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cxl/mem: Support Secure Erase

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Implement support for the non-pmem exclusive secure erase, per
CXL specs. Create a write-only 'security/erase' sysfs file to
perform the requested operation.

As with the sanitation this requires the device being offline
and thus no active HPA-DPA decoding.

The expectation is that userspace can use it such as:

	cxl disable-memdev memX
	echo 1 > /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase
	cxl enable-memdev memX

Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Fan Ni <fan.ni@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230612181038.14421-7-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
This commit is contained in:
Davidlohr Bueso 2023-06-12 11:10:37 -07:00 committed by Dan Williams
parent c5c39217ff
commit 180ffd338c
4 changed files with 44 additions and 1 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

10
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
View file

@ -85,6 +85,16 @@ Description:
the device to be not be actively decoding any HPA ranges.
What /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase
Date: June, 2023
KernelVersion: v6.5
Contact: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
Description:
(WO) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to
secure erase user data by changing the media encryption keys for
all user data areas of the device.
What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/*/devtype
Date: June, 2021
KernelVersion: v5.14

6
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
View file

@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, u16 cmd)
};
struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd = { .opcode = cmd };
if (cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE)
if (cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE && cmd != CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE)
return -EINVAL;
rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &sec_cmd);
@ -1120,6 +1120,10 @@ int cxl_mem_sanitize(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, u16 cmd)
if (sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET)
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd == CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE &&
sec_out & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_LOCKED)
return -EINVAL;
rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &mbox_cmd);
if (rc < 0) {
dev_err(cxlds->dev, "Failed to sanitize device : %d", rc);

28
drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
View file

@ -163,6 +163,33 @@ static ssize_t security_sanitize_store(struct device *dev,
static struct device_attribute dev_attr_security_sanitize =
__ATTR(sanitize, 0200, NULL, security_sanitize_store);
static ssize_t security_erase_store(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t len)
{
struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = to_cxl_memdev(dev);
struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
struct cxl_port *port = dev_get_drvdata(&cxlmd->dev);
ssize_t rc;
bool erase;
if (kstrtobool(buf, &erase) || !erase)
return -EINVAL;
if (!port || !is_cxl_endpoint(port))
return -EINVAL;
/* ensure no regions are mapped to this memdev */
if (port->commit_end != -1)
return -EBUSY;
rc = cxl_mem_sanitize(cxlds, CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE);
return rc ? rc : len;
}
static struct device_attribute dev_attr_security_erase =
__ATTR(erase, 0200, NULL, security_erase_store);
static int cxl_get_poison_by_memdev(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd)
{
struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
@ -411,6 +438,7 @@ static struct attribute *cxl_memdev_ram_attributes[] = {
static struct attribute *cxl_memdev_security_attributes[] = {
&dev_attr_security_state.attr,
&dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr,
&dev_attr_security_erase.attr,
NULL,
};

1
drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
View file

@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ enum cxl_opcode {
CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4304,
CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4305,
CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE = 0x4400,
CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE = 0x4401,
CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE = 0x4500,
CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PASSPHRASE = 0x4501,
CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE = 0x4502,