linux-stable/lib/Makefile

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#
# Makefile for some libs needed in the kernel.
#
ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
ORIG_CFLAGS := $(KBUILD_CFLAGS)
KBUILD_CFLAGS = $(subst $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE),,$(ORIG_CFLAGS))
endif
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
# These files are disabled because they produce lots of non-interesting and/or
# flaky coverage that is not a function of syscall inputs. For example,
# rbtree can be global and individual rotations don't correlate with inputs.
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_string.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_rbtree.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_list_debug.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_debugobjects.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_dynamic_debug.o := n
lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
rbtree.o radix-tree.o dump_stack.o timerqueue.o\
idr.o int_sqrt.o extable.o \
sha1.o chacha20.o md5.o irq_regs.o argv_split.o \
flex_proportions.o ratelimit.o show_mem.o \
is_single_threaded.o plist.o decompress.o kobject_uevent.o \
siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF SipHash is a 64-bit keyed hash function that is actually a cryptographically secure PRF, like HMAC. Except SipHash is super fast, and is meant to be used as a hashtable keyed lookup function, or as a general PRF for short input use cases, such as sequence numbers or RNG chaining. For the first usage: There are a variety of attacks known as "hashtable poisoning" in which an attacker forms some data such that the hash of that data will be the same, and then preceeds to fill up all entries of a hashbucket. This is a realistic and well-known denial-of-service vector. Currently hashtables use jhash, which is fast but not secure, and some kind of rotating key scheme (or none at all, which isn't good). SipHash is meant as a replacement for jhash in these cases. There are a modicum of places in the kernel that are vulnerable to hashtable poisoning attacks, either via userspace vectors or network vectors, and there's not a reliable mechanism inside the kernel at the moment to fix it. The first step toward fixing these issues is actually getting a secure primitive into the kernel for developers to use. Then we can, bit by bit, port things over to it as deemed appropriate. While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptographically secure function, it is likely a bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so replacements will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash usage poses a real security risk. For the second usage: A few places in the kernel are using MD5 or SHA1 for creating secure sequence numbers, syn cookies, port numbers, or fast random numbers. SipHash is a faster and more fitting, and more secure replacement for MD5 in those situations. Replacing MD5 and SHA1 with SipHash for these uses is obvious and straight-forward, and so is submitted along with this patch series. There shouldn't be much of a debate over its efficacy. Dozens of languages are already using this internally for their hash tables and PRFs. Some of the BSDs already use this in their kernels. SipHash is a widely known high-speed solution to a widely known set of problems, and it's time we catch-up. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 12:54:00 +00:00
earlycpio.o seq_buf.o siphash.o \
nmi_backtrace.o nodemask.o win_minmax.o
[PATCH] Add initial implementation of klist helpers. This klist interface provides a couple of structures that wrap around struct list_head to provide explicit list "head" (struct klist) and list "node" (struct klist_node) objects. For struct klist, a spinlock is included that protects access to the actual list itself. struct klist_node provides a pointer to the klist that owns it and a kref reference count that indicates the number of current users of that node in the list. The entire point is to provide an interface for iterating over a list that is safe and allows for modification of the list during the iteration (e.g. insertion and removal), including modification of the current node on the list. It works using a 3rd object type - struct klist_iter - that is declared and initialized before an iteration. klist_next() is used to acquire the next element in the list. It returns NULL if there are no more items. This klist interface provides a couple of structures that wrap around struct list_head to provide explicit list "head" (struct klist) and list "node" (struct klist_node) objects. For struct klist, a spinlock is included that protects access to the actual list itself. struct klist_node provides a pointer to the klist that owns it and a kref reference count that indicates the number of current users of that node in the list. The entire point is to provide an interface for iterating over a list that is safe and allows for modification of the list during the iteration (e.g. insertion and removal), including modification of the current node on the list. It works using a 3rd object type - struct klist_iter - that is declared and initialized before an iteration. klist_next() is used to acquire the next element in the list. It returns NULL if there are no more items. Internally, that routine takes the klist's lock, decrements the reference count of the previous klist_node and increments the count of the next klist_node. It then drops the lock and returns. There are primitives for adding and removing nodes to/from a klist. When deleting, klist_del() will simply decrement the reference count. Only when the count goes to 0 is the node removed from the list. klist_remove() will try to delete the node from the list and block until it is actually removed. This is useful for objects (like devices) that have been removed from the system and must be freed (but must wait until all accessors have finished). Internally, that routine takes the klist's lock, decrements the reference count of the previous klist_node and increments the count of the next klist_node. It then drops the lock and returns. There are primitives for adding and removing nodes to/from a klist. When deleting, klist_del() will simply decrement the reference count. Only when the count goes to 0 is the node removed from the list. klist_remove() will try to delete the node from the list and block until it is actually removed. This is useful for objects (like devices) that have been removed from the system and must be freed (but must wait until all accessors have finished). Signed-off-by: Patrick Mochel <mochel@digitalimplant.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> diff -Nru a/include/linux/klist.h b/include/linux/klist.h
