiler will
reload perf_guest_cbs in this sequence. perf_guest_cbs does get reloaded
for future derefs, e.g. for ->is_user_mode(), but the ->is_in_guest()
guard all but guarantees the consumer will win the race, e.g. to nullify
perf_guest_cbs, KVM has to completely exit the guest and teardown down
all VMs before KVM start its module unload / unregister sequence. This
also makes it all but impossible to encounter bug #3.
Bug #2 has not been a problem because all architectures that register
callbacks are strongly ordered and/or have a static set of callbacks.
But with help, unloading kvm_intel can trigger bug #1 e.g. wrapping
perf_guest_cbs with READ_ONCE in perf_misc_flags() while spamming
kvm_intel module load/unload leads to:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 6 PID: 1825 Comm: stress Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2+ #459
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:perf_misc_flags+0x1c/0x70
Call Trace:
perf_prepare_sample+0x53/0x6b0
perf_event_output_forward+0x67/0x160
__perf_event_overflow+0x52/0xf0
handle_pmi_common+0x207/0x300
intel_pmu_handle_irq+0xcf/0x410
perf_event_nmi_handler+0x28/0x50
nmi_handle+0xc7/0x260
default_do_nmi+0x6b/0x170
exc_nmi+0x103/0x130
asm_exc_nmi+0x76/0xbf
Fixes: 39447b386c84 ("perf: Enhance perf to allow for guest statistic collection from host")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211111020738.2512932-2-seanjc@google.com
2021-11-11 02:07:22 +00:00
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struct perf_guest_info_callbacks *guest_cbs = perf_get_guest_cbs();
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2021-11-11 02:07:27 +00:00
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if (guest_cbs && guest_cbs->state()) {
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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/* We don't support guest os callchain now */
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return;
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}
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perf_callchain_store(entry, regs->pc);
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if (!compat_user_mode(regs)) {
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/* AARCH64 mode */
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struct frame_tail __user *tail;
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tail = (struct frame_tail __user *)regs->regs[29];
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perf core: Add a 'nr' field to perf_event_callchain_context
We will use it to count how many addresses are in the entry->ip[] array,
excluding PERF_CONTEXT_{KERNEL,USER,etc} entries, so that we can really
return the number of entries specified by the user via the relevant
sysctl, kernel.perf_event_max_contexts, or via the per event
perf_event_attr.sample_max_stack knob.
This way we keep the perf_sample->ip_callchain->nr meaning, that is the
number of entries, be it real addresses or PERF_CONTEXT_ entries, while
honouring the max_stack knobs, i.e. the end result will be max_stack
entries if we have at least that many entries in a given stack trace.
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-s8teto51tdqvlfhefndtat9r@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
2016-05-10 21:08:32 +00:00
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while (entry->nr < entry->max_stack &&
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2021-05-26 17:49:26 +00:00
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tail && !((unsigned long)tail & 0x7))
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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tail = user_backtrace(tail, entry);
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} else {
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#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
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/* AARCH32 compat mode */
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struct compat_frame_tail __user *tail;
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tail = (struct compat_frame_tail __user *)regs->compat_fp - 1;
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perf core: Add a 'nr' field to perf_event_callchain_context
We will use it to count how many addresses are in the entry->ip[] array,
excluding PERF_CONTEXT_{KERNEL,USER,etc} entries, so that we can really
return the number of entries specified by the user via the relevant
sysctl, kernel.perf_event_max_contexts, or via the per event
perf_event_attr.sample_max_stack knob.
This way we keep the perf_sample->ip_callchain->nr meaning, that is the
number of entries, be it real addresses or PERF_CONTEXT_ entries, while
honouring the max_stack knobs, i.e. the end result will be max_stack
entries if we have at least that many entries in a given stack trace.
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-s8teto51tdqvlfhefndtat9r@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
2016-05-10 21:08:32 +00:00
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while ((entry->nr < entry->max_stack) &&
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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tail && !((unsigned long)tail & 0x3))
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tail = compat_user_backtrace(tail, entry);
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#endif
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}
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}
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/*
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* Gets called by walk_stackframe() for every stackframe. This will be called
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* whist unwinding the stackframe and is like a subroutine return so we use
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* the PC.
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*/
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2020-09-14 15:34:08 +00:00
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static bool callchain_trace(void *data, unsigned long pc)
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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{
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2016-04-28 15:30:53 +00:00
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struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry = data;
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2020-09-14 15:34:08 +00:00
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perf_callchain_store(entry, pc);
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return true;
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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}
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2016-04-28 15:30:53 +00:00
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void perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry,
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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perf: Protect perf_guest_cbs with RCU
Protect perf_guest_cbs with RCU to fix multiple possible errors. Luckily,
all paths that read perf_guest_cbs already require RCU protection, e.g. to
protect the callback chains, so only the direct perf_guest_cbs touchpoints
need to be modified.
