License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#
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# Cryptographic API
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#
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2008-03-30 08:36:09 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO) += crypto.o
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2022-05-28 10:24:29 +00:00
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crypto-y := api.o cipher.o compress.o
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2016-01-26 12:25:39 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ENGINE) += crypto_engine.o
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2008-08-05 06:13:08 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS) += fips.o
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2006-08-21 11:08:13 +00:00
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crypto_algapi-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
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2010-11-27 08:32:57 +00:00
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crypto_algapi-y := algapi.o scatterwalk.o $(crypto_algapi-y)
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2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ALGAPI2) += crypto_algapi.o
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AEAD2) += aead.o
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2023-06-13 09:13:35 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GENIV) += geniv.o
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2007-11-27 11:48:27 +00:00
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2023-09-14 08:28:24 +00:00
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crypto_skcipher-y += lskcipher.o
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crypto_skcipher-y += skcipher.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SKCIPHER2) += crypto_skcipher.o
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2007-11-30 10:38:37 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEQIV) += seqiv.o
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2015-05-21 07:11:15 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECHAINIV) += echainiv.o
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2006-08-21 14:07:53 +00:00
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2010-11-27 08:32:57 +00:00
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crypto_hash-y += ahash.o
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crypto_hash-y += shash.o
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2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH2) += crypto_hash.o
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2006-08-19 12:24:23 +00:00
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2015-06-16 17:30:55 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AKCIPHER2) += akcipher.o
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2023-06-15 10:28:48 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SIG2) += sig.o
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2016-06-22 16:49:13 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KPP2) += kpp.o
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crypto: compress - Add pcomp interface
The current "comp" crypto interface supports one-shot (de)compression only,
i.e. the whole data buffer to be (de)compressed must be passed at once, and
the whole (de)compressed data buffer will be received at once.
In several use-cases (e.g. compressed file systems that store files in big
compressed blocks), this workflow is not suitable.
Furthermore, the "comp" type doesn't provide for the configuration of
(de)compression parameters, and always allocates workspace memory for both
compression and decompression, which may waste memory.
To solve this, add a "pcomp" partial (de)compression interface that provides
the following operations:
- crypto_compress_{init,update,final}() for compression,
- crypto_decompress_{init,update,final}() for decompression,
- crypto_{,de}compress_setup(), to configure (de)compression parameters
(incl. allocating workspace memory).
The (de)compression methods take a struct comp_request, which was mimicked
after the z_stream object in zlib, and contains buffer pointer and length
pairs for input and output.
The setup methods take an opaque parameter pointer and length pair. Parameters
are supposed to be encoded using netlink attributes, whose meanings depend on
the actual (name of the) (de)compression algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <Geert.Uytterhoeven@sonycom.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2009-03-04 07:05:33 +00:00
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2016-06-22 16:49:14 +00:00
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dh_generic-y := dh.o
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dh_generic-y += dh_helper.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH) += dh_generic.o
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2018-03-23 13:04:37 +00:00
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$(obj)/rsapubkey.asn1.o: $(obj)/rsapubkey.asn1.c $(obj)/rsapubkey.asn1.h
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$(obj)/rsaprivkey.asn1.o: $(obj)/rsaprivkey.asn1.c $(obj)/rsaprivkey.asn1.h
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$(obj)/rsa_helper.o: $(obj)/rsapubkey.asn1.h $(obj)/rsaprivkey.asn1.h
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2015-06-16 17:31:01 +00:00
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2018-03-23 13:04:37 +00:00
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rsa_generic-y := rsapubkey.asn1.o
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rsa_generic-y += rsaprivkey.asn1.o
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2015-06-16 17:31:01 +00:00
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rsa_generic-y += rsa.o
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rsa_generic-y += rsa_helper.o
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2015-12-05 16:09:34 +00:00
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rsa_generic-y += rsa-pkcs1pad.o
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2015-06-16 17:31:01 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA) += rsa_generic.o
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2020-09-20 16:20:57 +00:00
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$(obj)/sm2signature.asn1.o: $(obj)/sm2signature.asn1.c $(obj)/sm2signature.asn1.h
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$(obj)/sm2.o: $(obj)/sm2signature.asn1.h
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sm2_generic-y += sm2signature.asn1.o
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sm2_generic-y += sm2.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM2) += sm2_generic.o
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2021-03-16 21:07:32 +00:00
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$(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.o: $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.c $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.h
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$(obj)/ecdsa.o: $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.h
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ecdsa_generic-y += ecdsa.o
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ecdsa_generic-y += ecdsasignature.asn1.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDSA) += ecdsa_generic.o
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2016-10-26 09:56:45 +00:00
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crypto_acompress-y := acompress.o
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crypto_acompress-y += scompress.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ACOMP2) += crypto_acompress.o
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2016-10-21 12:19:47 +00:00
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2010-11-27 08:32:57 +00:00
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cryptomgr-y := algboss.o testmgr.o
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2008-07-31 09:08:25 +00:00
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2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER2) += cryptomgr.o
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2011-09-27 05:23:50 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER) += crypto_user.o
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2018-11-29 14:42:16 +00:00
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crypto_user-y := crypto_user_base.o
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crypto_user-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS) += crypto_user_stat.o
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2013-04-08 07:48:44 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CMAC) += cmac.o
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HMAC) += hmac.o
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2009-09-02 10:05:22 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_VMAC) += vmac.o
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2006-10-28 03:15:24 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_XCBC) += xcbc.o
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2015-08-17 09:45:27 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_NULL2) += crypto_null.o
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4) += md4.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD5) += md5.o
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2008-05-07 14:14:10 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RMD160) += rmd160.o
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2007-10-08 03:45:10 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1) += sha1_generic.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256) += sha256_generic.o
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2008-03-06 11:55:38 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512) += sha512_generic.o
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2016-06-17 05:00:35 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3) += sha3_generic.o
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2022-03-14 03:11:01 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM3) += sm3.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM3_GENERIC) += sm3_generic.o
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2018-11-06 21:00:01 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_STREEBOG) += streebog_generic.o
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_WP512) += wp512.o
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crypto: improve gcc optimization flags for serpent and wp512
An ancient gcc bug (first reported in 2003) has apparently resurfaced
on MIPS, where kernelci.org reports an overly large stack frame in the
whirlpool hash algorithm:
crypto/wp512.c:987:1: warning: the frame size of 1112 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]
With some testing in different configurations, I'm seeing large
variations in stack frames size up to 1500 bytes for what should have
around 300 bytes at most. I also checked the reference implementation,
which is essentially the same code but also comes with some test and
benchmarking infrastructure.