2005-03-21 19:45:16 +00:00
CFLAGS_radix-tree.o += -DCONFIG_SPARSE_RCU_POINTER
CFLAGS_idr.o += -DCONFIG_SPARSE_RCU_POINTER
lib-$(CONFIG_MMU) += ioremap.o
lib-$(CONFIG_SMP) += cpumask.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DMA_NOOP_OPS) += dma-noop.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DMA_VIRT_OPS) += dma-virt.o
lib-y += kobject.o klist.o
obj-y += lockref.o
obj-y += bcd.o div64.o sort.o parser.o debug_locks.o random32.o \
bust_spinlocks.o kasprintf.o bitmap.o scatterlist.o \
gcd.o lcm.o list_sort.o uuid.o flex_array.o iov_iter.o clz_ctz.o \
bsearch.o find_bit.o llist.o memweight.o kfifo.o \
percpu-refcount.o percpu_ida.o rhashtable.o reciprocal_div.o \
once.o refcount.o
obj-y += string_helpers.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_STRING_HELPERS) += test-string_helpers.o
obj-y += hexdump.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_HEXDUMP) += test_hexdump.o
obj-y += kstrtox.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_BPF) += test_bpf.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_FIRMWARE) += test_firmware.o
siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF SipHash is a 64-bit keyed hash function that is actually a cryptographically secure PRF, like HMAC. Except SipHash is super fast, and is meant to be used as a hashtable keyed lookup function, or as a general PRF for short input use cases, such as sequence numbers or RNG chaining. For the first usage: There are a variety of attacks known as "hashtable poisoning" in which an attacker forms some data such that the hash of that data will be the same, and then preceeds to fill up all entries of a hashbucket. This is a realistic and well-known denial-of-service vector. Currently hashtables use jhash, which is fast but not secure, and some kind of rotating key scheme (or none at all, which isn't good). SipHash is meant as a replacement for jhash in these cases. There are a modicum of places in the kernel that are vulnerable to hashtable poisoning attacks, either via userspace vectors or network vectors, and there's not a reliable mechanism inside the kernel at the moment to fix it. The first step toward fixing these issues is actually getting a secure primitive into the kernel for developers to use. Then we can, bit by bit, port things over to it as deemed appropriate. While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptographically secure function, it is likely a bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so replacements will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash usage poses a real security risk. For the second usage: A few places in the kernel are using MD5 or SHA1 for creating secure sequence numbers, syn cookies, port numbers, or fast random numbers. SipHash is a faster and more fitting, and more secure replacement for MD5 in those situations. Replacing MD5 and SHA1 with SipHash for these uses is obvious and straight-forward, and so is submitted along with this patch series. There shouldn't be much of a debate over its efficacy. Dozens of languages are already using this internally for their hash tables and PRFs. Some of the BSDs already use this in their kernels. SipHash is a widely known high-speed solution to a widely known set of problems, and it's time we catch-up. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 12:54:00 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_HASH) += test_hash.o test_siphash.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_KASAN) += test_kasan.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_KSTRTOX) += test-kstrtox.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_LKM) += test_module.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_RHASHTABLE) += test_rhashtable.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_SORT) += test_sort.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_USER_COPY) += test_user_copy.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_STATIC_KEYS) += test_static_keys.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_STATIC_KEYS) += test_static_key_base.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_PRINTF) += test_printf.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_BITMAP) += test_bitmap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_UUID) += test_uuid.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_PARMAN) += test_parman.o
ifeq ($(CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT),y)
CFLAGS_kobject.o += -DDEBUG
CFLAGS_kobject_uevent.o += -DDEBUG
endif
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_REDUCED) += debug_info.o
CFLAGS_debug_info.o += $(call cc-option, -femit-struct-debug-detailed=any)
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_IOMAP) += iomap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_PCI_IOMAP) += pci_iomap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HAS_IOMEM) += iomap_copy.o devres.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CHECK_SIGNATURE) += check_signature.o
[PATCH] lockdep: locking API self tests Introduce DEBUG_LOCKING_API_SELFTESTS, which uses the generic lock debugging code's silent-failure feature to run a matrix of testcases. There are 210 testcases currently: +----------------------- | Locking API testsuite: +------------------------------+------+------+------+------+------+------+ | spin |wlock |rlock |mutex | wsem | rsem | -------------------------------+------+------+------+------+------+------+ A-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-B-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-B-C-C-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-C-A-B-C deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-B-C-C-D-D-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-C-D-B-D-D-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-C-D-B-C-D-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | double unlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | bad unlock order: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | --------------------------------------+------+------+------+------+------+ recursive read-lock: | ok | | ok | --------------------------------------+------+------+------+------+------+ non-nested unlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | --------------------------------------+------+------+------+ hard-irqs-on + irq-safe-A/12: ok | ok | ok | soft-irqs-on + irq-safe-A/12: ok | ok | ok | hard-irqs-on + irq-safe-A/21: ok | ok | ok | soft-irqs-on + irq-safe-A/21: ok | ok | ok | sirq-safe-A => hirqs-on/12: ok | ok | ok | sirq-safe-A => hirqs-on/21: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + irqs-on/12: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + irqs-on/12: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + irqs-on/21: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + irqs-on/21: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/123: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/123: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/132: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/132: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/213: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/213: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/231: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/231: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/312: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/312: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/321: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/321: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/123: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/123: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/132: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/132: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/213: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/213: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/231: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/231: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/312: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/312: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/321: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/321: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/123: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/123: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/132: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/132: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/213: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/213: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/231: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/231: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/312: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/312: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/321: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/321: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq read-recursion/123: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/123: ok | hard-irq read-recursion/132: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/132: ok | hard-irq read-recursion/213: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/213: ok | hard-irq read-recursion/231: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/231: ok | hard-irq read-recursion/312: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/312: ok | hard-irq read-recursion/321: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/321: ok | --------------------------------+-----+---------------- Good, all 210 testcases passed! | --------------------------------+ Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-03 07:24:48 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKING_API_SELFTESTS) += locking-selftest.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_HWEIGHT) += hweight.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BTREE) += btree.o
obj-$(CONFIG_INTERVAL_TREE) += interval_tree.o
Add a generic associative array implementation. Add a generic associative array implementation that can be used as the container for keyrings, thereby massively increasing the capacity available whilst also speeding up searching in keyrings that contain a lot of keys. This may also be useful in FS-Cache for tracking cookies. Documentation is added into Documentation/associative_array.txt Some of the properties of the implementation are: (1) Objects are opaque pointers. The implementation does not care where they point (if anywhere) or what they point to (if anything). [!] NOTE: Pointers to objects _must_ be zero in the two least significant bits. (2) Objects do not need to contain linkage blocks for use by the array. This permits an object to be located in multiple arrays simultaneously. Rather, the array is made up of metadata blocks that point to objects. (3) Objects are labelled as being one of two types (the type is a bool value). This information is stored in the array, but has no consequence to the array itself or its algorithms. (4) Objects require index keys to locate them within the array. (5) Index keys must be unique. Inserting an object with the same key as one already in the array will replace the old object. (6) Index keys can be of any length and can be of different lengths. (7) Index keys should encode the length early on, before any variation due to length is seen. (8) Index keys can include a hash to scatter objects throughout the array. (9) The array can iterated over. The objects will not necessarily come out in key order. (10) The array can be iterated whilst it is being modified, provided the RCU readlock is being held by the iterator. Note, however, under these circumstances, some objects may be seen more than once. If this is a problem, the iterator should lock against modification. Objects will not be missed, however, unless deleted. (11) Objects in the array can be looked up by means of their index key. (12) Objects can be looked up whilst the array is being modified, provided the RCU readlock is being held by the thread doing the look up. The implementation uses a tree of 16-pointer nodes internally that are indexed on each level by nibbles from the index key. To improve memory efficiency, shortcuts can be emplaced to skip over what would otherwise be a series of single-occupancy nodes. Further, nodes pack leaf object pointers into spare space in the node rather than making an extra branch until as such time an object needs to be added to a full node. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2013-09-24 09:35:17 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY) += assoc_array.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT) += smp_processor_id.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST) += list_debug.o
