License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
|
2007-07-09 18:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# Generic algorithms support
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
config XOR_BLOCKS
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#
|
async_tx: add the async_tx api
The async_tx api provides methods for describing a chain of asynchronous
bulk memory transfers/transforms with support for inter-transactional
dependencies. It is implemented as a dmaengine client that smooths over
the details of different hardware offload engine implementations. Code
that is written to the api can optimize for asynchronous operation and the
api will fit the chain of operations to the available offload resources.
I imagine that any piece of ADMA hardware would register with the
'async_*' subsystem, and a call to async_X would be routed as
appropriate, or be run in-line. - Neil Brown
async_tx exploits the capabilities of struct dma_async_tx_descriptor to
provide an api of the following general format:
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *
async_<operation>(..., struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *depend_tx,
dma_async_tx_callback cb_fn, void *cb_param)
{
struct dma_chan *chan = async_tx_find_channel(depend_tx, <operation>);
struct dma_device *device = chan ? chan->device : NULL;
int int_en = cb_fn ? 1 : 0;
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx = device ?
device->device_prep_dma_<operation>(chan, len, int_en) : NULL;
if (tx) { /* run <operation> asynchronously */
...
tx->tx_set_dest(addr, tx, index);
...
tx->tx_set_src(addr, tx, index);
...
async_tx_submit(chan, tx, flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
} else { /* run <operation> synchronously */
...
<operation>
...
async_tx_sync_epilog(flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
}
return tx;
}
async_tx_find_channel() returns a capable channel from its pool. The
channel pool is organized as a per-cpu array of channel pointers. The
async_tx_rebalance() routine is tasked with managing these arrays. In the
uniprocessor case async_tx_rebalance() tries to spread responsibility
evenly over channels of similar capabilities. For example if there are two
copy+xor channels, one will handle copy operations and the other will
handle xor. In the SMP case async_tx_rebalance() attempts to spread the
operations evenly over the cpus, e.g. cpu0 gets copy channel0 and xor
channel0 while cpu1 gets copy channel 1 and xor channel 1. When a
dependency is specified async_tx_find_channel defaults to keeping the
operation on the same channel. A xor->copy->xor chain will stay on one
channel if it supports both operation types, otherwise the transaction will
transition between a copy and a xor resource.
Currently the raid5 implementation in the MD raid456 driver has been
converted to the async_tx api. A driver for the offload engines on the
Intel Xscale series of I/O processors, iop-adma, is provided in a later
commit. With the iop-adma driver and async_tx, raid456 is able to offload
copy, xor, and xor-zero-sum operations to hardware engines.
On iop342 tiobench showed higher throughput for sequential writes (20 - 30%
improvement) and sequential reads to a degraded array (40 - 55%
improvement). For the other cases performance was roughly equal, +/- a few
percentage points. On a x86-smp platform the performance of the async_tx
implementation (in synchronous mode) was also +/- a few percentage points
of the original implementation. According to 'top' on iop342 CPU
utilization drops from ~50% to ~15% during a 'resync' while the speed
according to /proc/mdstat doubles from ~25 MB/s to ~50 MB/s.
The tiobench command line used for testing was: tiobench --size 2048
--block 4096 --block 131072 --dir /mnt/raid --numruns 5
* iop342 had 1GB of memory available
Details:
* if CONFIG_DMA_ENGINE=n the asynchronous path is compiled away by making
async_tx_find_channel a static inline routine that always returns NULL
* when a callback is specified for a given transaction an interrupt will
fire at operation completion time and the callback will occur in a
tasklet. if the the channel does not support interrupts then a live
polling wait will be performed
* the api is written as a dmaengine client that requests all available
channels
* In support of dependencies the api implicitly schedules channel-switch
interrupts. The interrupt triggers the cleanup tasklet which causes
pending operations to be scheduled on the next channel
* Xor engines treat an xor destination address differently than a software
xor routine. To the software routine the destination address is an implied
source, whereas engines treat it as a write-only destination. This patch
modifies the xor_blocks routine to take a an explicit destination address
to mirror the hardware.
Changelog:
* fixed a leftover debug print
* don't allow callbacks in async_interrupt_cond
* fixed xor_block changes
* fixed usage of ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DEST
* drop dma mapping methods, suggested by Chris Leech
* printk warning fixups from Andrew Morton
* don't use inline in C files, Adrian Bunk
* select the API when MD is enabled
* BUG_ON xor source counts <= 1
* implicitly handle hardware concerns like channel switching and
interrupts, Neil Brown
* remove the per operation type list, and distribute operation capabilities
evenly amongst the available channels
* simplify async_tx_find_channel to optimize the fast path
* introduce the channel_table_initialized flag to prevent early calls to
the api
* reorganize the code to mimic crypto
* include mm.h as not all archs include it in dma-mapping.h
* make the Kconfig options non-user visible, Adrian Bunk
* move async_tx under crypto since it is meant as 'core' functionality, and
the two may share algorithms in the future
* move large inline functions into c files
* checkpatch.pl fixes
* gpl v2 only correction
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-By: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
2007-01-02 18:10:44 +00:00
|
|
|
# async_tx api: hardware offloaded memory transfer/transform support
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#
|
async_tx: add the async_tx api
The async_tx api provides methods for describing a chain of asynchronous
bulk memory transfers/transforms with support for inter-transactional
dependencies. It is implemented as a dmaengine client that smooths over
the details of different hardware offload engine implementations. Code
that is written to the api can optimize for asynchronous operation and the
api will fit the chain of operations to the available offload resources.
I imagine that any piece of ADMA hardware would register with the
'async_*' subsystem, and a call to async_X would be routed as
appropriate, or be run in-line. - Neil Brown
async_tx exploits the capabilities of struct dma_async_tx_descriptor to
provide an api of the following general format:
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *
async_<operation>(..., struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *depend_tx,
dma_async_tx_callback cb_fn, void *cb_param)
{
struct dma_chan *chan = async_tx_find_channel(depend_tx, <operation>);
struct dma_device *device = chan ? chan->device : NULL;
int int_en = cb_fn ? 1 : 0;
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx = device ?
device->device_prep_dma_<operation>(chan, len, int_en) : NULL;
if (tx) { /* run <operation> asynchronously */
...
tx->tx_set_dest(addr, tx, index);
...
tx->tx_set_src(addr, tx, index);
...
async_tx_submit(chan, tx, flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
} else { /* run <operation> synchronously */
...
<operation>
...
async_tx_sync_epilog(flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
}
return tx;
}
async_tx_find_channel() returns a capable channel from its pool. The
channel pool is organized as a per-cpu array of channel pointers. The
async_tx_rebalance() routine is tasked with managing these arrays. In the
uniprocessor case async_tx_rebalance() tries to spread responsibility
evenly over channels of similar capabilities. For example if there are two
copy+xor channels, one will handle copy operations and the other will
handle xor. In the SMP case async_tx_rebalance() attempts to spread the
operations evenly over the cpus, e.g. cpu0 gets copy channel0 and xor
channel0 while cpu1 gets copy channel 1 and xor channel 1. When a
dependency is specified async_tx_find_channel defaults to keeping the
operation on the same channel. A xor->copy->xor chain will stay on one
channel if it supports both operation types, otherwise the transaction will
transition between a copy and a xor resource.
Currently the raid5 implementation in the MD raid456 driver has been
converted to the async_tx api. A driver for the offload engines on the
Intel Xscale series of I/O processors, iop-adma, is provided in a later
commit. With the iop-adma driver and async_tx, raid456 is able to offload
copy, xor, and xor-zero-sum operations to hardware engines.
On iop342 tiobench showed higher throughput for sequential writes (20 - 30%
improvement) and sequential reads to a degraded array (40 - 55%
improvement). For the other cases performance was roughly equal, +/- a few
percentage points. On a x86-smp platform the performance of the async_tx
implementation (in synchronous mode) was also +/- a few percentage points
of the original implementation. According to 'top' on iop342 CPU
utilization drops from ~50% to ~15% during a 'resync' while the speed
according to /proc/mdstat doubles from ~25 MB/s to ~50 MB/s.
The tiobench command line used for testing was: tiobench --size 2048
--block 4096 --block 131072 --dir /mnt/raid --numruns 5
* iop342 had 1GB of memory available
Details:
* if CONFIG_DMA_ENGINE=n the asynchronous path is compiled away by making
async_tx_find_channel a static inline routine that always returns NULL
* when a callback is specified for a given transaction an interrupt will
fire at operation completion time and the callback will occur in a
tasklet. if the the channel does not support interrupts then a live
polling wait will be performed
* the api is written as a dmaengine client that requests all available
channels
* In support of dependencies the api implicitly schedules channel-switch
interrupts. The interrupt triggers the cleanup tasklet which causes
pending operations to be scheduled on the next channel
* Xor engines treat an xor destination address differently than a software
xor routine. To the software routine the destination address is an implied
source, whereas engines treat it as a write-only destination. This patch
modifies the xor_blocks routine to take a an explicit destination address
to mirror the hardware.
Changelog:
* fixed a leftover debug print
* don't allow callbacks in async_interrupt_cond
* fixed xor_block changes
* fixed usage of ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DEST
* drop dma mapping methods, suggested by Chris Leech
* printk warning fixups from Andrew Morton
* don't use inline in C files, Adrian Bunk
* select the API when MD is enabled
* BUG_ON xor source counts <= 1
* implicitly handle hardware concerns like channel switching and
interrupts, Neil Brown
* remove the per operation type list, and distribute operation capabilities
evenly amongst the available channels
* simplify async_tx_find_channel to optimize the fast path
* introduce the channel_table_initialized flag to prevent early calls to
the api
* reorganize the code to mimic crypto
* include mm.h as not all archs include it in dma-mapping.h
* make the Kconfig options non-user visible, Adrian Bunk
* move async_tx under crypto since it is meant as 'core' functionality, and
the two may share algorithms in the future
* move large inline functions into c files
* checkpatch.pl fixes
* gpl v2 only correction
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-By: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
2007-01-02 18:10:44 +00:00
|
|
|
source "crypto/async_tx/Kconfig"
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
async_tx: add the async_tx api
The async_tx api provides methods for describing a chain of asynchronous
bulk memory transfers/transforms with support for inter-transactional
dependencies. It is implemented as a dmaengine client that smooths over
the details of different hardware offload engine implementations. Code
that is written to the api can optimize for asynchronous operation and the
api will fit the chain of operations to the available offload resources.
I imagine that any piece of ADMA hardware would register with the
'async_*' subsystem, and a call to async_X would be routed as
appropriate, or be run in-line. - Neil Brown
async_tx exploits the capabilities of struct dma_async_tx_descriptor to
provide an api of the following general format:
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *
async_<operation>(..., struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *depend_tx,
dma_async_tx_callback cb_fn, void *cb_param)
{
struct dma_chan *chan = async_tx_find_channel(depend_tx, <operation>);
struct dma_device *device = chan ? chan->device : NULL;
int int_en = cb_fn ? 1 : 0;
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx = device ?
device->device_prep_dma_<operation>(chan, len, int_en) : NULL;
if (tx) { /* run <operation> asynchronously */
...
tx->tx_set_dest(addr, tx, index);
...
tx->tx_set_src(addr, tx, index);
...
async_tx_submit(chan, tx, flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
} else { /* run <operation> synchronously */
...
<operation>
...
async_tx_sync_epilog(flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
}
return tx;
}
async_tx_find_channel() returns a capable channel from its pool. The
channel pool is organized as a per-cpu array of channel pointers. The
async_tx_rebalance() routine is tasked with managing these arrays. In the
uniprocessor case async_tx_rebalance() tries to spread responsibility
evenly over channels of similar capabilities. For example if there are two
copy+xor channels, one will handle copy operations and the other will
handle xor. In the SMP case async_tx_rebalance() attempts to spread the
operations evenly over the cpus, e.g. cpu0 gets copy channel0 and xor
channel0 while cpu1 gets copy channel 1 and xor channel 1. When a
dependency is specified async_tx_find_channel defaults to keeping the
operation on the same channel. A xor->copy->xor chain will stay on one
channel if it supports both operation types, otherwise the transaction will
transition between a copy and a xor resource.
Currently the raid5 implementation in the MD raid456 driver has been
converted to the async_tx api. A driver for the offload engines on the
Intel Xscale series of I/O processors, iop-adma, is provided in a later
commit. With the iop-adma driver and async_tx, raid456 is able to offload
copy, xor, and xor-zero-sum operations to hardware engines.
On iop342 tiobench showed higher throughput for sequential writes (20 - 30%
improvement) and sequential reads to a degraded array (40 - 55%
improvement). For the other cases performance was roughly equal, +/- a few
percentage points. On a x86-smp platform the performance of the async_tx
implementation (in synchronous mode) was also +/- a few percentage points
of the original implementation. According to 'top' on iop342 CPU
utilization drops from ~50% to ~15% during a 'resync' while the speed
according to /proc/mdstat doubles from ~25 MB/s to ~50 MB/s.
The tiobench command line used for testing was: tiobench --size 2048
--block 4096 --block 131072 --dir /mnt/raid --numruns 5
* iop342 had 1GB of memory available
Details:
* if CONFIG_DMA_ENGINE=n the asynchronous path is compiled away by making
async_tx_find_channel a static inline routine that always returns NULL
* when a callback is specified for a given transaction an interrupt will
fire at operation completion time and the callback will occur in a
tasklet. if the the channel does not support interrupts then a live
polling wait will be performed
* the api is written as a dmaengine client that requests all available
channels
* In support of dependencies the api implicitly schedules channel-switch
interrupts. The interrupt triggers the cleanup tasklet which causes
pending operations to be scheduled on the next channel
* Xor engines treat an xor destination address differently than a software
xor routine. To the software routine the destination address is an implied
source, whereas engines treat it as a write-only destination. This patch
modifies the xor_blocks routine to take a an explicit destination address
to mirror the hardware.
Changelog:
* fixed a leftover debug print
* don't allow callbacks in async_interrupt_cond
* fixed xor_block changes
* fixed usage of ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DEST
* drop dma mapping methods, suggested by Chris Leech
* printk warning fixups from Andrew Morton
* don't use inline in C files, Adrian Bunk
* select the API when MD is enabled
* BUG_ON xor source counts <= 1
* implicitly handle hardware concerns like channel switching and
interrupts, Neil Brown
* remove the per operation type list, and distribute operation capabilities
evenly amongst the available channels
* simplify async_tx_find_channel to optimize the fast path
* introduce the channel_table_initialized flag to prevent early calls to
the api
* reorganize the code to mimic crypto
* include mm.h as not all archs include it in dma-mapping.h
* make the Kconfig options non-user visible, Adrian Bunk
* move async_tx under crypto since it is meant as 'core' functionality, and
the two may share algorithms in the future
* move large inline functions into c files
* checkpatch.pl fixes
* gpl v2 only correction
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-By: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
2007-01-02 18:10:44 +00:00
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# Cryptographic API Configuration
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
2007-05-18 05:11:01 +00:00
|
|
|
menuconfig CRYPTO
|
2008-03-30 08:36:09 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate "Cryptographic API"
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
This option provides the core Cryptographic API.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2006-08-21 11:08:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if CRYPTO
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
comment "Crypto core or helper"
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-08-05 06:13:08 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_FIPS
|
|
|
|
|
bool "FIPS 200 compliance"
|
2014-07-04 14:15:08 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on (CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG || CRYPTO_DRBG) && !CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
|
2016-10-04 22:34:30 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on (MODULE_SIG || !MODULES)
|
2008-08-05 06:13:08 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2019-03-20 10:41:03 +00:00
|
|
|
This option enables the fips boot option which is
|
|
|
|
|
required if you want the system to operate in a FIPS 200
|
2008-08-05 06:13:08 +00:00
|
|
|
certification. You should say no unless you know what
|
2010-09-03 11:17:49 +00:00
|
|
|
this is.
|
2008-08-05 06:13:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-08-21 11:08:13 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
|
2006-08-21 11:08:13 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
This option provides the API for cryptographic algorithms.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-30 07:36:14 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AEAD
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD2
|
2007-08-30 07:36:14 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AEAD2
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
|
2015-08-13 09:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_NULL2
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_RNG2
|
2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2006-08-21 14:07:53 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER2
|
2006-08-21 14:07:53 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SKCIPHER2
|
2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_RNG2
|
2006-08-21 14:07:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-08-19 12:24:23 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH2
|
2006-08-19 12:24:23 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_HASH2
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-08-14 12:15:52 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_RNG
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_RNG2
|
2008-08-14 12:15:52 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_RNG2
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-03 06:49:31 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_RNG_DEFAULT
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 17:30:55 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AKCIPHER2
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER2
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-22 16:49:13 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_KPP2
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_KPP
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_KPP2
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-10-21 12:19:47 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ACOMP2
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
|
2018-01-05 16:26:47 +00:00
|
|
|
select SGL_ALLOC
|
2016-10-21 12:19:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ACOMP
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ACOMP2
|
|
|
|
|
|
2006-09-21 01:31:44 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Cryptographic algorithm manager"
|
2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER2
|
2006-09-21 01:31:44 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Create default cryptographic template instantiations such as
|
|
|
|
|
cbc(aes).
