linux-stable/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* RSA padding templates.
*
* Copyright (c) 2015 Intel Corporation
*/
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
#include <crypto/internal/akcipher.h>
#include <crypto/internal/rsa.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
/*
* Hash algorithm OIDs plus ASN.1 DER wrappings [RFC4880 sec 5.2.2].
*/
static const u8 rsa_digest_info_md5[] = {
0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08,
0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, /* OID */
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10
};
static const u8 rsa_digest_info_sha1[] = {
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
};
static const u8 rsa_digest_info_rmd160[] = {
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
0x2b, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
};
static const u8 rsa_digest_info_sha224[] = {
0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c
};
static const u8 rsa_digest_info_sha256[] = {
0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
};
static const u8 rsa_digest_info_sha384[] = {
0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30
};
static const u8 rsa_digest_info_sha512[] = {
0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40
};
static const struct rsa_asn1_template {
const char *name;
const u8 *data;
size_t size;
} rsa_asn1_templates[] = {
#define _(X) { #X, rsa_digest_info_##X, sizeof(rsa_digest_info_##X) }
_(md5),
_(sha1),
_(rmd160),
_(sha256),
_(sha384),
_(sha512),
_(sha224),
{ NULL }
#undef _
};
static const struct rsa_asn1_template *rsa_lookup_asn1(const char *name)
{
const struct rsa_asn1_template *p;
for (p = rsa_asn1_templates; p->name; p++)
if (strcmp(name, p->name) == 0)
return p;
return NULL;
}
struct pkcs1pad_ctx {
struct crypto_akcipher *child;
unsigned int key_size;
};
struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx {
struct crypto_akcipher_spawn spawn;
const struct rsa_asn1_template *digest_info;
};
struct pkcs1pad_request {
struct scatterlist in_sg[2], out_sg[1];
uint8_t *in_buf, *out_buf;
struct akcipher_request child_req;
};
static int pkcs1pad_set_pub_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
int err;
ctx->key_size = 0;
err = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(ctx->child, key, keylen);
if (err)
return err;
/* Find out new modulus size from rsa implementation */
err = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(ctx->child);
if (err > PAGE_SIZE)
return -ENOTSUPP;
ctx->key_size = err;
return 0;
}
static int pkcs1pad_set_priv_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
int err;
ctx->key_size = 0;
err = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(ctx->child, key, keylen);
if (err)
return err;
/* Find out new modulus size from rsa implementation */
err = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(ctx->child);
if (err > PAGE_SIZE)
return -ENOTSUPP;
ctx->key_size = err;
return 0;
}
static unsigned int pkcs1pad_get_max_size(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
{
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
/*
* The maximum destination buffer size for the encrypt/sign operations
* will be the same as for RSA, even though it's smaller for
* decrypt/verify.
*/
return ctx->key_size;
}
static void pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf(struct scatterlist *sg, void *buf, size_t len,
struct scatterlist *next)
{
int nsegs = next ? 2 : 1;
sg_init_table(sg, nsegs);
sg_set_buf(sg, buf, len);
if (next)
sg_chain(sg, nsegs, next);
}
static int pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
{
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
unsigned int pad_len;
unsigned int len;
u8 *out_buf;
if (err)
goto out;
len = req_ctx->child_req.dst_len;
pad_len = ctx->key_size - len;
/* Four billion to one */
if (likely(!pad_len))
goto out;
out_buf = kzalloc(ctx->key_size, GFP_KERNEL);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!out_buf)
goto out;
sg_copy_to_buffer(req->dst, sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, len),
out_buf + pad_len, len);
sg_copy_from_buffer(req->dst,
sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, ctx->key_size),
out_buf, ctx->key_size);
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 06:18:13 +00:00
kfree_sensitive(out_buf);
out:
req->dst_len = ctx->key_size;
kfree(req_ctx->in_buf);
return err;
}
static void pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete_cb(
struct crypto_async_request *child_async_req, int err)
{
struct akcipher_request *req = child_async_req->data;
if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
goto out;
err = pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete(req, err);
out:
akcipher_request_complete(req, err);
}
static int pkcs1pad_encrypt(struct akcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
int err;
unsigned int i, ps_end;
if (!ctx->key_size)
return -EINVAL;
if (req->src_len > ctx->key_size - 11)
return -EOVERFLOW;
if (req->dst_len < ctx->key_size) {
req->dst_len = ctx->key_size;
return -EOVERFLOW;
}
req_ctx->in_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size - 1 - req->src_len,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req_ctx->in_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
ps_end = ctx->key_size - req->src_len - 2;
req_ctx->in_buf[0] = 0x02;
for (i = 1; i < ps_end; i++)
req_ctx->in_buf[i] = 1 + prandom_u32_max(255);
req_ctx->in_buf[ps_end] = 0x00;
pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf(req_ctx->in_sg, req_ctx->in_buf,
ctx->key_size - 1 - req->src_len, req->src);
akcipher_request_set_tfm(&req_ctx->child_req, ctx->child);
akcipher_request_set_callback(&req_ctx->child_req, req->base.flags,
pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete_cb, req);
/* Reuse output buffer */
akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req_ctx->in_sg,
req->dst, ctx->key_size - 1, req->dst_len);
err = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(&req_ctx->child_req);
if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY)
return pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete(req, err);
return err;
}
static int pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
{
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
unsigned int dst_len;
unsigned int pos;
u8 *out_buf;
if (err)
goto done;
err = -EINVAL;
dst_len = req_ctx->child_req.dst_len;
if (dst_len < ctx->key_size - 1)
goto done;
out_buf = req_ctx->out_buf;
if (dst_len == ctx->key_size) {
if (out_buf[0] != 0x00)
/* Decrypted value had no leading 0 byte */
goto done;
dst_len--;
out_buf++;
}
if (out_buf[0] != 0x02)
goto done;
for (pos = 1; pos < dst_len; pos++)
if (out_buf[pos] == 0x00)
break;
if (pos < 9 || pos == dst_len)
goto done;
pos++;
err = 0;
if (req->dst_len < dst_len - pos)
err = -EOVERFLOW;
req->dst_len = dst_len - pos;
if (!err)
sg_copy_from_buffer(req->dst,
sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, req->dst_len),
out_buf + pos, req->dst_len);
done:
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 06:18:13 +00:00
kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->out_buf);
return err;
}
static void pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete_cb(
struct crypto_async_request *child_async_req, int err)
{
struct akcipher_request *req = child_async_req->data;
if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
goto out;
err = pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete(req, err);
out:
akcipher_request_complete(req, err);
}
static int pkcs1pad_decrypt(struct akcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
int err;
if (!ctx->key_size || req->src_len != ctx->key_size)
return -EINVAL;
req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req_ctx->out_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf(req_ctx->out_sg, req_ctx->out_buf,
ctx->key_size, NULL);
akcipher_request_set_tfm(&req_ctx->child_req, ctx->child);
akcipher_request_set_callback(&req_ctx->child_req, req->base.flags,
pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete_cb, req);
/* Reuse input buffer, output to a new buffer */
akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req->src,
req_ctx->out_sg, req->src_len,
ctx->key_size);
err = crypto_akcipher_decrypt(&req_ctx->child_req);
if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY)
return pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete(req, err);
return err;
}
static int pkcs1pad_sign(struct akcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
struct akcipher_instance *inst = akcipher_alg_instance(tfm);
struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ictx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
const struct rsa_asn1_template *digest_info = ictx->digest_info;
int err;
unsigned int ps_end, digest_size = 0;
if (!ctx->key_size)
return -EINVAL;
if (digest_info)
digest_size = digest_info->size;
if (req->src_len + digest_size > ctx->key_size - 11)
return -EOVERFLOW;
if (req->dst_len < ctx->key_size) {
req->dst_len = ctx->key_size;
return -EOVERFLOW;
}
req_ctx->in_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size - 1 - req->src_len,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req_ctx->in_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
ps_end = ctx->key_size - digest_size - req->src_len - 2;
req_ctx->in_buf[0] = 0x01;