infrastructure to debug (dynamic) objects We can see an ever repeating problem pattern with objects of any kind in the kernel: 1) freeing of active objects 2) reinitialization of active objects Both problems can be hard to debug because the crash happens at a point where we have no chance to decode the root cause anymore. One problem spot are kernel timers, where the detection of the problem often happens in interrupt context and usually causes the machine to panic. While working on a timer related bug report I had to hack specialized code into the timer subsystem to get a reasonable hint for the root cause. This debug hack was fine for temporary use, but far from a mergeable solution due to the intrusiveness into the timer code. The code further lacked the ability to detect and report the root cause instantly and keep the system operational. Keeping the system operational is important to get hold of the debug information without special debugging aids like serial consoles and special knowledge of the bug reporter. The problems described above are not restricted to timers, but timers tend to expose it usually in a full system crash. Other objects are less explosive, but the symptoms caused by such mistakes can be even harder to debug. Instead of creating specialized debugging code for the timer subsystem a generic infrastructure is created which allows developers to verify their code and provides an easy to enable debug facility for users in case of trouble. The debugobjects core code keeps track of operations on static and dynamic objects by inserting them into a hashed list and sanity checking them on object operations and provides additional checks whenever kernel memory is freed. The tracked object operations are: - initializing an object - adding an object to a subsystem list - deleting an object from a subsystem list Each operation is sanity checked before the operation is executed and the subsystem specific code can provide a fixup function which allows to prevent the damage of the operation. When the sanity check triggers a warning message and a stack trace is printed. The list of operations can be extended if the need arises. For now it's limited to the requirements of the first user (timers). The core code enqueues the objects into hash buckets. The hash index is generated from the address of the object to simplify the lookup for the check on kfree/vfree. Each bucket has it's own spinlock to avoid contention on a global lock. The debug code can be compiled in without being active. The runtime overhead is minimal and could be optimized by asm alternatives. A kernel command line option enables the debugging code. Thanks to Ingo Molnar for review, suggestions and cleanup patches. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 07:55:01 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS) += debugobjects.o
ifneq ($(CONFIG_HAVE_DEC_LOCK),y)
lib-y += dec_and_lock.o
endif
obj-$(CONFIG_BITREVERSE) += bitrev.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RATIONAL) += rational.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC_CCITT) += crc-ccitt.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC16) += crc16.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF)+= crc-t10dif.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T) += crc-itu-t.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC32) += crc32.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC32_SELFTEST) += crc32test.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC7) += crc7.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LIBCRC32C) += libcrc32c.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC8) += crc8.o
[PATCH] ia64 uncached alloc This patch contains the ia64 uncached page allocator and the generic allocator (genalloc). The uncached allocator was formerly part of the SN2 mspec driver but there are several other users of it so it has been split off from the driver. The generic allocator can be used by device driver to manage special memory etc. The generic allocator is based on the allocator from the sym53c8xx_2 driver. Various users on ia64 needs uncached memory. The SGI SN architecture requires it for inter-partition communication between partitions within a large NUMA cluster. The specific user for this is the XPC code. Another application is large MPI style applications which use it for synchronization, on SN this can be done using special 'fetchop' operations but it also benefits non SN hardware which may use regular uncached memory for this purpose. Performance of doing this through uncached vs cached memory is pretty substantial. This is handled by the mspec driver which I will push out in a seperate patch. Rather than creating a specific allocator for just uncached memory I came up with genalloc which is a generic purpose allocator that can be used by device drivers and other subsystems as they please. For instance to handle onboard device memory. It was derived from the sym53c7xx_2 driver's allocator which is also an example of a potential user (I am refraining from modifying sym2 right now as it seems to have been under fairly heavy development recently). On ia64 memory has various properties within a granule, ie. it isn't safe to access memory as uncached within the same granule as currently has memory accessed in cached mode. The regular system therefore doesn't utilize memory in the lower granules which is mixed in with device PAL code etc. The uncached driver walks the EFI memmap and pulls out the spill uncached pages and sticks them into the uncached pool. Only after these chunks have been utilized, will it start converting regular cached memory into uncached memory. Hence the reason for the EFI related code additions. Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <jes@wildopensource.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-22 00:15:02 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_ALLOCATOR) += genalloc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_842_COMPRESS) += 842/
obj-$(CONFIG_842_DECOMPRESS) += 842/
obj-$(CONFIG_ZLIB_INFLATE) += zlib_inflate/
obj-$(CONFIG_ZLIB_DEFLATE) += zlib_deflate/
obj-$(CONFIG_REED_SOLOMON) += reed_solomon/
lib: add shared BCH ECC library This is a new software BCH encoding/decoding library, similar to the shared Reed-Solomon library. Binary BCH (Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem) codes are widely used to correct errors in NAND flash devices requiring more than 1-bit ecc correction; they are generally better suited for NAND flash than RS codes because NAND bit errors do not occur in bursts. Latest SLC NAND devices typically require at least 4-bit ecc protection per 512 bytes block. This library provides software encoding/decoding, but may also be used with ASIC/SoC hardware BCH engines to perform error correction. It is being currently used for this purpose on an OMAP3630 board (4bit/8bit HW BCH). It has also been used to decode raw dumps of NAND devices with on-die BCH ecc engines (e.g. Micron 4bit ecc SLC devices). Latest NAND devices (including SLC) can exhibit high error rates (typically a dozen or more bitflips per hour during stress tests); in order to minimize the performance impact of error correction, this library implements recently developed algorithms for fast polynomial root finding (see bch.c header for details) instead of the traditional exhaustive Chien root search; a few performance figures are provided below: Platform: arm926ejs @ 468 MHz, 32 KiB icache, 16 KiB dcache BCH ecc : 4-bit per 512 bytes Encoding average throughput: 250 Mbits/s Error correction time (compared with Chien search): average worst average (Chien) worst (Chien) ---------------------------------------------------------- 1 bit 8.5 µs 11 µs 200 µs 383 µs 2 bit 9.7 µs 12.5 µs 477 µs 728 µs 3 bit 18.1 µs 20.6 µs 758 µs 1010 µs 4 bit 19.5 µs 23 µs 1028 µs 1280 µs In the above figures, "worst" is meant in terms of error pattern, not in terms of cache miss / page faults effects (not taken into account here). The library has been extensively tested on the following platforms: x86, x86_64, arm926ejs, omap3630, qemu-ppc64, qemu-mips. Signed-off-by: Ivan Djelic <ivan.djelic@parrot.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
