mirrors/linux-stable
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git synced 2024-09-16 07:35:14 +00:00
Code Issues Releases Wiki Activity

tpm: add session encryption protection to tpm2_get_random()

Browse source 
If some entity is snooping the TPM bus, they can see the random
numbers we're extracting from the TPM and do prediction attacks
against their consumers.  Foil this attack by using response
encryption to prevent the attacker from seeing the random sequence.

Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
James Bottomley 2024-04-29 16:28:07 -04:00 committed by Jarkko Sakkinen
parent 6519fea6fd
commit 1b6d7f9eb1
1 changed files with 17 additions and 4 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

21
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
View file

@ -292,25 +292,35 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
if (!num_bytes || max > TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA)
return -EINVAL;
err = tpm_buf_init(&buf, 0, 0);
err = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
if (err)
return err;
err = tpm_buf_init(&buf, 0, 0);
if (err) {
tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
return err;
}
do {
tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM);
tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM);
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT
| TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
NULL, 0);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes);
tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf,
offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out,
buffer),
"attempting get random");
err = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, err);
if (err) {
if (err > 0)
err = -EIO;
goto out;
}
out = (struct tpm2_get_random_out *)
&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
out = (struct tpm2_get_random_out *)tpm_buf_parameters(&buf);
recd = min_t(u32, be16_to_cpu(out->size), num_bytes);
if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) <
TPM_HEADER_SIZE +
@ -327,9 +337,12 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
} while (retries-- && total < max);
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
return total ? total : -EIO;
out:
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
return err;
}