Bug #1 is a simple lack of WRITE_ONCE/READ_ONCE behavior to ensure
perf_guest_cbs isn't reloaded between a !NULL check and a dereference.
Fixed via the READ_ONCE() in rcu_dereference().
Bug #2 is that on weakly-ordered architectures, updates to the callbacks
themselves are not guaranteed to be visible before the pointer is made
visible to readers. Fixed by the smp_store_release() in
rcu_assign_pointer() when the new pointer is non-NULL.
Bug #3 is that, because the callbacks are global, it's possible for
readers to run in parallel with an unregisters, and thus a module
implementing the callbacks can be unloaded while readers are in flight,
resulting in a use-after-free. Fixed by a synchronize_rcu() call when
unregistering callbacks.
Bug #1 escaped notice because it's extremely unlikely a compiler will
reload perf_guest_cbs in this sequence. perf_guest_cbs does get reloaded
for future derefs, e.g. for ->is_user_mode(), but the ->is_in_guest()
guard all but guarantees the consumer will win the race, e.g. to nullify
perf_guest_cbs, KVM has to completely exit the guest and teardown down
all VMs before KVM start its module unload / unregister sequence. This
also makes it all but impossible to encounter bug #3.
Bug #2 has not been a problem because all architectures that register
callbacks are strongly ordered and/or have a static set of callbacks.
But with help, unloading kvm_intel can trigger bug #1 e.g. wrapping
perf_guest_cbs with READ_ONCE in perf_misc_flags() while spamming
kvm_intel module load/unload leads to:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 6 PID: 1825 Comm: stress Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2+ #459
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:perf_misc_flags+0x1c/0x70
Call Trace:
perf_prepare_sample+0x53/0x6b0
perf_event_output_forward+0x67/0x160
__perf_event_overflow+0x52/0xf0
handle_pmi_common+0x207/0x300
intel_pmu_handle_irq+0xcf/0x410
perf_event_nmi_handler+0x28/0x50
nmi_handle+0xc7/0x260
default_do_nmi+0x6b/0x170
exc_nmi+0x103/0x130
asm_exc_nmi+0x76/0xbf
Fixes: 39447b386c84 ("perf: Enhance perf to allow for guest statistic collection from host")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211111020738.2512932-2-seanjc@google.com
2021-11-11 02:07:22 +00:00
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struct perf_guest_info_callbacks *guest_cbs = perf_get_guest_cbs();
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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struct stackframe frame;
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2021-11-11 02:07:27 +00:00
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if (guest_cbs && guest_cbs->state()) {
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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/* We don't support guest os callchain now */
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return;
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}
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2019-07-02 13:07:28 +00:00
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start_backtrace(&frame, regs->regs[29], regs->pc);
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2015-12-15 08:33:40 +00:00
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walk_stackframe(current, &frame, callchain_trace, entry);
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2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
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}
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unsigned long perf_instruction_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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perf: Protect perf_guest_cbs with RCU
Protect perf_guest_cbs with RCU to fix multiple possible errors. Luckily,
all paths that read perf_guest_cbs already require RCU protection, e.g. to
protect the callback chains, so only the direct perf_guest_cbs touchpoints
need to be modified.
Bug #1 is a simple lack of WRITE_ONCE/READ_ONCE behavior to ensure
perf_guest_cbs isn't reloaded between a !NULL check and a dereference.
Fixed via the READ_ONCE() in rcu_dereference().
Bug #2 is that on weakly-ordered architectures, updates to the callbacks
themselves are not guaranteed to be visible before the pointer is made
visible to readers. Fixed by the smp_store_release() in
rcu_assign_pointer() when the new pointer is non-NULL.
Bug #3 is that, because the callbacks are global, it's possible for
readers to run in parallel with an unregisters, and thus a module
implementing the callbacks can be unloaded while readers are in flight,
resulting in a use-after-free. Fixed by a synchronize_rcu() call when
unregistering callbacks.
Bug #1 escaped notice because it's extremely unlikely a compiler will
reload perf_guest_cbs in this sequence. perf_guest_cbs does get reloaded
for future derefs, e.g. for ->is_user_mode(), but the ->is_in_guest()
guard all but guarantees the consumer will win the race, e.g. to nullify
perf_guest_cbs, KVM has to completely exit the guest and teardown down
all VMs before KVM start its module unload / unregister sequence. This
also makes it all but impossible to encounter bug #3.
Bug #2 has not been a problem because all architectures that register
callbacks are strongly ordered and/or have a static set of callbacks.
