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Bluetooth: Avoid redundant authentication 

[ Upstream commit 1d8e801422 ]

While executing the Android 13 CTS Verifier Secure Server test on a
ChromeOS device, it was observed that the Bluetooth host initiates
authentication for an RFCOMM connection after SSP completes.
When this happens, some Intel Bluetooth controllers, like AC9560, would
disconnect with "Connection Rejected due to Security Reasons (0x0e)".

Historically, BlueZ did not mandate this authentication while an
authenticated combination key was already in use for the connection.
This behavior was changed since commit 7b5a9241b7
("Bluetooth: Introduce requirements for security level 4").
So, this patch addresses the aforementioned disconnection issue by
restoring the previous behavior.

Signed-off-by: Ying Hsu <yinghsu@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Ying Hsu 2023-09-07 04:39:34 +00:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 38681af225
commit 02b0e69918
1 changed files with 35 additions and 28 deletions
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63
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
View File

@ -1486,34 +1486,41 @@ int hci_conn_security(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level, __u8 auth_type,
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH, &conn->flags))
goto auth;
/* An authenticated FIPS approved combination key has sufficient
* security for security level 4. */
if (conn->key_type == HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256 &&
sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
goto encrypt;
/* An authenticated combination key has sufficient security for
security level 3. */
if ((conn->key_type == HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P192 ||
conn->key_type == HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256) &&
sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
goto encrypt;
/* An unauthenticated combination key has sufficient security for
security level 1 and 2. */
if ((conn->key_type == HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P192 ||
conn->key_type == HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256) &&
(sec_level == BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM || sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW))
goto encrypt;
/* A combination key has always sufficient security for the security
levels 1 or 2. High security level requires the combination key
is generated using maximum PIN code length (16).
For pre 2.1 units. */
if (conn->key_type == HCI_LK_COMBINATION &&
(sec_level == BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM || sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW ||
conn->pin_length == 16))
goto encrypt;
switch (conn->key_type) {
case HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256:
/* An authenticated FIPS approved combination key has
* sufficient security for security level 4 or lower.
*/
if (sec_level <= BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
goto encrypt;
break;
case HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P192:
/* An authenticated combination key has sufficient security for
* security level 3 or lower.
*/
if (sec_level <= BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
goto encrypt;
break;
case HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P192:
case HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256:
/* An unauthenticated combination key has sufficient security
* for security level 2 or lower.
*/
if (sec_level <= BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
goto encrypt;
break;
case HCI_LK_COMBINATION:
/* A combination key has always sufficient security for the
* security levels 2 or lower. High security level requires the
* combination key is generated using maximum PIN code length
* (16). For pre 2.1 units.
*/
if (sec_level <= BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM || conn->pin_length == 16)
goto encrypt;
break;
default:
break;
}
auth:
if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags))