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Merge branch 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull smack updates from James Morris: "Two minor fixes" * 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: Smack: Privilege check on key operations Smack: fix dereferenced before check
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commit
2a71490314
3 changed files with 39 additions and 12 deletions
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@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int);
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void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp);
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struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *);
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bool smack_privileged(int cap);
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bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred);
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void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list);
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/*
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@ -623,26 +623,24 @@ struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
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LIST_HEAD(smack_onlycap_list);
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DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock);
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/*
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/**
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* smack_privileged_cred - are all privilege requirements met by cred
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* @cap: The requested capability
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* @cred: the credential to use
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*
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* Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
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* by the onlycap rule.
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*
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* Returns true if the task is allowed to be privileged, false if it's not.
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*/
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bool smack_privileged(int cap)
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bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred)
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{
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struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
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struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
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struct smack_known *skp = tsp->smk_task;
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struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
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int rc;
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/*
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* All kernel tasks are privileged
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*/
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if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
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return true;
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rc = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, cap,
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SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
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rc = cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
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if (rc)
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return false;
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@ -662,3 +660,23 @@ bool smack_privileged(int cap)
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return false;
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}
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/**
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* smack_privileged - are all privilege requirements met
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* @cap: The requested capability
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*
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* Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
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* by the onlycap rule.
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*
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* Returns true if the task is allowed to be privileged, false if it's not.
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*/
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bool smack_privileged(int cap)
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{
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/*
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* All kernel tasks are privileged
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*/
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if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
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return true;
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return smack_privileged_cred(cap, current_cred());
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}
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@ -2866,12 +2866,16 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
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#endif
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#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
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struct smack_known *rsp;
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struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
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struct socket_smack *ssp;
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#endif
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if (sock->sk == NULL)
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return 0;
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#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
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ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
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#endif
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switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
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case PF_INET:
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if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
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@ -4365,6 +4369,10 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
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*/
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if (tkp == NULL)
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return -EACCES;
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if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, cred))
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return 0;
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#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
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smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
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ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
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