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_MANAGER2
|
|
|
|
|
def_tristate CRYPTO_MANAGER || (CRYPTO_MANAGER!=n && CRYPTO_ALGAPI=y)
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD2
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH2
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER2
|
2015-06-16 17:31:06 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER2
|
2016-06-22 16:49:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_KPP2
|
2016-10-21 12:19:47 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ACOMP2
|
2008-12-10 12:29:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-09-27 05:23:50 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_USER
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Userspace cryptographic algorithm configuration"
|
2011-11-01 01:12:43 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on NET
|
2011-09-27 05:23:50 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
2011-11-09 06:29:20 +00:00
|
|
|
Userspace configuration for cryptographic instantiations such as
|
2011-09-27 05:23:50 +00:00
|
|
|
cbc(aes).
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010-08-06 01:40:28 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
|
|
|
|
|
bool "Disable run-time self tests"
|
2010-08-06 02:34:00 +00:00
|
|
|
default y
|
2010-06-03 10:53:43 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2010-08-06 01:40:28 +00:00
|
|
|
Disable run-time self tests that normally take place at
|
|
|
|
|
algorithm registration.
|
2010-06-03 10:53:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-02-01 07:51:44 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
|
|
|
|
|
bool "Enable extra run-time crypto self tests"
|
2020-11-02 13:48:15 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && !CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS && CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2019-02-01 07:51:44 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Enable extra run-time self tests of registered crypto algorithms,
|
|
|
|
|
including randomized fuzz tests.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is intended for developer use only, as these tests take much
|
|
|
|
|
longer to run than the normal self tests.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_GF128MUL
|
2019-05-20 16:53:43 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate
|
2006-10-28 03:15:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_NULL
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Null algorithms"
|
2015-08-13 09:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_NULL2
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
These are 'Null' algorithms, used by IPsec, which do nothing.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-08-13 09:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_NULL2
|
2015-08-17 12:39:40 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate
|
2015-08-13 09:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER2
|
2015-08-13 09:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH2
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010-01-07 04:57:19 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_PCRYPT
|
2012-10-02 18:16:49 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate "Parallel crypto engine"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on SMP
|
2010-01-07 04:57:19 +00:00
|
|
|
select PADATA
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
This converts an arbitrary crypto algorithm into a parallel
|
|
|
|
|
algorithm that executes in kernel threads.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CRYPTD
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Software async crypto daemon"
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2008-05-14 13:23:00 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
This is a generic software asynchronous crypto daemon that
|
|
|
|
|
converts an arbitrary synchronous software crypto algorithm
|
|
|
|
|
into an asynchronous algorithm that executes in a kernel thread.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AUTHENC
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Authenc support"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2015-08-04 13:23:14 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_NULL
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Authenc: Combined mode wrapper for IPsec.
|
|
|
|
|
This is required for IPSec.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_TEST
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Testing module"
|
2020-11-20 11:04:32 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on m || EXPERT
|
2008-07-31 09:08:25 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Quick & dirty crypto test module.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-11-22 12:08:25 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SIMD
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
2012-06-18 11:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_CRYPTD
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-26 12:25:39 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ENGINE
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-11 15:51:18 +00:00
|
|
|
comment "Public-key cryptography"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_RSA
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "RSA algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
|
select MPILIB
|
|
|
|
|
select ASN1
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Generic implementation of the RSA public key algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_DH
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Diffie-Hellman algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_KPP
|
|
|
|
|
select MPILIB
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Generic implementation of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-11 15:51:19 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ECC
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
2021-09-20 10:05:35 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_RNG_DEFAULT
|
2019-04-11 15:51:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-04-11 15:51:18 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ECDH
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "ECDH algorithm"
|
2019-04-11 15:51:19 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ECC
|
2019-04-11 15:51:18 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_KPP
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Generic implementation of the ECDH algorithm
|
|
|
|
|
|
2021-03-16 21:07:32 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ECDSA
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "ECDSA (NIST P192, P256 etc.) algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ECC
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
|
select ASN1
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (NIST P192, P256 etc.)
|
|
|
|
|
is A NIST cryptographic standard algorithm. Only signature verification
|
|
|
|
|
is implemented.
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm
Add Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm (GOST R
34.10-2012, RFC 7091, ISO/IEC 14888-3) is one of the Russian (and since
2018 the CIS countries) cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST
algorithms). Only signature verification is supported, with intent to be
used in the IMA.
Summary of the changes:
* crypto/Kconfig:
- EC-RDSA is added into Public-key cryptography section.
* crypto/Makefile:
- ecrdsa objects are added.
* crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:
- Recognize EC-RDSA and Streebog OIDs.
* include/linux/oid_registry.h:
- EC-RDSA OIDs are added to the enum. Also, a two currently not
implemented curve OIDs are added for possible extension later (to
not change numbering and grouping).
* crypto/ecc.c:
- Kenneth MacKay copyright date is updated to 2014, because
vli_mmod_slow, ecc_point_add, ecc_point_mult_shamir are based on his
code from micro-ecc.
- Functions needed for ecrdsa are EXPORT_SYMBOL'ed.
- New functions:
vli_is_negative - helper to determine sign of vli;
vli_from_be64 - unpack big-endian array into vli (used for
a signature);
vli_from_le64 - unpack little-endian array into vli (used for
a public key);
vli_uadd, vli_usub - add/sub u64 value to/from vli (used for
increment/decrement);
mul_64_64 - optimized to use __int128 where appropriate, this speeds
up point multiplication (and as a consequence signature
verification) by the factor of 1.5-2;
vli_umult - multiply vli by a small value (speeds up point
multiplication by another factor of 1.5-2, depending on vli sizes);
vli_mmod_special - module reduction for some form of Pseudo-Mersenne
primes (used for the curves A);
vli_mmod_special2 - module reduction for another form of
Pseudo-Mersenne primes (used for the curves B);
vli_mmod_barrett - module reduction using pre-computed value (used
for the curve C);
vli_mmod_slow - more general module reduction which is much slower
(used when the modulus is subgroup order);
vli_mod_mult_slow - modular multiplication;
ecc_point_add - add two points;
ecc_point_mult_shamir - add two points multiplied by scalars in one
combined multiplication (this gives speed up by another factor 2 in
compare to two separate multiplications).
ecc_is_pubkey_valid_partial - additional samity check is added.
- Updated vli_mmod_fast with non-strict heuristic to call optimal
module reduction function depending on the prime value;
- All computations for the previously defined (two NIST) curves should
not unaffected.
* crypto/ecc.h:
- Newly exported functions are documented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_defs.h
- Five curves are defined.
* crypto/ecrdsa.c:
- Signature verification is implemented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_params.asn1, crypto/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1:
- Templates for BER decoder for EC-RDSA parameters and public key.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 15:51:20 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ECRDSA
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ECC
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_STREEBOG
|
2019-04-24 01:32:40 +00:00
|
|
|
select OID_REGISTRY
|
|
|
|
|
select ASN1
|
crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm
Add Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm (GOST R
34.10-2012, RFC 7091, ISO/IEC 14888-3) is one of the Russian (and since
2018 the CIS countries) cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST
algorithms). Only signature verification is supported, with intent to be
used in the IMA.
Summary of the changes:
* crypto/Kconfig:
- EC-RDSA is added into Public-key cryptography section.
* crypto/Makefile:
- ecrdsa objects are added.
* crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:
- Recognize EC-RDSA and Streebog OIDs.
* include/linux/oid_registry.h:
- EC-RDSA OIDs are added to the enum. Also, a two currently not
implemented curve OIDs are added for possible extension later (to
not change numbering and grouping).
* crypto/ecc.c:
- Kenneth MacKay copyright date is updated to 2014, because
vli_mmod_slow, ecc_point_add, ecc_point_mult_shamir are based on his
code from micro-ecc.
- Functions needed for ecrdsa are EXPORT_SYMBOL'ed.
- New functions:
vli_is_negative - helper to determine sign of vli;
vli_from_be64 - unpack big-endian array into vli (used for
a signature);
vli_from_le64 - unpack little-endian array into vli (used for
a public key);
vli_uadd, vli_usub - add/sub u64 value to/from vli (used for
increment/decrement);
mul_64_64 - optimized to use __int128 where appropriate, this speeds
up point multiplication (and as a consequence signature
verification) by the factor of 1.5-2;
vli_umult - multiply vli by a small value (speeds up point
multiplication by another factor of 1.5-2, depending on vli sizes);
vli_mmod_special - module reduction for some form of Pseudo-Mersenne
primes (used for the curves A);
vli_mmod_special2 - module reduction for another form of
Pseudo-Mersenne primes (used for the curves B);
vli_mmod_barrett - module reduction using pre-computed value (used
for the curve C);
vli_mmod_slow - more general module reduction which is much slower
(used when the modulus is subgroup order);
vli_mod_mult_slow - modular multiplication;
ecc_point_add - add two points;
ecc_point_mult_shamir - add two points multiplied by scalars in one
combined multiplication (this gives speed up by another factor 2 in
compare to two separate multiplications).
ecc_is_pubkey_valid_partial - additional samity check is added.
- Updated vli_mmod_fast with non-strict heuristic to call optimal
module reduction function depending on the prime value;
- All computations for the previously defined (two NIST) curves should
not unaffected.
* crypto/ecc.h:
- Newly exported functions are documented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_defs.h
- Five curves are defined.
* crypto/ecrdsa.c:
- Signature verification is implemented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_params.asn1, crypto/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1:
- Templates for BER decoder for EC-RDSA parameters and public key.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 15:51:20 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm (GOST R 34.10-2012,
|
|
|
|
|
RFC 7091, ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018) is one of the Russian cryptographic
|
|
|
|
|
standard algorithms (called GOST algorithms). Only signature verification
|
|
|
|
|
is implemented.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-20 16:20:57 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SM2
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SM2 algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SM3
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
|
select MPILIB
|
|
|
|
|
select ASN1
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Generic implementation of the SM2 public key algorithm. It was
|
|
|
|
|
published by State Encryption Management Bureau, China.
|
|
|
|
|
as specified by OSCCA GM/T 0003.1-2012 -- 0003.5-2012.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
References:
|
|
|
|
|
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02
|
|
|
|
|
http://www.oscca.gov.cn/sca/xxgk/2010-12/17/content_1002386.shtml
|
|
|
|
|
http://www.gmbz.org.cn/main/bzlb.html
|
|
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|
|
|
2019-11-08 12:22:34 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CURVE25519
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Curve25519 algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_KPP
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-08 12:22:36 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CURVE25519_X86
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "x86_64 accelerated Curve25519 scalar multiplication library"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
comment "Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data"
|
2007-11-10 12:08:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CCM
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CCM support"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_CTR
|
2017-02-03 14:49:36 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD
|
2019-05-20 16:49:46 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Support for Counter with CBC MAC. Required for IPsec.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_GCM
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "GCM/GMAC support"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_CTR
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD
|
2009-08-06 05:34:26 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_GHASH
|
2013-04-07 13:43:41 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_NULL
|
2019-05-20 16:49:46 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Support for Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and Galois Message
|
|
|
|
|
Authentication Code (GMAC). Required for IPSec.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-01 11:44:00 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CHACHA20POLY1305
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD support"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_CHACHA20
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_POLY1305
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD
|
2019-05-20 16:49:46 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2015-06-01 11:44:00 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD support, RFC7539.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Support for the AEAD wrapper using the ChaCha20 stream cipher combined
|
|
|
|
|
with the Poly1305 authenticator. It is defined in RFC7539 for use in
|
|
|
|
|
IETF protocols.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-11 12:12:49 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AEGIS128
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "AEGIS-128 AEAD algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AES # for AES S-box tables
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Support for the AEGIS-128 dedicated AEAD algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-08-11 22:59:11 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AEGIS128_SIMD
|
|
|
|
|
bool "Support SIMD acceleration for AEGIS-128"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on CRYPTO_AEGIS128 && ((ARM || ARM64) && KERNEL_MODE_NEON)
|
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-11 12:12:51 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AEGIS128_AESNI_SSE2
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "AEGIS-128 AEAD algorithm (x86_64 AESNI+SSE2 implementation)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD
|
2019-03-10 19:00:53 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SIMD
|
2018-05-11 12:12:51 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2019-03-15 07:47:25 +00:00
|
|
|
AESNI+SSE2 implementation of the AEGIS-128 dedicated AEAD algorithm.
|
2018-05-11 12:12:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SEQIV
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Sequence Number IV Generator"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2015-05-21 07:11:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_NULL
|
2015-06-03 06:49:31 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_RNG_DEFAULT
|
2019-05-20 16:49:46 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
This IV generator generates an IV based on a sequence number by
|
|
|
|
|
xoring it with a salt. This algorithm is mainly useful for CTR
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-05-21 07:11:15 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ECHAINIV
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Encrypted Chain IV Generator"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_NULL
|
2015-06-03 06:49:31 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_RNG_DEFAULT
|
2019-05-20 16:49:46 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2015-05-21 07:11:15 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
This IV generator generates an IV based on the encryption of
|
|
|
|
|
a sequence number xored with a salt. This is the default
|
|
|
|
|
algorithm for CBC.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
comment "Block modes"
|
2006-11-29 07:59:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CBC
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CBC support"
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2006-10-16 11:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2006-09-21 01:44:08 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
CBC: Cipher Block Chaining mode
|
|
|
|
|
This block cipher algorithm is required for IPSec.
|
2006-09-21 01:44:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-03-01 22:36:17 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CFB
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CFB support"
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2018-03-01 22:36:17 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
CFB: Cipher FeedBack mode
|
|
|
|
|
This block cipher algorithm is required for TPM2 Cryptography.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CTR
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CTR support"
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2006-10-16 11:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2006-09-21 01:44:08 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
CTR: Counter mode
|
2006-09-21 01:44:08 +00:00
|
|
|
This block cipher algorithm is required for IPSec.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CTS
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CTS support"
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2019-05-20 16:49:46 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
CTS: Cipher Text Stealing
|
|
|
|
|
This is the Cipher Text Stealing mode as described by
|
2018-11-05 12:05:01 +00:00
|
|
|
Section 8 of rfc2040 and referenced by rfc3962
|
|
|
|
|
(rfc3962 includes errata information in its Appendix A) or
|
|
|
|
|
CBC-CS3 as defined by NIST in Sp800-38A addendum from Oct 2010.
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
This mode is required for Kerberos gss mechanism support
|
|
|
|
|
for AES encryption.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-11-05 12:05:01 +00:00
|
|
|
See: https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38a/addendum/final
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ECB
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "ECB support"
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2006-12-16 01:09:02 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
ECB: Electronic CodeBook mode
|
|
|
|
|
This is the simplest block cipher algorithm. It simply encrypts
|
|
|
|
|
the input block by block.
|
2006-12-16 01:09:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-11-25 22:43:10 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_LRW
|
2011-12-13 10:52:51 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate "LRW support"
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2006-11-25 22:43:10 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_GF128MUL
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
LRW: Liskov Rivest Wagner, a tweakable, non malleable, non movable
|
|
|
|
|
narrow block cipher mode for dm-crypt. Use it with cipher
|
|
|
|
|
specification string aes-lrw-benbi, the key must be 256, 320 or 384.
|
|
|
|
|
The first 128, 192 or 256 bits in the key are used for AES and the
|
|
|
|
|
rest is used to tie each cipher block to its logical position.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-20 13:18:39 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_OFB
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "OFB support"
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2018-09-20 13:18:39 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
OFB: the Output Feedback mode makes a block cipher into a synchronous
|
|
|
|
|
stream cipher. It generates keystream blocks, which are then XORed
|
|
|
|
|
with the plaintext blocks to get the ciphertext. Flipping a bit in the
|
|
|
|
|
ciphertext produces a flipped bit in the plaintext at the same
|
|
|
|
|
location. This property allows many error correcting codes to function
|
|
|
|
|
normally even when applied before encryption.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_PCBC
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "PCBC support"
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
PCBC: Propagating Cipher Block Chaining mode
|
|
|
|
|
This block cipher algorithm is required for RxRPC.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2007-09-19 12:23:13 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_XTS
|
2011-12-13 10:52:56 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate "XTS support"
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2007-09-19 12:23:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2017-02-23 07:38:26 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ECB
|
2007-09-19 12:23:13 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
XTS: IEEE1619/D16 narrow block cipher use with aes-xts-plain,
|
|
|
|
|
key size 256, 384 or 512 bits. This implementation currently
|
|
|
|
|
can't handle a sectorsize which is not a multiple of 16 bytes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-21 18:58:56 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_KEYWRAP
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Key wrapping support"
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2019-05-20 16:49:46 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2015-09-21 18:58:56 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Support for key wrapping (NIST SP800-38F / RFC3394) without
|
|
|
|
|
padding.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-11-17 01:26:29 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2019-11-08 12:22:19 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
|
2018-11-17 01:26:29 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-12-05 06:20:00 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_SSE2
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "NHPoly1305 hash function (x86_64 SSE2 implementation)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
SSE2 optimized implementation of the hash function used by the
|
|
|
|
|
Adiantum encryption mode.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-05 06:20:01 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_AVX2
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "NHPoly1305 hash function (x86_64 AVX2 implementation)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
AVX2 optimized implementation of the hash function used by the
|
|
|
|
|
Adiantum encryption mode.
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode. Adiantum was designed by
Paul Crowley and is specified by our paper:
Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf)
See our paper for full details; this patch only provides an overview.
Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for
fast and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated
crypto instructions. Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12
stream cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash
function, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single
16-byte block. On CPUs without AES instructions, Adiantum is much
faster than AES-XTS; for example, on ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte sectors
Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption,
and decryption about 5 times faster.