2011-03-11 10:05:32 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_BCH) += bch.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LZO_COMPRESS) += lzo/
obj-$(CONFIG_LZO_DECOMPRESS) += lzo/
lib: add lz4 compressor module This patchset is for supporting LZ4 compression and the crypto API using it. As shown below, the size of data is a little bit bigger but compressing speed is faster under the enabled unaligned memory access. We can use lz4 de/compression through crypto API as well. Also, It will be useful for another potential user of lz4 compression. lz4 Compression Benchmark: Compiler: ARM gcc 4.6.4 ARMv7, 1 GHz based board Kernel: linux 3.4 Uncompressed data Size: 101 MB Compressed Size compression Speed LZO 72.1MB 32.1MB/s, 33.0MB/s(UA) LZ4 75.1MB 30.4MB/s, 35.9MB/s(UA) LZ4HC 59.8MB 2.4MB/s, 2.5MB/s(UA) - UA: Unaligned memory Access support - Latest patch set for LZO applied This patch: Add support for LZ4 compression in the Linux Kernel. LZ4 Compression APIs for kernel are based on LZ4 implementation by Yann Collet and were changed for kernel coding style. LZ4 homepage : http://fastcompression.blogspot.com/p/lz4.html LZ4 source repository : http://code.google.com/p/lz4/ svn revision : r90 Two APIs are added: lz4_compress() support basic lz4 compression whereas lz4hc_compress() support high compression or CPU performance get lower but compression ratio get higher. Also, we require the pre-allocated working memory with the defined size and destination buffer must be allocated with the size of lz4_compressbound. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make lz4_compresshcctx() static] Signed-off-by: Chanho Min <chanho.min@lge.com> Cc: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@us.ibm.com> Cc: Bob Pearson <rpearson@systemfabricworks.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.hengli.com.au> Cc: Yann Collet <yann.collet.73@gmail.com> Cc: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-07-08 23:01:49 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_LZ4_COMPRESS) += lz4/
obj-$(CONFIG_LZ4HC_COMPRESS) += lz4/
obj-$(CONFIG_LZ4_DECOMPRESS) += lz4/
obj-$(CONFIG_XZ_DEC) += xz/
obj-$(CONFIG_RAID6_PQ) += raid6/
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_GZIP) += decompress_inflate.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_BZIP2) += decompress_bunzip2.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_LZMA) += decompress_unlzma.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_XZ) += decompress_unxz.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_LZO) += decompress_unlzo.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_LZ4) += decompress_unlz4.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEXTSEARCH) += textsearch.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEXTSEARCH_KMP) += ts_kmp.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEXTSEARCH_BM) += ts_bm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEXTSEARCH_FSM) += ts_fsm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SMP) += percpu_counter.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT_GENERIC) += audit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT_COMPAT_GENERIC) += compat_audit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SWIOTLB) += swiotlb.o
obj-$(CONFIG_IOMMU_HELPER) += iommu-helper.o iommu-common.o
obj-$(CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION) += fault-inject.o
fault-injection: notifier error injection This patchset provides kernel modules that can be used to test the error handling of notifier call chain failures by injecting artifical errors to the following notifier chain callbacks. * CPU notifier * PM notifier * memory hotplug notifier * powerpc pSeries reconfig notifier Example: Inject CPU offline error (-1 == -EPERM) # cd /sys/kernel/debug/notifier-error-inject/cpu # echo -1 > actions/CPU_DOWN_PREPARE/error # echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online bash: echo: write error: Operation not permitted The patchset also adds cpu and memory hotplug tests to tools/testing/selftests These tests first do simple online and offline test and then do fault injection tests if notifier error injection module is available. This patch: The notifier error injection provides the ability to inject artifical errors to specified notifier chain callbacks. It is useful to test the error handling of notifier call chain failures. This adds common basic functions to define which type of events can be fail and to initialize the debugfs interface to control what error code should be returned and which event should be failed. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-07-30 21:43:02 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECTION) += notifier-error-inject.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PM_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECT) += pm-notifier-error-inject.o
obj-$(CONFIG_NETDEV_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECT) += netdev-notifier-error-inject.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MEMORY_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECT) += memory-notifier-error-inject.o
obj-$(CONFIG_OF_RECONFIG_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECT) += \
of-reconfig-notifier-error-inject.o
