linux-stable/net/can/j1939/socket.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
// Copyright (c) 2010-2011 EIA Electronics,
// Pieter Beyens <pieter.beyens@eia.be>
// Copyright (c) 2010-2011 EIA Electronics,
// Kurt Van Dijck <kurt.van.dijck@eia.be>
// Copyright (c) 2018 Protonic,
// Robin van der Gracht <robin@protonic.nl>
// Copyright (c) 2017-2019 Pengutronix,
// Marc Kleine-Budde <kernel@pengutronix.de>
// Copyright (c) 2017-2019 Pengutronix,
// Oleksij Rempel <kernel@pengutronix.de>
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/can/can-ml.h>
#include <linux/can/core.h>
#include <linux/can/skb.h>
#include <linux/errqueue.h>
#include <linux/if_arp.h>
#include "j1939-priv.h"
#define J1939_MIN_NAMELEN CAN_REQUIRED_SIZE(struct sockaddr_can, can_addr.j1939)
/* conversion function between struct sock::sk_priority from linux and
* j1939 priority field
*/
static inline priority_t j1939_prio(u32 sk_priority)
{
sk_priority = min(sk_priority, 7U);
return 7 - sk_priority;
}
static inline u32 j1939_to_sk_priority(priority_t prio)
{
return 7 - prio;
}
/* function to see if pgn is to be evaluated */
static inline bool j1939_pgn_is_valid(pgn_t pgn)
{
return pgn <= J1939_PGN_MAX;
}
/* test function to avoid non-zero DA placeholder for pdu1 pgn's */
static inline bool j1939_pgn_is_clean_pdu(pgn_t pgn)
{
if (j1939_pgn_is_pdu1(pgn))
return !(pgn & 0xff);
else
return true;
}
static inline void j1939_sock_pending_add(struct sock *sk)
{
struct j1939_sock *jsk = j1939_sk(sk);
atomic_inc(&jsk->skb_pending);
}
static int j1939_sock_pending_get(struct sock *sk)
{
struct j1939_sock *jsk = j1939_sk(sk);
return atomic_read(&jsk->skb_pending);
}
void j1939_sock_pending_del(struct sock *sk)
{
struct j1939_sock *jsk = j1939_sk(sk);
/* atomic_dec_return returns the new value */
if (!atomic_dec_return(&jsk->skb_pending))
wake_up(&jsk->waitq); /* no pending SKB's */
}
static void j1939_jsk_add(struct j1939_priv *priv, struct j1939_sock *jsk)
{
jsk->state |= J1939_SOCK_BOUND;
j1939_priv_get(priv);
write_lock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
list_add_tail(&jsk->list, &priv->j1939_socks);
write_unlock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
}
static void j1939_jsk_del(struct j1939_priv *priv, struct j1939_sock *jsk)
{
write_lock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
list_del_init(&jsk->list);
write_unlock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
j1939_priv_put(priv);
jsk->state &= ~J1939_SOCK_BOUND;
}
static bool j1939_sk_queue_session(struct j1939_session *session)
{
struct j1939_sock *jsk = j1939_sk(session->sk);
bool empty;
spin_lock_bh(&jsk->sk_session_queue_lock);
empty = list_empty(&jsk->sk_session_queue);
j1939_session_get(session);
list_add_tail(&session->sk_session_queue_entry, &jsk->sk_session_queue);
spin_unlock_bh(&jsk->sk_session_queue_lock);
j1939_sock_pending_add(&jsk->sk);
return empty;
}
static struct
j1939_session *j1939_sk_get_incomplete_session(struct j1939_sock *jsk)
{
struct j1939_session *session = NULL;
spin_lock_bh(&jsk->sk_session_queue_lock);
if (!list_empty(&jsk->sk_session_queue)) {
session = list_last_entry(&jsk->sk_session_queue,
struct j1939_session,
sk_session_queue_entry);
if (session->total_queued_size == session->total_message_size)
session = NULL;
else
j1939_session_get(session);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&jsk->sk_session_queue_lock);
return session;
}
static void j1939_sk_queue_drop_all(struct j1939_priv *priv,
struct j1939_sock *jsk, int err)
{
struct j1939_session *session, *tmp;
netdev_dbg(priv->ndev, "%s: err: %i\n", __func__, err);
spin_lock_bh(&jsk->sk_session_queue_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(session, tmp, &jsk->sk_session_queue,
sk_session_queue_entry) {
list_del_init(&session->sk_session_queue_entry);
session->err = err;
j1939_session_put(session);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&jsk->sk_session_queue_lock);
}
static void j1939_sk_queue_activate_next_locked(struct j1939_session *session)
{
struct j1939_sock *jsk;
struct j1939_session *first;
int err;
/* RX-Session don't have a socket (yet) */
if (!session->sk)
return;
jsk = j1939_sk(session->sk);
lockdep_assert_held(&jsk->sk_session_queue_lock);
err = session->err;
first = list_first_entry_or_null(&jsk->sk_session_queue,
struct j1939_session,
sk_session_queue_entry);
/* Some else has already activated the next session */
if (first != session)
return;
activate_next:
list_del_init(&first->sk_session_queue_entry);
j1939_session_put(first);
first = list_first_entry_or_null(&jsk->sk_session_queue,
struct j1939_session,
sk_session_queue_entry);
if (!first)
return;
if (j1939_session_activate(first)) {
netdev_warn_once(first->priv->ndev,
"%s: 0x%p: Identical session is already activated.\n",
__func__, first);
first->err = -EBUSY;
goto activate_next;
} else {
/* Give receiver some time (arbitrary chosen) to recover */
int time_ms = 0;
if (err)
time_ms = 10 + get_random_u32_below(16);
j1939_tp_schedule_txtimer(first, time_ms);
}
}
void j1939_sk_queue_activate_next(struct j1939_session *session)
{
struct j1939_sock *jsk;
if (!session->sk)
return;
jsk = j1939_sk(session->sk);
spin_lock_bh(&jsk->sk_session_queue_lock);
j1939_sk_queue_activate_next_locked(session);
spin_unlock_bh(&jsk->sk_session_queue_lock);
}
static bool j1939_sk_match_dst(struct j1939_sock *jsk,
const struct j1939_sk_buff_cb *skcb)
{
if ((jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_PROMISC))
return true;
/* Destination address filter */
if (jsk->addr.src_name && skcb->addr.dst_name) {
if (jsk->addr.src_name != skcb->addr.dst_name)
return false;
} else {
/* receive (all sockets) if
* - all packages that match our bind() address
* - all broadcast on a socket if SO_BROADCAST
* is set
*/
if (j1939_address_is_unicast(skcb->addr.da)) {
if (jsk->addr.sa != skcb->addr.da)
return false;
} else if (!sock_flag(&jsk->sk, SOCK_BROADCAST)) {
/* receiving broadcast without SO_BROADCAST
* flag is not allowed
*/
return false;
}
}
/* Source address filter */
if (jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_CONNECTED) {
/* receive (all sockets) if
* - all packages that match our connect() name or address
*/
if (jsk->addr.dst_name && skcb->addr.src_name) {
if (jsk->addr.dst_name != skcb->addr.src_name)
return false;
} else {
if (jsk->addr.da != skcb->addr.sa)
return false;
}
}
/* PGN filter */
if (j1939_pgn_is_valid(jsk->pgn_rx_filter) &&
jsk->pgn_rx_filter != skcb->addr.pgn)
return false;
return true;
}
/* matches skb control buffer (addr) with a j1939 filter */
static bool j1939_sk_match_filter(struct j1939_sock *jsk,
const struct j1939_sk_buff_cb *skcb)
{
can: j1939: Fix UAF in j1939_sk_match_filter during setsockopt(SO_J1939_FILTER) Lock jsk->sk to prevent UAF when setsockopt(..., SO_J1939_FILTER, ...) modifies jsk->filters while receiving packets. Following trace was seen on affected system: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012144014 by task j1939/350 CPU: 0 PID: 350 Comm: j1939 Tainted: G W OE 6.5.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: print_report+0xd3/0x620 ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] kasan_report+0xc2/0x100 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] __asan_load4+0x84/0xb0 j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] j1939_sk_recv+0x20b/0x320 [can_j1939] ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? __pfx_j1939_sk_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? j1939_simple_recv+0x69/0x280 [can_j1939] ? j1939_ac_recv+0x5e/0x310 [can_j1939] j1939_can_recv+0x43f/0x580 [can_j1939] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? raw_rcv+0x42/0x3c0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] can_rcv_filter+0x11f/0x350 [can] can_receive+0x12f/0x190 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] can_rcv+0xdd/0x130 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13d/0x150 ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8c/0xe0 __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xb0 process_backlog+0x107/0x260 __napi_poll+0x69/0x310 net_rx_action+0x2a1/0x580 ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? handle_irq_event+0x7d/0xa0 __do_softirq+0xf3/0x3f8 do_softirq+0x53/0x80 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6e/0x70 netif_rx+0x16b/0x180 can_send+0x32b/0x520 [can] ? __pfx_can_send+0x10/0x10 [can] ? __check_object_size+0x299/0x410 raw_sendmsg+0x572/0x6d0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] ? apparmor_socket_sendmsg+0x2f/0x40 ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] sock_sendmsg+0xef/0x100 sock_write_iter+0x162/0x220 ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10 ? __rtnl_unlock+0x47/0x80 ? security_file_permission+0x54/0x320 vfs_write+0x6ba/0x750 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 ? __fget_light+0x1ca/0x1f0 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280 ksys_write+0x143/0x170 ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x62/0x70 __x64_sys_write+0x47/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90 ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Allocated by task 348: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xb5/0xc0 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x67/0x160 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x284/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 349: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x2f/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x1c0 __kmem_cache_free+0x1b9/0x380 kfree+0x7a/0x120 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x3b2/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Fixes: 9d71dd0c70099 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Reported-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231020133814.383996-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-10-20 13:38:14 +00:00