Adiantum is a specialization of the more general HBSH construction. Our
earlier proposal, HPolyC, was also a HBSH specialization, but it used a
different εA∆U hash function, one based on Poly1305 only. Adiantum's
εA∆U hash function, which is based primarily on the "NH" hash function
like that used in UMAC (RFC4418), is about twice as fast as HPolyC's;
consequently, Adiantum is about 20% faster than HPolyC.
This speed comes with no loss of security: Adiantum is provably just as
secure as HPolyC, in fact slightly *more* secure. Like HPolyC,
Adiantum's security is reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256,
subject to a security bound. XChaCha12 itself has a security reduction
to ChaCha12. Therefore, one need not "trust" Adiantum; one need only
trust ChaCha12 and AES-256. Note that the εA∆U hash function is only
used for its proven combinatorical properties so cannot be "broken".
Adiantum is also a true wide-block encryption mode, so flipping any
plaintext bit in the sector scrambles the entire ciphertext, and vice
versa. No other such mode is available in the kernel currently; doing
the same with XTS scrambles only 16 bytes. Adiantum also supports
arbitrary-length tweaks and naturally supports any length input >= 16
bytes without needing "ciphertext stealing".
For the stream cipher, Adiantum uses XChaCha12 rather than XChaCha20 in
order to make encryption feasible on the widest range of devices.
Although the 20-round variant is quite popular, the best known attacks
on ChaCha are on only 7 rounds, so ChaCha12 still has a substantial
security margin; in fact, larger than AES-256's. 12-round Salsa20 is
also the eSTREAM recommendation. For the block cipher, Adiantum uses
AES-256, despite it having a lower security margin than XChaCha12 and
needing table lookups, due to AES's extensive adoption and analysis
making it the obvious first choice. Nevertheless, for flexibility this
patch also permits the "adiantum" template to be instantiated with
XChaCha20 and/or with an alternate block cipher.
We need Adiantum support in the kernel for use in dm-crypt and fscrypt,
where currently the only other suitable options are block cipher modes
such as AES-XTS. A big problem with this is that many low-end mobile
devices (e.g. Android Go phones sold primarily in developing countries,
as well as some smartwatches) still have CPUs that lack AES
instructions, e.g. ARM Cortex-A7. Sadly, AES-XTS encryption is much too
slow to be viable on these devices. We did find that some "lightweight"
block ciphers are fast enough, but these suffer from problems such as
not having much cryptanalysis or being too controversial.
The ChaCha stream cipher has excellent performance but is insecure to
use directly for disk encryption, since each sector's IV is reused each
time it is overwritten. Even restricting the threat model to offline
attacks only isn't enough, since modern flash storage devices don't
guarantee that "overwrites" are really overwrites, due to wear-leveling.
Adiantum avoids this problem by constructing a
"tweakable super-pseudorandom permutation"; this is the strongest
possible security model for length-preserving encryption.
Of course, storing random nonces along with the ciphertext would be the
ideal solution. But doing that with existing hardware and filesystems
runs into major practical problems; in most cases it would require data
journaling (like dm-integrity) which severely degrades performance.
Thus, for now length-preserving encryption is still needed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-17 01:26:31 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ADIANTUM
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Adiantum support"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_CHACHA20
|
2019-11-08 12:22:19 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
|
crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode. Adiantum was designed by
Paul Crowley and is specified by our paper:
Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf)
See our paper for full details; this patch only provides an overview.
Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for
fast and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated
crypto instructions. Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12
stream cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash
function, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single
16-byte block. On CPUs without AES instructions, Adiantum is much
faster than AES-XTS; for example, on ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte sectors
Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption,
and decryption about 5 times faster.
Adiantum is a specialization of the more general HBSH construction. Our
earlier proposal, HPolyC, was also a HBSH specialization, but it used a
different εA∆U hash function, one based on Poly1305 only. Adiantum's
εA∆U hash function, which is based primarily on the "NH" hash function
like that used in UMAC (RFC4418), is about twice as fast as HPolyC's;
consequently, Adiantum is about 20% faster than HPolyC.
This speed comes with no loss of security: Adiantum is provably just as
secure as HPolyC, in fact slightly *more* secure. Like HPolyC,
Adiantum's security is reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256,
subject to a security bound. XChaCha12 itself has a security reduction
to ChaCha12. Therefore, one need not "trust" Adiantum; one need only
trust ChaCha12 and AES-256. Note that the εA∆U hash function is only
used for its proven combinatorical properties so cannot be "broken".
Adiantum is also a true wide-block encryption mode, so flipping any
plaintext bit in the sector scrambles the entire ciphertext, and vice
versa. No other such mode is available in the kernel currently; doing
the same with XTS scrambles only 16 bytes. Adiantum also supports
arbitrary-length tweaks and naturally supports any length input >= 16
bytes without needing "ciphertext stealing".
For the stream cipher, Adiantum uses XChaCha12 rather than XChaCha20 in
order to make encryption feasible on the widest range of devices.
Although the 20-round variant is quite popular, the best known attacks
on ChaCha are on only 7 rounds, so ChaCha12 still has a substantial
security margin; in fact, larger than AES-256's. 12-round Salsa20 is
also the eSTREAM recommendation. For the block cipher, Adiantum uses
AES-256, despite it having a lower security margin than XChaCha12 and
needing table lookups, due to AES's extensive adoption and analysis
making it the obvious first choice. Nevertheless, for flexibility this
patch also permits the "adiantum" template to be instantiated with
XChaCha20 and/or with an alternate block cipher.
We need Adiantum support in the kernel for use in dm-crypt and fscrypt,
where currently the only other suitable options are block cipher modes
such as AES-XTS. A big problem with this is that many low-end mobile
devices (e.g. Android Go phones sold primarily in developing countries,
as well as some smartwatches) still have CPUs that lack AES
instructions, e.g. ARM Cortex-A7. Sadly, AES-XTS encryption is much too
slow to be viable on these devices. We did find that some "lightweight"
block ciphers are fast enough, but these suffer from problems such as
not having much cryptanalysis or being too controversial.
The ChaCha stream cipher has excellent performance but is insecure to
use directly for disk encryption, since each sector's IV is reused each
time it is overwritten. Even restricting the threat model to offline
attacks only isn't enough, since modern flash storage devices don't
guarantee that "overwrites" are really overwrites, due to wear-leveling.
Adiantum avoids this problem by constructing a
"tweakable super-pseudorandom permutation"; this is the strongest
possible security model for length-preserving encryption.
Of course, storing random nonces along with the ciphertext would be the
ideal solution. But doing that with existing hardware and filesystems
runs into major practical problems; in most cases it would require data
journaling (like dm-integrity) which severely degrades performance.
Thus, for now length-preserving encryption is still needed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-17 01:26:31 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305
|
2019-05-20 16:49:46 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode. Adiantum was designed by
Paul Crowley and is specified by our paper:
Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf)
See our paper for full details; this patch only provides an overview.
Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for
fast and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated
crypto instructions. Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12
stream cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash
function, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single
16-byte block. On CPUs without AES instructions, Adiantum is much
faster than AES-XTS; for example, on ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte sectors
Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption,
and decryption about 5 times faster.
Adiantum is a specialization of the more general HBSH construction. Our
earlier proposal, HPolyC, was also a HBSH specialization, but it used a
different εA∆U hash function, one based on Poly1305 only. Adiantum's
εA∆U hash function, which is based primarily on the "NH" hash function
like that used in UMAC (RFC4418), is about twice as fast as HPolyC's;
consequently, Adiantum is about 20% faster than HPolyC.
This speed comes with no loss of security: Adiantum is provably just as
secure as HPolyC, in fact slightly *more* secure. Like HPolyC,
Adiantum's security is reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256,
subject to a security bound. XChaCha12 itself has a security reduction
to ChaCha12. Therefore, one need not "trust" Adiantum; one need only
trust ChaCha12 and AES-256. Note that the εA∆U hash function is only
used for its proven combinatorical properties so cannot be "broken".
Adiantum is also a true wide-block encryption mode, so flipping any
plaintext bit in the sector scrambles the entire ciphertext, and vice
versa. No other such mode is available in the kernel currently; doing
the same with XTS scrambles only 16 bytes. Adiantum also supports
arbitrary-length tweaks and naturally supports any length input >= 16
bytes without needing "ciphertext stealing".
For the stream cipher, Adiantum uses XChaCha12 rather than XChaCha20 in
order to make encryption feasible on the widest range of devices.
Although the 20-round variant is quite popular, the best known attacks
on ChaCha are on only 7 rounds, so ChaCha12 still has a substantial
security margin; in fact, larger than AES-256's. 12-round Salsa20 is
also the eSTREAM recommendation. For the block cipher, Adiantum uses
AES-256, despite it having a lower security margin than XChaCha12 and
needing table lookups, due to AES's extensive adoption and analysis
making it the obvious first choice. Nevertheless, for flexibility this
patch also permits the "adiantum" template to be instantiated with
XChaCha20 and/or with an alternate block cipher.
We need Adiantum support in the kernel for use in dm-crypt and fscrypt,
where currently the only other suitable options are block cipher modes
such as AES-XTS. A big problem with this is that many low-end mobile
devices (e.g. Android Go phones sold primarily in developing countries,
as well as some smartwatches) still have CPUs that lack AES
instructions, e.g. ARM Cortex-A7. Sadly, AES-XTS encryption is much too
slow to be viable on these devices. We did find that some "lightweight"
block ciphers are fast enough, but these suffer from problems such as
not having much cryptanalysis or being too controversial.
The ChaCha stream cipher has excellent performance but is insecure to
use directly for disk encryption, since each sector's IV is reused each
time it is overwritten. Even restricting the threat model to offline
attacks only isn't enough, since modern flash storage devices don't
guarantee that "overwrites" are really overwrites, due to wear-leveling.
Adiantum avoids this problem by constructing a
"tweakable super-pseudorandom permutation"; this is the strongest
possible security model for length-preserving encryption.
Of course, storing random nonces along with the ciphertext would be the
ideal solution. But doing that with existing hardware and filesystems
runs into major practical problems; in most cases it would require data
journaling (like dm-integrity) which severely degrades performance.
Thus, for now length-preserving encryption is still needed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-17 01:26:31 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode
|
|
|
|
|
designed for fast and secure disk encryption, especially on
|
|
|
|
|
CPUs without dedicated crypto instructions. It encrypts
|
|
|
|
|
each sector using the XChaCha12 stream cipher, two passes of
|
|
|
|
|
an ε-almost-∆-universal hash function, and an invocation of
|
|
|
|
|
the AES-256 block cipher on a single 16-byte block. On CPUs
|
|
|
|
|
without AES instructions, Adiantum is much faster than
|
|
|
|
|
AES-XTS.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Adiantum's security is provably reducible to that of its
|
|
|
|
|
underlying stream and block ciphers, subject to a security
|
|
|
|
|
bound. Unlike XTS, Adiantum is a true wide-block encryption
|
|
|
|
|
mode, so it actually provides an even stronger notion of
|
|
|
|
|
security than XTS, subject to the security bound.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say N.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-08-19 14:17:33 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ESSIV
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "ESSIV support for block encryption"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AUTHENC
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Encrypted salt-sector initialization vector (ESSIV) is an IV
|
|
|
|
|
generation method that is used in some cases by fscrypt and/or
|
|
|
|
|
dm-crypt. It uses the hash of the block encryption key as the
|
|
|
|
|
symmetric key for a block encryption pass applied to the input
|
|
|
|
|
IV, making low entropy IV sources more suitable for block
|
|
|
|
|
encryption.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This driver implements a crypto API template that can be
|
2020-01-12 16:58:58 +00:00
|
|
|
instantiated either as an skcipher or as an AEAD (depending on the
|
2019-08-19 14:17:33 +00:00
|
|
|
type of the first template argument), and which defers encryption
|
|
|
|
|
and decryption requests to the encapsulated cipher after applying
|
2020-01-12 16:58:58 +00:00
|
|
|
ESSIV to the input IV. Note that in the AEAD case, it is assumed
|
2019-08-19 14:17:33 +00:00
|
|
|
that the keys are presented in the same format used by the authenc
|
|
|
|
|
template, and that the IV appears at the end of the authenticated
|
|
|
|
|
associated data (AAD) region (which is how dm-crypt uses it.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note that the use of ESSIV is not recommended for new deployments,
|
|
|
|
|
and so this only needs to be enabled when interoperability with
|
|
|
|
|
existing encrypted volumes of filesystems is required, or when
|
|
|
|
|
building for a particular system that requires it (e.g., when
|
|
|
|
|
the SoC in question has accelerated CBC but not XTS, making CBC
|
|
|
|
|
combined with ESSIV the only feasible mode for h/w accelerated
|
|
|
|
|
block encryption)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
comment "Hash modes"
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-04-08 07:48:44 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CMAC
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CMAC support"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) specified by
|
|
|
|
|
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4493
|
|
|
|
|
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_HMAC
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "HMAC support"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
[CRYPTO] ctr: Add CTR (Counter) block cipher mode
This patch implements CTR mode for IPsec.
It is based off of RFC 3686.
Please note:
1. CTR turns a block cipher into a stream cipher.
Encryption is done in blocks, however the last block
may be a partial block.
A "counter block" is encrypted, creating a keystream
that is xor'ed with the plaintext. The counter portion
of the counter block is incremented after each block
of plaintext is encrypted.
Decryption is performed in same manner.
2. The CTR counterblock is composed of,
nonce + IV + counter
The size of the counterblock is equivalent to the
blocksize of the cipher.
sizeof(nonce) + sizeof(IV) + sizeof(counter) = blocksize
The CTR template requires the name of the cipher
algorithm, the sizeof the nonce, and the sizeof the iv.
ctr(cipher,sizeof_nonce,sizeof_iv)
So for example,
ctr(aes,4,8)
specifies the counterblock will be composed of 4 bytes
from a nonce, 8 bytes from the iv, and 4 bytes for counter
since aes has a blocksize of 16 bytes.
3. The counter portion of the counter block is stored
in big endian for conformance to rfc 3686.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-10-23 00:50:32 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication (RFC2104).
|
|
|
|
|
This is required for IPSec.
|
[CRYPTO] ctr: Add CTR (Counter) block cipher mode
This patch implements CTR mode for IPsec.
It is based off of RFC 3686.
Please note:
1. CTR turns a block cipher into a stream cipher.
Encryption is done in blocks, however the last block
may be a partial block.
A "counter block" is encrypted, creating a keystream
that is xor'ed with the plaintext. The counter portion
of the counter block is incremented after each block
of plaintext is encrypted.
Decryption is performed in same manner.
2. The CTR counterblock is composed of,
nonce + IV + counter
The size of the counterblock is equivalent to the
blocksize of the cipher.
sizeof(nonce) + sizeof(IV) + sizeof(counter) = blocksize
The CTR template requires the name of the cipher
algorithm, the sizeof the nonce, and the sizeof the iv.
ctr(cipher,sizeof_nonce,sizeof_iv)
So for example,
ctr(aes,4,8)
specifies the counterblock will be composed of 4 bytes
from a nonce, 8 bytes from the iv, and 4 bytes for counter
since aes has a blocksize of 16 bytes.