It seems that recent compiler versions on at least arm, arm64 and powerpc
have a partial fix for this problem, but enabling "-fsched-pressure", but
even with that fix they suffer from the issue to a certain degree. Some
testing on arm64 shows that the time needed to hash a given amount of
data is roughly proportional to the stack frame size here, which makes
sense given that the wp512 implementation is doing lots of loads for
table lookups, and the problem with the overly large stack is a result
of doing a lot more loads and stores for spilled registers (as seen from
inspecting the object code).
Disabling -fschedule-insns consistently fixes the problem for wp512,
in my collection of cross-compilers, the results are consistently better
or identical when comparing the stack sizes in this function, though
some architectures (notable x86) have schedule-insns disabled by
default.
The four columns are:
default: -O2
press: -O2 -fsched-pressure
nopress: -O2 -fschedule-insns -fno-sched-pressure
nosched: -O2 -no-schedule-insns (disables sched-pressure)
default press nopress nosched
alpha-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1136 848 1136 176
am33_2.0-linux-gcc-4.9.3 2100 2076 2100 2104
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.9.3 848 848 1048 352
cris-linux-gcc-4.9.3 272 272 272 272
frv-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1128 1000 1128 280
hppa64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1128 336 1128 184
hppa-linux-gcc-4.9.3 644 308 644 276
i386-linux-gcc-4.9.3 352 352 352 352
m32r-linux-gcc-4.9.3 720 656 720 268
microblaze-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1108 604 1108 256
mips64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1328 592 1328 208
mips-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1096 624 1096 240
powerpc64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1088 432 1088 160
powerpc-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1080 584 1080 224
s390-linux-gcc-4.9.3 456 456 624 360
sh3-linux-gcc-4.9.3 292 292 292 292
sparc64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 992 240 992 208
sparc-linux-gcc-4.9.3 680 592 680 312
x86_64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 224 240 272 224
xtensa-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1152 704 1152 304
aarch64-linux-gcc-7.0.0 224 224 1104 208
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-7.0.1 824 824 1048 352
mips-linux-gcc-7.0.0 1120 648 1120 272
x86_64-linux-gcc-7.0.1 240 240 304 240
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.4.7 840 392
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.5.4 784 728 784 320
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.6.4 736 728 736 304
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.7.4 944 784 944 352
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.8.5 464 464 760 352
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.9.3 848 848 1048 352
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-5.3.1 824 824 1064 336
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-6.1.1 808 808 1056 344
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-7.0.1 824 824 1048 352
Trying the same test for serpent-generic, the picture is a bit different,
and while -fno-schedule-insns is generally better here than the default,
-fsched-pressure wins overall, so I picked that instead.
default press nopress nosched
alpha-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1392 864 1392 960
am33_2.0-linux-gcc-4.9.3 536 524 536 528
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.9.3 552 552 776 536
cris-linux-gcc-4.9.3 528 528 528 528
frv-linux-gcc-4.9.3 536 400 536 504
hppa64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 524 208 524 480
hppa-linux-gcc-4.9.3 768 472 768 508
i386-linux-gcc-4.9.3 564 564 564 564
m32r-linux-gcc-4.9.3 712 576 712 532
microblaze-linux-gcc-4.9.3 724 392 724 512
mips64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 720 384 720 496
mips-linux-gcc-4.9.3 728 384 728 496
powerpc64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 704 304 704 480
powerpc-linux-gcc-4.9.3 704 296 704 480
s390-linux-gcc-4.9.3 560 560 592 536
sh3-linux-gcc-4.9.3 540 540 540 540
sparc64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 544 352 544 496
sparc-linux-gcc-4.9.3 544 344 544 496
x86_64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 528 536 576 528
xtensa-linux-gcc-4.9.3 752 544 752 544
aarch64-linux-gcc-7.0.0 432 432 656 480
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-7.0.1 616 616 808 536
mips-linux-gcc-7.0.0 720 464 720 488
x86_64-linux-gcc-7.0.1 536 528 600 536
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.4.7 592 440
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.5.4 776 448 776 544
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.6.4 776 448 776 544
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.7.4 768 448 768 544
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.8.5 488 488 776 544
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.9.3 552 552 776 536
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-5.3.1 552 552 776 536
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-6.1.1 560 560 776 536
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-7.0.1 616 616 808 536
I did not do any runtime tests with serpent, so it is possible that stack
frame size does not directly correlate with runtime performance here and
it actually makes things worse, but it's more likely to help here, and
the reduced stack frame size is probably enough reason to apply the patch,
especially given that the crypto code is often used in deep call chains.