const struct j1939_filter *f;
int nfilter;
spin_lock_bh(&jsk->filters_lock);
f = jsk->filters;
nfilter = jsk->nfilters;
if (!nfilter)
/* receive all when no filters are assigned */
can: j1939: Fix UAF in j1939_sk_match_filter during setsockopt(SO_J1939_FILTER) Lock jsk->sk to prevent UAF when setsockopt(..., SO_J1939_FILTER, ...) modifies jsk->filters while receiving packets. Following trace was seen on affected system: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012144014 by task j1939/350 CPU: 0 PID: 350 Comm: j1939 Tainted: G W OE 6.5.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: print_report+0xd3/0x620 ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] kasan_report+0xc2/0x100 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] __asan_load4+0x84/0xb0 j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] j1939_sk_recv+0x20b/0x320 [can_j1939] ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? __pfx_j1939_sk_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? j1939_simple_recv+0x69/0x280 [can_j1939] ? j1939_ac_recv+0x5e/0x310 [can_j1939] j1939_can_recv+0x43f/0x580 [can_j1939] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? raw_rcv+0x42/0x3c0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] can_rcv_filter+0x11f/0x350 [can] can_receive+0x12f/0x190 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] can_rcv+0xdd/0x130 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13d/0x150 ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8c/0xe0 __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xb0 process_backlog+0x107/0x260 __napi_poll+0x69/0x310 net_rx_action+0x2a1/0x580 ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? handle_irq_event+0x7d/0xa0 __do_softirq+0xf3/0x3f8 do_softirq+0x53/0x80 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6e/0x70 netif_rx+0x16b/0x180 can_send+0x32b/0x520 [can] ? __pfx_can_send+0x10/0x10 [can] ? __check_object_size+0x299/0x410 raw_sendmsg+0x572/0x6d0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] ? apparmor_socket_sendmsg+0x2f/0x40 ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] sock_sendmsg+0xef/0x100 sock_write_iter+0x162/0x220 ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10 ? __rtnl_unlock+0x47/0x80 ? security_file_permission+0x54/0x320 vfs_write+0x6ba/0x750 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 ? __fget_light+0x1ca/0x1f0 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280 ksys_write+0x143/0x170 ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x62/0x70 __x64_sys_write+0x47/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90 ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Allocated by task 348: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xb5/0xc0 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x67/0x160 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x284/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 349: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x2f/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x1c0 __kmem_cache_free+0x1b9/0x380 kfree+0x7a/0x120 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x3b2/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Fixes: 9d71dd0c70099 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Reported-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231020133814.383996-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-10-20 13:38:14 +00:00
goto filter_match_found;
for (; nfilter; ++f, --nfilter) {
if ((skcb->addr.pgn & f->pgn_mask) != f->pgn)
continue;
if ((skcb->addr.sa & f->addr_mask) != f->addr)
continue;
if ((skcb->addr.src_name & f->name_mask) != f->name)
continue;
can: j1939: Fix UAF in j1939_sk_match_filter during setsockopt(SO_J1939_FILTER) Lock jsk->sk to prevent UAF when setsockopt(..., SO_J1939_FILTER, ...) modifies jsk->filters while receiving packets. Following trace was seen on affected system: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012144014 by task j1939/350 CPU: 0 PID: 350 Comm: j1939 Tainted: G W OE 6.5.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: print_report+0xd3/0x620 ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] kasan_report+0xc2/0x100 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] __asan_load4+0x84/0xb0 j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] j1939_sk_recv+0x20b/0x320 [can_j1939] ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? __pfx_j1939_sk_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? j1939_simple_recv+0x69/0x280 [can_j1939] ? j1939_ac_recv+0x5e/0x310 [can_j1939] j1939_can_recv+0x43f/0x580 [can_j1939] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? raw_rcv+0x42/0x3c0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] can_rcv_filter+0x11f/0x350 [can] can_receive+0x12f/0x190 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] can_rcv+0xdd/0x130 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13d/0x150 ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8c/0xe0 __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xb0 process_backlog+0x107/0x260 __napi_poll+0x69/0x310 net_rx_action+0x2a1/0x580 ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? handle_irq_event+0x7d/0xa0 __do_softirq+0xf3/0x3f8 do_softirq+0x53/0x80 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6e/0x70 netif_rx+0x16b/0x180 can_send+0x32b/0x520 [can] ? __pfx_can_send+0x10/0x10 [can] ? __check_object_size+0x299/0x410 raw_sendmsg+0x572/0x6d0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] ? apparmor_socket_sendmsg+0x2f/0x40 ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] sock_sendmsg+0xef/0x100 sock_write_iter+0x162/0x220 ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10 ? __rtnl_unlock+0x47/0x80 ? security_file_permission+0x54/0x320 vfs_write+0x6ba/0x750 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 ? __fget_light+0x1ca/0x1f0 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280 ksys_write+0x143/0x170 ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x62/0x70 __x64_sys_write+0x47/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90 ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Allocated by task 348: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xb5/0xc0 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x67/0x160 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x284/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 349: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x2f/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x1c0 __kmem_cache_free+0x1b9/0x380 kfree+0x7a/0x120 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x3b2/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Fixes: 9d71dd0c70099 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Reported-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231020133814.383996-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-10-20 13:38:14 +00:00
goto filter_match_found;
}