3. The counter portion of the counter block is stored
in big endian for conformance to rfc 3686.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-10-23 00:50:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_XCBC
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "XCBC support"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2008-03-24 13:26:16 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
XCBC: Keyed-Hashing with encryption algorithm
|
2020-07-19 16:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3566.txt
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/modes/proposedmodes/
|
|
|
|
|
xcbc-mac/xcbc-mac-spec.pdf
|
2008-03-24 13:26:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-09-02 10:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_VMAC
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "VMAC support"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
VMAC is a message authentication algorithm designed for
|
|
|
|
|
very high speed on 64-bit architectures.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2020-07-19 16:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://fastcrypto.org/vmac>
|
2009-09-02 10:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
comment "Digest"
|
2007-11-26 14:24:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CRC32C
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CRC32c CRC algorithm"
|
2008-07-08 12:54:28 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2012-03-23 22:02:25 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRC32
|
2007-12-12 12:25:13 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Castagnoli, et al Cyclic Redundancy-Check Algorithm. Used
|
|
|
|
|
by iSCSI for header and data digests and by others.
|
2008-11-07 07:11:47 +00:00
|
|
|
See Castagnoli93. Module will be crc32c.
|
2007-12-12 12:25:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-08-07 01:57:03 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CRC32C_INTEL
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CRC32c INTEL hardware acceleration"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
In Intel processor with SSE4.2 supported, the processor will
|
|
|
|
|
support CRC32C implementation using hardware accelerated CRC32
|
|
|
|
|
instruction. This option will create 'crc32c-intel' module,
|
|
|
|
|
which will enable any routine to use the CRC32 instruction to
|
|
|
|
|
gain performance compared with software implementation.
|
|
|
|
|
Module will be crc32c-intel.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-11-22 09:32:44 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CRC32C_VPMSUM
|
2016-06-30 22:19:45 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate "CRC32c CRC algorithm (powerpc64)"
|
2016-08-08 22:46:15 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on PPC64 && ALTIVEC
|
2016-06-30 22:19:45 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
select CRC32
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
CRC32c algorithm implemented using vector polynomial multiply-sum
|
|
|
|
|
(vpmsum) instructions, introduced in POWER8. Enable on POWER8
|
|
|
|
|
and newer processors for improved performance.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-08-23 03:47:36 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CRC32C_SPARC64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CRC32c CRC algorithm (SPARC64)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on SPARC64
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
select CRC32
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
CRC32c CRC algorithm implemented using sparc64 crypto instructions,
|
|
|
|
|
when available.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-10 14:54:59 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CRC32
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CRC32 CRC algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
select CRC32
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
CRC-32-IEEE 802.3 cyclic redundancy-check algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
Shash crypto api wrappers to crc32_le function.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CRC32_PCLMUL
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CRC32 PCLMULQDQ hardware acceleration"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
select CRC32
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
From Intel Westmere and AMD Bulldozer processor with SSE4.2
|
|
|
|
|
and PCLMULQDQ supported, the processor will support
|
|
|
|
|
CRC32 PCLMULQDQ implementation using hardware accelerated PCLMULQDQ
|
2018-12-28 10:09:40 +00:00
|
|
|
instruction. This option will create 'crc32-pclmul' module,
|
2013-01-10 14:54:59 +00:00
|
|
|
which will enable any routine to use the CRC-32-IEEE 802.3 checksum
|
|
|
|
|
and gain better performance as compared with the table implementation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-09 22:11:06 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CRC32_MIPS
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CRC32c and CRC32 CRC algorithm (MIPS)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on MIPS_CRC_SUPPORT
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
CRC32c and CRC32 CRC algorithms implemented using mips crypto
|
|
|
|
|
instructions, when available.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-05-30 06:52:57 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_XXHASH
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "xxHash hash algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
select XXHASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
xxHash non-cryptographic hash algorithm. Extremely fast, working at
|
|
|
|
|
speeds close to RAM limits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-10-24 16:28:31 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_BLAKE2B
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "BLAKE2b digest algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Implementation of cryptographic hash function BLAKE2b (or just BLAKE2),
|
|
|
|
|
optimized for 64bit platforms and can produce digests of any size
|
|
|
|
|
between 1 to 64. The keyed hash is also implemented.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This module provides the following algorithms:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- blake2b-160
|
|
|
|
|
- blake2b-256
|
|
|
|
|
- blake2b-384
|
|
|
|
|
- blake2b-512
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See https://blake2.net for further information.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-08 12:22:30 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_BLAKE2S
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "BLAKE2s digest algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Implementation of cryptographic hash function BLAKE2s
|
|
|
|
|
optimized for 8-32bit platforms and can produce digests of any size
|
|
|
|
|
between 1 to 32. The keyed hash is also implemented.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This module provides the following algorithms:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- blake2s-128
|
|
|
|
|
- blake2s-160
|
|
|
|
|
- blake2s-224
|
|
|
|
|
- blake2s-256
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See https://blake2.net for further information.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-08 12:22:31 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "BLAKE2s digest algorithm (x86 accelerated version)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-07 02:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CRCT10DIF algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
CRC T10 Data Integrity Field computation is being cast as
|
|
|
|
|
a crypto transform. This allows for faster crc t10 diff
|
|
|
|
|
transforms to be used if they are available.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF_PCLMUL
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CRCT10DIF PCLMULQDQ hardware acceleration"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT && CRC_T10DIF
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
For x86_64 processors with SSE4.2 and PCLMULQDQ supported,
|
|
|
|
|
CRC T10 DIF PCLMULQDQ computation can be hardware
|
|
|
|
|
accelerated PCLMULQDQ instruction. This option will create
|
2018-12-28 10:09:40 +00:00
|
|
|
'crct10dif-pclmul' module, which is faster when computing the
|
2013-09-07 02:56:26 +00:00
|
|
|
crct10dif checksum as compared with the generic table implementation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-15 12:37:36 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF_VPMSUM
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CRC32T10DIF powerpc64 hardware acceleration"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on PPC64 && ALTIVEC && CRC_T10DIF
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
CRC10T10DIF algorithm implemented using vector polynomial
|
|
|
|
|
multiply-sum (vpmsum) instructions, introduced in POWER8. Enable on
|
|
|
|
|
POWER8 and newer processors for improved performance.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-15 12:37:37 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_VPMSUM_TESTER
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Powerpc64 vpmsum hardware acceleration tester"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF_VPMSUM && CRYPTO_CRC32C_VPMSUM
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Stress test for CRC32c and CRC-T10DIF algorithms implemented with
|
|
|
|
|
POWER8 vpmsum instructions.
|
|
|
|
|
Unless you are testing these algorithms, you don't need this.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-06 05:32:38 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_GHASH
|
2019-07-20 06:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate "GHASH hash function"
|
2009-08-06 05:32:38 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_GF128MUL
|
2016-01-25 16:51:21 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2009-08-06 05:32:38 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2019-07-20 06:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
GHASH is the hash function used in GCM (Galois/Counter Mode).
|
|
|
|
|
It is not a general-purpose cryptographic hash function.
|
2009-08-06 05:32:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-01 11:43:58 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_POLY1305
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Poly1305 authenticator algorithm"
|
2016-01-25 16:51:21 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2019-11-08 12:22:19 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
|
2015-06-01 11:43:58 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Poly1305 authenticator algorithm, RFC7539.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Poly1305 is an authenticator algorithm designed by Daniel J. Bernstein.
|
|
|
|
|
It is used for the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD, specified in RFC7539 for use
|
|
|
|
|
in IETF protocols. This is the portable C implementation of Poly1305.
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto: poly1305 - Add a SSE2 SIMD variant for x86_64
Implements an x86_64 assembler driver for the Poly1305 authenticator. This
single block variant holds the 130-bit integer in 5 32-bit words, but uses
SSE to do two multiplications/additions in parallel.
When calling updates with small blocks, the overhead for kernel_fpu_begin/
kernel_fpu_end() negates the perfmance gain. We therefore use the
poly1305-generic fallback for small updates.
For large messages, throughput increases by ~5-10% compared to
poly1305-generic:
testing speed of poly1305 (poly1305-generic)
test 0 ( 96 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 6 updates): 4080026 opers/sec, 391682496 bytes/sec
test 1 ( 96 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 3 updates): 6221094 opers/sec, 597225024 bytes/sec
test 2 ( 96 byte blocks, 96 bytes per update, 1 updates): 9609750 opers/sec, 922536057 bytes/sec
test 3 ( 288 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 18 updates): 1459379 opers/sec, 420301267 bytes/sec
test 4 ( 288 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 9 updates): 2115179 opers/sec, 609171609 bytes/sec
test 5 ( 288 byte blocks, 288 bytes per update, 1 updates): 3729874 opers/sec, 1074203856 bytes/sec
test 6 ( 1056 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 33 updates): 593000 opers/sec, 626208000 bytes/sec
test 7 ( 1056 byte blocks, 1056 bytes per update, 1 updates): 1081536 opers/sec, 1142102332 bytes/sec
test 8 ( 2080 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 65 updates): 302077 opers/sec, 628320576 bytes/sec
test 9 ( 2080 byte blocks, 2080 bytes per update, 1 updates): 554384 opers/sec, 1153120176 bytes/sec
test 10 ( 4128 byte blocks, 4128 bytes per update, 1 updates): 278715 opers/sec, 1150536345 bytes/sec
test 11 ( 8224 byte blocks, 8224 bytes per update, 1 updates): 140202 opers/sec, 1153022070 bytes/sec
testing speed of poly1305 (poly1305-simd)
test 0 ( 96 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 6 updates): 3790063 opers/sec, 363846076 bytes/sec
test 1 ( 96 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 3 updates): 5913378 opers/sec, 567684355 bytes/sec
test 2 ( 96 byte blocks, 96 bytes per update, 1 updates): 9352574 opers/sec, 897847104 bytes/sec
test 3 ( 288 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 18 updates): 1362145 opers/sec, 392297990 bytes/sec
test 4 ( 288 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 9 updates): 2007075 opers/sec, 578037628 bytes/sec
test 5 ( 288 byte blocks, 288 bytes per update, 1 updates): 3709811 opers/sec, 1068425798 bytes/sec
test 6 ( 1056 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 33 updates): 566272 opers/sec, 597984182 bytes/sec
test 7 ( 1056 byte blocks, 1056 bytes per update, 1 updates): 1111657 opers/sec, 1173910108 bytes/sec
test 8 ( 2080 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 65 updates): 288857 opers/sec, 600823808 bytes/sec
test 9 ( 2080 byte blocks, 2080 bytes per update, 1 updates): 590746 opers/sec, 1228751888 bytes/sec
test 10 ( 4128 byte blocks, 4128 bytes per update, 1 updates): 301825 opers/sec, 1245936902 bytes/sec
test 11 ( 8224 byte blocks, 8224 bytes per update, 1 updates): 153075 opers/sec, 1258896201 bytes/sec
Benchmark results from a Core i5-4670T.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-07-16 17:14:06 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_POLY1305_X86_64
|
crypto: poly1305 - Add a four block AVX2 variant for x86_64
Extends the x86_64 Poly1305 authenticator by a function processing four
consecutive Poly1305 blocks in parallel using AVX2 instructions.
For large messages, throughput increases by ~15-45% compared to two
block SSE2:
testing speed of poly1305 (poly1305-simd)
test 0 ( 96 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 6 updates): 3809514 opers/sec, 365713411 bytes/sec
test 1 ( 96 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 3 updates): 5973423 opers/sec, 573448627 bytes/sec
test 2 ( 96 byte blocks, 96 bytes per update, 1 updates): 9446779 opers/sec, 906890803 bytes/sec
test 3 ( 288 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 18 updates): 1364814 opers/sec, 393066691 bytes/sec
test 4 ( 288 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 9 updates): 2045780 opers/sec, 589184697 bytes/sec
test 5 ( 288 byte blocks, 288 bytes per update, 1 updates): 3711946 opers/sec, 1069040592 bytes/sec
test 6 ( 1056 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 33 updates): 573686 opers/sec, 605812732 bytes/sec
test 7 ( 1056 byte blocks, 1056 bytes per update, 1 updates): 1647802 opers/sec, 1740079440 bytes/sec
test 8 ( 2080 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 65 updates): 292970 opers/sec, 609378224 bytes/sec
test 9 ( 2080 byte blocks, 2080 bytes per update, 1 updates): 943229 opers/sec, 1961916528 bytes/sec
test 10 ( 4128 byte blocks, 4128 bytes per update, 1 updates): 494623 opers/sec, 2041804569 bytes/sec
test 11 ( 8224 byte blocks, 8224 bytes per update, 1 updates): 254045 opers/sec, 2089271014 bytes/sec
testing speed of poly1305 (poly1305-simd)
test 0 ( 96 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 6 updates): 3826224 opers/sec, 367317552 bytes/sec
test 1 ( 96 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 3 updates): 5948638 opers/sec, 571069267 bytes/sec
test 2 ( 96 byte blocks, 96 bytes per update, 1 updates): 9439110 opers/sec, 906154627 bytes/sec
test 3 ( 288 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 18 updates): 1367756 opers/sec, 393913872 bytes/sec
test 4 ( 288 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 9 updates): 2056881 opers/sec, 592381958 bytes/sec
test 5 ( 288 byte blocks, 288 bytes per update, 1 updates): 3711153 opers/sec, 1068812179 bytes/sec
test 6 ( 1056 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 33 updates): 574940 opers/sec, 607136745 bytes/sec
test 7 ( 1056 byte blocks, 1056 bytes per update, 1 updates): 1948830 opers/sec, 2057964585 bytes/sec
test 8 ( 2080 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 65 updates): 293308 opers/sec, 610082096 bytes/sec
test 9 ( 2080 byte blocks, 2080 bytes per update, 1 updates): 1235224 opers/sec, 2569267792 bytes/sec
test 10 ( 4128 byte blocks, 4128 bytes per update, 1 updates): 684405 opers/sec, 2825226316 bytes/sec
test 11 ( 8224 byte blocks, 8224 bytes per update, 1 updates): 367101 opers/sec, 3019039446 bytes/sec
Benchmark results from a Core i5-4670T.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-07-16 17:14:08 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate "Poly1305 authenticator algorithm (x86_64/SSE2/AVX2)"
|
crypto: poly1305 - Add a SSE2 SIMD variant for x86_64
Implements an x86_64 assembler driver for the Poly1305 authenticator. This
single block variant holds the 130-bit integer in 5 32-bit words, but uses
SSE to do two multiplications/additions in parallel.
When calling updates with small blocks, the overhead for kernel_fpu_begin/
kernel_fpu_end() negates the perfmance gain. We therefore use the
poly1305-generic fallback for small updates.
For large messages, throughput increases by ~5-10% compared to
poly1305-generic:
testing speed of poly1305 (poly1305-generic)
test 0 ( 96 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 6 updates): 4080026 opers/sec, 391682496 bytes/sec
test 1 ( 96 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 3 updates): 6221094 opers/sec, 597225024 bytes/sec
test 2 ( 96 byte blocks, 96 bytes per update, 1 updates): 9609750 opers/sec, 922536057 bytes/sec
test 3 ( 288 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 18 updates): 1459379 opers/sec, 420301267 bytes/sec
test 4 ( 288 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 9 updates): 2115179 opers/sec, 609171609 bytes/sec
test 5 ( 288 byte blocks, 288 bytes per update, 1 updates): 3729874 opers/sec, 1074203856 bytes/sec
test 6 ( 1056 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 33 updates): 593000 opers/sec, 626208000 bytes/sec
test 7 ( 1056 byte blocks, 1056 bytes per update, 1 updates): 1081536 opers/sec, 1142102332 bytes/sec
test 8 ( 2080 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 65 updates): 302077 opers/sec, 628320576 bytes/sec
test 9 ( 2080 byte blocks, 2080 bytes per update, 1 updates): 554384 opers/sec, 1153120176 bytes/sec
test 10 ( 4128 byte blocks, 4128 bytes per update, 1 updates): 278715 opers/sec, 1150536345 bytes/sec
test 11 ( 8224 byte blocks, 8224 bytes per update, 1 updates): 140202 opers/sec, 1153022070 bytes/sec
testing speed of poly1305 (poly1305-simd)
test 0 ( 96 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 6 updates): 3790063 opers/sec, 363846076 bytes/sec
test 1 ( 96 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 3 updates): 5913378 opers/sec, 567684355 bytes/sec
test 2 ( 96 byte blocks, 96 bytes per update, 1 updates): 9352574 opers/sec, 897847104 bytes/sec
test 3 ( 288 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 18 updates): 1362145 opers/sec, 392297990 bytes/sec
test 4 ( 288 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 9 updates): 2007075 opers/sec, 578037628 bytes/sec
test 5 ( 288 byte blocks, 288 bytes per update, 1 updates): 3709811 opers/sec, 1068425798 bytes/sec
test 6 ( 1056 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 33 updates): 566272 opers/sec, 597984182 bytes/sec
test 7 ( 1056 byte blocks, 1056 bytes per update, 1 updates): 1111657 opers/sec, 1173910108 bytes/sec
test 8 ( 2080 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 65 updates): 288857 opers/sec, 600823808 bytes/sec
test 9 ( 2080 byte blocks, 2080 bytes per update, 1 updates): 590746 opers/sec, 1228751888 bytes/sec
test 10 ( 4128 byte blocks, 4128 bytes per update, 1 updates): 301825 opers/sec, 1245936902 bytes/sec
test 11 ( 8224 byte blocks, 8224 bytes per update, 1 updates): 153075 opers/sec, 1258896201 bytes/sec
Benchmark results from a Core i5-4670T.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-07-16 17:14:06 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
2019-11-08 12:22:22 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
|
2019-11-08 12:22:23 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
|
crypto: poly1305 - Add a SSE2 SIMD variant for x86_64
Implements an x86_64 assembler driver for the Poly1305 authenticator. This
single block variant holds the 130-bit integer in 5 32-bit words, but uses
SSE to do two multiplications/additions in parallel.
When calling updates with small blocks, the overhead for kernel_fpu_begin/
kernel_fpu_end() negates the perfmance gain. We therefore use the
poly1305-generic fallback for small updates.
