linux-stable/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* flexible mmap layout support
*
* Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
* All Rights Reserved.
*
* Started by Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
*/
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/elf-randomize.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
/*
* Top of mmap area (just below the process stack).
*
* Leave at least a ~128 MB hole.
*/
#define MIN_GAP (128*1024*1024)
#define MAX_GAP (TASK_SIZE/6*5)
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-10 23:34:53 +00:00
static inline int mmap_is_legacy(struct rlimit *rlim_stack)
{
if (current->personality & ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT)
return 1;
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-10 23:34:53 +00:00
if (rlim_stack->rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY)
return 1;
return sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
}
mm: expose arch_mmap_rnd when available When an architecture fully supports randomizing the ELF load location, a per-arch mmap_rnd() function is used to find a randomized mmap base. In preparation for randomizing the location of ET_DYN binaries separately from mmap, this renames and exports these functions as arch_mmap_rnd(). Additionally introduces CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE for describing this feature on architectures that support it (which is a superset of ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE, since s390 already supports a separated ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR without the ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE logic). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com> Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com> Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com> Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-14 22:48:00 +00:00
unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
{
powerpc/mm: Add support for runtime configuration of ASLR limits Add powerpc support for mmap_rnd_bits and mmap_rnd_compat_bits, which are two sysctls that allow a user to configure the number of bits of randomness used for ASLR. Because of the way the Kconfig for ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS is defined, we have to construct at least the MIN value in Kconfig, vs in a header which would be more natural. Given that we just go ahead and do it all in Kconfig. At least according to the code (the documentation makes no mention of it), the value is defined as the number of bits of randomisation *of the page*, not the address. This makes some sense, with larger page sizes more of the low bits are forced to zero, which would reduce the randomisation if we didn't take the PAGE_SIZE into account. However it does mean the min/max values have to change depending on the PAGE_SIZE in order to actually limit the amount of address space consumed by the randomisation. The result of that is that we have to define the default values based on both 32-bit vs 64-bit, but also the configured PAGE_SIZE. Furthermore now that we have 128TB address space support on Book3S, we also have to take that into account. Finally we can wire up the value in arch_mmap_rnd(). Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Tested-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-04-20 14:36:20 +00:00
unsigned long shift, rnd;
powerpc/mm: Add support for runtime configuration of ASLR limits Add powerpc support for mmap_rnd_bits and mmap_rnd_compat_bits, which are two sysctls that allow a user to configure the number of bits of randomness used for ASLR. Because of the way the Kconfig for ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS is defined, we have to construct at least the MIN value in Kconfig, vs in a header which would be more natural. Given that we just go ahead and do it all in Kconfig. At least according to the code (the documentation makes no mention of it), the value is defined as the number of bits of randomisation *of the page*, not the address. This makes some sense, with larger page sizes more of the low bits are forced to zero, which would reduce the randomisation if we didn't take the PAGE_SIZE into account. However it does mean the min/max values have to change depending on the PAGE_SIZE in order to actually limit the amount of address space consumed by the randomisation. The result of that is that we have to define the default values based on both 32-bit vs 64-bit, but also the configured PAGE_SIZE. Furthermore now that we have 128TB address space support on Book3S, we also have to take that into account. Finally we can wire up the value in arch_mmap_rnd(). Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Tested-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-04-20 14:36:20 +00:00
shift = mmap_rnd_bits;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (is_32bit_task())
powerpc/mm: Add support for runtime configuration of ASLR limits Add powerpc support for mmap_rnd_bits and mmap_rnd_compat_bits, which are two sysctls that allow a user to configure the number of bits of randomness used for ASLR. Because of the way the Kconfig for ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS is defined, we have to construct at least the MIN value in Kconfig, vs in a header which would be more natural. Given that we just go ahead and do it all in Kconfig. At least according to the code (the documentation makes no mention of it), the value is defined as the number of bits of randomisation *of the page*, not the address. This makes some sense, with larger page sizes more of the low bits are forced to zero, which would reduce the randomisation if we didn't take the PAGE_SIZE into account. However it does mean the min/max values have to change depending on the PAGE_SIZE in order to actually limit the amount of address space consumed by the randomisation. The result of that is that we have to define the default values based on both 32-bit vs 64-bit, but also the configured PAGE_SIZE. Furthermore now that we have 128TB address space support on Book3S, we also have to take that into account. Finally we can wire up the value in arch_mmap_rnd(). Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Tested-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-04-20 14:36:20 +00:00
shift = mmap_rnd_compat_bits;
#endif
rnd = get_random_long() % (1ul << shift);
return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
static inline unsigned long stack_maxrandom_size(void)
{
if (!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
return 0;
/* 8MB for 32bit, 1GB for 64bit */
if (is_32bit_task())
return (1<<23);
else
return (1<<30);
}
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-10 23:34:53 +00:00
static inline unsigned long mmap_base(unsigned long rnd,
struct rlimit *rlim_stack)
{
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-10 23:34:53 +00:00
unsigned long gap = rlim_stack->rlim_cur;
unsigned long pad = stack_maxrandom_size() + stack_guard_gap;
/* Values close to RLIM_INFINITY can overflow. */
if (gap + pad > gap)
gap += pad;
if (gap < MIN_GAP)
gap = MIN_GAP;
else if (gap > MAX_GAP)
gap = MAX_GAP;