[PATCH] Generic BUG implementation This patch adds common handling for kernel BUGs, for use by architectures as they wish. The code is derived from arch/powerpc. The advantages of having common BUG handling are: - consistent BUG reporting across architectures - shared implementation of out-of-line file/line data - implement CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE consistently This means that in inline impact of BUG is just the illegal instruction itself, which is an improvement for i386 and x86-64. A BUG is represented in the instruction stream as an illegal instruction, which has file/line information associated with it. This extra information is stored in the __bug_table section in the ELF file. When the kernel gets an illegal instruction, it first confirms it might possibly be from a BUG (ie, in kernel mode, the right illegal instruction). It then calls report_bug(). This searches __bug_table for a matching instruction pointer, and if found, prints the corresponding file/line information. If report_bug() determines that it wasn't a BUG which caused the trap, it returns BUG_TRAP_TYPE_NONE. Some architectures (powerpc) implement WARN using the same mechanism; if the illegal instruction was the result of a WARN, then report_bug(Q) returns CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE; otherwise it returns BUG_TRAP_TYPE_BUG. lib/bug.c keeps a list of loaded modules which can be searched for __bug_table entries. The architecture must call module_bug_finalize()/module_bug_cleanup() from its corresponding module_finalize/cleanup functions. Unsetting CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE will reduce the kernel size by some amount. At the very least, filename and line information will not be recorded for each but, but architectures may decide to store no extra information per BUG at all. Unfortunately, gcc doesn't have a general way to mark an asm() as noreturn, so architectures will generally have to include an infinite loop (or similar) in the BUG code, so that gcc knows execution won't continue beyond that point. gcc does have a __builtin_trap() operator which may be useful to achieve the same effect, unfortunately it cannot be used to actually implement the BUG itself, because there's no way to get the instruction's address for use in generating the __bug_table entry. [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: Handle BUG=n, GENERIC_BUG=n to prevent build errors] [bunk@stusta.de: include/linux/bug.h must always #include <linux/module.h] Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Hugh Dickens <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08 10:36:19 +00:00
lib-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG) += bug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK) += syscall.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG) += dynamic_debug.o
driver core: basic infrastructure for per-module dynamic debug messages Base infrastructure to enable per-module debug messages. I've introduced CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG, which when enabled centralizes control of debugging statements on a per-module basis in one /proc file, currently, <debugfs>/dynamic_printk/modules. When, CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG, is not set, debugging statements can still be enabled as before, often by defining 'DEBUG' for the proper compilation unit. Thus, this patch set has no affect when CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG is not set. The infrastructure currently ties into all pr_debug() and dev_dbg() calls. That is, if CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG is set, all pr_debug() and dev_dbg() calls can be dynamically enabled/disabled on a per-module basis. Future plans include extending this functionality to subsystems, that define their own debug levels and flags. Usage: Dynamic debugging is controlled by the debugfs file, <debugfs>/dynamic_printk/modules. This file contains a list of the modules that can be enabled. The format of the file is as follows: <module_name> <enabled=0/1> . . . <module_name> : Name of the module in which the debug call resides <enabled=0/1> : whether the messages are enabled or not For example: snd_hda_intel enabled=0 fixup enabled=1 driver enabled=0 Enable a module: $echo "set enabled=1 <module_name>" > dynamic_printk/modules Disable a module: $echo "set enabled=0 <module_name>" > dynamic_printk/modules Enable all modules: $echo "set enabled=1 all" > dynamic_printk/modules Disable all modules: $echo "set enabled=0 all" > dynamic_printk/modules Finally, passing "dynamic_printk" at the command line enables debugging for all modules. This mode can be turned off via the above disable command. [gkh: minor cleanups and tweaks to make the build work quietly] Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2008-08-12 20:46:19 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_NLATTR) += nlattr.o
driver core: basic infrastructure for per-module dynamic debug messages Base infrastructure to enable per-module debug messages. I've introduced CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG, which when enabled centralizes control of debugging statements on a per-module basis in one /proc file, currently, <debugfs>/dynamic_printk/modules. When, CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG, is not set, debugging statements can still be enabled as before, often by defining 'DEBUG' for the proper compilation unit. Thus, this patch set has no affect when CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG is not set. The infrastructure currently ties into all pr_debug() and dev_dbg() calls. That is, if CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG is set, all pr_debug() and dev_dbg() calls can be dynamically enabled/disabled on a per-module basis. Future plans include extending this functionality to subsystems, that define their own debug levels and flags. Usage: Dynamic debugging is controlled by the debugfs file, <debugfs>/dynamic_printk/modules. This file contains a list of the modules that can be enabled. The format of the file is as follows: <module_name> <enabled=0/1> . . . <module_name> : Name of the module in which the debug call resides <enabled=0/1> : whether the messages are enabled or not For example: snd_hda_intel enabled=0 fixup enabled=1 driver enabled=0 Enable a module: $echo "set enabled=1 <module_name>" > dynamic_printk/modules Disable a module: $echo "set enabled=0 <module_name>" > dynamic_printk/modules Enable all modules: $echo "set enabled=1 all" > dynamic_printk/modules Disable all modules: $echo "set enabled=0 all" > dynamic_printk/modules Finally, passing "dynamic_printk" at the command line enables debugging for all modules. This mode can be turned off via the above disable command. [gkh: minor cleanups and tweaks to make the build work quietly] Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2008-08-12 20:46:19 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_LRU_CACHE) += lru_cache.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG) += dma-debug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CSUM) += checksum.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_ATOMIC64) += atomic64.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ATOMIC64_SELFTEST) += atomic64_test.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_RMAP) += cpu_rmap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CORDIC) += cordic.o