Link: https://kernelci.org/build/id/58797d7559b5149efdf6c3a9/logs/
Link: http://www.larc.usp.br/~pbarreto/WhirlpoolPage.html
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=11488
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=79149
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-03 22:33:23 +00:00
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CFLAGS_wp512.o := $(call cc-option,-fno-schedule-insns) # https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=79149
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2019-10-24 16:28:31 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2B) += blake2b_generic.o
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2022-08-11 00:59:11 +00:00
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CFLAGS_blake2b_generic.o := -Wframe-larger-than=4096 # https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=105930
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2006-09-21 01:44:08 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECB) += ecb.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CBC) += cbc.o
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2018-03-01 22:36:17 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CFB) += cfb.o
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2006-12-16 01:09:02 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC) += pcbc.o
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2008-03-24 13:26:16 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CTS) += cts.o
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2006-11-25 22:43:10 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LRW) += lrw.o
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2007-09-19 12:23:13 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_XTS) += xts.o
|
[CRYPTO] ctr: Add CTR (Counter) block cipher mode
This patch implements CTR mode for IPsec.
It is based off of RFC 3686.
Please note:
1. CTR turns a block cipher into a stream cipher.
Encryption is done in blocks, however the last block
may be a partial block.
A "counter block" is encrypted, creating a keystream
that is xor'ed with the plaintext. The counter portion
of the counter block is incremented after each block
of plaintext is encrypted.
Decryption is performed in same manner.
2. The CTR counterblock is composed of,
nonce + IV + counter
The size of the counterblock is equivalent to the
blocksize of the cipher.
sizeof(nonce) + sizeof(IV) + sizeof(counter) = blocksize
The CTR template requires the name of the cipher
algorithm, the sizeof the nonce, and the sizeof the iv.
ctr(cipher,sizeof_nonce,sizeof_iv)
So for example,
ctr(aes,4,8)
specifies the counterblock will be composed of 4 bytes
from a nonce, 8 bytes from the iv, and 4 bytes for counter
since aes has a blocksize of 16 bytes.
3. The counter portion of the counter block is stored
in big endian for conformance to rfc 3686.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-10-23 00:50:32 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CTR) += ctr.o
|
2022-05-20 18:14:53 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_XCTR) += xctr.o
|
crypto: hctr2 - Add HCTR2 support
Add support for HCTR2 as a template. HCTR2 is a length-preserving
encryption mode that is efficient on processors with instructions to
accelerate AES and carryless multiplication, e.g. x86 processors with
AES-NI and CLMUL, and ARM processors with the ARMv8 Crypto Extensions.
As a length-preserving encryption mode, HCTR2 is suitable for
applications such as storage encryption where ciphertext expansion is
not possible, and thus authenticated encryption cannot be used.
Currently, such applications usually use XTS, or in some cases Adiantum.
XTS has the disadvantage that it is a narrow-block mode: a bitflip will
only change 16 bytes in the resulting ciphertext or plaintext. This
reveals more information to an attacker than necessary.
HCTR2 is a wide-block mode, so it provides a stronger security property:
a bitflip will change the entire message. HCTR2 is somewhat similar to
Adiantum, which is also a wide-block mode. However, HCTR2 is designed
to take advantage of existing crypto instructions, while Adiantum
targets devices without such hardware support. Adiantum is also
designed with longer messages in mind, while HCTR2 is designed to be
efficient even on short messages.
HCTR2 requires POLYVAL and XCTR as components. More information on
HCTR2 can be found here: "Length-preserving encryption with HCTR2":
https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1441.pdf
Signed-off-by: Nathan Huckleberry <nhuck@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2022-05-20 18:14:55 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HCTR2) += hctr2.o
|
2015-09-21 18:58:56 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEYWRAP) += keywrap.o
|
crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode. Adiantum was designed by
Paul Crowley and is specified by our paper:
Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf)
See our paper for full details; this patch only provides an overview.
Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for
fast and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated
crypto instructions. Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12
stream cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash
function, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single
16-byte block. On CPUs without AES instructions, Adiantum is much
faster than AES-XTS; for example, on ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte sectors
Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption,
and decryption about 5 times faster.
Adiantum is a specialization of the more general HBSH construction. Our
earlier proposal, HPolyC, was also a HBSH specialization, but it used a
different εA∆U hash function, one based on Poly1305 only. Adiantum's
εA∆U hash function, which is based primarily on the "NH" hash function
like that used in UMAC (RFC4418), is about twice as fast as HPolyC's;
consequently, Adiantum is about 20% faster than HPolyC.
