docs: trusted-encrypted: add DCP as new trust source

Update the documentation for trusted and encrypted KEYS with DCP as new
trust source:

- Describe security properties of DCP trust source
- Describe key usage
- Document blob format

Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Gstir 2024-04-03 09:21:22 +02:00 committed by Jarkko Sakkinen
parent b85b253e23
commit 28c5f596ae
2 changed files with 72 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -42,6 +42,14 @@ safe.
randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time.
Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead.
(4) DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs)
Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally burnt
in the on-chip fuses and is accessible to the DCP encryption engine only.
DCP provides two keys that can be used as root of trust: the OTP key
and the UNIQUE key. Default is to use the UNIQUE key, but selecting
the OTP key can be done via a module parameter (dcp_use_otp_key).
* Execution isolation
(1) TPM
@ -57,6 +65,12 @@ safe.
Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.
(4) DCP
Fixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution
environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there.
The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel space.
* Optional binding to platform integrity state
(1) TPM
@ -79,6 +93,11 @@ safe.
Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs
for platform integrity.
(4) DCP
Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for
platform integrity.
* Interfaces and APIs
(1) TPM
@ -94,6 +113,11 @@ safe.
Interface is specific to silicon vendor.
(4) DCP
Vendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto driver in
``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``.
* Threat model
The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given
@ -129,6 +153,13 @@ selected trust source:
CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device
is probed.
* DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs)
The DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG interface,
so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do have
a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be enabled
to back the kernel RNG.
Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel
command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool.
@ -231,6 +262,19 @@ Usage::
CAAM-specific format. The key length for new keys is always in bytes.
Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).
Trusted Keys usage: DCP
-----------------------
Usage::
keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
keyctl print keyid
"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format
specific to this DCP key-blob implementation. The key length for new keys is
always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).
Encrypted Keys usage
--------------------
@ -426,3 +470,12 @@ string length.
privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the
initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed
string length.
DCP Blob Format
---------------
.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
:doc: dcp blob format
.. kernel-doc:: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
:identifiers: struct dcp_blob_fmt

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@ -19,6 +19,25 @@
#define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1
#define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16
/**
* DOC: dcp blob format
*
* The Data Co-Processor (DCP) provides hardware-bound AES keys using its
* AES encryption engine only. It does not provide direct key sealing/unsealing.
* To make DCP hardware encryption keys usable as trust source, we define
* our own custom format that uses a hardware-bound key to secure the sealing
* key stored in the key blob.
*
* Whenever a new trusted key using DCP is generated, we generate a random 128-bit
* blob encryption key (BEK) and 128-bit nonce. The BEK and nonce are used to
* encrypt the trusted key payload using AES-128-GCM.
*
* The BEK itself is encrypted using the hardware-bound key using the DCP's AES
* encryption engine with AES-128-ECB. The encrypted BEK, generated nonce,
* BEK-encrypted payload and authentication tag make up the blob format together
* with a version number, payload length and authentication tag.
*/
/**
* struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format.
*