can: j1939: Fix UAF in j1939_sk_match_filter during setsockopt(SO_J1939_FILTER) Lock jsk->sk to prevent UAF when setsockopt(..., SO_J1939_FILTER, ...) modifies jsk->filters while receiving packets. Following trace was seen on affected system: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012144014 by task j1939/350 CPU: 0 PID: 350 Comm: j1939 Tainted: G W OE 6.5.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: print_report+0xd3/0x620 ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] kasan_report+0xc2/0x100 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] __asan_load4+0x84/0xb0 j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] j1939_sk_recv+0x20b/0x320 [can_j1939] ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? __pfx_j1939_sk_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? j1939_simple_recv+0x69/0x280 [can_j1939] ? j1939_ac_recv+0x5e/0x310 [can_j1939] j1939_can_recv+0x43f/0x580 [can_j1939] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? raw_rcv+0x42/0x3c0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] can_rcv_filter+0x11f/0x350 [can] can_receive+0x12f/0x190 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] can_rcv+0xdd/0x130 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13d/0x150 ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8c/0xe0 __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xb0 process_backlog+0x107/0x260 __napi_poll+0x69/0x310 net_rx_action+0x2a1/0x580 ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? handle_irq_event+0x7d/0xa0 __do_softirq+0xf3/0x3f8 do_softirq+0x53/0x80 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6e/0x70 netif_rx+0x16b/0x180 can_send+0x32b/0x520 [can] ? __pfx_can_send+0x10/0x10 [can] ? __check_object_size+0x299/0x410 raw_sendmsg+0x572/0x6d0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] ? apparmor_socket_sendmsg+0x2f/0x40 ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] sock_sendmsg+0xef/0x100 sock_write_iter+0x162/0x220 ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10 ? __rtnl_unlock+0x47/0x80 ? security_file_permission+0x54/0x320 vfs_write+0x6ba/0x750 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 ? __fget_light+0x1ca/0x1f0 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280 ksys_write+0x143/0x170 ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x62/0x70 __x64_sys_write+0x47/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90 ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Allocated by task 348: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xb5/0xc0 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x67/0x160 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x284/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 349: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x2f/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x1c0 __kmem_cache_free+0x1b9/0x380 kfree+0x7a/0x120 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x3b2/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Fixes: 9d71dd0c70099 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Reported-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231020133814.383996-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-10-20 13:38:14 +00:00
spin_unlock_bh(&jsk->filters_lock);
return false;
can: j1939: Fix UAF in j1939_sk_match_filter during setsockopt(SO_J1939_FILTER) Lock jsk->sk to prevent UAF when setsockopt(..., SO_J1939_FILTER, ...) modifies jsk->filters while receiving packets. Following trace was seen on affected system: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012144014 by task j1939/350 CPU: 0 PID: 350 Comm: j1939 Tainted: G W OE 6.5.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: print_report+0xd3/0x620 ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] kasan_report+0xc2/0x100 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] __asan_load4+0x84/0xb0 j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] j1939_sk_recv+0x20b/0x320 [can_j1939] ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? __pfx_j1939_sk_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? j1939_simple_recv+0x69/0x280 [can_j1939] ? j1939_ac_recv+0x5e/0x310 [can_j1939] j1939_can_recv+0x43f/0x580 [can_j1939] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? raw_rcv+0x42/0x3c0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] can_rcv_filter+0x11f/0x350 [can] can_receive+0x12f/0x190 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] can_rcv+0xdd/0x130 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13d/0x150 ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8c/0xe0 __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xb0 process_backlog+0x107/0x260 __napi_poll+0x69/0x310 net_rx_action+0x2a1/0x580 ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? handle_irq_event+0x7d/0xa0 __do_softirq+0xf3/0x3f8 do_softirq+0x53/0x80 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6e/0x70 netif_rx+0x16b/0x180 can_send+0x32b/0x520 [can] ? __pfx_can_send+0x10/0x10 [can] ? __check_object_size+0x299/0x410 raw_sendmsg+0x572/0x6d0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] ? apparmor_socket_sendmsg+0x2f/0x40 ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] sock_sendmsg+0xef/0x100 sock_write_iter+0x162/0x220 ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10 ? __rtnl_unlock+0x47/0x80 ? security_file_permission+0x54/0x320 vfs_write+0x6ba/0x750 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 ? __fget_light+0x1ca/0x1f0 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280 ksys_write+0x143/0x170 ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x62/0x70 __x64_sys_write+0x47/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90 ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Allocated by task 348: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xb5/0xc0 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x67/0x160 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x284/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 349: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x2f/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x1c0 __kmem_cache_free+0x1b9/0x380 kfree+0x7a/0x120 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x3b2/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Fixes: 9d71dd0c70099 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Reported-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231020133814.383996-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-10-20 13:38:14 +00:00
filter_match_found:
spin_unlock_bh(&jsk->filters_lock);
return true;
}
static bool j1939_sk_recv_match_one(struct j1939_sock *jsk,
const struct j1939_sk_buff_cb *skcb)
{
if (!(jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_BOUND))
return false;
if (!j1939_sk_match_dst(jsk, skcb))
return false;
if (!j1939_sk_match_filter(jsk, skcb))
return false;
return true;
}
static void j1939_sk_recv_one(struct j1939_sock *jsk, struct sk_buff *oskb)
{
const struct j1939_sk_buff_cb *oskcb = j1939_skb_to_cb(oskb);
struct j1939_sk_buff_cb *skcb;
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (oskb->sk == &jsk->sk)
return;
if (!j1939_sk_recv_match_one(jsk, oskcb))
return;
skb = skb_clone(oskb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb) {
pr_warn("skb clone failed\n");
return;
}
can_skb_set_owner(skb, oskb->sk);
skcb = j1939_skb_to_cb(skb);
skcb->msg_flags &= ~(MSG_DONTROUTE);
if (skb->sk)
skcb->msg_flags |= MSG_DONTROUTE;
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(&jsk->sk, skb) < 0)
kfree_skb(skb);
}
bool j1939_sk_recv_match(struct j1939_priv *priv, struct j1939_sk_buff_cb *skcb)
{
struct j1939_sock *jsk;
bool match = false;
read_lock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
list_for_each_entry(jsk, &priv->j1939_socks, list) {
match = j1939_sk_recv_match_one(jsk, skcb);
if (match)
break;
}
read_unlock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
return match;
}
void j1939_sk_recv(struct j1939_priv *priv, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct j1939_sock *jsk;
read_lock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
list_for_each_entry(jsk, &priv->j1939_socks, list) {
j1939_sk_recv_one(jsk, skb);
}
read_unlock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
}
static void j1939_sk_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
struct j1939_sock *jsk = j1939_sk(sk);
/* This function will be called by the generic networking code, when
* the socket is ultimately closed (sk->sk_destruct).
*
* The race between
* - processing a received CAN frame
* (can_receive -> j1939_can_recv)
* and accessing j1939_priv
* ... and ...
* - closing a socket
* (j1939_can_rx_unregister -> can_rx_unregister)
* and calling the final j1939_priv_put()
*
* is avoided by calling the final j1939_priv_put() from this
* RCU deferred cleanup call.
*/
if (jsk->priv) {
j1939_priv_put(jsk->priv);
jsk->priv = NULL;
}
/* call generic CAN sock destruct */
can_sock_destruct(sk);
}
static int j1939_sk_init(struct sock *sk)
{
struct j1939_sock *jsk = j1939_sk(sk);
/* Ensure that "sk" is first member in "struct j1939_sock", so that we
* can skip it during memset().