This speed comes with no loss of security: Adiantum is provably just as
secure as HPolyC, in fact slightly *more* secure. Like HPolyC,
Adiantum's security is reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256,
subject to a security bound. XChaCha12 itself has a security reduction
to ChaCha12. Therefore, one need not "trust" Adiantum; one need only
trust ChaCha12 and AES-256. Note that the εA∆U hash function is only
used for its proven combinatorical properties so cannot be "broken".
Adiantum is also a true wide-block encryption mode, so flipping any
plaintext bit in the sector scrambles the entire ciphertext, and vice
versa. No other such mode is available in the kernel currently; doing
the same with XTS scrambles only 16 bytes. Adiantum also supports
arbitrary-length tweaks and naturally supports any length input >= 16
bytes without needing "ciphertext stealing".
For the stream cipher, Adiantum uses XChaCha12 rather than XChaCha20 in
order to make encryption feasible on the widest range of devices.
Although the 20-round variant is quite popular, the best known attacks
on ChaCha are on only 7 rounds, so ChaCha12 still has a substantial
security margin; in fact, larger than AES-256's. 12-round Salsa20 is
also the eSTREAM recommendation. For the block cipher, Adiantum uses
AES-256, despite it having a lower security margin than XChaCha12 and
needing table lookups, due to AES's extensive adoption and analysis
making it the obvious first choice. Nevertheless, for flexibility this
patch also permits the "adiantum" template to be instantiated with
XChaCha20 and/or with an alternate block cipher.
We need Adiantum support in the kernel for use in dm-crypt and fscrypt,
where currently the only other suitable options are block cipher modes
such as AES-XTS. A big problem with this is that many low-end mobile
devices (e.g. Android Go phones sold primarily in developing countries,
as well as some smartwatches) still have CPUs that lack AES
instructions, e.g. ARM Cortex-A7. Sadly, AES-XTS encryption is much too
slow to be viable on these devices. We did find that some "lightweight"
block ciphers are fast enough, but these suffer from problems such as
not having much cryptanalysis or being too controversial.
The ChaCha stream cipher has excellent performance but is insecure to
use directly for disk encryption, since each sector's IV is reused each
time it is overwritten. Even restricting the threat model to offline
attacks only isn't enough, since modern flash storage devices don't
guarantee that "overwrites" are really overwrites, due to wear-leveling.
Adiantum avoids this problem by constructing a
"tweakable super-pseudorandom permutation"; this is the strongest
possible security model for length-preserving encryption.
Of course, storing random nonces along with the ciphertext would be the
ideal solution. But doing that with existing hardware and filesystems
runs into major practical problems; in most cases it would require data
journaling (like dm-integrity) which severely degrades performance.
Thus, for now length-preserving encryption is still needed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-17 01:26:31 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ADIANTUM) += adiantum.o
|
2018-11-17 01:26:29 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305) += nhpoly1305.o
|
2007-11-26 14:24:11 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GCM) += gcm.o
|
2007-12-12 12:25:13 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CCM) += ccm.o
|
2015-06-01 11:44:00 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20POLY1305) += chacha20poly1305.o
|
2018-05-11 12:12:49 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AEGIS128) += aegis128.o
|
2019-08-11 22:59:10 +00:00
|
|
|
aegis128-y := aegis128-core.o
|
2019-08-11 22:59:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ifeq ($(ARCH),arm)
|
2019-09-13 18:36:18 +00:00
|
|
|
CFLAGS_aegis128-neon-inner.o += -ffreestanding -march=armv8-a -mfloat-abi=softfp
|
2019-08-11 22:59:11 +00:00
|
|
|
CFLAGS_aegis128-neon-inner.o += -mfpu=crypto-neon-fp-armv8
|
|
|
|
|
aegis128-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AEGIS128_SIMD) += aegis128-neon.o aegis128-neon-inner.o
|
|
|
|
|
endif
|
|
|
|
|
ifeq ($(ARCH),arm64)
|
2019-08-11 22:59:12 +00:00
|
|
|
aegis128-cflags-y := -ffreestanding -mcpu=generic+crypto
|
|
|
|
|
aegis128-cflags-$(CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC) += -ffixed-q16 -ffixed-q17 -ffixed-q18 \
|
|
|
|
|
-ffixed-q19 -ffixed-q20 -ffixed-q21 \
|
|
|
|
|
-ffixed-q22 -ffixed-q23 -ffixed-q24 \
|
|
|
|
|
-ffixed-q25 -ffixed-q26 -ffixed-q27 \
|
|
|
|
|
-ffixed-q28 -ffixed-q29 -ffixed-q30 \
|
|
|
|
|
-ffixed-q31
|
|
|
|
|
CFLAGS_aegis128-neon-inner.o += $(aegis128-cflags-y)
|
2019-08-11 22:59:11 +00:00
|
|
|
CFLAGS_REMOVE_aegis128-neon-inner.o += -mgeneral-regs-only
|
|
|
|
|
aegis128-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AEGIS128_SIMD) += aegis128-neon.o aegis128-neon-inner.o
|
|
|
|
|
endif
|
2021-08-02 20:43:15 +00:00
|
|
|
# Enable <arm_neon.h>
|
|
|
|
|
CFLAGS_aegis128-neon-inner.o += -isystem $(shell $(CC) -print-file-name=include)
|
2019-08-11 22:59:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-01-07 04:57:19 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCRYPT) += pcrypt.o
|
2007-04-16 10:49:20 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRYPTD) += cryptd.o
|
2007-10-05 08:42:03 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DES) += des_generic.o
|
2006-12-16 01:13:14 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FCRYPT) += fcrypt.o
|
2011-09-01 22:45:12 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLOWFISH) += blowfish_generic.o
|
2011-09-01 22:45:07 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLOWFISH_COMMON) += blowfish_common.o
|
2010-06-03 11:02:51 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH) += twofish_generic.o
|
2006-06-20 10:37:23 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON) += twofish_common.o
|
2011-10-17 21:03:13 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT) += serpent_generic.o
|
crypto: improve gcc optimization flags for serpent and wp512
An ancient gcc bug (first reported in 2003) has apparently resurfaced
on MIPS, where kernelci.org reports an overly large stack frame in the
whirlpool hash algorithm:
crypto/wp512.c:987:1: warning: the frame size of 1112 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]
With some testing in different configurations, I'm seeing large
variations in stack frames size up to 1500 bytes for what should have
around 300 bytes at most. I also checked the reference implementation,
which is essentially the same code but also comes with some test and
benchmarking infrastructure.