memset(req_ctx->in_buf + 1, 0xff, ps_end - 1);
req_ctx->in_buf[ps_end] = 0x00;
if (digest_info)
memcpy(req_ctx->in_buf + ps_end + 1, digest_info->data,
digest_info->size);
pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf(req_ctx->in_sg, req_ctx->in_buf,
ctx->key_size - 1 - req->src_len, req->src);
akcipher_request_set_tfm(&req_ctx->child_req, ctx->child);
akcipher_request_set_callback(&req_ctx->child_req, req->base.flags,
pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete_cb, req);
/* Reuse output buffer */
akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req_ctx->in_sg,
req->dst, ctx->key_size - 1, req->dst_len);
err = crypto_akcipher_decrypt(&req_ctx->child_req);
if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY)
return pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete(req, err);
return err;
}
static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
{
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
struct akcipher_instance *inst = akcipher_alg_instance(tfm);
struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ictx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
const struct rsa_asn1_template *digest_info = ictx->digest_info;
unsigned int dst_len;
unsigned int pos;
u8 *out_buf;
if (err)
goto done;
err = -EINVAL;
dst_len = req_ctx->child_req.dst_len;
if (dst_len < ctx->key_size - 1)
goto done;
out_buf = req_ctx->out_buf;
if (dst_len == ctx->key_size) {
if (out_buf[0] != 0x00)
/* Decrypted value had no leading 0 byte */
goto done;
dst_len--;
out_buf++;
}
err = -EBADMSG;
if (out_buf[0] != 0x01)
goto done;
for (pos = 1; pos < dst_len; pos++)
if (out_buf[pos] != 0xff)
break;
if (pos < 9 || pos == dst_len || out_buf[pos] != 0x00)
goto done;
pos++;
if (digest_info) {
if (digest_info->size > dst_len - pos)
goto done;
if (crypto_memneq(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data,
digest_info->size))
goto done;
pos += digest_info->size;
}
err = 0;
if (req->dst_len != dst_len - pos) {
err = -EKEYREJECTED;
req->dst_len = dst_len - pos;
goto done;
}
/* Extract appended digest. */
sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req->src,
sg_nents_for_len(req->src,
req->src_len + req->dst_len),
req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size,
crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - correctly get hash from source scatterlist commit e316f7179be22912281ce6331d96d7c121fb2b17 upstream. Commit c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms") changed akcipher_alg::verify to take in both the signature and the actual hash and do the signature verification, rather than just return the hash expected by the signature as was the case before. To do this, it implemented a hack where the signature and hash are concatenated with each other in one scatterlist. Obviously, for this to work correctly, akcipher_alg::verify needs to correctly extract the two items from the scatterlist it is given. Unfortunately, it doesn't correctly extract the hash in the case where the signature is longer than the RSA key size, as it assumes that the signature's length is equal to the RSA key size. This causes a prefix of the hash, or even the entire hash, to be taken from the *signature*. (Note, the case of a signature longer than the RSA key size should not be allowed in the first place; a separate patch will fix that.) It is unclear whether the resulting scheme has any useful security properties. Fix this by correctly extracting the hash from the scatterlist. Fixes: c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.2+ Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-01-19 00:13:03 +00:00
req->dst_len, req->src_len);
/* Do the actual verification step. */
if (memcmp(req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size, out_buf + pos,
req->dst_len) != 0)
err = -EKEYREJECTED;
done:
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 06:18:13 +00:00
kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->out_buf);
return err;
}
static void pkcs1pad_verify_complete_cb(
struct crypto_async_request *child_async_req, int err)
{
struct akcipher_request *req = child_async_req->data;
if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
goto out;
err = pkcs1pad_verify_complete(req, err);
out:
akcipher_request_complete(req, err);
}
/*
* The verify operation is here for completeness similar to the verification
* defined in RFC2313 section 10.2 except that block type 0 is not accepted,
* as in RFC2437. RFC2437 section 9.2 doesn't define any operation to
* retrieve the DigestInfo from a signature, instead the user is expected
* to call the sign operation to generate the expected signature and compare
* signatures instead of the message-digests.