For large messages, throughput increases by ~5-10% compared to
poly1305-generic:
testing speed of poly1305 (poly1305-generic)
test 0 ( 96 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 6 updates): 4080026 opers/sec, 391682496 bytes/sec
test 1 ( 96 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 3 updates): 6221094 opers/sec, 597225024 bytes/sec
test 2 ( 96 byte blocks, 96 bytes per update, 1 updates): 9609750 opers/sec, 922536057 bytes/sec
test 3 ( 288 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 18 updates): 1459379 opers/sec, 420301267 bytes/sec
test 4 ( 288 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 9 updates): 2115179 opers/sec, 609171609 bytes/sec
test 5 ( 288 byte blocks, 288 bytes per update, 1 updates): 3729874 opers/sec, 1074203856 bytes/sec
test 6 ( 1056 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 33 updates): 593000 opers/sec, 626208000 bytes/sec
test 7 ( 1056 byte blocks, 1056 bytes per update, 1 updates): 1081536 opers/sec, 1142102332 bytes/sec
test 8 ( 2080 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 65 updates): 302077 opers/sec, 628320576 bytes/sec
test 9 ( 2080 byte blocks, 2080 bytes per update, 1 updates): 554384 opers/sec, 1153120176 bytes/sec
test 10 ( 4128 byte blocks, 4128 bytes per update, 1 updates): 278715 opers/sec, 1150536345 bytes/sec
test 11 ( 8224 byte blocks, 8224 bytes per update, 1 updates): 140202 opers/sec, 1153022070 bytes/sec
testing speed of poly1305 (poly1305-simd)
test 0 ( 96 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 6 updates): 3790063 opers/sec, 363846076 bytes/sec
test 1 ( 96 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 3 updates): 5913378 opers/sec, 567684355 bytes/sec
test 2 ( 96 byte blocks, 96 bytes per update, 1 updates): 9352574 opers/sec, 897847104 bytes/sec
test 3 ( 288 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 18 updates): 1362145 opers/sec, 392297990 bytes/sec
test 4 ( 288 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 9 updates): 2007075 opers/sec, 578037628 bytes/sec
test 5 ( 288 byte blocks, 288 bytes per update, 1 updates): 3709811 opers/sec, 1068425798 bytes/sec
test 6 ( 1056 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 33 updates): 566272 opers/sec, 597984182 bytes/sec
test 7 ( 1056 byte blocks, 1056 bytes per update, 1 updates): 1111657 opers/sec, 1173910108 bytes/sec
test 8 ( 2080 byte blocks, 32 bytes per update, 65 updates): 288857 opers/sec, 600823808 bytes/sec
test 9 ( 2080 byte blocks, 2080 bytes per update, 1 updates): 590746 opers/sec, 1228751888 bytes/sec
test 10 ( 4128 byte blocks, 4128 bytes per update, 1 updates): 301825 opers/sec, 1245936902 bytes/sec
test 11 ( 8224 byte blocks, 8224 bytes per update, 1 updates): 153075 opers/sec, 1258896201 bytes/sec
Benchmark results from a Core i5-4670T.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-07-16 17:14:06 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Poly1305 authenticator algorithm, RFC7539.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Poly1305 is an authenticator algorithm designed by Daniel J. Bernstein.
|
|
|
|
|
It is used for the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD, specified in RFC7539 for use
|
|
|
|
|
in IETF protocols. This is the x86_64 assembler implementation using SIMD
|
|
|
|
|
instructions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-08 12:22:26 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_POLY1305_MIPS
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Poly1305 authenticator algorithm (MIPS optimized)"
|
2021-03-03 01:16:04 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on MIPS
|
2019-11-08 12:22:26 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_MD4
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "MD4 digest algorithm"
|
2008-12-03 11:55:27 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2007-04-16 10:49:20 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
MD4 message digest algorithm (RFC1320).
|
2007-04-16 10:49:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_MD5
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "MD5 digest algorithm"
|
2008-12-03 11:57:12 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
MD5 message digest algorithm (RFC1321).
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-21 20:54:02 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_MD5_OCTEON
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "MD5 digest algorithm (OCTEON)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on CPU_CAVIUM_OCTEON
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MD5
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
MD5 message digest algorithm (RFC1321) implemented
|
|
|
|
|
using OCTEON crypto instructions, when available.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-01 18:30:46 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_MD5_PPC
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "MD5 digest algorithm (PPC)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on PPC
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
MD5 message digest algorithm (RFC1321) implemented
|
|
|
|
|
in PPC assembler.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-08-20 04:51:26 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_MD5_SPARC64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "MD5 digest algorithm (SPARC64)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on SPARC64
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MD5
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
MD5 message digest algorithm (RFC1321) implemented
|
|
|
|
|
using sparc64 crypto instructions, when available.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_MICHAEL_MIC
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Michael MIC keyed digest algorithm"
|
2008-12-07 11:35:38 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2006-12-16 01:13:14 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Michael MIC is used for message integrity protection in TKIP
|
|
|
|
|
(IEEE 802.11i). This algorithm is required for TKIP, but it
|
|
|
|
|
should not be used for other purposes because of the weakness
|
|
|
|
|
of the algorithm.
|
2006-12-16 01:13:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-05-07 14:17:37 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_RMD160
|
2008-07-16 11:28:00 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate "RIPEMD-160 digest algorithm"
|
2008-11-08 01:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2008-07-16 11:28:00 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
RIPEMD-160 (ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004).
|
2008-05-07 14:17:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-07-16 11:28:00 +00:00
|
|
|
RIPEMD-160 is a 160-bit cryptographic hash function. It is intended
|
|
|
|
|
to be used as a secure replacement for the 128-bit hash functions
|
|
|
|
|
MD4, MD5 and it's predecessor RIPEMD
|
|
|
|
|
(not to be confused with RIPEMD-128).
|
2008-05-07 14:17:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-07-16 11:28:00 +00:00
|
|
|
It's speed is comparable to SHA1 and there are no known attacks
|
|
|
|
|
against RIPEMD-160.
|
2008-05-09 13:30:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-07-16 11:28:00 +00:00
|
|
|
Developed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel.
|
2020-07-19 16:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
See <https://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html>
|
2008-05-09 13:30:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA1
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SHA1 digest algorithm"
|
2008-12-02 13:08:20 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
SHA-1 secure hash standard (FIPS 180-1/DFIPS 180-2).
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-08-04 18:19:25 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA1_SSSE3
|
2015-09-10 22:27:26 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate "SHA1 digest algorithm (SSSE3/AVX/AVX2/SHA-NI)"
|
2011-08-04 18:19:25 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SHA1
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
SHA-1 secure hash standard (FIPS 180-1/DFIPS 180-2) implemented
|
|
|
|
|
using Supplemental SSE3 (SSSE3) instructions or Advanced Vector
|
2015-09-10 22:27:26 +00:00
|
|
|
Extensions (AVX/AVX2) or SHA-NI(SHA Extensions New Instructions),
|
|
|
|
|
when available.
|
2011-08-04 18:19:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-03-26 20:59:17 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA256_SSSE3
|
2015-09-10 22:27:26 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate "SHA256 digest algorithm (SSSE3/AVX/AVX2/SHA-NI)"
|
2013-03-26 20:59:17 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SHA256
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
SHA-256 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2) implemented
|
|
|
|
|
using Supplemental SSE3 (SSSE3) instructions, or Advanced Vector
|
|
|
|
|
Extensions version 1 (AVX1), or Advanced Vector Extensions
|
2015-09-10 22:27:26 +00:00
|
|
|
version 2 (AVX2) instructions, or SHA-NI (SHA Extensions New
|
|
|
|
|
Instructions) when available.
|
2013-03-26 21:00:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA512_SSSE3
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SHA512 digest algorithm (SSSE3/AVX/AVX2)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SHA512
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
SHA-512 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2) implemented
|
|
|
|
|
using Supplemental SSE3 (SSSE3) instructions, or Advanced Vector
|
|
|
|
|
Extensions version 1 (AVX1), or Advanced Vector Extensions
|
2013-03-26 20:59:17 +00:00
|
|
|
version 2 (AVX2) instructions, when available.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-08 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA1_OCTEON
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SHA1 digest algorithm (OCTEON)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on CPU_CAVIUM_OCTEON
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SHA1
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
SHA-1 secure hash standard (FIPS 180-1/DFIPS 180-2) implemented
|
|
|
|
|
using OCTEON crypto instructions, when available.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-08-19 22:41:53 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA1_SPARC64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SHA1 digest algorithm (SPARC64)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on SPARC64
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SHA1
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
SHA-1 secure hash standard (FIPS 180-1/DFIPS 180-2) implemented
|
|
|
|
|
using sparc64 crypto instructions, when available.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-09-13 23:00:49 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA1_PPC
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SHA1 digest algorithm (powerpc)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on PPC
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
This is the powerpc hardware accelerated implementation of the
|
|
|
|
|
SHA-1 secure hash standard (FIPS 180-1/DFIPS 180-2).
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-24 19:36:50 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA1_PPC_SPE
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SHA1 digest algorithm (PPC SPE)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on PPC && SPE
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
SHA-1 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-4) implemented
|
|
|
|
|
using powerpc SPE SIMD instruction set.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA256
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SHA224 and SHA256 digest algorithm"
|
2008-12-03 11:57:49 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2019-08-17 14:24:35 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
SHA256 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2).
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
This version of SHA implements a 256 bit hash with 128 bits of
|
|
|
|
|
security against collision attacks.
|
2006-06-20 10:37:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-07-16 11:28:00 +00:00
|
|
|
This code also includes SHA-224, a 224 bit hash with 112 bits
|
|
|
|
|
of security against collision attacks.
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-30 14:39:34 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA256_PPC_SPE
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SHA224 and SHA256 digest algorithm (PPC SPE)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on PPC && SPE
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SHA256
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
SHA224 and SHA256 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2)
|
|
|
|
|
implemented using powerpc SPE SIMD instruction set.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-08 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA256_OCTEON
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SHA224 and SHA256 digest algorithm (OCTEON)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on CPU_CAVIUM_OCTEON
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SHA256
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
SHA-256 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2) implemented
|
|
|
|
|
using OCTEON crypto instructions, when available.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-08-20 00:11:37 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA256_SPARC64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SHA224 and SHA256 digest algorithm (SPARC64)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on SPARC64
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SHA256
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
SHA-256 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2) implemented
|
|
|
|
|
using sparc64 crypto instructions, when available.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA512
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SHA384 and SHA512 digest algorithms"
|
2008-12-17 05:49:02 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2006-06-20 10:59:16 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
SHA512 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2).
|
2006-06-20 10:59:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
This version of SHA implements a 512 bit hash with 256 bits of
|
|
|
|
|
security against collision attacks.
|
2006-06-20 10:59:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
This code also includes SHA-384, a 384 bit hash with 192 bits
|
|
|
|
|
of security against collision attacks.
|
2006-06-20 10:59:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-08 20:07:47 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA512_OCTEON
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SHA384 and SHA512 digest algorithms (OCTEON)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on CPU_CAVIUM_OCTEON
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SHA512
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
SHA-512 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2) implemented
|
|
|
|
|
using OCTEON crypto instructions, when available.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-08-20 00:37:56 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA512_SPARC64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SHA384 and SHA512 digest algorithm (SPARC64)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on SPARC64
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SHA512
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
SHA-512 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2) implemented
|
|
|
|
|
using sparc64 crypto instructions, when available.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-17 05:00:35 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA3
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SHA3 digest algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
SHA-3 secure hash standard (DFIPS 202). It's based on
|
|
|
|
|
cryptographic sponge function family called Keccak.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
References:
|
|
|
|
|
http://keccak.noekeon.org/
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-21 10:51:28 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SM3
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SM3 digest algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
SM3 secure hash function as defined by OSCCA GM/T 0004-2012 SM3).
|
|
|
|
|
It is part of the Chinese Commercial Cryptography suite.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
References:
|
|
|
|
|
http://www.oscca.gov.cn/UpFile/20101222141857786.pdf
|
|
|
|
|
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-shen-sm3-hash
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-11-06 21:00:01 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_STREEBOG
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Streebog Hash Function"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Streebog Hash Function (GOST R 34.11-2012, RFC 6986) is one of the Russian
|
|
|
|
|
cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST algorithms).
|
|
|
|
|
This setting enables two hash algorithms with 256 and 512 bits output.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
References:
|
|
|
|
|
https://tc26.ru/upload/iblock/fed/feddbb4d26b685903faa2ba11aea43f6.pdf
|
|
|
|
|
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6986
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_WP512
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Whirlpool digest algorithms"
|
2008-12-07 11:34:37 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Whirlpool hash algorithm 512, 384 and 256-bit hashes
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Whirlpool-512 is part of the NESSIE cryptographic primitives.
|
|
|
|
|
Whirlpool will be part of the ISO/IEC 10118-3:2003(E) standard
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2010-09-12 02:42:47 +00:00
|
|
|
<http://www.larc.usp.br/~pbarreto/WhirlpoolPage.html>
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-10-19 02:53:06 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_GHASH_CLMUL_NI_INTEL
|
2019-07-20 06:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate "GHASH hash function (CLMUL-NI accelerated)"
|
2011-06-08 12:56:29 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
2009-10-19 02:53:06 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_CRYPTD
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
2019-07-20 06:09:18 +00:00
|
|
|
This is the x86_64 CLMUL-NI accelerated implementation of
|
|
|
|
|
GHASH, the hash function used in GCM (Galois/Counter mode).
|
2009-10-19 02:53:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
comment "Ciphers"
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AES
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "AES cipher algorithms"
|
2006-08-21 11:08:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2019-07-02 19:41:33 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_AES
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
AES cipher algorithms (FIPS-197). AES uses the Rijndael
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rijndael appears to be consistently a very good performer in
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
both hardware and software across a wide range of computing
|
|
|
|
|
environments regardless of its use in feedback or non-feedback
|
|
|
|
|
modes. Its key setup time is excellent, and its key agility is
|
|
|
|
|
good. Rijndael's very low memory requirements make it very well
|
|
|
|
|
suited for restricted-space environments, in which it also
|
|
|
|
|
demonstrates excellent performance. Rijndael's operations are
|
|
|
|
|
among the easiest to defend against power and timing attacks.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
The AES specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See <http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/aes/> for more information.
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher
Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is due to
the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and the fact that
8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of cachelines on any
architecture, resulting in an exploitable correlation between the key
and the processing time for known plaintexts.
For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents a
security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically time
invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or by using
SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups.
For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too much
performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by switching
to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table data (the actual
S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start of each block to
eliminate data dependent latencies.
This code encrypts at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the
ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this
hardware). Decryption is substantially slower.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-02 16:37:40 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AES_TI
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Fixed time AES cipher"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2019-07-02 19:41:22 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_AES
|
crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher
Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is due to
the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and the fact that
8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of cachelines on any
architecture, resulting in an exploitable correlation between the key
and the processing time for known plaintexts.
For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents a
security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically time
invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or by using
SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups.
For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too much
performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by switching
to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table data (the actual
S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start of each block to
eliminate data dependent latencies.
This code encrypts at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the
ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this
hardware). Decryption is substantially slower.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-02 16:37:40 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
This is a generic implementation of AES that attempts to eliminate
|
|
|
|
|
data dependent latencies as much as possible without affecting
|
|
|
|
|
performance too much. It is intended for use by the generic CCM
|
|
|
|
|
and GCM drivers, and other CTR or CMAC/XCBC based modes that rely
|
|
|
|
|
solely on encryption (although decryption is supported as well, but
|
|
|
|
|
with a more dramatic performance hit)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Instead of using 16 lookup tables of 1 KB each, (8 for encryption and
|
|
|
|
|
8 for decryption), this implementation only uses just two S-boxes of
|
|
|
|
|
256 bytes each, and attempts to eliminate data dependent latencies by
|
|
|
|
|
prefetching the entire table into the cache at the start of each
|
2018-10-18 04:37:58 +00:00
|
|
|
block. Interrupts are also disabled to avoid races where cachelines
|
|
|
|
|
are evicted when the CPU is interrupted to do something else.
|
crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher
Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is due to
the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and the fact that
8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of cachelines on any
architecture, resulting in an exploitable correlation between the key
and the processing time for known plaintexts.
For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents a
security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically time
invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or by using
SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups.
For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too much
performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by switching
to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table data (the actual
S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start of each block to
eliminate data dependent latencies.
This code encrypts at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the
ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this
hardware). Decryption is substantially slower.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-02 16:37:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-01-18 05:28:34 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AES_NI_INTEL
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "AES cipher algorithms (AES-NI)"
|
2011-06-08 12:56:29 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on X86
|
2016-11-22 12:08:33 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD
|
2019-07-02 19:41:23 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_AES
|
2009-01-18 05:28:34 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2016-11-22 12:08:33 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SIMD
|
2009-01-18 05:28:34 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Use Intel AES-NI instructions for AES algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
AES cipher algorithms (FIPS-197). AES uses the Rijndael
|
|
|
|
|
algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rijndael appears to be consistently a very good performer in
|
|
|
|
|
both hardware and software across a wide range of computing
|
|
|
|
|
environments regardless of its use in feedback or non-feedback
|
|
|
|
|
modes. Its key setup time is excellent, and its key agility is
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
good. Rijndael's very low memory requirements make it very well
|
|
|
|
|
suited for restricted-space environments, in which it also
|
|
|
|
|
demonstrates excellent performance. Rijndael's operations are
|
|
|
|
|
among the easiest to defend against power and timing attacks.
|
2005-07-06 20:55:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
The AES specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See <http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/> for more information.
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto: aesni-intel - Ported implementation to x86-32
The AES-NI instructions are also available in legacy mode so the 32-bit
architecture may profit from those, too.
To illustrate the performance gain here's a short summary of a dm-crypt
speed test on a Core i7 M620 running at 2.67GHz comparing both assembler
implementations:
x86: i568 aes-ni delta
ECB, 256 bit: 93.8 MB/s 123.3 MB/s +31.4%
CBC, 256 bit: 84.8 MB/s 262.3 MB/s +209.3%
LRW, 256 bit: 108.6 MB/s 222.1 MB/s +104.5%
XTS, 256 bit: 105.0 MB/s 205.5 MB/s +95.7%
Additionally, due to some minor optimizations, the 64-bit version also
got a minor performance gain as seen below:
x86-64: old impl. new impl. delta
ECB, 256 bit: 121.1 MB/s 123.0 MB/s +1.5%
CBC, 256 bit: 285.3 MB/s 290.8 MB/s +1.9%
LRW, 256 bit: 263.7 MB/s 265.3 MB/s +0.6%
XTS, 256 bit: 251.1 MB/s 255.3 MB/s +1.7%
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2010-11-27 08:34:46 +00:00
|
|
|
In addition to AES cipher algorithm support, the acceleration
|
|
|
|
|
for some popular block cipher mode is supported too, including
|
2018-09-24 12:48:16 +00:00
|
|
|
ECB, CBC, LRW, XTS. The 64 bit version has additional
|
crypto: aesni-intel - Ported implementation to x86-32
The AES-NI instructions are also available in legacy mode so the 32-bit
architecture may profit from those, too.