It seems that recent compiler versions on at least arm, arm64 and powerpc
have a partial fix for this problem, but enabling "-fsched-pressure", but
even with that fix they suffer from the issue to a certain degree. Some
testing on arm64 shows that the time needed to hash a given amount of
data is roughly proportional to the stack frame size here, which makes
sense given that the wp512 implementation is doing lots of loads for
table lookups, and the problem with the overly large stack is a result
of doing a lot more loads and stores for spilled registers (as seen from
inspecting the object code).
Disabling -fschedule-insns consistently fixes the problem for wp512,
in my collection of cross-compilers, the results are consistently better
or identical when comparing the stack sizes in this function, though
some architectures (notable x86) have schedule-insns disabled by
default.
The four columns are:
default: -O2
press: -O2 -fsched-pressure
nopress: -O2 -fschedule-insns -fno-sched-pressure
nosched: -O2 -no-schedule-insns (disables sched-pressure)
default press nopress nosched
alpha-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1136 848 1136 176
am33_2.0-linux-gcc-4.9.3 2100 2076 2100 2104
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.9.3 848 848 1048 352
cris-linux-gcc-4.9.3 272 272 272 272
frv-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1128 1000 1128 280
hppa64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1128 336 1128 184
hppa-linux-gcc-4.9.3 644 308 644 276
i386-linux-gcc-4.9.3 352 352 352 352
m32r-linux-gcc-4.9.3 720 656 720 268
microblaze-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1108 604 1108 256
mips64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1328 592 1328 208
mips-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1096 624 1096 240
powerpc64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1088 432 1088 160
powerpc-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1080 584 1080 224
s390-linux-gcc-4.9.3 456 456 624 360
sh3-linux-gcc-4.9.3 292 292 292 292
sparc64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 992 240 992 208
sparc-linux-gcc-4.9.3 680 592 680 312
x86_64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 224 240 272 224
xtensa-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1152 704 1152 304
aarch64-linux-gcc-7.0.0 224 224 1104 208
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-7.0.1 824 824 1048 352
mips-linux-gcc-7.0.0 1120 648 1120 272
x86_64-linux-gcc-7.0.1 240 240 304 240
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.4.7 840 392
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.5.4 784 728 784 320
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.6.4 736 728 736 304
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.7.4 944 784 944 352
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.8.5 464 464 760 352
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.9.3 848 848 1048 352
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-5.3.1 824 824 1064 336
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-6.1.1 808 808 1056 344
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-7.0.1 824 824 1048 352
Trying the same test for serpent-generic, the picture is a bit different,
and while -fno-schedule-insns is generally better here than the default,
-fsched-pressure wins overall, so I picked that instead.
default press nopress nosched
alpha-linux-gcc-4.9.3 1392 864 1392 960
am33_2.0-linux-gcc-4.9.3 536 524 536 528
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.9.3 552 552 776 536
cris-linux-gcc-4.9.3 528 528 528 528
frv-linux-gcc-4.9.3 536 400 536 504
hppa64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 524 208 524 480
hppa-linux-gcc-4.9.3 768 472 768 508
i386-linux-gcc-4.9.3 564 564 564 564
m32r-linux-gcc-4.9.3 712 576 712 532
microblaze-linux-gcc-4.9.3 724 392 724 512
mips64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 720 384 720 496
mips-linux-gcc-4.9.3 728 384 728 496
powerpc64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 704 304 704 480
powerpc-linux-gcc-4.9.3 704 296 704 480
s390-linux-gcc-4.9.3 560 560 592 536
sh3-linux-gcc-4.9.3 540 540 540 540
sparc64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 544 352 544 496
sparc-linux-gcc-4.9.3 544 344 544 496
x86_64-linux-gcc-4.9.3 528 536 576 528
xtensa-linux-gcc-4.9.3 752 544 752 544
aarch64-linux-gcc-7.0.0 432 432 656 480
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-7.0.1 616 616 808 536
mips-linux-gcc-7.0.0 720 464 720 488
x86_64-linux-gcc-7.0.1 536 528 600 536
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.4.7 592 440
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.5.4 776 448 776 544
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.6.4 776 448 776 544
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.7.4 768 448 768 544
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.8.5 488 488 776 544
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-4.9.3 552 552 776 536
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-5.3.1 552 552 776 536
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-6.1.1 560 560 776 536
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc-7.0.1 616 616 808 536
I did not do any runtime tests with serpent, so it is possible that stack
frame size does not directly correlate with runtime performance here and
it actually makes things worse, but it's more likely to help here, and
the reduced stack frame size is probably enough reason to apply the patch,
especially given that the crypto code is often used in deep call chains.