*/
static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
int err;
if (WARN_ON(req->dst) ||
WARN_ON(!req->dst_len) ||
!ctx->key_size || req->src_len != ctx->key_size)
return -EINVAL;
req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + req->dst_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req_ctx->out_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf(req_ctx->out_sg, req_ctx->out_buf,
ctx->key_size, NULL);
akcipher_request_set_tfm(&req_ctx->child_req, ctx->child);
akcipher_request_set_callback(&req_ctx->child_req, req->base.flags,
pkcs1pad_verify_complete_cb, req);
/* Reuse input buffer, output to a new buffer */
akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req->src,
req_ctx->out_sg, req->src_len,
ctx->key_size);
err = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(&req_ctx->child_req);
if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY)
return pkcs1pad_verify_complete(req, err);
return err;
}
static int pkcs1pad_init_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
{
struct akcipher_instance *inst = akcipher_alg_instance(tfm);
struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ictx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct crypto_akcipher *child_tfm;
child_tfm = crypto_spawn_akcipher(&ictx->spawn);
if (IS_ERR(child_tfm))
return PTR_ERR(child_tfm);
ctx->child = child_tfm;
akcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct pkcs1pad_request) +
crypto_akcipher_reqsize(child_tfm));
return 0;
}
static void pkcs1pad_exit_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
{
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
crypto_free_akcipher(ctx->child);
}
static void pkcs1pad_free(struct akcipher_instance *inst)
{
struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ctx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
struct crypto_akcipher_spawn *spawn = &ctx->spawn;
crypto_drop_akcipher(spawn);
kfree(inst);
}
static int pkcs1pad_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
{
u32 mask;
struct akcipher_instance *inst;
struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ctx;
struct akcipher_alg *rsa_alg;
const char *hash_name;
int err;
err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AKCIPHER, &mask);
if (err)
return err;
inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!inst)
return -ENOMEM;
ctx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
err = crypto_grab_akcipher(&ctx->spawn, akcipher_crypto_instance(inst),
crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]), 0, mask);
if (err)
goto err_free_inst;
rsa_alg = crypto_spawn_akcipher_alg(&ctx->spawn);
if (strcmp(rsa_alg->base.cra_name, "rsa") != 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_free_inst;
}
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
hash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
if (IS_ERR(hash_name)) {
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name,
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "pkcs1pad(%s)",
rsa_alg->base.cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto err_free_inst;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name,
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "pkcs1pad(%s)",
rsa_alg->base.cra_driver_name) >=
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto err_free_inst;
} else {
ctx->digest_info = rsa_lookup_asn1(hash_name);
if (!ctx->digest_info) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_free_inst;
}
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"pkcs1pad(%s,%s)", rsa_alg->base.cra_name,
hash_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto err_free_inst;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name,
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "pkcs1pad(%s,%s)",
rsa_alg->base.cra_driver_name,
hash_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto err_free_inst;
}
inst->alg.base.cra_priority = rsa_alg->base.cra_priority;
inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct pkcs1pad_ctx);
inst->alg.init = pkcs1pad_init_tfm;
inst->alg.exit = pkcs1pad_exit_tfm;
inst->alg.encrypt = pkcs1pad_encrypt;
inst->alg.decrypt = pkcs1pad_decrypt;
inst->alg.sign = pkcs1pad_sign;
inst->alg.verify = pkcs1pad_verify;
inst->alg.set_pub_key = pkcs1pad_set_pub_key;
inst->alg.set_priv_key = pkcs1pad_set_priv_key;
inst->alg.max_size = pkcs1pad_get_max_size;
inst->free = pkcs1pad_free;
err = akcipher_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
if (err) {
err_free_inst:
pkcs1pad_free(inst);
}
return err;
}
struct crypto_template rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl = {
.name = "pkcs1pad",
.create = pkcs1pad_create,
.module = THIS_MODULE,
};