dql: Dynamic queue limits Implementation of dynamic queue limits (dql). This is a libary which allows a queue limit to be dynamically managed. The goal of dql is to set the queue limit, number of objects to the queue, to be minimized without allowing the queue to be starved. dql would be used with a queue which has these properties: 1) Objects are queued up to some limit which can be expressed as a count of objects. 2) Periodically a completion process executes which retires consumed objects. 3) Starvation occurs when limit has been reached, all queued data has actually been consumed but completion processing has not yet run, so queuing new data is blocked. 4) Minimizing the amount of queued data is desirable. A canonical example of such a queue would be a NIC HW transmit queue. The queue limit is dynamic, it will increase or decrease over time depending on the workload. The queue limit is recalculated each time completion processing is done. Increases occur when the queue is starved and can exponentially increase over successive intervals. Decreases occur when more data is being maintained in the queue than needed to prevent starvation. The number of extra objects, or "slack", is measured over successive intervals, and to avoid hysteresis the limit is only reduced by the miminum slack seen over a configurable time period. dql API provides routines to manage the queue: - dql_init is called to intialize the dql structure - dql_reset is called to reset dynamic values - dql_queued called when objects are being enqueued - dql_avail returns availability in the queue - dql_completed is called when objects have be consumed in the queue Configuration consists of: - max_limit, maximum limit - min_limit, minimum limit - slack_hold_time, time to measure instances of slack before reducing queue limit Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-11-28 16:32:35 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_DQL) += dynamic_queue_limits.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GLOB) += glob.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GLOB_SELFTEST) += globtest.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MPILIB) += mpi/
obj-$(CONFIG_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
lib-$(CONFIG_CLZ_TAB) += clz_tab.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DDR) += jedec_ddr_data.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_STRNCPY_FROM_USER) += strncpy_from_user.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_STRNLEN_USER) += strnlen_user.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_NET_UTILS) += net_utils.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SG_SPLIT) += sg_split.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SG_POOL) += sg_pool.o
obj-$(CONFIG_STMP_DEVICE) += stmp_device.o
obj-$(CONFIG_IRQ_POLL) += irq_poll.o
mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation. Enable stackdepot for SLAB Implement the stack depot and provide CONFIG_STACKDEPOT. Stack depot will allow KASAN store allocation/deallocation stack traces for memory chunks. The stack traces are stored in a hash table and referenced by handles which reside in the kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta structures in the allocated memory chunks. IRQ stack traces are cut below the IRQ entry point to avoid unnecessary duplication. Right now stackdepot support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Once KASAN features in SLAB are on par with those in SLUB we can switch SLUB to stackdepot as well, thus removing the dependency on SLUB stack bookkeeping, which wastes a lot of memory. This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: stack depots" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. Joonsoo has said that he plans to reuse the stackdepot code for the mm/page_owner.c debugging facility. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depot_stack_handle/depot_stack_handle_t] [aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: comment style fixes] Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-25 21:22:08 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_STACKDEPOT) += stackdepot.o
KASAN_SANITIZE_stackdepot.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_stackdepot.o := n
mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation. Enable stackdepot for SLAB Implement the stack depot and provide CONFIG_STACKDEPOT. Stack depot will allow KASAN store allocation/deallocation stack traces for memory chunks. The stack traces are stored in a hash table and referenced by handles which reside in the kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta structures in the allocated memory chunks. IRQ stack traces are cut below the IRQ entry point to avoid unnecessary duplication. Right now stackdepot support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Once KASAN features in SLAB are on par with those in SLUB we can switch SLUB to stackdepot as well, thus removing the dependency on SLUB stack bookkeeping, which wastes a lot of memory. This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: stack depots" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. Joonsoo has said that he plans to reuse the stackdepot code for the mm/page_owner.c debugging facility. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depot_stack_handle/depot_stack_handle_t] [aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: comment style fixes] Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-25 21:22:08 +00:00
libfdt_files = fdt.o fdt_ro.o fdt_wip.o fdt_rw.o fdt_sw.o fdt_strerror.o \
fdt_empty_tree.o
$(foreach file, $(libfdt_files), \
$(eval CFLAGS_$(file) = -I$(src)/../scripts/dtc/libfdt))
lib-$(CONFIG_LIBFDT) += $(libfdt_files)
obj-$(CONFIG_RBTREE_TEST) += rbtree_test.o