Link: https://kernelci.org/build/id/58797d7559b5149efdf6c3a9/logs/
Link: http://www.larc.usp.br/~pbarreto/WhirlpoolPage.html
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=11488
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=79149
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-03 22:33:23 +00:00
|
|
|
CFLAGS_serpent_generic.o := $(call cc-option,-fsched-pressure) # https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=79149
|
2007-10-05 08:52:01 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES) += aes_generic.o
|
2018-01-15 16:07:22 +00:00
|
|
|
CFLAGS_aes_generic.o := $(call cc-option,-fno-code-hoisting) # https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=83356
|
2022-03-14 03:11:01 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM4) += sm4.o
|
|
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM4_GENERIC) += sm4_generic.o
|
crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher
Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is due to
the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and the fact that
8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of cachelines on any
architecture, resulting in an exploitable correlation between the key
and the processing time for known plaintexts.
For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents a
security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically time
invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or by using
SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups.
For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too much
performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by switching
to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table data (the actual
S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start of each block to
eliminate data dependent latencies.
This code encrypts at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the
ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this
hardware). Decryption is substantially slower.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-02 16:37:40 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_TI) += aes_ti.o
|
2012-03-05 18:26:32 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAMELLIA) += camellia_generic.o
|
2012-11-13 09:43:14 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAST_COMMON) += cast_common.o
|
2012-07-11 17:37:04 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAST5) += cast5_generic.o
|
2012-07-11 17:38:12 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAST6) += cast6_generic.o
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARC4) += arc4.o
|
|
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA) += tea.o
|
|
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KHAZAD) += khazad.o
|
|
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANUBIS) += anubis.o
|
2007-08-21 12:01:03 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED) += seed.o
|
2022-09-16 12:57:34 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARIA) += aria_generic.o
|
2018-11-17 01:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20) += chacha_generic.o
|
2015-06-01 11:43:58 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_POLY1305) += poly1305_generic.o
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEFLATE) += deflate.o
|
|
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MICHAEL_MIC) += michael_mic.o
|
2014-01-23 11:25:47 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32C) += crc32c_generic.o
|
2016-01-29 10:20:17 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32) += crc32_generic.o
|
2013-09-12 05:31:34 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF) += crct10dif_common.o crct10dif_generic.o
|
2022-03-03 20:13:10 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC64_ROCKSOFT) += crc64_rocksoft_generic.o
|
2011-03-08 00:04:58 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AUTHENC) += authenc.o authencesn.o
|
2019-03-08 00:30:44 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO) += lzo.o lzo-rle.o
|
2013-07-08 23:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZ4) += lz4.o
|
|
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZ4HC) += lz4hc.o
|
2019-05-30 06:52:57 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_XXHASH) += xxhash_generic.o
|
2012-07-19 14:42:41 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_842) += 842.o
|
2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RNG2) += rng.o
|
2008-08-14 12:15:52 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG) += ansi_cprng.o
|
2014-07-04 14:15:08 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG) += drbg.o
|
2015-06-23 14:18:54 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY) += jitterentropy_rng.o
|
|
|
|
|
CFLAGS_jitterentropy.o = -O0
|
crypto: jitterentropy - build without sanitizer
Recent clang-9 snapshots double the kernel stack usage when building
this file with -O0 -fsanitize=kernel-hwaddress, compared to clang-8
and older snapshots, this changed between commits svn364966 and
svn366056:
crypto/jitterentropy.c:516:5: error: stack frame size of 2640 bytes in function 'jent_entropy_init' [-Werror,-Wframe-larger-than=]
int jent_entropy_init(void)
^
crypto/jitterentropy.c:185:14: error: stack frame size of 2224 bytes in function 'jent_lfsr_time' [-Werror,-Wframe-larger-than=]
static __u64 jent_lfsr_time(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 time, __u64 loop_cnt)
^
I prepared a reduced test case in case any clang developers want to
take a closer look, but from looking at the earlier output it seems
that even with clang-8, something was very wrong here.
Turn off any KASAN and UBSAN sanitizing for this file, as that likely
clashes with -O0 anyway. Turning off just KASAN avoids the warning
already, but I suspect both of these have undesired side-effects
for jitterentropy.