To illustrate the performance gain here's a short summary of a dm-crypt
speed test on a Core i7 M620 running at 2.67GHz comparing both assembler
implementations:
x86: i568 aes-ni delta
ECB, 256 bit: 93.8 MB/s 123.3 MB/s +31.4%
CBC, 256 bit: 84.8 MB/s 262.3 MB/s +209.3%
LRW, 256 bit: 108.6 MB/s 222.1 MB/s +104.5%
XTS, 256 bit: 105.0 MB/s 205.5 MB/s +95.7%
Additionally, due to some minor optimizations, the 64-bit version also
got a minor performance gain as seen below:
x86-64: old impl. new impl. delta
ECB, 256 bit: 121.1 MB/s 123.0 MB/s +1.5%
CBC, 256 bit: 285.3 MB/s 290.8 MB/s +1.9%
LRW, 256 bit: 263.7 MB/s 265.3 MB/s +0.6%
XTS, 256 bit: 251.1 MB/s 255.3 MB/s +1.7%
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2010-11-27 08:34:46 +00:00
|
|
|
acceleration for CTR.
|
2009-03-29 07:41:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-08-21 10:58:13 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AES_SPARC64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "AES cipher algorithms (SPARC64)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on SPARC64
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2012-08-21 10:58:13 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Use SPARC64 crypto opcodes for AES algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
AES cipher algorithms (FIPS-197). AES uses the Rijndael
|
|
|
|
|
algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rijndael appears to be consistently a very good performer in
|
|
|
|
|
both hardware and software across a wide range of computing
|
|
|
|
|
environments regardless of its use in feedback or non-feedback
|
|
|
|
|
modes. Its key setup time is excellent, and its key agility is
|
|
|
|
|
good. Rijndael's very low memory requirements make it very well
|
|
|
|
|
suited for restricted-space environments, in which it also
|
|
|
|
|
demonstrates excellent performance. Rijndael's operations are
|
|
|
|
|
among the easiest to defend against power and timing attacks.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The AES specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See <http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/> for more information.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In addition to AES cipher algorithm support, the acceleration
|
|
|
|
|
for some popular block cipher mode is supported too, including
|
|
|
|
|
ECB and CBC.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-22 09:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AES_PPC_SPE
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "AES cipher algorithms (PPC SPE)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on PPC && SPE
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2015-02-22 09:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
AES cipher algorithms (FIPS-197). Additionally the acceleration
|
|
|
|
|
for popular block cipher modes ECB, CBC, CTR and XTS is supported.
|
|
|
|
|
This module should only be used for low power (router) devices
|
|
|
|
|
without hardware AES acceleration (e.g. caam crypto). It reduces the
|
|
|
|
|
size of the AES tables from 16KB to 8KB + 256 bytes and mitigates
|
|
|
|
|
timining attacks. Nevertheless it might be not as secure as other
|
|
|
|
|
architecture specific assembler implementations that work on 1KB
|
|
|
|
|
tables or 256 bytes S-boxes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ANUBIS
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Anubis cipher algorithm"
|
2020-09-11 14:11:03 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Anubis cipher algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Anubis is a variable key length cipher which can use keys from
|
|
|
|
|
128 bits to 320 bits in length. It was evaluated as a entrant
|
|
|
|
|
in the NESSIE competition.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2010-09-12 02:42:47 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/nessie/reports/>
|
|
|
|
|
<http://www.larc.usp.br/~pbarreto/AnubisPage.html>
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ARC4
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "ARC4 cipher algorithm"
|
crypto: arc4 - mark ecb(arc4) skcipher as obsolete
Cryptographic algorithms may have a lifespan that is significantly
shorter than Linux's, and so we need to start phasing out algorithms
that are known to be broken, and are no longer fit for general use.
RC4 (or arc4) is a good example here: there are a few areas where its
use is still somewhat acceptable, e.g., for interoperability with legacy
wifi hardware that can only use WEP or TKIP data encryption, but that
should not imply that, for instance, use of RC4 based EAP-TLS by the WPA
supplicant for negotiating TKIP keys is equally acceptable, or that RC4
should remain available as a general purpose cryptographic transform for
all in-kernel and user space clients.
Now that all in-kernel users that need to retain support have moved to
the arc4 library interface, and the known users of ecb(arc4) via the
socket API (iwd [0] and libell [1][2]) have been updated to switch to a
local implementation, we can take the next step, and mark the ecb(arc4)
skcipher as obsolete, and only provide it if the socket API is enabled in
the first place, as well as provide the option to disable all algorithms
that have been marked as obsolete.
[0] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/wireless/iwd.git/commit/?id=1db8a85a60c64523
[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/commit/?id=53482ce421b727c2
[2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/commit/?id=7f6a137809d42f6b
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-08-31 15:16:49 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2019-06-12 16:19:53 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
ARC4 cipher algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ARC4 is a stream cipher using keys ranging from 8 bits to 2048
|
|
|
|
|
bits in length. This algorithm is required for driver-based
|
|
|
|
|
WEP, but it should not be for other purposes because of the
|
|
|
|
|
weakness of the algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_BLOWFISH
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Blowfish cipher algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2011-09-01 22:45:07 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLOWFISH_COMMON
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Blowfish cipher algorithm, by Bruce Schneier.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is a variable key length cipher which can use keys from 32
|
|
|
|
|
bits to 448 bits in length. It's fast, simple and specifically
|
|
|
|
|
designed for use on "large microprocessors".
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2020-07-19 16:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://www.schneier.com/blowfish.html>
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-09-01 22:45:07 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_BLOWFISH_COMMON
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Common parts of the Blowfish cipher algorithm shared by the
|
|
|
|
|
generic c and the assembler implementations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2020-07-19 16:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://www.schneier.com/blowfish.html>
|
2011-09-01 22:45:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-09-01 22:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_BLOWFISH_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Blowfish cipher algorithm (x86_64)"
|
2012-04-09 00:31:22 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2011-09-01 22:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLOWFISH_COMMON
|
2021-01-05 16:48:01 +00:00
|
|
|
imply CRYPTO_CTR
|
2011-09-01 22:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Blowfish cipher algorithm (x86_64), by Bruce Schneier.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is a variable key length cipher which can use keys from 32
|
|
|
|
|
bits to 448 bits in length. It's fast, simple and specifically
|
|
|
|
|
designed for use on "large microprocessors".
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2020-07-19 16:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://www.schneier.com/blowfish.html>
|
2011-09-01 22:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CAMELLIA
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Camellia cipher algorithms"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Camellia cipher algorithms module.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Camellia is a symmetric key block cipher developed jointly
|
|
|
|
|
at NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Camellia specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
|
|
|
|
<https://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/index_s.html>
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-05 18:26:47 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Camellia cipher algorithm (x86_64)"
|
2012-04-09 00:31:22 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2021-01-05 16:47:54 +00:00
|
|
|
imply CRYPTO_CTR
|
2012-03-05 18:26:47 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Camellia cipher algorithm module (x86_64).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Camellia is a symmetric key block cipher developed jointly
|
|
|
|
|
at NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Camellia specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2012-10-26 11:49:01 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/index_s.html>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Camellia cipher algorithm (x86_64/AES-NI/AVX)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2012-10-26 11:49:01 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_X86_64
|
2018-02-20 07:48:23 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SIMD
|
2021-01-05 16:47:49 +00:00
|
|
|
imply CRYPTO_XTS
|
2012-10-26 11:49:01 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Camellia cipher algorithm module (x86_64/AES-NI/AVX).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Camellia is a symmetric key block cipher developed jointly
|
|
|
|
|
at NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Camellia specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2012-03-05 18:26:47 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/index_s.html>
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-04-13 10:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX2_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Camellia cipher algorithm (x86_64/AES-NI/AVX2)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Camellia cipher algorithm module (x86_64/AES-NI/AVX2).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Camellia is a symmetric key block cipher developed jointly
|
|
|
|
|
at NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Camellia specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
|
|
|
|
<https://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/index_s.html>
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-08-28 19:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_SPARC64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Camellia cipher algorithm (SPARC64)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on SPARC64
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2012-08-28 19:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Camellia cipher algorithm module (SPARC64).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Camellia is a symmetric key block cipher developed jointly
|
|
|
|
|
at NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Camellia specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
|
|
|
|
<https://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/index_s.html>
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-11-13 09:43:14 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CAST_COMMON
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Common parts of the CAST cipher algorithms shared by the
|
|
|
|
|
generic c and the assembler implementations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CAST5
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CAST5 (CAST-128) cipher algorithm"
|
2006-08-21 11:08:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2012-11-13 09:43:14 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_CAST_COMMON
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
The CAST5 encryption algorithm (synonymous with CAST-128) is
|
|
|
|
|
described in RFC2144.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-07-11 17:37:37 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CAST5_AVX_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CAST5 (CAST-128) cipher algorithm (x86_64/AVX)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2012-07-11 17:37:37 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_CAST5
|
2018-02-20 07:48:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_CAST_COMMON
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SIMD
|
2021-01-05 16:47:56 +00:00
|
|
|
imply CRYPTO_CTR
|
2012-07-11 17:37:37 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
The CAST5 encryption algorithm (synonymous with CAST-128) is
|
|
|
|
|
described in RFC2144.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This module provides the Cast5 cipher algorithm that processes
|
|
|
|
|
sixteen blocks parallel using the AVX instruction set.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CAST6
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CAST6 (CAST-256) cipher algorithm"
|
2006-08-21 11:08:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2012-11-13 09:43:14 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_CAST_COMMON
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
The CAST6 encryption algorithm (synonymous with CAST-256) is
|
|
|
|
|
described in RFC2612.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-07-11 17:38:57 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CAST6_AVX_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "CAST6 (CAST-256) cipher algorithm (x86_64/AVX)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2012-07-11 17:38:57 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_CAST6
|
2018-02-20 07:48:15 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_CAST_COMMON
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SIMD
|
2021-01-05 16:47:50 +00:00
|
|
|
imply CRYPTO_XTS
|
2021-01-05 16:47:57 +00:00
|
|
|
imply CRYPTO_CTR
|
2012-07-11 17:38:57 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
The CAST6 encryption algorithm (synonymous with CAST-256) is
|
|
|
|
|
described in RFC2612.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This module provides the Cast6 cipher algorithm that processes
|
|
|
|
|
eight blocks parallel using the AVX instruction set.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_DES
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "DES and Triple DES EDE cipher algorithms"
|
2006-08-21 11:08:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2019-08-15 09:01:09 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_DES
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
DES cipher algorithm (FIPS 46-2), and Triple DES EDE (FIPS 46-3).
|
2005-09-02 00:42:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-08-26 05:37:23 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_DES_SPARC64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "DES and Triple DES EDE cipher algorithms (SPARC64)"
|
2012-10-02 21:13:20 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on SPARC64
|
2012-08-26 05:37:23 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2019-08-15 09:01:09 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_DES
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2012-08-26 05:37:23 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
DES cipher algorithm (FIPS 46-2), and Triple DES EDE (FIPS 46-3),
|
|
|
|
|
optimized using SPARC64 crypto opcodes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-09 17:59:54 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_DES3_EDE_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Triple DES EDE cipher algorithm (x86-64)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2019-08-15 09:01:09 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_DES
|
2021-01-05 16:48:00 +00:00
|
|
|
imply CRYPTO_CTR
|
2014-06-09 17:59:54 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Triple DES EDE (FIPS 46-3) algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This module provides implementation of the Triple DES EDE cipher
|
|
|
|
|
algorithm that is optimized for x86-64 processors. Two versions of
|
|
|
|
|
algorithm are provided; regular processing one input block and
|
|
|
|
|
one that processes three blocks parallel.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_FCRYPT
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "FCrypt cipher algorithm"
|
2006-08-21 11:08:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
FCrypt algorithm used by RxRPC.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_KHAZAD
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Khazad cipher algorithm"
|
2020-09-11 14:11:03 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE
|
2006-08-21 11:08:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Khazad cipher algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Khazad was a finalist in the initial NESSIE competition. It is
|
|
|
|
|
an algorithm optimized for 64-bit processors with good performance
|
|
|
|
|
on 32-bit processors. Khazad uses an 128 bit key size.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2010-09-12 02:42:47 +00:00
|
|
|
<http://www.larc.usp.br/~pbarreto/KhazadPage.html>
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-01 11:43:56 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CHACHA20
|
crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support
Now that the generic implementation of ChaCha20 has been refactored to
allow varying the number of rounds, add support for XChaCha12, which is
the XSalsa construction applied to ChaCha12. ChaCha12 is one of the
three ciphers specified by the original ChaCha paper
(https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf: "ChaCha, a variant of
Salsa20"), alongside ChaCha8 and ChaCha20. ChaCha12 is faster than
ChaCha20 but has a lower, but still large, security margin.
We need XChaCha12 support so that it can be used in the Adiantum
encryption mode, which enables disk/file encryption on low-end mobile
devices where AES-XTS is too slow as the CPUs lack AES instructions.
We'd prefer XChaCha20 (the more popular variant), but it's too slow on
some of our target devices, so at least in some cases we do need the
XChaCha12-based version. In more detail, the problem is that Adiantum
is still much slower than we're happy with, and encryption still has a
quite noticeable effect on the feel of low-end devices. Users and
vendors push back hard against encryption that degrades the user
experience, which always risks encryption being disabled entirely. So
we need to choose the fastest option that gives us a solid margin of
security, and here that's XChaCha12. The best known attack on ChaCha
breaks only 7 rounds and has 2^235 time complexity, so ChaCha12's
security margin is still better than AES-256's. Much has been learned
about cryptanalysis of ARX ciphers since Salsa20 was originally designed
in 2005, and it now seems we can be comfortable with a smaller number of
rounds. The eSTREAM project also suggests the 12-round version of
Salsa20 as providing the best balance among the different variants:
combining very good performance with a "comfortable margin of security".
Note that it would be trivial to add vanilla ChaCha12 in addition to
XChaCha12. However, it's unneeded for now and therefore is omitted.
As discussed in the patch that introduced XChaCha20 support, I
considered splitting the code into separate chacha-common, chacha20,
xchacha20, and xchacha12 modules, so that these algorithms could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-17 01:26:22 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate "ChaCha stream cipher algorithms"
|
2019-11-08 12:22:08 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2015-06-01 11:43:56 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support
Now that the generic implementation of ChaCha20 has been refactored to
allow varying the number of rounds, add support for XChaCha12, which is
the XSalsa construction applied to ChaCha12. ChaCha12 is one of the
three ciphers specified by the original ChaCha paper
(https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf: "ChaCha, a variant of
Salsa20"), alongside ChaCha8 and ChaCha20. ChaCha12 is faster than
ChaCha20 but has a lower, but still large, security margin.
We need XChaCha12 support so that it can be used in the Adiantum
encryption mode, which enables disk/file encryption on low-end mobile
devices where AES-XTS is too slow as the CPUs lack AES instructions.
We'd prefer XChaCha20 (the more popular variant), but it's too slow on
some of our target devices, so at least in some cases we do need the
XChaCha12-based version. In more detail, the problem is that Adiantum
is still much slower than we're happy with, and encryption still has a
quite noticeable effect on the feel of low-end devices. Users and
vendors push back hard against encryption that degrades the user
experience, which always risks encryption being disabled entirely. So
we need to choose the fastest option that gives us a solid margin of
security, and here that's XChaCha12. The best known attack on ChaCha
breaks only 7 rounds and has 2^235 time complexity, so ChaCha12's
security margin is still better than AES-256's. Much has been learned
about cryptanalysis of ARX ciphers since Salsa20 was originally designed
in 2005, and it now seems we can be comfortable with a smaller number of
rounds. The eSTREAM project also suggests the 12-round version of
Salsa20 as providing the best balance among the different variants:
combining very good performance with a "comfortable margin of security".
Note that it would be trivial to add vanilla ChaCha12 in addition to
XChaCha12. However, it's unneeded for now and therefore is omitted.
As discussed in the patch that introduced XChaCha20 support, I
considered splitting the code into separate chacha-common, chacha20,
xchacha20, and xchacha12 modules, so that these algorithms could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-17 01:26:22 +00:00
|
|
|
The ChaCha20, XChaCha20, and XChaCha12 stream cipher algorithms.
|
2015-06-01 11:43:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ChaCha20 is a 256-bit high-speed stream cipher designed by Daniel J.
|
|
|
|
|
Bernstein and further specified in RFC7539 for use in IETF protocols.
|
crypto: chacha20-generic - add XChaCha20 support
Add support for the XChaCha20 stream cipher. XChaCha20 is the
application of the XSalsa20 construction
(https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf) to ChaCha20 rather than
to Salsa20. XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce length from 64 bits (or
96 bits, depending on convention) to 192 bits, while provably retaining
ChaCha20's security. XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 permutation to map the
key and first 128 nonce bits to a 256-bit subkey. Then, it does the
ChaCha20 stream cipher with the subkey and remaining 64 bits of nonce.
We need XChaCha support in order to add support for the Adiantum
encryption mode. Note that to meet our performance requirements, we
actually plan to primarily use the variant XChaCha12. But we believe
it's wise to first add XChaCha20 as a baseline with a higher security
margin, in case there are any situations where it can be used.
Supporting both variants is straightforward.