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct j1939_sock, sk) != 0);
memset((void *)jsk + sizeof(jsk->sk), 0x0,
sizeof(*jsk) - sizeof(jsk->sk));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&jsk->list);
init_waitqueue_head(&jsk->waitq);
jsk->sk.sk_priority = j1939_to_sk_priority(6);
jsk->sk.sk_reuse = 1; /* per default */
jsk->addr.sa = J1939_NO_ADDR;
jsk->addr.da = J1939_NO_ADDR;
jsk->addr.pgn = J1939_NO_PGN;
jsk->pgn_rx_filter = J1939_NO_PGN;
atomic_set(&jsk->skb_pending, 0);
spin_lock_init(&jsk->sk_session_queue_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&jsk->sk_session_queue);
can: j1939: Fix UAF in j1939_sk_match_filter during setsockopt(SO_J1939_FILTER) Lock jsk->sk to prevent UAF when setsockopt(..., SO_J1939_FILTER, ...) modifies jsk->filters while receiving packets. Following trace was seen on affected system: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012144014 by task j1939/350 CPU: 0 PID: 350 Comm: j1939 Tainted: G W OE 6.5.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: print_report+0xd3/0x620 ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] kasan_report+0xc2/0x100 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] __asan_load4+0x84/0xb0 j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] j1939_sk_recv+0x20b/0x320 [can_j1939] ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? __pfx_j1939_sk_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? j1939_simple_recv+0x69/0x280 [can_j1939] ? j1939_ac_recv+0x5e/0x310 [can_j1939] j1939_can_recv+0x43f/0x580 [can_j1939] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? raw_rcv+0x42/0x3c0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] can_rcv_filter+0x11f/0x350 [can] can_receive+0x12f/0x190 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] can_rcv+0xdd/0x130 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13d/0x150 ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8c/0xe0 __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xb0 process_backlog+0x107/0x260 __napi_poll+0x69/0x310 net_rx_action+0x2a1/0x580 ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? handle_irq_event+0x7d/0xa0 __do_softirq+0xf3/0x3f8 do_softirq+0x53/0x80 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6e/0x70 netif_rx+0x16b/0x180 can_send+0x32b/0x520 [can] ? __pfx_can_send+0x10/0x10 [can] ? __check_object_size+0x299/0x410 raw_sendmsg+0x572/0x6d0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] ? apparmor_socket_sendmsg+0x2f/0x40 ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] sock_sendmsg+0xef/0x100 sock_write_iter+0x162/0x220 ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10 ? __rtnl_unlock+0x47/0x80 ? security_file_permission+0x54/0x320 vfs_write+0x6ba/0x750 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 ? __fget_light+0x1ca/0x1f0 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280 ksys_write+0x143/0x170 ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x62/0x70 __x64_sys_write+0x47/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90 ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Allocated by task 348: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xb5/0xc0 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x67/0x160 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x284/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 349: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x2f/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x1c0 __kmem_cache_free+0x1b9/0x380 kfree+0x7a/0x120 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x3b2/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Fixes: 9d71dd0c70099 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Reported-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231020133814.383996-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-10-20 13:38:14 +00:00
spin_lock_init(&jsk->filters_lock);
/* j1939_sk_sock_destruct() depends on SOCK_RCU_FREE flag */
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE);
sk->sk_destruct = j1939_sk_sock_destruct;
sk->sk_protocol = CAN_J1939;
return 0;
}
static int j1939_sk_sanity_check(struct sockaddr_can *addr, int len)
{
if (!addr)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
if (len < J1939_MIN_NAMELEN)
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->can_family != AF_CAN)
return -EINVAL;
if (!addr->can_ifindex)
return -ENODEV;
if (j1939_pgn_is_valid(addr->can_addr.j1939.pgn) &&
!j1939_pgn_is_clean_pdu(addr->can_addr.j1939.pgn))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
static int j1939_sk_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int len)
{
struct sockaddr_can *addr = (struct sockaddr_can *)uaddr;
struct j1939_sock *jsk = j1939_sk(sock->sk);
can: j1939: j1939_sk_bind(): take priv after lock is held syzbot reproduced following crash: =============================================================================== kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 9844 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.4.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x1254/0x4a00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3828 Code: 00 0f 85 96 24 00 00 48 81 c4 f0 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 0b 28 00 00 49 81 3e 20 19 78 8a 0f 84 5f ee ff RSP: 0018:ffff888099c3fb48 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000218 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffff888099c3fc60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: fffffbfff146e1d0 R11: ffff888098720400 R12: 00000000000010c0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000010c0 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f0559e98700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fe4d89e0000 CR3: 0000000099606000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: lock_acquire+0x190/0x410 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4485 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:135 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:175 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:343 [inline] j1939_jsk_del+0x32/0x210 net/can/j1939/socket.c:89 j1939_sk_bind+0x2ea/0x8f0 net/can/j1939/socket.c:448 __sys_bind+0x239/0x290 net/socket.c:1648 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1659 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1657 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1657 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x45a679 Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f0559e97c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 000000000045a679 RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f0559e986d4 R13: 00000000004c09e9 R14: 00000000004d37d0 R15: 00000000ffffffff Modules linked in: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9844 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:1419 mutex_trylock+0x279/0x2f0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1427 =============================================================================== This issues was caused by null pointer deference. Where j1939_sk_bind() was using currently not existing priv. Possible scenario may look as following: cpu0 cpu1 bind() bind() j1939_sk_bind() j1939_sk_bind() priv = jsk->priv; priv = jsk->priv; lock_sock(sock->sk); priv = j1939_netdev_start(ndev); j1939_jsk_add(priv, jsk); jsk->priv = priv; relase_sock(sock->sk); lock_sock(sock->sk); j1939_jsk_del(priv, jsk); ..... ooops ...... With this patch we move "priv = jsk->priv;" after the lock, to avoid assigning of wrong priv pointer. Reported-by: syzbot+99e9e1b200a1e363237d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # >= v5.4 Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2019-12-06 14:18:35 +00:00
struct j1939_priv *priv;
struct sock *sk;
struct net *net;
int ret = 0;
ret = j1939_sk_sanity_check(addr, len);
if (ret)
return ret;
lock_sock(sock->sk);
can: j1939: j1939_sk_bind(): take priv after lock is held syzbot reproduced following crash: =============================================================================== kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 9844 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.4.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x1254/0x4a00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3828 Code: 00 0f 85 96 24 00 00 48 81 c4 f0 00 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 0b 28 00 00 49 81 3e 20 19 78 8a 0f 84 5f ee ff RSP: 0018:ffff888099c3fb48 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000218 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffff888099c3fc60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: fffffbfff146e1d0 R11: ffff888098720400 R12: 00000000000010c0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000010c0 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f0559e98700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fe4d89e0000 CR3: 0000000099606000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: lock_acquire+0x190/0x410 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4485 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:135 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:175 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:343 [inline] j1939_jsk_del+0x32/0x210 net/can/j1939/socket.c:89 j1939_sk_bind+0x2ea/0x8f0 net/can/j1939/socket.c:448 __sys_bind+0x239/0x290 net/socket.c:1648 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1659 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1657 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1657 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x45a679 Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f0559e97c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 000000000045a679 RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f0559e986d4 R13: 00000000004c09e9 R14: 00000000004d37d0 R15: 00000000ffffffff Modules linked in: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9844 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:1419 mutex_trylock+0x279/0x2f0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1427 =============================================================================== This issues was caused by null pointer deference. Where j1939_sk_bind() was using currently not existing priv. Possible scenario may look as following: cpu0 cpu1 bind() bind() j1939_sk_bind() j1939_sk_bind() priv = jsk->priv; priv = jsk->priv; lock_sock(sock->sk); priv = j1939_netdev_start(ndev); j1939_jsk_add(priv, jsk); jsk->priv = priv; relase_sock(sock->sk); lock_sock(sock->sk); j1939_jsk_del(priv, jsk); ..... ooops ...... With this patch we move "priv = jsk->priv;" after the lock, to avoid assigning of wrong priv pointer. Reported-by: syzbot+99e9e1b200a1e363237d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # >= v5.4 Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2019-12-06 14:18:35 +00:00
priv = jsk->priv;
sk = sock->sk;
net = sock_net(sk);
/* Already bound to an interface? */
if (jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_BOUND) {
/* A re-bind() to a different interface is not
* supported.