Link: https://godbolt.org/z/fDcwZ5
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-07-24 18:51:55 +00:00
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KASAN_SANITIZE_jitterentropy.o = n
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UBSAN_SANITIZE_jitterentropy.o = n
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2015-06-23 14:18:54 +00:00
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jitterentropy_rng-y := jitterentropy.o jitterentropy-kcapi.o
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2023-04-21 06:08:23 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY_TESTINTERFACE) += jitterentropy-testing.o
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEST) += tcrypt.o
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2009-08-06 05:32:38 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH) += ghash-generic.o
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2022-05-20 18:14:54 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_POLYVAL) += polyval-generic.o
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2010-10-19 13:12:39 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API) += af_alg.o
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2010-10-19 13:23:00 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH) += algif_hash.o
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2010-10-19 13:31:55 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER) += algif_skcipher.o
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2014-12-25 22:00:39 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG) += algif_rng.o
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2015-02-28 19:50:40 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD) += algif_aead.o
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2018-03-30 19:14:53 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ZSTD) += zstd.o
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2018-09-20 13:18:39 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_OFB) += ofb.o
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2019-04-11 15:51:19 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECC) += ecc.o
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2019-08-19 14:17:33 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ESSIV) += essiv.o
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2019-11-08 12:22:34 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CURVE25519) += curve25519-generic.o
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2007-07-09 18:56:42 +00:00
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2017-05-30 14:52:48 +00:00
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ecdh_generic-y += ecdh.o
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ecdh_generic-y += ecdh_helper.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDH) += ecdh_generic.o
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crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm
Add Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm (GOST R
34.10-2012, RFC 7091, ISO/IEC 14888-3) is one of the Russian (and since
2018 the CIS countries) cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST
algorithms). Only signature verification is supported, with intent to be
used in the IMA.
Summary of the changes:
* crypto/Kconfig:
- EC-RDSA is added into Public-key cryptography section.
* crypto/Makefile:
- ecrdsa objects are added.
* crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:
- Recognize EC-RDSA and Streebog OIDs.
* include/linux/oid_registry.h:
- EC-RDSA OIDs are added to the enum. Also, a two currently not
implemented curve OIDs are added for possible extension later (to
not change numbering and grouping).
* crypto/ecc.c:
- Kenneth MacKay copyright date is updated to 2014, because
vli_mmod_slow, ecc_point_add, ecc_point_mult_shamir are based on his
code from micro-ecc.
- Functions needed for ecrdsa are EXPORT_SYMBOL'ed.
- New functions:
vli_is_negative - helper to determine sign of vli;
vli_from_be64 - unpack big-endian array into vli (used for
a signature);
vli_from_le64 - unpack little-endian array into vli (used for
a public key);
vli_uadd, vli_usub - add/sub u64 value to/from vli (used for
increment/decrement);
mul_64_64 - optimized to use __int128 where appropriate, this speeds
up point multiplication (and as a consequence signature
verification) by the factor of 1.5-2;
vli_umult - multiply vli by a small value (speeds up point
multiplication by another factor of 1.5-2, depending on vli sizes);
vli_mmod_special - module reduction for some form of Pseudo-Mersenne
primes (used for the curves A);
vli_mmod_special2 - module reduction for another form of
Pseudo-Mersenne primes (used for the curves B);
vli_mmod_barrett - module reduction using pre-computed value (used
for the curve C);
vli_mmod_slow - more general module reduction which is much slower
(used when the modulus is subgroup order);
vli_mod_mult_slow - modular multiplication;
ecc_point_add - add two points;
ecc_point_mult_shamir - add two points multiplied by scalars in one
combined multiplication (this gives speed up by another factor 2 in
compare to two separate multiplications).
ecc_is_pubkey_valid_partial - additional samity check is added.
- Updated vli_mmod_fast with non-strict heuristic to call optimal
module reduction function depending on the prime value;
- All computations for the previously defined (two NIST) curves should
not unaffected.
* crypto/ecc.h:
- Newly exported functions are documented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_defs.h
- Five curves are defined.
* crypto/ecrdsa.c:
- Signature verification is implemented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_params.asn1, crypto/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1:
- Templates for BER decoder for EC-RDSA parameters and public key.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 15:51:20 +00:00
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$(obj)/ecrdsa_params.asn1.o: $(obj)/ecrdsa_params.asn1.c $(obj)/ecrdsa_params.asn1.h
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$(obj)/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1.o: $(obj)/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1.c $(obj)/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1.h
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$(obj)/ecrdsa.o: $(obj)/ecrdsa_params.asn1.h $(obj)/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1.h
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ecrdsa_generic-y += ecrdsa.o
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ecrdsa_generic-y += ecrdsa_params.asn1.o
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ecrdsa_generic-y += ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECRDSA) += ecrdsa_generic.o
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2007-07-09 18:56:42 +00:00
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#
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# generic algorithms and the async_tx api
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#
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obj-$(CONFIG_XOR_BLOCKS) += xor.o
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async_tx: add the async_tx api
The async_tx api provides methods for describing a chain of asynchronous
bulk memory transfers/transforms with support for inter-transactional
dependencies. It is implemented as a dmaengine client that smooths over
the details of different hardware offload engine implementations. Code
that is written to the api can optimize for asynchronous operation and the
api will fit the chain of operations to the available offload resources.
