io_uring: don't audit the capability check in io_uring_create()

[ Upstream commit 6adc2272aa ]

The check being unconditional may lead to unwanted denials reported by
LSMs when a process has the capability granted by DAC, but denied by an
LSM. In the case of SELinux such denials are a problem, since they can't
be effectively filtered out via the policy and when not silenced, they
produce noise that may hide a true problem or an attack.

Since not having the capability merely means that the created io_uring
context will be accounted against the current user's RLIMIT_MEMLOCK
limit, we can disable auditing of denials for this check by using
ns_capable_noaudit() instead of capable().

Fixes: 2b188cc1bb ("Add io_uring IO interface")
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2193317
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230718115607.65652-1-omosnace@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Ondrej Mosnacek 2023-07-18 13:56:07 +02:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 49a2686add
commit 21d063d27b

View file

@ -10602,7 +10602,7 @@ static int io_uring_create(unsigned entries, struct io_uring_params *p,
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
ctx->compat = in_compat_syscall();
if (!capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
if (!ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_IPC_LOCK))
ctx->user = get_uid(current_user());
/*