*/
if (jsk->ifindex != addr->can_ifindex) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_release_sock;
}
/* drop old references */
j1939_jsk_del(priv, jsk);
j1939_local_ecu_put(priv, jsk->addr.src_name, jsk->addr.sa);
} else {
struct can_ml_priv *can_ml;
struct net_device *ndev;
ndev = dev_get_by_index(net, addr->can_ifindex);
if (!ndev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_release_sock;
}
can_ml = can_get_ml_priv(ndev);
if (!can_ml) {
dev_put(ndev);
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_release_sock;
}
if (!(ndev->flags & IFF_UP)) {
dev_put(ndev);
ret = -ENETDOWN;
goto out_release_sock;
}
priv = j1939_netdev_start(ndev);
dev_put(ndev);
if (IS_ERR(priv)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(priv);
goto out_release_sock;
}
jsk->ifindex = addr->can_ifindex;
/* the corresponding j1939_priv_put() is called via
* sk->sk_destruct, which points to j1939_sk_sock_destruct()
*/
j1939_priv_get(priv);
jsk->priv = priv;
}
/* set default transmit pgn */
if (j1939_pgn_is_valid(addr->can_addr.j1939.pgn))
jsk->pgn_rx_filter = addr->can_addr.j1939.pgn;
jsk->addr.src_name = addr->can_addr.j1939.name;
jsk->addr.sa = addr->can_addr.j1939.addr;
/* get new references */
ret = j1939_local_ecu_get(priv, jsk->addr.src_name, jsk->addr.sa);
if (ret) {
j1939_netdev_stop(priv);
goto out_release_sock;
}
j1939_jsk_add(priv, jsk);
out_release_sock: /* fall through */
release_sock(sock->sk);
return ret;
}
static int j1939_sk_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int len, int flags)
{
struct sockaddr_can *addr = (struct sockaddr_can *)uaddr;
struct j1939_sock *jsk = j1939_sk(sock->sk);
int ret = 0;
ret = j1939_sk_sanity_check(addr, len);
if (ret)
return ret;
lock_sock(sock->sk);
/* bind() before connect() is mandatory */
if (!(jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_BOUND)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_release_sock;
}
/* A connect() to a different interface is not supported. */
if (jsk->ifindex != addr->can_ifindex) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_release_sock;
}
if (!addr->can_addr.j1939.name &&
addr->can_addr.j1939.addr == J1939_NO_ADDR &&
!sock_flag(&jsk->sk, SOCK_BROADCAST)) {
/* broadcast, but SO_BROADCAST not set */
ret = -EACCES;
goto out_release_sock;
}
jsk->addr.dst_name = addr->can_addr.j1939.name;
jsk->addr.da = addr->can_addr.j1939.addr;
if (j1939_pgn_is_valid(addr->can_addr.j1939.pgn))
jsk->addr.pgn = addr->can_addr.j1939.pgn;
jsk->state |= J1939_SOCK_CONNECTED;
out_release_sock: /* fall through */
release_sock(sock->sk);
return ret;
}
static void j1939_sk_sock2sockaddr_can(struct sockaddr_can *addr,
const struct j1939_sock *jsk, int peer)
{
can: j1939: fix kernel-infoleak in j1939_sk_sock2sockaddr_can() syzbot found that at least 2 bytes of kernel information were leaked during getsockname() on AF_CAN CAN_J1939 socket. Since struct sockaddr_can has in fact two holes, simply clear the whole area before filling it with useful data. BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in kmsan_copy_to_user+0x81/0x90 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:253 CPU: 0 PID: 8466 Comm: syz-executor511 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc5-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x21c/0x280 lib/dump_stack.c:118 kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:121 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x238/0x3d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:423 kmsan_copy_to_user+0x81/0x90 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:253 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:91 [inline] _copy_to_user+0x18e/0x260 lib/usercopy.c:39 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:186 [inline] move_addr_to_user+0x3de/0x670 net/socket.c:237 __sys_getsockname+0x407/0x5e0 net/socket.c:1909 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1920 [inline] __se_sys_getsockname+0x91/0xb0 net/socket.c:1917 __x64_sys_getsockname+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:1917 do_syscall_64+0xad/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:386 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x440219 Code: Bad RIP value. RSP: 002b:00007ffe5ee150c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000033 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440219 RDX: 0000000020000240 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000401a20 R13: 0000000000401ab0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Local variable ----address@__sys_getsockname created at: __sys_getsockname+0x91/0x5e0 net/socket.c:1894 __sys_getsockname+0x91/0x5e0 net/socket.c:1894 Bytes 2-3 of 24 are uninitialized Memory access of size 24 starts at ffff8880ba2c7de8 Data copied to user address 0000000020000100 Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Robin van der Gracht <robin@protonic.nl> Cc: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Cc: Pengutronix Kernel Team <kernel@pengutronix.de> Cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200813161834.4021638-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2020-08-13 16:18:34 +00:00
/* There are two holes (2 bytes and 3 bytes) to clear to avoid
* leaking kernel information to user space.
*/
memset(addr, 0, J1939_MIN_NAMELEN);
addr->can_family = AF_CAN;
addr->can_ifindex = jsk->ifindex;
addr->can_addr.j1939.pgn = jsk->addr.pgn;
if (peer) {
addr->can_addr.j1939.name = jsk->addr.dst_name;
addr->can_addr.j1939.addr = jsk->addr.da;
} else {
addr->can_addr.j1939.name = jsk->addr.src_name;
addr->can_addr.j1939.addr = jsk->addr.sa;
}
}
static int j1939_sk_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_can *addr = (struct sockaddr_can *)uaddr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct j1939_sock *jsk = j1939_sk(sk);
int ret = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
if (peer && !(jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_CONNECTED)) {
ret = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
goto failure;
}
j1939_sk_sock2sockaddr_can(addr, jsk, peer);
ret = J1939_MIN_NAMELEN;
failure:
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
}
static int j1939_sk_release(struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct j1939_sock *jsk;
if (!sk)
return 0;
lock_sock(sk);
jsk = j1939_sk(sk);
if (jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_BOUND) {
struct j1939_priv *priv = jsk->priv;
if (wait_event_interruptible(jsk->waitq,
!j1939_sock_pending_get(&jsk->sk))) {
j1939_cancel_active_session(priv, sk);
j1939_sk_queue_drop_all(priv, jsk, ESHUTDOWN);
}
j1939_jsk_del(priv, jsk);
j1939_local_ecu_put(priv, jsk->addr.src_name,
jsk->addr.sa);
j1939_netdev_stop(priv);
}
kfree(jsk->filters);
sock_orphan(sk);
sock->sk = NULL;
release_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
static int j1939_sk_setsockopt_flag(struct j1939_sock *jsk, sockptr_t optval,
unsigned int optlen, int flag)
{
int tmp;
if (optlen != sizeof(tmp))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
lock_sock(&jsk->sk);
if (tmp)
jsk->state |= flag;
else
jsk->state &= ~flag;
release_sock(&jsk->sk);
return tmp;
}
static int j1939_sk_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct j1939_sock *jsk = j1939_sk(sk);
int tmp, count = 0, ret = 0;
struct j1939_filter *filters = NULL, *ofilters;
if (level != SOL_CAN_J1939)
return -EINVAL;
switch (optname) {
case SO_J1939_FILTER:
if (!sockptr_is_null(optval) && optlen != 0) {
struct j1939_filter *f;
int c;
if (optlen % sizeof(*filters) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (optlen > J1939_FILTER_MAX *
sizeof(struct j1939_filter))
return -EINVAL;
count = optlen / sizeof(*filters);
filters = memdup_sockptr(optval, optlen);
if (IS_ERR(filters))
return PTR_ERR(filters);
for (f = filters, c = count; c; f++, c--) {
f->name &= f->name_mask;
f->pgn &= f->pgn_mask;
f->addr &= f->addr_mask;
}
}
lock_sock(&jsk->sk);