I imagine that any piece of ADMA hardware would register with the
'async_*' subsystem, and a call to async_X would be routed as
appropriate, or be run in-line. - Neil Brown
async_tx exploits the capabilities of struct dma_async_tx_descriptor to
provide an api of the following general format:
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *
async_<operation>(..., struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *depend_tx,
dma_async_tx_callback cb_fn, void *cb_param)
{
struct dma_chan *chan = async_tx_find_channel(depend_tx, <operation>);
struct dma_device *device = chan ? chan->device : NULL;
int int_en = cb_fn ? 1 : 0;
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx = device ?
device->device_prep_dma_<operation>(chan, len, int_en) : NULL;
if (tx) { /* run <operation> asynchronously */
...
tx->tx_set_dest(addr, tx, index);
...
tx->tx_set_src(addr, tx, index);
...
async_tx_submit(chan, tx, flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
} else { /* run <operation> synchronously */
...
<operation>
...
async_tx_sync_epilog(flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
}
return tx;
}
async_tx_find_channel() returns a capable channel from its pool. The
channel pool is organized as a per-cpu array of channel pointers. The
async_tx_rebalance() routine is tasked with managing these arrays. In the
uniprocessor case async_tx_rebalance() tries to spread responsibility
evenly over channels of similar capabilities. For example if there are two
copy+xor channels, one will handle copy operations and the other will
handle xor. In the SMP case async_tx_rebalance() attempts to spread the
operations evenly over the cpus, e.g. cpu0 gets copy channel0 and xor
channel0 while cpu1 gets copy channel 1 and xor channel 1. When a
dependency is specified async_tx_find_channel defaults to keeping the
operation on the same channel. A xor->copy->xor chain will stay on one
channel if it supports both operation types, otherwise the transaction will
transition between a copy and a xor resource.
Currently the raid5 implementation in the MD raid456 driver has been
converted to the async_tx api. A driver for the offload engines on the
Intel Xscale series of I/O processors, iop-adma, is provided in a later
commit. With the iop-adma driver and async_tx, raid456 is able to offload
copy, xor, and xor-zero-sum operations to hardware engines.
On iop342 tiobench showed higher throughput for sequential writes (20 - 30%
improvement) and sequential reads to a degraded array (40 - 55%
improvement). For the other cases performance was roughly equal, +/- a few
percentage points. On a x86-smp platform the performance of the async_tx
implementation (in synchronous mode) was also +/- a few percentage points
of the original implementation. According to 'top' on iop342 CPU
utilization drops from ~50% to ~15% during a 'resync' while the speed
according to /proc/mdstat doubles from ~25 MB/s to ~50 MB/s.
The tiobench command line used for testing was: tiobench --size 2048
--block 4096 --block 131072 --dir /mnt/raid --numruns 5
* iop342 had 1GB of memory available
Details:
* if CONFIG_DMA_ENGINE=n the asynchronous path is compiled away by making
async_tx_find_channel a static inline routine that always returns NULL
* when a callback is specified for a given transaction an interrupt will
fire at operation completion time and the callback will occur in a
tasklet. if the the channel does not support interrupts then a live
polling wait will be performed
* the api is written as a dmaengine client that requests all available
channels
* In support of dependencies the api implicitly schedules channel-switch
interrupts. The interrupt triggers the cleanup tasklet which causes
pending operations to be scheduled on the next channel
* Xor engines treat an xor destination address differently than a software
xor routine. To the software routine the destination address is an implied
source, whereas engines treat it as a write-only destination. This patch
modifies the xor_blocks routine to take a an explicit destination address
to mirror the hardware.
Changelog:
* fixed a leftover debug print
* don't allow callbacks in async_interrupt_cond
* fixed xor_block changes
* fixed usage of ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DEST
* drop dma mapping methods, suggested by Chris Leech
* printk warning fixups from Andrew Morton
* don't use inline in C files, Adrian Bunk
* select the API when MD is enabled
* BUG_ON xor source counts <= 1
* implicitly handle hardware concerns like channel switching and
interrupts, Neil Brown
* remove the per operation type list, and distribute operation capabilities
evenly amongst the available channels
* simplify async_tx_find_channel to optimize the fast path
* introduce the channel_table_initialized flag to prevent early calls to
the api
* reorganize the code to mimic crypto
* include mm.h as not all archs include it in dma-mapping.h
* make the Kconfig options non-user visible, Adrian Bunk
* move async_tx under crypto since it is meant as 'core' functionality, and
the two may share algorithms in the future
* move large inline functions into c files
* checkpatch.pl fixes
* gpl v2 only correction
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-By: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
2007-01-02 18:10:44 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_ASYNC_CORE) += async_tx/
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2012-09-13 14:17:21 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += asymmetric_keys/
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2013-05-06 12:40:01 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO) += hash_info.o
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2016-11-22 12:08:25 +00:00
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crypto_simd-y := simd.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SIMD) += crypto_simd.o
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2021-11-19 06:55:58 +00:00
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#
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# Key derivation function
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#
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obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KDF800108_CTR) += kdf_sp800108.o
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