Since XChaCha20's subkey differs for each request, XChaCha20 can't be a
template that wraps ChaCha20; that would require re-keying the
underlying ChaCha20 for every request, which wouldn't be thread-safe.
Instead, we make XChaCha20 its own top-level algorithm which calls the
ChaCha20 streaming implementation internally.
Similar to the existing ChaCha20 implementation, we define the IV to be
the nonce and stream position concatenated together. This allows users
to seek to any position in the stream.
I considered splitting the code into separate chacha20-common, chacha20,
and xchacha20 modules, so that chacha20 and xchacha20 could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity of separate modules.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-17 01:26:20 +00:00
|
|
|
This is the portable C implementation of ChaCha20. See also:
|
2020-07-19 16:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf>
|
2015-06-01 11:43:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
crypto: chacha20-generic - add XChaCha20 support
Add support for the XChaCha20 stream cipher. XChaCha20 is the
application of the XSalsa20 construction
(https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf) to ChaCha20 rather than
to Salsa20. XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce length from 64 bits (or
96 bits, depending on convention) to 192 bits, while provably retaining
ChaCha20's security. XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 permutation to map the
key and first 128 nonce bits to a 256-bit subkey. Then, it does the
ChaCha20 stream cipher with the subkey and remaining 64 bits of nonce.
We need XChaCha support in order to add support for the Adiantum
encryption mode. Note that to meet our performance requirements, we
actually plan to primarily use the variant XChaCha12. But we believe
it's wise to first add XChaCha20 as a baseline with a higher security
margin, in case there are any situations where it can be used.
Supporting both variants is straightforward.
Since XChaCha20's subkey differs for each request, XChaCha20 can't be a
template that wraps ChaCha20; that would require re-keying the
underlying ChaCha20 for every request, which wouldn't be thread-safe.
Instead, we make XChaCha20 its own top-level algorithm which calls the
ChaCha20 streaming implementation internally.
Similar to the existing ChaCha20 implementation, we define the IV to be
the nonce and stream position concatenated together. This allows users
to seek to any position in the stream.
I considered splitting the code into separate chacha20-common, chacha20,
and xchacha20 modules, so that chacha20 and xchacha20 could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity of separate modules.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-17 01:26:20 +00:00
|
|
|
XChaCha20 is the application of the XSalsa20 construction to ChaCha20
|
|
|
|
|
rather than to Salsa20. XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce length
|
|
|
|
|
from 64 bits (or 96 bits using the RFC7539 convention) to 192 bits,
|
|
|
|
|
while provably retaining ChaCha20's security. See also:
|
|
|
|
|
<https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf>
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support
Now that the generic implementation of ChaCha20 has been refactored to
allow varying the number of rounds, add support for XChaCha12, which is
the XSalsa construction applied to ChaCha12. ChaCha12 is one of the
three ciphers specified by the original ChaCha paper
(https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf: "ChaCha, a variant of
Salsa20"), alongside ChaCha8 and ChaCha20. ChaCha12 is faster than
ChaCha20 but has a lower, but still large, security margin.
We need XChaCha12 support so that it can be used in the Adiantum
encryption mode, which enables disk/file encryption on low-end mobile
devices where AES-XTS is too slow as the CPUs lack AES instructions.
We'd prefer XChaCha20 (the more popular variant), but it's too slow on
some of our target devices, so at least in some cases we do need the
XChaCha12-based version. In more detail, the problem is that Adiantum
is still much slower than we're happy with, and encryption still has a
quite noticeable effect on the feel of low-end devices. Users and
vendors push back hard against encryption that degrades the user
experience, which always risks encryption being disabled entirely. So
we need to choose the fastest option that gives us a solid margin of
security, and here that's XChaCha12. The best known attack on ChaCha
breaks only 7 rounds and has 2^235 time complexity, so ChaCha12's
security margin is still better than AES-256's. Much has been learned
about cryptanalysis of ARX ciphers since Salsa20 was originally designed
in 2005, and it now seems we can be comfortable with a smaller number of
rounds. The eSTREAM project also suggests the 12-round version of
Salsa20 as providing the best balance among the different variants:
combining very good performance with a "comfortable margin of security".
Note that it would be trivial to add vanilla ChaCha12 in addition to
XChaCha12. However, it's unneeded for now and therefore is omitted.
As discussed in the patch that introduced XChaCha20 support, I
considered splitting the code into separate chacha-common, chacha20,
xchacha20, and xchacha12 modules, so that these algorithms could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-17 01:26:22 +00:00
|
|
|
XChaCha12 is XChaCha20 reduced to 12 rounds, with correspondingly
|
|
|
|
|
reduced security margin but increased performance. It can be needed
|
|
|
|
|
in some performance-sensitive scenarios.
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto: chacha20 - Add a SSSE3 SIMD variant for x86_64
Implements an x86_64 assembler driver for the ChaCha20 stream cipher. This
single block variant works on a single state matrix using SSE instructions.
It requires SSSE3 due the use of pshufb for efficient 8/16-bit rotate
operations.
For large messages, throughput increases by ~65% compared to
chacha20-generic:
testing speed of chacha20 (chacha20-generic) encryption
test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 45089207 operations in 10 seconds (721427312 bytes)
test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 43839521 operations in 10 seconds (2805729344 bytes)
test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 12702056 operations in 10 seconds (3251726336 bytes)
test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 3371173 operations in 10 seconds (3452081152 bytes)
test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 422468 operations in 10 seconds (3460857856 bytes)
testing speed of chacha20 (chacha20-simd) encryption
test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 43141886 operations in 10 seconds (690270176 bytes)
test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 46845874 operations in 10 seconds (2998135936 bytes)
test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 18458512 operations in 10 seconds (4725379072 bytes)
test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 5360533 operations in 10 seconds (5489185792 bytes)
test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 692846 operations in 10 seconds (5675794432 bytes)
Benchmark results from a Core i5-4670T.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-07-16 17:14:01 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_X86_64
|
2018-12-05 06:20:02 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate "ChaCha stream cipher algorithms (x86_64/SSSE3/AVX2/AVX-512VL)"
|
crypto: chacha20 - Add a SSSE3 SIMD variant for x86_64
Implements an x86_64 assembler driver for the ChaCha20 stream cipher. This
single block variant works on a single state matrix using SSE instructions.
It requires SSSE3 due the use of pshufb for efficient 8/16-bit rotate
operations.
For large messages, throughput increases by ~65% compared to
chacha20-generic:
testing speed of chacha20 (chacha20-generic) encryption
test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 45089207 operations in 10 seconds (721427312 bytes)
test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 43839521 operations in 10 seconds (2805729344 bytes)
test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 12702056 operations in 10 seconds (3251726336 bytes)
test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 3371173 operations in 10 seconds (3452081152 bytes)
test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 422468 operations in 10 seconds (3460857856 bytes)
testing speed of chacha20 (chacha20-simd) encryption
test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 43141886 operations in 10 seconds (690270176 bytes)
test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 46845874 operations in 10 seconds (2998135936 bytes)
test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 18458512 operations in 10 seconds (4725379072 bytes)
test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 5360533 operations in 10 seconds (5489185792 bytes)
test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 692846 operations in 10 seconds (5675794432 bytes)
Benchmark results from a Core i5-4670T.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-07-16 17:14:01 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2019-11-08 12:22:09 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
|
2019-11-08 12:22:10 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
|
crypto: chacha20 - Add a SSSE3 SIMD variant for x86_64
Implements an x86_64 assembler driver for the ChaCha20 stream cipher. This
single block variant works on a single state matrix using SSE instructions.
It requires SSSE3 due the use of pshufb for efficient 8/16-bit rotate
operations.
For large messages, throughput increases by ~65% compared to
chacha20-generic:
testing speed of chacha20 (chacha20-generic) encryption
test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 45089207 operations in 10 seconds (721427312 bytes)
test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 43839521 operations in 10 seconds (2805729344 bytes)
test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 12702056 operations in 10 seconds (3251726336 bytes)
test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 3371173 operations in 10 seconds (3452081152 bytes)
test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 422468 operations in 10 seconds (3460857856 bytes)
testing speed of chacha20 (chacha20-simd) encryption
test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 43141886 operations in 10 seconds (690270176 bytes)
test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 46845874 operations in 10 seconds (2998135936 bytes)
test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 18458512 operations in 10 seconds (4725379072 bytes)
test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 5360533 operations in 10 seconds (5489185792 bytes)
test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 692846 operations in 10 seconds (5675794432 bytes)
Benchmark results from a Core i5-4670T.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-07-16 17:14:01 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2018-12-05 06:20:04 +00:00
|
|
|
SSSE3, AVX2, and AVX-512VL optimized implementations of the ChaCha20,
|
|
|
|
|
XChaCha20, and XChaCha12 stream ciphers.
|
crypto: chacha20 - Add a SSSE3 SIMD variant for x86_64
Implements an x86_64 assembler driver for the ChaCha20 stream cipher. This
single block variant works on a single state matrix using SSE instructions.
It requires SSSE3 due the use of pshufb for efficient 8/16-bit rotate
operations.
For large messages, throughput increases by ~65% compared to
chacha20-generic:
testing speed of chacha20 (chacha20-generic) encryption
test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 45089207 operations in 10 seconds (721427312 bytes)
test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 43839521 operations in 10 seconds (2805729344 bytes)
test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 12702056 operations in 10 seconds (3251726336 bytes)
test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 3371173 operations in 10 seconds (3452081152 bytes)
test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 422468 operations in 10 seconds (3460857856 bytes)
testing speed of chacha20 (chacha20-simd) encryption
test 0 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 43141886 operations in 10 seconds (690270176 bytes)
test 1 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 46845874 operations in 10 seconds (2998135936 bytes)
test 2 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 18458512 operations in 10 seconds (4725379072 bytes)
test 3 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 5360533 operations in 10 seconds (5489185792 bytes)
test 4 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 692846 operations in 10 seconds (5675794432 bytes)
Benchmark results from a Core i5-4670T.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-07-16 17:14:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-11-08 12:22:17 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CHACHA_MIPS
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "ChaCha stream cipher algorithms (MIPS 32r2 optimized)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on CPU_MIPS32_R2
|
2019-11-17 02:53:24 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2019-11-08 12:22:17 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SEED
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SEED cipher algorithm"
|
2020-09-11 14:11:03 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE
|
2006-08-21 11:08:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
SEED cipher algorithm (RFC4269).
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
SEED is a 128-bit symmetric key block cipher that has been
|
|
|
|
|
developed by KISA (Korea Information Security Agency) as a
|
|
|
|
|
national standard encryption algorithm of the Republic of Korea.
|
|
|
|
|
It is a 16 round block cipher with the key size of 128 bit.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
|
|
|
|
<http://www.kisa.or.kr/kisa/seed/jsp/seed_eng.jsp>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SERPENT
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Serpent cipher algorithm"
|
2006-08-21 11:08:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Serpent cipher algorithm, by Anderson, Biham & Knudsen.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Keys are allowed to be from 0 to 256 bits in length, in steps
|
2021-02-01 18:02:30 +00:00
|
|
|
of 8 bits.
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2020-07-19 16:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/serpent.html>
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-11-09 14:26:25 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SERPENT_SSE2_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Serpent cipher algorithm (x86_64/SSE2)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2011-11-09 14:26:25 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SERPENT
|
2018-02-20 07:48:03 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SIMD
|
2021-01-05 16:47:55 +00:00
|
|
|
imply CRYPTO_CTR
|
2011-11-09 14:26:25 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Serpent cipher algorithm, by Anderson, Biham & Knudsen.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Keys are allowed to be from 0 to 256 bits in length, in steps
|
|
|
|
|
of 8 bits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-03 15:20:30 +00:00
|
|
|
This module provides Serpent cipher algorithm that processes eight
|
2011-11-09 14:26:25 +00:00
|
|
|
blocks parallel using SSE2 instruction set.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2020-07-19 16:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/serpent.html>
|
2011-11-09 14:26:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-11-09 14:26:31 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SERPENT_SSE2_586
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Serpent cipher algorithm (i586/SSE2)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && !64BIT
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2011-11-09 14:26:31 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SERPENT
|
2018-02-20 07:48:03 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SIMD
|
2021-01-05 16:47:55 +00:00
|
|
|
imply CRYPTO_CTR
|
2011-11-09 14:26:31 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Serpent cipher algorithm, by Anderson, Biham & Knudsen.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Keys are allowed to be from 0 to 256 bits in length, in steps
|
|
|
|
|
of 8 bits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This module provides Serpent cipher algorithm that processes four
|
|
|
|
|
blocks parallel using SSE2 instruction set.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2020-07-19 16:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/serpent.html>
|
2012-06-12 08:47:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SERPENT_AVX_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Serpent cipher algorithm (x86_64/AVX)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2012-06-12 08:47:43 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SERPENT
|
2018-02-20 07:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SIMD
|
2021-01-05 16:47:51 +00:00
|
|
|
imply CRYPTO_XTS
|
2021-01-05 16:47:55 +00:00
|
|
|
imply CRYPTO_CTR
|
2012-06-12 08:47:43 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Serpent cipher algorithm, by Anderson, Biham & Knudsen.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Keys are allowed to be from 0 to 256 bits in length, in steps
|
|
|
|
|
of 8 bits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This module provides the Serpent cipher algorithm that processes
|
|
|
|
|
eight blocks parallel using the AVX instruction set.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2020-07-19 16:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/serpent.html>
|
2011-11-09 14:26:31 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-04-13 10:46:55 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SERPENT_AVX2_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Serpent cipher algorithm (x86_64/AVX2)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SERPENT_AVX_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Serpent cipher algorithm, by Anderson, Biham & Knudsen.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Keys are allowed to be from 0 to 256 bits in length, in steps
|
|
|
|
|
of 8 bits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This module provides Serpent cipher algorithm that processes 16
|
|
|
|
|
blocks parallel using AVX2 instruction set.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2020-07-19 16:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/serpent.html>
|
2013-04-13 10:46:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-03-06 09:44:42 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SM4
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SM4 cipher algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
crypto: sm4 - create SM4 library based on sm4 generic code
Take the existing small footprint and mostly time invariant C code
and turn it into a SM4 library that can be used for non-performance
critical, casual use of SM4, and as a fallback for, e.g., SIMD code
that needs a secondary path that can be taken in contexts where the
SIMD unit is off limits.
Secondly, some codes have been optimized, such as unrolling small
times loop, removing unnecessary memory shifts, exporting sbox, fk,
ck arrays, and basic encryption and decryption functions.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2021-07-20 03:46:39 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_SM4
|
2018-03-06 09:44:42 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
SM4 cipher algorithms (OSCCA GB/T 32907-2016).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM4 (GBT.32907-2016) is a cryptographic standard issued by the
|
|
|
|
|
Organization of State Commercial Administration of China (OSCCA)
|
|
|
|
|
as an authorized cryptographic algorithms for the use within China.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMS4 was originally created for use in protecting wireless
|
|
|
|
|
networks, and is mandated in the Chinese National Standard for
|
|
|
|
|
Wireless LAN WAPI (Wired Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure)
|
|
|
|
|
(GB.15629.11-2003).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The latest SM4 standard (GBT.32907-2016) was proposed by OSCCA and
|
|
|
|
|
standardized through TC 260 of the Standardization Administration
|
|
|
|
|
of the People's Republic of China (SAC).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The input, output, and key of SMS4 are each 128 bits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also: <https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/329.pdf>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say N.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2021-07-20 03:46:41 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SM4_AESNI_AVX_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SM4 cipher algorithm (x86_64/AES-NI/AVX)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SIMD
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_SM4
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
SM4 cipher algorithms (OSCCA GB/T 32907-2016) (x86_64/AES-NI/AVX).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SM4 (GBT.32907-2016) is a cryptographic standard issued by the
|
|
|
|
|
Organization of State Commercial Administration of China (OSCCA)
|
|
|
|
|
as an authorized cryptographic algorithms for the use within China.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is SM4 optimized implementation using AES-NI/AVX/x86_64
|
|
|
|
|
instruction set for block cipher. Through two affine transforms,
|
|
|
|
|
we can use the AES S-Box to simulate the SM4 S-Box to achieve the
|
|
|
|
|
effect of instruction acceleration.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say N.
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto: x86/sm4 - add AES-NI/AVX2/x86_64 implementation
Like the implementation of AESNI/AVX, this patch adds an accelerated
implementation of AESNI/AVX2. In terms of code implementation, by
reusing AESNI/AVX mode-related codes, the amount of code is greatly
reduced. From the benchmark data, it can be seen that when the block
size is 1024, compared to AVX acceleration, the performance achieved
by AVX2 has increased by about 70%, it is also 7.7 times of the pure
software implementation of sm4-generic.
The main algorithm implementation comes from SM4 AES-NI work by
libgcrypt and Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen at:
https://github.com/mjosaarinen/sm4ni
This optimization supports the four modes of SM4, ECB, CBC, CFB,
and CTR. Since CBC and CFB do not support multiple block parallel
encryption, the optimization effect is not obvious.