can: j1939: Fix UAF in j1939_sk_match_filter during setsockopt(SO_J1939_FILTER) Lock jsk->sk to prevent UAF when setsockopt(..., SO_J1939_FILTER, ...) modifies jsk->filters while receiving packets. Following trace was seen on affected system: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012144014 by task j1939/350 CPU: 0 PID: 350 Comm: j1939 Tainted: G W OE 6.5.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: print_report+0xd3/0x620 ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] kasan_report+0xc2/0x100 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] __asan_load4+0x84/0xb0 j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] j1939_sk_recv+0x20b/0x320 [can_j1939] ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? __pfx_j1939_sk_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? j1939_simple_recv+0x69/0x280 [can_j1939] ? j1939_ac_recv+0x5e/0x310 [can_j1939] j1939_can_recv+0x43f/0x580 [can_j1939] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? raw_rcv+0x42/0x3c0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] can_rcv_filter+0x11f/0x350 [can] can_receive+0x12f/0x190 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] can_rcv+0xdd/0x130 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13d/0x150 ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8c/0xe0 __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xb0 process_backlog+0x107/0x260 __napi_poll+0x69/0x310 net_rx_action+0x2a1/0x580 ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? handle_irq_event+0x7d/0xa0 __do_softirq+0xf3/0x3f8 do_softirq+0x53/0x80 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6e/0x70 netif_rx+0x16b/0x180 can_send+0x32b/0x520 [can] ? __pfx_can_send+0x10/0x10 [can] ? __check_object_size+0x299/0x410 raw_sendmsg+0x572/0x6d0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] ? apparmor_socket_sendmsg+0x2f/0x40 ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] sock_sendmsg+0xef/0x100 sock_write_iter+0x162/0x220 ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10 ? __rtnl_unlock+0x47/0x80 ? security_file_permission+0x54/0x320 vfs_write+0x6ba/0x750 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 ? __fget_light+0x1ca/0x1f0 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280 ksys_write+0x143/0x170 ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x62/0x70 __x64_sys_write+0x47/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90 ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Allocated by task 348: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xb5/0xc0 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x67/0x160 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x284/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 349: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x2f/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x1c0 __kmem_cache_free+0x1b9/0x380 kfree+0x7a/0x120 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x3b2/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Fixes: 9d71dd0c70099 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Reported-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231020133814.383996-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-10-20 13:38:14 +00:00
spin_lock_bh(&jsk->filters_lock);
ofilters = jsk->filters;
jsk->filters = filters;
jsk->nfilters = count;
can: j1939: Fix UAF in j1939_sk_match_filter during setsockopt(SO_J1939_FILTER) Lock jsk->sk to prevent UAF when setsockopt(..., SO_J1939_FILTER, ...) modifies jsk->filters while receiving packets. Following trace was seen on affected system: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012144014 by task j1939/350 CPU: 0 PID: 350 Comm: j1939 Tainted: G W OE 6.5.0-rc5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: print_report+0xd3/0x620 ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] kasan_report+0xc2/0x100 ? j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] __asan_load4+0x84/0xb0 j1939_sk_recv_match_one+0x1af/0x2d0 [can_j1939] j1939_sk_recv+0x20b/0x320 [can_j1939] ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? __pfx_j1939_sk_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? j1939_simple_recv+0x69/0x280 [can_j1939] ? j1939_ac_recv+0x5e/0x310 [can_j1939] j1939_can_recv+0x43f/0x580 [can_j1939] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] ? raw_rcv+0x42/0x3c0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_j1939_can_recv+0x10/0x10 [can_j1939] can_rcv_filter+0x11f/0x350 [can] can_receive+0x12f/0x190 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] can_rcv+0xdd/0x130 [can] ? __pfx_can_rcv+0x10/0x10 [can] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13d/0x150 ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8c/0xe0 __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xb0 process_backlog+0x107/0x260 __napi_poll+0x69/0x310 net_rx_action+0x2a1/0x580 ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? handle_irq_event+0x7d/0xa0 __do_softirq+0xf3/0x3f8 do_softirq+0x53/0x80 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6e/0x70 netif_rx+0x16b/0x180 can_send+0x32b/0x520 [can] ? __pfx_can_send+0x10/0x10 [can] ? __check_object_size+0x299/0x410 raw_sendmsg+0x572/0x6d0 [can_raw] ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] ? apparmor_socket_sendmsg+0x2f/0x40 ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [can_raw] sock_sendmsg+0xef/0x100 sock_write_iter+0x162/0x220 ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10 ? __rtnl_unlock+0x47/0x80 ? security_file_permission+0x54/0x320 vfs_write+0x6ba/0x750 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 ? __fget_light+0x1ca/0x1f0 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280 ksys_write+0x143/0x170 ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x62/0x70 __x64_sys_write+0x47/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90 ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Allocated by task 348: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xb5/0xc0 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x67/0x160 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x284/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 349: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x2f/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x1c0 __kmem_cache_free+0x1b9/0x380 kfree+0x7a/0x120 j1939_sk_setsockopt+0x3b2/0x450 [can_j1939] __sys_setsockopt+0x15c/0x2f0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x6b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Fixes: 9d71dd0c70099 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Reported-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Sili Luo <rootlab@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231020133814.383996-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-10-20 13:38:14 +00:00
spin_unlock_bh(&jsk->filters_lock);
release_sock(&jsk->sk);
kfree(ofilters);
return 0;
case SO_J1939_PROMISC:
return j1939_sk_setsockopt_flag(jsk, optval, optlen,
J1939_SOCK_PROMISC);
case SO_J1939_ERRQUEUE:
ret = j1939_sk_setsockopt_flag(jsk, optval, optlen,
J1939_SOCK_ERRQUEUE);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (!(jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_ERRQUEUE))
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_error_queue);
return ret;
case SO_J1939_SEND_PRIO:
if (optlen != sizeof(tmp))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (tmp < 0 || tmp > 7)
return -EDOM;
if (tmp < 2 && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
lock_sock(&jsk->sk);
jsk->sk.sk_priority = j1939_to_sk_priority(tmp);
release_sock(&jsk->sk);
return 0;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
}
static int j1939_sk_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct j1939_sock *jsk = j1939_sk(sk);
int ret, ulen;
/* set defaults for using 'int' properties */
int tmp = 0;
int len = sizeof(tmp);
void *val = &tmp;
if (level != SOL_CAN_J1939)