But with help, unloading kvm_intel can trigger bug #1 e.g. wrapping
perf_guest_cbs with READ_ONCE in perf_misc_flags() while spamming
kvm_intel module load/unload leads to:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 6 PID: 1825 Comm: stress Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2+ #459
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:perf_misc_flags+0x1c/0x70
Call Trace:
perf_prepare_sample+0x53/0x6b0
perf_event_output_forward+0x67/0x160
__perf_event_overflow+0x52/0xf0
handle_pmi_common+0x207/0x300
intel_pmu_handle_irq+0xcf/0x410
perf_event_nmi_handler+0x28/0x50
nmi_handle+0xc7/0x260
default_do_nmi+0x6b/0x170
exc_nmi+0x103/0x130
asm_exc_nmi+0x76/0xbf
Fixes: 39447b386c84 ("perf: Enhance perf to allow for guest statistic collection from host")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211111020738.2512932-2-seanjc@google.com
2021-11-11 02:07:22 +00:00
|
|
|
struct perf_guest_info_callbacks *guest_cbs = perf_get_guest_cbs();
|
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2021-11-11 02:07:27 +00:00
|
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if (guest_cbs && guest_cbs->state())
|
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return guest_cbs->get_ip();
|
2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
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return instruction_pointer(regs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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unsigned long perf_misc_flags(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
perf: Protect perf_guest_cbs with RCU
Protect perf_guest_cbs with RCU to fix multiple possible errors. Luckily,
all paths that read perf_guest_cbs already require RCU protection, e.g. to
protect the callback chains, so only the direct perf_guest_cbs touchpoints
need to be modified.
Bug #1 is a simple lack of WRITE_ONCE/READ_ONCE behavior to ensure
perf_guest_cbs isn't reloaded between a !NULL check and a dereference.
Fixed via the READ_ONCE() in rcu_dereference().
Bug #2 is that on weakly-ordered architectures, updates to the callbacks
themselves are not guaranteed to be visible before the pointer is made
visible to readers. Fixed by the smp_store_release() in
rcu_assign_pointer() when the new pointer is non-NULL.
Bug #3 is that, because the callbacks are global, it's possible for
readers to run in parallel with an unregisters, and thus a module
implementing the callbacks can be unloaded while readers are in flight,
resulting in a use-after-free. Fixed by a synchronize_rcu() call when
unregistering callbacks.
Bug #1 escaped notice because it's extremely unlikely a compiler will
reload perf_guest_cbs in this sequence. perf_guest_cbs does get reloaded
for future derefs, e.g. for ->is_user_mode(), but the ->is_in_guest()
guard all but guarantees the consumer will win the race, e.g. to nullify
perf_guest_cbs, KVM has to completely exit the guest and teardown down
all VMs before KVM start its module unload / unregister sequence. This
also makes it all but impossible to encounter bug #3.
Bug #2 has not been a problem because all architectures that register
callbacks are strongly ordered and/or have a static set of callbacks.
But with help, unloading kvm_intel can trigger bug #1 e.g. wrapping
perf_guest_cbs with READ_ONCE in perf_misc_flags() while spamming
kvm_intel module load/unload leads to:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 6 PID: 1825 Comm: stress Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2+ #459
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:perf_misc_flags+0x1c/0x70
Call Trace:
perf_prepare_sample+0x53/0x6b0
perf_event_output_forward+0x67/0x160
__perf_event_overflow+0x52/0xf0
handle_pmi_common+0x207/0x300
intel_pmu_handle_irq+0xcf/0x410
perf_event_nmi_handler+0x28/0x50
nmi_handle+0xc7/0x260
default_do_nmi+0x6b/0x170
exc_nmi+0x103/0x130
asm_exc_nmi+0x76/0xbf
Fixes: 39447b386c84 ("perf: Enhance perf to allow for guest statistic collection from host")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211111020738.2512932-2-seanjc@google.com
2021-11-11 02:07:22 +00:00
|
|
|
struct perf_guest_info_callbacks *guest_cbs = perf_get_guest_cbs();
|
2021-11-11 02:07:27 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int guest_state = guest_cbs ? guest_cbs->state() : 0;
|
2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
|
|
|
int misc = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-11 02:07:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (guest_state) {
|
|
|
|
if (guest_state & PERF_GUEST_USER)
|
2015-07-06 11:23:54 +00:00
|
|
|
misc |= PERF_RECORD_MISC_GUEST_USER;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
misc |= PERF_RECORD_MISC_GUEST_KERNEL;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (user_mode(regs))
|
|
|
|
misc |= PERF_RECORD_MISC_USER;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
misc |= PERF_RECORD_MISC_KERNEL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return misc;
|
|
|
|
}
|