Benchmark on Intel i5-6200U 2.30GHz, performance data of three
implementation methods, pure software sm4-generic, aesni/avx
acceleration, and aesni/avx2 acceleration, the data comes from
the 218 mode and 518 mode of tcrypt. The abscissas are blocks of
different lengths. The data is tabulated and the unit is Mb/s:
block-size | 16 64 128 256 1024 1420 4096
sm4-generic
ECB enc | 60.94 70.41 72.27 73.02 73.87 73.58 73.59
ECB dec | 61.87 70.53 72.15 73.09 73.89 73.92 73.86
CBC enc | 56.71 66.31 68.05 69.84 70.02 70.12 70.24
CBC dec | 54.54 65.91 68.22 69.51 70.63 70.79 70.82
CFB enc | 57.21 67.24 69.10 70.25 70.73 70.52 71.42
CFB dec | 57.22 64.74 66.31 67.24 67.40 67.64 67.58
CTR enc | 59.47 68.64 69.91 71.02 71.86 71.61 71.95
CTR dec | 59.94 68.77 69.95 71.00 71.84 71.55 71.95
sm4-aesni-avx
ECB enc | 44.95 177.35 292.06 316.98 339.48 322.27 330.59
ECB dec | 45.28 178.66 292.31 317.52 339.59 322.52 331.16
CBC enc | 57.75 67.68 69.72 70.60 71.48 71.63 71.74
CBC dec | 44.32 176.83 284.32 307.24 328.61 312.61 325.82
CFB enc | 57.81 67.64 69.63 70.55 71.40 71.35 71.70
CFB dec | 43.14 167.78 282.03 307.20 328.35 318.24 325.95
CTR enc | 42.35 163.32 279.11 302.93 320.86 310.56 317.93
CTR dec | 42.39 162.81 278.49 302.37 321.11 310.33 318.37
sm4-aesni-avx2
ECB enc | 45.19 177.41 292.42 316.12 339.90 322.53 330.54
ECB dec | 44.83 178.90 291.45 317.31 339.85 322.55 331.07
CBC enc | 57.66 67.62 69.73 70.55 71.58 71.66 71.77
CBC dec | 44.34 176.86 286.10 501.68 559.58 483.87 527.46
CFB enc | 57.43 67.60 69.61 70.52 71.43 71.28 71.65
CFB dec | 43.12 167.75 268.09 499.33 558.35 490.36 524.73
CTR enc | 42.42 163.39 256.17 493.95 552.45 481.58 517.19
CTR dec | 42.49 163.11 256.36 493.34 552.62 481.49 516.83
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2021-08-18 03:31:17 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SM4_AESNI_AVX2_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "SM4 cipher algorithm (x86_64/AES-NI/AVX2)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SIMD
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_LIB_SM4
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SM4_AESNI_AVX_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
SM4 cipher algorithms (OSCCA GB/T 32907-2016) (x86_64/AES-NI/AVX2).
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
SM4 (GBT.32907-2016) is a cryptographic standard issued by the
|
|
|
|
|
Organization of State Commercial Administration of China (OSCCA)
|
|
|
|
|
as an authorized cryptographic algorithms for the use within China.
|
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|
|
This is SM4 optimized implementation using AES-NI/AVX2/x86_64
|
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|
|
|
instruction set for block cipher. Through two affine transforms,
|
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|
|
we can use the AES S-Box to simulate the SM4 S-Box to achieve the
|
|
|
|
|
effect of instruction acceleration.
|
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|
|
If unsure, say N.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_TEA
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "TEA, XTEA and XETA cipher algorithms"
|
2020-09-11 14:11:03 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE
|
2006-08-21 11:08:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
TEA cipher algorithm.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Tiny Encryption Algorithm is a simple cipher that uses
|
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|
|
|
many rounds for security. It is very fast and uses
|
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|
|
|
little memory.
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Xtendend Tiny Encryption Algorithm is a modification to
|
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|
|
|
the TEA algorithm to address a potential key weakness
|
|
|
|
|
in the TEA algorithm.
|
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|
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|
|
|
|
Xtendend Encryption Tiny Algorithm is a mis-implementation
|
|
|
|
|
of the XTEA algorithm for compatibility purposes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_TWOFISH
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Twofish cipher algorithm"
|
2006-10-22 04:49:17 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON
|
2006-10-22 04:49:17 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Twofish cipher algorithm.
|
2006-10-22 04:49:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Twofish was submitted as an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
|
|
|
|
|
candidate cipher by researchers at CounterPane Systems. It is a
|
|
|
|
|
16 round block cipher supporting key sizes of 128, 192, and 256
|
|
|
|
|
bits.
|
2006-10-22 04:49:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
See also:
|
2020-07-19 16:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://www.schneier.com/twofish.html>
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Common parts of the Twofish cipher algorithm shared by the
|
|
|
|
|
generic c and the assembler implementations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_TWOFISH_586
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Twofish cipher algorithms (i586)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on (X86 || UML_X86) && !64BIT
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON
|
2021-01-05 16:47:58 +00:00
|
|
|
imply CRYPTO_CTR
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Twofish cipher algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Twofish was submitted as an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
|
|
|
|
|
candidate cipher by researchers at CounterPane Systems. It is a
|
|
|
|
|
16 round block cipher supporting key sizes of 128, 192, and 256
|
|
|
|
|
bits.
|
2006-10-22 04:49:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2020-07-19 16:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://www.schneier.com/twofish.html>
|
2006-10-22 04:49:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_TWOFISH_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Twofish cipher algorithm (x86_64)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on (X86 || UML_X86) && 64BIT
|
2006-08-21 11:08:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON
|
2021-01-05 16:47:58 +00:00
|
|
|
imply CRYPTO_CTR
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Twofish cipher algorithm (x86_64).
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Twofish was submitted as an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
|
|
|
|
|
candidate cipher by researchers at CounterPane Systems. It is a
|
|
|
|
|
16 round block cipher supporting key sizes of 128, 192, and 256
|
|
|
|
|
bits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2020-07-19 16:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://www.schneier.com/twofish.html>
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-09-26 13:47:25 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_TWOFISH_X86_64_3WAY
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Twofish cipher algorithm (x86_64, 3-way parallel)"
|
2012-04-09 00:31:22 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2011-09-26 13:47:25 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Twofish cipher algorithm (x86_64, 3-way parallel).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Twofish was submitted as an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
|
|
|
|
|
candidate cipher by researchers at CounterPane Systems. It is a
|
|
|
|
|
16 round block cipher supporting key sizes of 128, 192, and 256
|
|
|
|
|
bits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This module provides Twofish cipher algorithm that processes three
|
|
|
|
|
blocks parallel, utilizing resources of out-of-order CPUs better.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2020-07-19 16:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://www.schneier.com/twofish.html>
|
2011-09-26 13:47:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-28 13:54:24 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_TWOFISH_AVX_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Twofish cipher algorithm (x86_64/AVX)"
|
|
|
|
|
depends on X86 && 64BIT
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
|
2018-02-20 07:48:11 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SIMD
|
2012-05-28 13:54:24 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_X86_64
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_X86_64_3WAY
|
2021-01-05 16:47:52 +00:00
|
|
|
imply CRYPTO_XTS
|
2012-05-28 13:54:24 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Twofish cipher algorithm (x86_64/AVX).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Twofish was submitted as an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
|
|
|
|
|
candidate cipher by researchers at CounterPane Systems. It is a
|
|
|
|
|
16 round block cipher supporting key sizes of 128, 192, and 256
|
|
|
|
|
bits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This module provides the Twofish cipher algorithm that processes
|
|
|
|
|
eight blocks parallel using the AVX Instruction Set.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2020-07-19 16:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
<https://www.schneier.com/twofish.html>
|
2012-05-28 13:54:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
comment "Compression"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_DEFLATE
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Deflate compression algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2016-10-21 12:19:53 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ACOMP2
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
select ZLIB_INFLATE
|
|
|
|
|
select ZLIB_DEFLATE
|
[CRYPTO] aead: Add authenc
This patch adds the authenc algorithm which constructs an AEAD algorithm
from an asynchronous block cipher and a hash. The construction is done
by concatenating the encrypted result from the cipher with the output
from the hash, as is used by the IPsec ESP protocol.
The authenc algorithm exists as a template with four parameters:
authenc(auth, authsize, enc, enckeylen).
The authentication algorithm, the authentication size (i.e., truncating
the output of the authentication algorithm), the encryption algorithm,
and the encryption key length. Both the size field and the key length
field are in bytes. For example, AES-128 with SHA1-HMAC would be
represented by
authenc(hmac(sha1), 12, cbc(aes), 16)
The key for the authenc algorithm is the concatenation of the keys for
the authentication algorithm with the encryption algorithm. For the
above example, if a key of length 36 bytes is given, then hmac(sha1)
would receive the first 20 bytes while the last 16 would be given to
cbc(aes).
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-08-30 08:24:15 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 13:04:48 +00:00
|
|
|
This is the Deflate algorithm (RFC1951), specified for use in
|
|
|
|
|
IPSec with the IPCOMP protocol (RFC3173, RFC2394).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
You will most probably want this if using IPSec.
|
[CRYPTO] aead: Add authenc
This patch adds the authenc algorithm which constructs an AEAD algorithm
from an asynchronous block cipher and a hash. The construction is done
by concatenating the encrypted result from the cipher with the output
from the hash, as is used by the IPsec ESP protocol.
The authenc algorithm exists as a template with four parameters:
authenc(auth, authsize, enc, enckeylen).
The authentication algorithm, the authentication size (i.e., truncating
the output of the authentication algorithm), the encryption algorithm,
and the encryption key length. Both the size field and the key length
field are in bytes. For example, AES-128 with SHA1-HMAC would be
represented by
authenc(hmac(sha1), 12, cbc(aes), 16)
The key for the authenc algorithm is the concatenation of the keys for
the authentication algorithm with the encryption algorithm. For the
above example, if a key of length 36 bytes is given, then hmac(sha1)
would receive the first 20 bytes while the last 16 would be given to
cbc(aes).
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-08-30 08:24:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-12-07 08:53:23 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_LZO
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "LZO compression algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2016-10-21 12:19:49 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ACOMP2
|
2007-12-07 08:53:23 +00:00
|
|
|
select LZO_COMPRESS
|
|
|
|
|
select LZO_DECOMPRESS
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
This is the LZO algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-07-19 14:42:41 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_842
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "842 compression algorithm"
|
2015-05-07 17:49:15 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2016-10-21 12:19:52 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ACOMP2
|
2015-05-07 17:49:15 +00:00
|
|
|
select 842_COMPRESS
|
|
|
|
|
select 842_DECOMPRESS
|
2012-07-19 14:42:41 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
This is the 842 algorithm.
|
2013-07-08 23:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_LZ4
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "LZ4 compression algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2016-10-21 12:19:50 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ACOMP2
|
2013-07-08 23:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
select LZ4_COMPRESS
|
|
|
|
|
select LZ4_DECOMPRESS
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
This is the LZ4 algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_LZ4HC
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "LZ4HC compression algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2016-10-21 12:19:51 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ACOMP2
|
2013-07-08 23:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
select LZ4HC_COMPRESS
|
|
|
|
|
select LZ4_DECOMPRESS
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
This is the LZ4 high compression mode algorithm.
|
2012-07-19 14:42:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-03-30 19:14:53 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ZSTD
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Zstd compression algorithm"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ACOMP2
|
|
|
|
|
select ZSTD_COMPRESS
|
|
|
|
|
select ZSTD_DECOMPRESS
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
This is the zstd algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-08-14 12:15:52 +00:00
|
|
|
comment "Random Number Generation"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Pseudo Random Number Generation for Cryptographic modules"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AES
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_RNG
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
This option enables the generic pseudo random number generator
|
|
|
|
|
for cryptographic modules. Uses the Algorithm specified in
|
2010-01-27 00:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
ANSI X9.31 A.2.4. Note that this option must be enabled if
|
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_FIPS is selected
|
2008-08-14 12:15:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-04 14:15:08 +00:00
|
|
|
menuconfig CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU
|
2014-05-31 15:22:31 +00:00
|
|
|
tristate "NIST SP800-90A DRBG"
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
NIST SP800-90A compliant DRBG. In the following submenu, one or
|
|
|
|
|
more of the DRBG types must be selected.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-04 14:15:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU
|
2014-05-31 15:22:31 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC
|
2015-06-03 06:49:31 +00:00
|
|
|
bool
|
2014-05-31 15:22:31 +00:00
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HMAC
|
2021-06-30 10:32:52 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SHA512
|
2014-05-31 15:22:31 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
bool "Enable Hash DRBG"
|
2015-06-11 00:55:10 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SHA256
|
2014-05-31 15:22:31 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Enable the Hash DRBG variant as defined in NIST SP800-90A.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR
|
|
|
|
|
bool "Enable CTR DRBG"
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AES
|
2020-04-24 13:40:47 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_CTR
|
2014-05-31 15:22:31 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
Enable the CTR DRBG variant as defined in NIST SP800-90A.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-04 14:15:08 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_DRBG
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
2015-06-03 06:49:31 +00:00
|
|
|
default CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU
|
2014-07-04 14:15:08 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_RNG
|
2015-05-25 13:10:20 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
|
2014-07-04 14:15:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
endif # if CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU
|
2014-05-31 15:22:31 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-05-25 13:10:20 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "Jitterentropy Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator"
|
2016-01-26 13:47:10 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_RNG
|
2015-05-25 13:10:20 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
The Jitterentropy RNG is a noise that is intended
|
|
|
|
|
to provide seed to another RNG. The RNG does not
|
|
|
|
|
perform any cryptographic whitening of the generated
|
|
|
|
|
random numbers. This Jitterentropy RNG registers with
|
|
|
|
|
the kernel crypto API and can be used by any caller.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010-10-19 13:12:39 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_USER_API
|
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010-10-19 13:23:00 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "User-space interface for hash algorithms"
|
2010-11-29 14:56:03 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on NET
|
2010-10-19 13:23:00 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_USER_API
|
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
|
This option enables the user-spaces interface for hash
|
|
|
|
|
algorithms.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010-10-19 13:31:55 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
|
tristate "User-space interface for symmetric key cipher algorithms"
|
2010-11-29 14:56:03 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on NET
|
2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
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2010-10-19 13:31:55 +00:00
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select CRYPTO_USER_API
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help
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This option enables the user-spaces interface for symmetric
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key cipher algorithms.
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2014-12-25 22:00:39 +00:00
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config CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG
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tristate "User-space interface for random number generator algorithms"
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depends on NET
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select CRYPTO_RNG
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select CRYPTO_USER_API
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help
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This option enables the user-spaces interface for random
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number generator algorithms.
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2020-09-18 15:42:16 +00:00
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config CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG_CAVP
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bool "Enable CAVP testing of DRBG"
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depends on CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG && CRYPTO_DRBG
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help
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This option enables extra API for CAVP testing via the user-space
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interface: resetting of DRBG entropy, and providing Additional Data.
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This should only be enabled for CAVP testing. You should say
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no unless you know what this is.
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2015-05-28 03:30:35 +00:00
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config CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD
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tristate "User-space interface for AEAD cipher algorithms"
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depends on NET
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select CRYPTO_AEAD
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2019-10-25 19:41:13 +00:00
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select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
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2017-07-30 12:32:58 +00:00
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select CRYPTO_NULL
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2015-05-28 03:30:35 +00:00
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select CRYPTO_USER_API
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help
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This option enables the user-spaces interface for AEAD
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cipher algorithms.
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crypto: arc4 - mark ecb(arc4) skcipher as obsolete
Cryptographic algorithms may have a lifespan that is significantly
shorter than Linux's, and so we need to start phasing out algorithms
that are known to be broken, and are no longer fit for general use.
RC4 (or arc4) is a good example here: there are a few areas where its
use is still somewhat acceptable, e.g., for interoperability with legacy
wifi hardware that can only use WEP or TKIP data encryption, but that
should not imply that, for instance, use of RC4 based EAP-TLS by the WPA
supplicant for negotiating TKIP keys is equally acceptable, or that RC4
should remain available as a general purpose cryptographic transform for
all in-kernel and user space clients.
Now that all in-kernel users that need to retain support have moved to
the arc4 library interface, and the known users of ecb(arc4) via the
socket API (iwd [0] and libell [1][2]) have been updated to switch to a
local implementation, we can take the next step, and mark the ecb(arc4)
skcipher as obsolete, and only provide it if the socket API is enabled in
the first place, as well as provide the option to disable all algorithms
that have been marked as obsolete.
[0] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/wireless/iwd.git/commit/?id=1db8a85a60c64523
[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/commit/?id=53482ce421b727c2
[2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/commit/?id=7f6a137809d42f6b
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-08-31 15:16:49 +00:00
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config CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE
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bool "Enable obsolete cryptographic algorithms for userspace"
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depends on CRYPTO_USER_API
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default y
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help
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Allow obsolete cryptographic algorithms to be selected that have
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already been phased out from internal use by the kernel, and are
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only useful for userspace clients that still rely on them.
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2018-09-19 10:10:54 +00:00
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config CRYPTO_STATS
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bool "Crypto usage statistics for User-space"
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2018-11-29 14:42:17 +00:00
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depends on CRYPTO_USER
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2018-09-19 10:10:54 +00:00
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help
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This option enables the gathering of crypto stats.
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This will collect:
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- encrypt/decrypt size and numbers of symmeric operations
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- compress/decompress size and numbers of compress operations
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- size and numbers of hash operations
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- encrypt/decrypt/sign/verify numbers for asymmetric operations
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- generate/seed numbers for rng operations
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2013-05-06 12:40:01 +00:00
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config CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
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bool
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2019-11-08 12:22:07 +00:00
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source "lib/crypto/Kconfig"
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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source "drivers/crypto/Kconfig"
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2018-12-11 11:01:04 +00:00
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source "crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig"
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source "certs/Kconfig"
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2006-08-21 11:08:13 +00:00
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endif # if CRYPTO
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