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(ulen, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (ulen < 0)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(&jsk->sk);
switch (optname) {
case SO_J1939_PROMISC:
tmp = (jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_PROMISC) ? 1 : 0;
break;
case SO_J1939_ERRQUEUE:
tmp = (jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_ERRQUEUE) ? 1 : 0;
break;
case SO_J1939_SEND_PRIO:
tmp = j1939_prio(jsk->sk.sk_priority);
break;
default:
ret = -ENOPROTOOPT;
goto no_copy;
}
/* copy to user, based on 'len' & 'val'
* but most sockopt's are 'int' properties, and have 'len' & 'val'
* left unchanged, but instead modified 'tmp'
*/
if (len > ulen)
ret = -EFAULT;
else if (put_user(len, optlen))
ret = -EFAULT;
else if (copy_to_user(optval, val, len))
ret = -EFAULT;
else
ret = 0;
no_copy:
release_sock(&jsk->sk);
return ret;
}
static int j1939_sk_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct j1939_sk_buff_cb *skcb;
int ret = 0;
if (flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_ERRQUEUE | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT))
return -EINVAL;
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return sock_recv_errqueue(sock->sk, msg, size, SOL_CAN_J1939,
SCM_J1939_ERRQUEUE);
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, &ret);
if (!skb)
return ret;
if (size < skb->len)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
else
size = skb->len;
ret = memcpy_to_msg(msg, skb->data, size);
if (ret < 0) {
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return ret;
}
skcb = j1939_skb_to_cb(skb);
if (j1939_address_is_valid(skcb->addr.da))
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_CAN_J1939, SCM_J1939_DEST_ADDR,
sizeof(skcb->addr.da), &skcb->addr.da);
if (skcb->addr.dst_name)
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_CAN_J1939, SCM_J1939_DEST_NAME,
sizeof(skcb->addr.dst_name), &skcb->addr.dst_name);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_CAN_J1939, SCM_J1939_PRIO,
sizeof(skcb->priority), &skcb->priority);
if (msg->msg_name) {
struct sockaddr_can *paddr = msg->msg_name;
msg->msg_namelen = J1939_MIN_NAMELEN;
memset(msg->msg_name, 0, msg->msg_namelen);
paddr->can_family = AF_CAN;
paddr->can_ifindex = skb->skb_iif;
paddr->can_addr.j1939.name = skcb->addr.src_name;
paddr->can_addr.j1939.addr = skcb->addr.sa;
paddr->can_addr.j1939.pgn = skcb->addr.pgn;
}
sock_recv_cmsgs(msg, sk, skb);
msg->msg_flags |= skcb->msg_flags;
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return size;
}
static struct sk_buff *j1939_sk_alloc_skb(struct net_device *ndev,
struct sock *sk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
int *errcode)
{
struct j1939_sock *jsk = j1939_sk(sk);
struct j1939_sk_buff_cb *skcb;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int ret;
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
size +
sizeof(struct can_frame) -
sizeof(((struct can_frame *)NULL)->data) +
sizeof(struct can_skb_priv),
msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &ret);
if (!skb)
goto failure;
can_skb_reserve(skb);
can_skb_prv(skb)->ifindex = ndev->ifindex;
can_skb_prv(skb)->skbcnt = 0;
skb_reserve(skb, offsetof(struct can_frame, data));
ret = memcpy_from_msg(skb_put(skb, size), msg, size);
if (ret < 0)
goto free_skb;
skb->dev = ndev;
skcb = j1939_skb_to_cb(skb);
memset(skcb, 0, sizeof(*skcb));
skcb->addr = jsk->addr;
skcb->priority = j1939_prio(READ_ONCE(sk->sk_priority));
if (msg->msg_name) {
struct sockaddr_can *addr = msg->msg_name;
if (addr->can_addr.j1939.name ||
addr->can_addr.j1939.addr != J1939_NO_ADDR) {
skcb->addr.dst_name = addr->can_addr.j1939.name;
skcb->addr.da = addr->can_addr.j1939.addr;
}
if (j1939_pgn_is_valid(addr->can_addr.j1939.pgn))
skcb->addr.pgn = addr->can_addr.j1939.pgn;
}
*errcode = ret;
return skb;
free_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
failure:
*errcode = ret;
return NULL;
}
static size_t j1939_sk_opt_stats_get_size(enum j1939_sk_errqueue_type type)
{
switch (type) {
case J1939_ERRQUEUE_RX_RTS:
return
nla_total_size(sizeof(u32)) + /* J1939_NLA_TOTAL_SIZE */
nla_total_size(sizeof(u32)) + /* J1939_NLA_PGN */
nla_total_size(sizeof(u64)) + /* J1939_NLA_SRC_NAME */
nla_total_size(sizeof(u64)) + /* J1939_NLA_DEST_NAME */
nla_total_size(sizeof(u8)) + /* J1939_NLA_SRC_ADDR */
nla_total_size(sizeof(u8)) + /* J1939_NLA_DEST_ADDR */
0;
default:
return
nla_total_size(sizeof(u32)) + /* J1939_NLA_BYTES_ACKED */
0;
}
}
static struct sk_buff *
j1939_sk_get_timestamping_opt_stats(struct j1939_session *session,
enum j1939_sk_errqueue_type type)
{
struct sk_buff *stats;
u32 size;
stats = alloc_skb(j1939_sk_opt_stats_get_size(type), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!stats)
return NULL;
if (session->skcb.addr.type == J1939_SIMPLE)
size = session->total_message_size;
else
size = min(session->pkt.tx_acked * 7,
session->total_message_size);
switch (type) {
case J1939_ERRQUEUE_RX_RTS:
nla_put_u32(stats, J1939_NLA_TOTAL_SIZE,
session->total_message_size);
nla_put_u32(stats, J1939_NLA_PGN,
session->skcb.addr.pgn);
nla_put_u64_64bit(stats, J1939_NLA_SRC_NAME,
session->skcb.addr.src_name, J1939_NLA_PAD);
nla_put_u64_64bit(stats, J1939_NLA_DEST_NAME,
session->skcb.addr.dst_name, J1939_NLA_PAD);
nla_put_u8(stats, J1939_NLA_SRC_ADDR,
session->skcb.addr.sa);
nla_put_u8(stats, J1939_NLA_DEST_ADDR,
session->skcb.addr.da);
break;
default:
nla_put_u32(stats, J1939_NLA_BYTES_ACKED, size);
}
return stats;
}
static void __j1939_sk_errqueue(struct j1939_session *session, struct sock *sk,
enum j1939_sk_errqueue_type type)
{
struct j1939_priv *priv = session->priv;
struct j1939_sock *jsk;
struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
char *state = "UNK";
u32 tsflags;
int err;
jsk = j1939_sk(sk);
if (!(jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_ERRQUEUE))
return;
tsflags = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_tsflags);
switch (type) {
case J1939_ERRQUEUE_TX_ACK:
if (!(tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_ACK))
return;
break;
case J1939_ERRQUEUE_TX_SCHED:
if (!(tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_SCHED))
return;
break;
case J1939_ERRQUEUE_TX_ABORT:
break;
case J1939_ERRQUEUE_RX_RTS:
fallthrough;
case J1939_ERRQUEUE_RX_DPO:
fallthrough;
case J1939_ERRQUEUE_RX_ABORT:
if (!(tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE))
return;
break;
default:
netdev_err(priv->ndev, "Unknown errqueue type %i\n", type);
}
skb = j1939_sk_get_timestamping_opt_stats(session, type);
if (!skb)
return;
skb->tstamp = ktime_get_real();
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct sock_exterr_skb) > sizeof(skb->cb));
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
memset(serr, 0, sizeof(*serr));
switch (type) {
case J1939_ERRQUEUE_TX_ACK:
serr->ee.ee_errno = ENOMSG;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_TIMESTAMPING;
serr->ee.ee_info = SCM_TSTAMP_ACK;
state = "TX ACK";
break;
case J1939_ERRQUEUE_TX_SCHED:
serr->ee.ee_errno = ENOMSG;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_TIMESTAMPING;
serr->ee.ee_info = SCM_TSTAMP_SCHED;
state = "TX SCH";
break;
case J1939_ERRQUEUE_TX_ABORT:
serr->ee.ee_errno = session->err;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_LOCAL;
serr->ee.ee_info = J1939_EE_INFO_TX_ABORT;
state = "TX ABT";
break;
case J1939_ERRQUEUE_RX_RTS:
serr->ee.ee_errno = ENOMSG;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_LOCAL;
serr->ee.ee_info = J1939_EE_INFO_RX_RTS;
state = "RX RTS";
break;
case J1939_ERRQUEUE_RX_DPO:
serr->ee.ee_errno = ENOMSG;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_LOCAL;
serr->ee.ee_info = J1939_EE_INFO_RX_DPO;
state = "RX DPO";
break;
case J1939_ERRQUEUE_RX_ABORT:
serr->ee.ee_errno = session->err;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_LOCAL;
serr->ee.ee_info = J1939_EE_INFO_RX_ABORT;
state = "RX ABT";
break;
}
serr->opt_stats = true;
if (tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID)