powerpc/mm: Enable mappings above 128TB Not all user space application is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their information. It collides with valid pointers with 512TB addresses and leads to crashes. To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space above 128TB by default. But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 128TB. If hint address set above 128TB, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than from 128TB window. This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual address space. This is going to be a per mmap decision. ie, we can have some mmaps with larger addresses and other that do not. A sample memory layout looks like: 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB 10029630000-10029660000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] 7fff834a0000-7fff834b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7fff834b0000-7fff83670000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so 7fff83670000-7fff83680000 r--p 001b0000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so 7fff83680000-7fff83690000 rw-p 001c0000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so 7fff83690000-7fff836a0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7fff836a0000-7fff836c0000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 7fff836c0000-7fff83700000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so 7fff83700000-7fff83710000 r--p 00030000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so 7fff83710000-7fff83720000 rw-p 00040000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so 7fffdccf0000-7fffdcd20000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 1000000000000-1000000010000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 1ffff83710000-1ffff83720000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2017-03-30 11:05:21 +00:00
return PAGE_ALIGN(DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW - gap - rnd);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_RADIX_MMU
/*
* Same function as generic code used only for radix, because we don't need to overload
* the generic one. But we will have to duplicate, because hash select
* HAVE_ARCH_UNMAPPED_AREA
*/
static unsigned long
radix__arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int fixed = (flags & MAP_FIXED);
unsigned long high_limit;
struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
high_limit = DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW;
if (addr >= high_limit || (fixed && (addr + len > high_limit)))
high_limit = TASK_SIZE;
if (len > high_limit)
return -ENOMEM;
if (fixed) {
if (addr > high_limit - len)
return -ENOMEM;
return addr;
}
if (addr) {
addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
if (high_limit - len >= addr && addr >= mmap_min_addr &&
mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping. But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX] which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN. This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical, unfortunatelly. Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot. One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace, but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units). Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page: because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point, a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK and strict non-overcommit mode. Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start (or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(), and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that. Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-06-19 11:03:24 +00:00
(!vma || addr + len <= vm_start_gap(vma)))
return addr;
}
info.flags = 0;
info.length = len;
info.low_limit = mm->mmap_base;
info.high_limit = high_limit;
info.align_mask = 0;
powerpc/mm: Enable mappings above 128TB Not all user space application is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their information. It collides with valid pointers with 512TB addresses and leads to crashes. To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space above 128TB by default. But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 128TB. If hint address set above 128TB, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than from 128TB window. This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual address space. This is going to be a per mmap decision. ie, we can have some mmaps with larger addresses and other that do not. A sample memory layout looks like: 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB 10029630000-10029660000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] 7fff834a0000-7fff834b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7fff834b0000-7fff83670000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so 7fff83670000-7fff83680000 r--p 001b0000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so 7fff83680000-7fff83690000 rw-p 001c0000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so 7fff83690000-7fff836a0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7fff836a0000-7fff836c0000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 7fff836c0000-7fff83700000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so 7fff83700000-7fff83710000 r--p 00030000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so 7fff83710000-7fff83720000 rw-p 00040000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so 7fffdccf0000-7fffdcd20000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 1000000000000-1000000010000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 1ffff83710000-1ffff83720000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2017-03-30 11:05:21 +00:00
return vm_unmapped_area(&info);
}
static unsigned long
radix__arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp,
const unsigned long addr0,
const unsigned long len,
const unsigned long pgoff,
const unsigned long flags)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
unsigned long addr = addr0;
int fixed = (flags & MAP_FIXED);
unsigned long high_limit;
struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
high_limit = DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW;
if (addr >= high_limit || (fixed && (addr + len > high_limit)))
high_limit = TASK_SIZE;
if (len > high_limit)
return -ENOMEM;
if (fixed) {
if (addr > high_limit - len)
return -ENOMEM;
return addr;
}
if (addr) {
addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
if (high_limit - len >= addr && addr >= mmap_min_addr &&
(!vma || addr + len <= vm_start_gap(vma)))
return addr;
}
info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN;
info.length = len;
info.low_limit = max(PAGE_SIZE, mmap_min_addr);
info.high_limit = mm->mmap_base + (high_limit - DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW);
info.align_mask = 0;
powerpc/mm: Enable mappings above 128TB Not all user space application is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their information. It collides with valid pointers with 512TB addresses and leads to crashes. To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space above 128TB by default. But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 128TB. If hint address set above 128TB, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than from 128TB window. This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual address space. This is going to be a per mmap decision. ie, we can have some mmaps with larger addresses and other that do not. A sample memory layout looks like: 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB 10029630000-10029660000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] 7fff834a0000-7fff834b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7fff834b0000-7fff83670000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so 7fff83670000-7fff83680000 r--p 001b0000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so 7fff83680000-7fff83690000 rw-p 001c0000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so 7fff83690000-7fff836a0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7fff836a0000-7fff836c0000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 7fff836c0000-7fff83700000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so 7fff83700000-7fff83710000 r--p 00030000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so 7fff83710000-7fff83720000 rw-p 00040000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so 7fffdccf0000-7fffdcd20000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 1000000000000-1000000010000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 1ffff83710000-1ffff83720000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2017-03-30 11:05:21 +00:00
addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
powerpc/mm: Enable mappings above 128TB Not all user space application is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their information. It collides with valid pointers with 512TB addresses and leads to crashes. To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space above 128TB by default. But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 128TB. If hint address set above 128TB, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than from 128TB window. This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual address space. This is going to be a per mmap decision. ie, we can have some mmaps with larger addresses and other that do not. A sample memory layout looks like: 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB 10029630000-10029660000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] 7fff834a0000-7fff834b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7fff834b0000-7fff83670000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so 7fff83670000-7fff83680000 r--p 001b0000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so 7fff83680000-7fff83690000 rw-p 001c0000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so 7fff83690000-7fff836a0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7fff836a0000-7fff836c0000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 7fff836c0000-7fff83700000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so 7fff83700000-7fff83710000 r--p 00030000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so 7fff83710000-7fff83720000 rw-p 00040000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so 7fffdccf0000-7fffdcd20000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 1000000000000-1000000010000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 1ffff83710000-1ffff83720000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2017-03-30 11:05:21 +00:00
if (!(addr & ~PAGE_MASK))
return addr;
VM_BUG_ON(addr != -ENOMEM);
/*
* A failed mmap() very likely causes application failure,
* so fall back to the bottom-up function here. This scenario
* can happen with large stack limits and large mmap()
* allocations.
*/
powerpc/mm: Enable mappings above 128TB Not all user space application is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their information. It collides with valid pointers with 512TB addresses and leads to crashes. To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space above 128TB by default. But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 128TB. If hint address set above 128TB, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than from 128TB window. This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual address space. This is going to be a per mmap decision. ie, we can have some mmaps with larger addresses and other that do not. A sample memory layout looks like: 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB 10029630000-10029660000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] 7fff834a0000-7fff834b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7fff834b0000-7fff83670000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so 7fff83670000-7fff83680000 r--p 001b0000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so 7fff83680000-7fff83690000 rw-p 001c0000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so 7fff83690000-7fff836a0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 7fff836a0000-7fff836c0000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 7fff836c0000-7fff83700000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so 7fff83700000-7fff83710000 r--p 00030000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so 7fff83710000-7fff83720000 rw-p 00040000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so 7fffdccf0000-7fffdcd20000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 1000000000000-1000000010000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 1ffff83710000-1ffff83720000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2017-03-30 11:05:21 +00:00
return radix__arch_get_unmapped_area(filp, addr0, len, pgoff, flags);
}
static void radix__arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm,
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-10 23:34:53 +00:00
unsigned long random_factor,
struct rlimit *rlim_stack)
{
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-10 23:34:53 +00:00
if (mmap_is_legacy(rlim_stack)) {
mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
mm->get_unmapped_area = radix__arch_get_unmapped_area;
} else {
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-10 23:34:53 +00:00
mm->mmap_base = mmap_base(random_factor, rlim_stack);
mm->get_unmapped_area = radix__arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
}
}
#else
/* dummy */
extern void radix__arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm,
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-10 23:34:53 +00:00
unsigned long random_factor,
struct rlimit *rlim_stack);
#endif
/*
* This function, called very early during the creation of a new
* process VM image, sets up which VM layout function to use:
*/
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-10 23:34:53 +00:00
void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm, struct rlimit *rlim_stack)
{
unsigned long random_factor = 0UL;
if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
mm: expose arch_mmap_rnd when available When an architecture fully supports randomizing the ELF load location, a per-arch mmap_rnd() function is used to find a randomized mmap base. In preparation for randomizing the location of ET_DYN binaries separately from mmap, this renames and exports these functions as arch_mmap_rnd(). Additionally introduces CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE for describing this feature on architectures that support it (which is a superset of ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE, since s390 already supports a separated ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR without the ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE logic). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com> Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com> Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com> Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com> Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-14 22:48:00 +00:00
random_factor = arch_mmap_rnd();
if (radix_enabled())
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-10 23:34:53 +00:00
return radix__arch_pick_mmap_layout(mm, random_factor,
rlim_stack);
/*
* Fall back to the standard layout if the personality
* bit is set, or if the expected stack growth is unlimited:
*/
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-10 23:34:53 +00:00
if (mmap_is_legacy(rlim_stack)) {
mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
} else {
exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-10 23:34:53 +00:00
mm->mmap_base = mmap_base(random_factor, rlim_stack);
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
}
}