linux-stable/mm/kasan/tags_report.c

89 lines
2.2 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* This file contains tag-based KASAN specific error reporting code.
*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
* Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
*
* Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by
* Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
*/
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/ftrace.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/kasan.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include "kasan.h"
#include "../slab.h"
const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
struct kmem_cache *cache;
struct page *page;
const void *addr;
void *object;
u8 tag;
int i;
tag = get_tag(info->access_addr);
addr = reset_tag(info->access_addr);
page = kasan_addr_to_page(addr);
if (page && PageSlab(page)) {
cache = page->slab_cache;
object = nearest_obj(cache, page, (void *)addr);
alloc_meta = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
for (i = 0; i < KASAN_NR_FREE_STACKS; i++)
if (alloc_meta->free_pointer_tag[i] == tag)
return "use-after-free";
return "out-of-bounds";
}
#endif
kasan: detect negative size in memory operation function Patch series "fix the missing underflow in memory operation function", v4. The patchset helps to produce a KASAN report when size is negative in memory operation functions. It is helpful for programmer to solve an undefined behavior issue. Patch 1 based on Dmitry's review and suggestion, patch 2 is a test in order to verify the patch 1. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341 [2]https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20190927034338.15813-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com/ This patch (of 2): KASAN missed detecting size is a negative number in memset(), memcpy(), and memmove(), it will cause out-of-bounds bug. So needs to be detected by KASAN. If size is a negative number, then it has a reason to be defined as out-of-bounds bug type. Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds. KASAN report is shown below: BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0 Read of size 18446744073709551608 at addr ffffff8069660904 by task cat/72 CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004ajb-00001-gdb8af2f372b2-dirty #1 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0x10c/0x164 print_address_description.isra.9+0x68/0x378 __kasan_report+0x164/0x1a0 kasan_report+0xc/0x18 check_memory_region+0x174/0x1d0 memmove+0x34/0x88 kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0 [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341 [cai@lca.pw: fix -Wdeclaration-after-statement warn] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1583509030-27939-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw [peterz@infradead.org: fix objtool warning] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200305095436.GV2596@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191112065302.7015-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-02 04:09:37 +00:00
/*
* If access_size is a negative number, then it has reason to be
* defined as out-of-bounds bug type.
*
* Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as
* a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
* so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
*/
if (info->access_addr + info->access_size < info->access_addr)
return "out-of-bounds";
return "invalid-access";
}
void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size)
{
u8 tag = get_tag(addr);
void *p = reset_tag(addr);
void *end = p + size;
while (p < end && tag == *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(p))
p += KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
return p;
}
void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr)
{
u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
pr_err("Pointer tag: [%02x], memory tag: [%02x]\n", addr_tag, *shadow);
}