serr->ee.ee_data = session->tskey;
netdev_dbg(session->priv->ndev, "%s: 0x%p tskey: %i, state: %s\n",
__func__, session, session->tskey, state);
err = sock_queue_err_skb(sk, skb);
if (err)
kfree_skb(skb);
};
void j1939_sk_errqueue(struct j1939_session *session,
enum j1939_sk_errqueue_type type)
{
struct j1939_priv *priv = session->priv;
struct j1939_sock *jsk;
if (session->sk) {
/* send TX notifications to the socket of origin */
__j1939_sk_errqueue(session, session->sk, type);
return;
}
/* spread RX notifications to all sockets subscribed to this session */
read_lock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
list_for_each_entry(jsk, &priv->j1939_socks, list) {
if (j1939_sk_recv_match_one(jsk, &session->skcb))
__j1939_sk_errqueue(session, &jsk->sk, type);
}
read_unlock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
};
void j1939_sk_send_loop_abort(struct sock *sk, int err)
{
can: j1939: j1939_sk_send_loop_abort(): improved error queue handling in J1939 Socket This patch addresses an issue within the j1939_sk_send_loop_abort() function in the j1939/socket.c file, specifically in the context of Transport Protocol (TP) sessions. Without this patch, when a TP session is initiated and a Clear To Send (CTS) frame is received from the remote side requesting one data packet, the kernel dispatches the first Data Transport (DT) frame and then waits for the next CTS. If the remote side doesn't respond with another CTS, the kernel aborts due to a timeout. This leads to the user-space receiving an EPOLLERR on the socket, and the socket becomes active. However, when trying to read the error queue from the socket with sock.recvmsg(, , socket.MSG_ERRQUEUE), it returns -EAGAIN, given that the socket is non-blocking. This situation results in an infinite loop: the user-space repeatedly calls epoll(), epoll() returns the socket file descriptor with EPOLLERR, but the socket then blocks on the recv() of ERRQUEUE. This patch introduces an additional check for the J1939_SOCK_ERRQUEUE flag within the j1939_sk_send_loop_abort() function. If the flag is set, it indicates that the application has subscribed to receive error queue messages. In such cases, the kernel can communicate the current transfer state via the error queue. This allows for the function to return early, preventing the unnecessary setting of the socket into an error state, and breaking the infinite loop. It is crucial to note that a socket error is only needed if the application isn't using the error queue, as, without it, the application wouldn't be aware of transfer issues. Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Reported-by: David Jander <david@protonic.nl> Tested-by: David Jander <david@protonic.nl> Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526081946.715190-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-05-26 08:19:46 +00:00
struct j1939_sock *jsk = j1939_sk(sk);
if (jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_ERRQUEUE)
return;
sk->sk_err = err;
sk_error_report(sk);
}
static int j1939_sk_send_loop(struct j1939_priv *priv, struct sock *sk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
{
struct j1939_sock *jsk = j1939_sk(sk);
struct j1939_session *session = j1939_sk_get_incomplete_session(jsk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
size_t segment_size, todo_size;
int ret = 0;
if (session &&
session->total_message_size != session->total_queued_size + size) {
j1939_session_put(session);
return -EIO;
}
todo_size = size;
while (todo_size) {
struct j1939_sk_buff_cb *skcb;
segment_size = min_t(size_t, J1939_MAX_TP_PACKET_SIZE,
todo_size);
/* Allocate skb for one segment */
skb = j1939_sk_alloc_skb(priv->ndev, sk, msg, segment_size,
&ret);
if (ret)
break;
skcb = j1939_skb_to_cb(skb);
if (!session) {
/* at this point the size should be full size
* of the session
*/
skcb->offset = 0;
session = j1939_tp_send(priv, skb, size);
if (IS_ERR(session)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(session);
goto kfree_skb;
}
if (j1939_sk_queue_session(session)) {
/* try to activate session if we a
* fist in the queue
*/
if (!j1939_session_activate(session)) {
j1939_tp_schedule_txtimer(session, 0);
} else {
ret = -EBUSY;
session->err = ret;
j1939_sk_queue_drop_all(priv, jsk,
EBUSY);
break;
}
}
} else {
skcb->offset = session->total_queued_size;
j1939_session_skb_queue(session, skb);
}
todo_size -= segment_size;
session->total_queued_size += segment_size;
}
switch (ret) {
case 0: /* OK */
if (todo_size)
netdev_warn(priv->ndev,
"no error found and not completely queued?! %zu\n",
todo_size);
ret = size;
break;
case -ERESTARTSYS:
ret = -EINTR;
fallthrough;
case -EAGAIN: /* OK */
if (todo_size != size)
ret = size - todo_size;
break;
default: /* ERROR */
break;
}
if (session)
j1939_session_put(session);
return ret;
kfree_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
return ret;
}
static int j1939_sk_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct j1939_sock *jsk = j1939_sk(sk);
struct j1939_priv *priv;
int ifindex;
int ret;
lock_sock(sock->sk);
/* various socket state tests */
if (!(jsk->state & J1939_SOCK_BOUND)) {
ret = -EBADFD;
goto sendmsg_done;
}
priv = jsk->priv;
ifindex = jsk->ifindex;
if (!jsk->addr.src_name && jsk->addr.sa == J1939_NO_ADDR) {
/* no source address assigned yet */
ret = -EBADFD;
goto sendmsg_done;
}
/* deal with provided destination address info */
if (msg->msg_name) {
struct sockaddr_can *addr = msg->msg_name;
if (msg->msg_namelen < J1939_MIN_NAMELEN) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto sendmsg_done;
}
if (addr->can_family != AF_CAN) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto sendmsg_done;
}
if (addr->can_ifindex && addr->can_ifindex != ifindex) {
ret = -EBADFD;
goto sendmsg_done;
}
if (j1939_pgn_is_valid(addr->can_addr.j1939.pgn) &&
!j1939_pgn_is_clean_pdu(addr->can_addr.j1939.pgn)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto sendmsg_done;
}
if (!addr->can_addr.j1939.name &&
addr->can_addr.j1939.addr == J1939_NO_ADDR &&
!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST)) {
/* broadcast, but SO_BROADCAST not set */
ret = -EACCES;
goto sendmsg_done;
}
} else {
if (!jsk->addr.dst_name && jsk->addr.da == J1939_NO_ADDR &&
!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST)) {
/* broadcast, but SO_BROADCAST not set */
ret = -EACCES;
goto sendmsg_done;
}
}
ret = j1939_sk_send_loop(priv, sk, msg, size);
sendmsg_done:
release_sock(sock->sk);
return ret;
}
void j1939_sk_netdev_event_netdown(struct j1939_priv *priv)
{
struct j1939_sock *jsk;
int error_code = ENETDOWN;
read_lock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
list_for_each_entry(jsk, &priv->j1939_socks, list) {
jsk->sk.sk_err = error_code;
if (!sock_flag(&jsk->sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk_error_report(&jsk->sk);
j1939_sk_queue_drop_all(priv, jsk, error_code);
}
read_unlock_bh(&priv->j1939_socks_lock);
}
static int j1939_sk_no_ioctlcmd(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
/* no ioctls for socket layer -> hand it down to NIC layer */
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
static const struct proto_ops j1939_ops = {
.family = PF_CAN,
.release = j1939_sk_release,
.bind = j1939_sk_bind,
.connect = j1939_sk_connect,
.socketpair = sock_no_socketpair,
.accept = sock_no_accept,
.getname = j1939_sk_getname,
.poll = datagram_poll,
.ioctl = j1939_sk_no_ioctlcmd,
.listen = sock_no_listen,
.shutdown = sock_no_shutdown,
.setsockopt = j1939_sk_setsockopt,
.getsockopt = j1939_sk_getsockopt,
.sendmsg = j1939_sk_sendmsg,
.recvmsg = j1939_sk_recvmsg,
.mmap = sock_no_mmap,
};
static struct proto j1939_proto __read_mostly = {
.name = "CAN_J1939",
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.obj_size = sizeof(struct j1939_sock),
.init = j1939_sk_init,
};
const struct can_proto j1939_can_proto = {
.type = SOCK_DGRAM,
.protocol = CAN_J1939,
.ops = &j1939_ops,
.prot = &j1939_proto,
};