rbtree: add prio tree and interval tree tests Patch 1 implements support for interval trees, on top of the augmented rbtree API. It also adds synthetic tests to compare the performance of interval trees vs prio trees. Short answers is that interval trees are slightly faster (~25%) on insert/erase, and much faster (~2.4 - 3x) on search. It is debatable how realistic the synthetic test is, and I have not made such measurements yet, but my impression is that interval trees would still come out faster. Patch 2 uses a preprocessor template to make the interval tree generic, and uses it as a replacement for the vma prio_tree. Patch 3 takes the other prio_tree user, kmemleak, and converts it to use a basic rbtree. We don't actually need the augmented rbtree support here because the intervals are always non-overlapping. Patch 4 removes the now-unused prio tree library. Patch 5 proposes an additional optimization to rb_erase_augmented, now providing it as an inline function so that the augmented callbacks can be inlined in. This provides an additional 5-10% performance improvement for the interval tree insert/erase benchmark. There is a maintainance cost as it exposes augmented rbtree users to some of the rbtree library internals; however I think this cost shouldn't be too high as I expect the augmented rbtree will always have much less users than the base rbtree. I should probably add a quick summary of why I think it makes sense to replace prio trees with augmented rbtree based interval trees now. One of the drivers is that we need augmented rbtrees for Rik's vma gap finding code, and once you have them, it just makes sense to use them for interval trees as well, as this is the simpler and more well known algorithm. prio trees, in comparison, seem *too* clever: they impose an additional 'heap' constraint on the tree, which they use to guarantee a faster worst-case complexity of O(k+log N) for stabbing queries in a well-balanced prio tree, vs O(k*log N) for interval trees (where k=number of matches, N=number of intervals). Now this sounds great, but in practice prio trees don't realize this theorical benefit. First, the additional constraint makes them harder to update, so that the kernel implementation has to simplify things by balancing them like a radix tree, which is not always ideal. Second, the fact that there are both index and heap properties makes both tree manipulation and search more complex, which results in a higher multiplicative time constant. As it turns out, the simple interval tree algorithm ends up running faster than the more clever prio tree. This patch: Add two test modules: - prio_tree_test measures the performance of lib/prio_tree.c, both for insertion/removal and for stabbing searches - interval_tree_test measures the performance of a library of equivalent functionality, built using the augmented rbtree support. In order to support the second test module, lib/interval_tree.c is introduced. It is kept separate from the interval_tree_test main file for two reasons: first we don't want to provide an unfair advantage over prio_tree_test by having everything in a single compilation unit, and second there is the possibility that the interval tree functionality could get some non-test users in kernel over time. Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-10-08 23:31:23 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_INTERVAL_TREE_TEST) += interval_tree_test.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PERCPU_TEST) += percpu_test.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_decoder.o
obj-$(CONFIG_FONT_SUPPORT) += fonts/
obj-$(CONFIG_PRIME_NUMBERS) += prime_numbers.o
hostprogs-y := gen_crc32table
clean-files := crc32table.h
$(obj)/crc32.o: $(obj)/crc32table.h
quiet_cmd_crc32 = GEN $@
cmd_crc32 = $< > $@
$(obj)/crc32table.h: $(obj)/gen_crc32table
$(call cmd,crc32)
#
# Build a fast OID lookip registry from include/linux/oid_registry.h
#
obj-$(CONFIG_OID_REGISTRY) += oid_registry.o
$(obj)/oid_registry.o: $(obj)/oid_registry_data.c
$(obj)/oid_registry_data.c: $(srctree)/include/linux/oid_registry.h \
$(src)/build_OID_registry
$(call cmd,build_OID_registry)
quiet_cmd_build_OID_registry = GEN $@
cmd_build_OID_registry = perl $(srctree)/$(src)/build_OID_registry $< $@
clean-files += oid_registry_data.c
obj-$(CONFIG_UCS2_STRING) += ucs2_string.o
UBSAN: run-time undefined behavior sanity checker UBSAN uses compile-time instrumentation to catch undefined behavior (UB). Compiler inserts code that perform certain kinds of checks before operations that could cause UB. If check fails (i.e. UB detected) __ubsan_handle_* function called to print error message. So the most of the work is done by compiler. This patch just implements ubsan handlers printing errors. GCC has this capability since 4.9.x [1] (see -fsanitize=undefined option and its suboptions). However GCC 5.x has more checkers implemented [2]. Article [3] has a bit more details about UBSAN in the GCC. [1] - https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.0/gcc/Debugging-Options.html [2] - https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Debugging-Options.html [3] - http://developerblog.redhat.com/2014/10/16/gcc-undefined-behavior-sanitizer-ubsan/ Issues which UBSAN has found thus far are: Found bugs: * out-of-bounds access - 97840cb67ff5 ("netfilter: nfnetlink: fix insufficient validation in nfnetlink_bind") undefined shifts: * d48458d4a768 ("jbd2: use a better hash function for the revoke table") * 10632008b9e1 ("clockevents: Prevent shift out of bounds") * 'x << -1' shift in ext4 - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<5444EF21.8020501@samsung.com> * undefined rol32(0) - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449198241-20654-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com> * undefined dirty_ratelimit calculation - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<566594E2.3050306@odin.com> * undefined roundown_pow_of_two(0) - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449156616-11474-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com> * [WONTFIX] undefined shift in __bpf_prog_run - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CACT4Y+ZxoR3UjLgcNdUm4fECLMx2VdtfrENMtRRCdgHB2n0bJA@mail.gmail.com> WONTFIX here because it should be fixed in bpf program, not in kernel. signed overflows: * 32a8df4e0b33f ("sched: Fix odd values in effective_load() calculations") * mul overflow in ntp - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449175608-1146-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com> * incorrect conversion into rtc_time in rtc_time64_to_tm() - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449187944-11730-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com> * unvalidated timespec in io_getevents() - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CACT4Y+bBxVYLQ6LtOKrKtnLthqLHcw-BMp3aqP3mjdAvr9FULQ@mail.gmail.com> * [NOTABUG] signed overflow in ktime_add_safe() - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CACT4Y+aJ4muRnWxsUe1CMnA6P8nooO33kwG-c8YZg=0Xc8rJqw@mail.gmail.com> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix unused local warning] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix __int128 build woes] Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Yury Gribov <y.gribov@samsung.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-20 23:00:55 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_UBSAN) += ubsan.o
UBSAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n
obj-$(CONFIG_SBITMAP) += sbitmap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PARMAN) += parman.o