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crypto: hisilicon - Add aead support on SEC2
authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes)), authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)), and authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(aes)) support are added for SEC v2. Signed-off-by: Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This commit is contained in:
Zaibo Xu
Herbert Xu
parent
473a0f9662
commit
2f072d75d1
4 changed files with 620 additions and 24 deletions
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@ -20,12 +20,18 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_HISI_SEC2
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select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
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select CRYPTO_LIB_DES
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select CRYPTO_DEV_HISI_QM
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select CRYPTO_AEAD
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select CRYPTO_AUTHENC
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select CRYPTO_HMAC
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select CRYPTO_SHA1
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select CRYPTO_SHA256
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select CRYPTO_SHA512
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depends on PCI && PCI_MSI
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depends on ARM64 || (COMPILE_TEST && 64BIT)
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help
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Support for HiSilicon SEC Engine of version 2 in crypto subsystem.
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It provides AES, SM4, and 3DES algorithms with ECB
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CBC, and XTS cipher mode.
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CBC, and XTS cipher mode, and AEAD algorithms.
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To compile this as a module, choose M here: the module
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will be called hisi_sec2.
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@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
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struct sec_alg_res {
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u8 *c_ivin;
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dma_addr_t c_ivin_dma;
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u8 *out_mac;
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dma_addr_t out_mac_dma;
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};
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/* Cipher request of SEC private */
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@ -26,14 +28,21 @@ struct sec_cipher_req {
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bool encrypt;
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};
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struct sec_aead_req {
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u8 *out_mac;
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dma_addr_t out_mac_dma;
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struct aead_request *aead_req;
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};
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/* SEC request of Crypto */
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struct sec_req {
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struct sec_sqe sec_sqe;
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struct sec_ctx *ctx;
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struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx;
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/* Cipher supported only at present */
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struct sec_cipher_req c_req;
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struct sec_aead_req aead_req;
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int err_type;
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int req_id;
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@ -60,6 +69,16 @@ struct sec_req_op {
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int (*process)(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req);
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};
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/* SEC auth context */
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struct sec_auth_ctx {
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dma_addr_t a_key_dma;
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u8 *a_key;
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u8 a_key_len;
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u8 mac_len;
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u8 a_alg;
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struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
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};
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/* SEC cipher context which cipher's relatives */
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struct sec_cipher_ctx {
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u8 *c_key;
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@ -85,6 +104,11 @@ struct sec_qp_ctx {
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atomic_t pending_reqs;
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};
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enum sec_alg_type {
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SEC_SKCIPHER,
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SEC_AEAD
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};
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/* SEC Crypto TFM context which defines queue and cipher .etc relatives */
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struct sec_ctx {
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struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx;
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@ -102,7 +126,10 @@ struct sec_ctx {
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/* Currrent cyclic index to select a queue for decipher */
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atomic_t dec_qcyclic;
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enum sec_alg_type alg_type;
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struct sec_cipher_ctx c_ctx;
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struct sec_auth_ctx a_ctx;
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};
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enum sec_endian {
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@ -3,7 +3,11 @@
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#include <crypto/aes.h>
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#include <crypto/algapi.h>
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#include <crypto/authenc.h>
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#include <crypto/des.h>
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#include <crypto/hash.h>
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#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
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#include <crypto/sha.h>
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#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
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#include <crypto/xts.h>
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#include <linux/crypto.h>
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@ -27,6 +31,10 @@
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#define SEC_SRC_SGL_OFFSET 7
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#define SEC_CKEY_OFFSET 9
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#define SEC_CMODE_OFFSET 12
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#define SEC_AKEY_OFFSET 5
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#define SEC_AEAD_ALG_OFFSET 11
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#define SEC_AUTH_OFFSET 6
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#define SEC_FLAG_OFFSET 7
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#define SEC_FLAG_MASK 0x0780
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#define SEC_TYPE_MASK 0x0F
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@ -35,11 +43,16 @@
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#define SEC_TOTAL_IV_SZ (SEC_IV_SIZE * QM_Q_DEPTH)
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#define SEC_SGL_SGE_NR 128
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#define SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx) (&(ctx)->sec->qm.pdev->dev)
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#define SEC_CIPHER_AUTH 0xfe
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#define SEC_AUTH_CIPHER 0x1
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#define SEC_MAX_MAC_LEN 64
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#define SEC_TOTAL_MAC_SZ (SEC_MAX_MAC_LEN * QM_Q_DEPTH)
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#define SEC_SQE_LEN_RATE 4
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#define SEC_SQE_CFLAG 2
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#define SEC_SQE_AEAD_FLAG 3
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#define SEC_SQE_DONE 0x1
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static DEFINE_MUTEX(sec_algs_lock);
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static unsigned int sec_active_devs;
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static atomic_t sec_active_devs;
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/* Get an en/de-cipher queue cyclically to balance load over queues of TFM */
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static inline int sec_alloc_queue_id(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
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@ -97,6 +110,27 @@ static void sec_free_req_id(struct sec_req *req)
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mutex_unlock(&qp_ctx->req_lock);
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}
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static int sec_aead_verify(struct sec_req *req, struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx)
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{
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struct aead_request *aead_req = req->aead_req.aead_req;
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struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(aead_req);
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u8 *mac_out = qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].out_mac;
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size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
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u8 *mac = mac_out + SEC_MAX_MAC_LEN;
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struct scatterlist *sgl = aead_req->src;
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size_t sz;
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sz = sg_pcopy_to_buffer(sgl, sg_nents(sgl), mac, authsize,
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aead_req->cryptlen + aead_req->assoclen -
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authsize);
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if (unlikely(sz != authsize || memcmp(mac_out, mac, sz))) {
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dev_err(SEC_CTX_DEV(req->ctx), "aead verify failure!\n");
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return -EBADMSG;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static void sec_req_cb(struct hisi_qp *qp, void *resp)
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{
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struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx = qp->qp_ctx;
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@ -119,14 +153,18 @@ static void sec_req_cb(struct hisi_qp *qp, void *resp)
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done = le16_to_cpu(bd->type2.done_flag) & SEC_DONE_MASK;
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flag = (le16_to_cpu(bd->type2.done_flag) &
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SEC_FLAG_MASK) >> SEC_FLAG_OFFSET;
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if (req->err_type || done != SEC_SQE_DONE ||
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flag != SEC_SQE_CFLAG) {
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if (unlikely(req->err_type || done != SEC_SQE_DONE ||
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(ctx->alg_type == SEC_SKCIPHER && flag != SEC_SQE_CFLAG) ||
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(ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD && flag != SEC_SQE_AEAD_FLAG))) {
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dev_err(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx),
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"err_type[%d],done[%d],flag[%d]\n",
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req->err_type, done, flag);
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err = -EIO;
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}
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if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD && !req->c_req.encrypt)
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err = sec_aead_verify(req, qp_ctx);
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atomic64_inc(&ctx->sec->debug.dfx.recv_cnt);
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ctx->req_op->buf_unmap(ctx, req);
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@ -182,12 +220,53 @@ static void sec_free_civ_resource(struct device *dev, struct sec_alg_res *res)
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res->c_ivin, res->c_ivin_dma);
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}
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static int sec_alloc_mac_resource(struct device *dev, struct sec_alg_res *res)
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{
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int i;
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res->out_mac = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, SEC_TOTAL_MAC_SZ << 1,
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&res->out_mac_dma, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!res->out_mac)
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return -ENOMEM;
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for (i = 1; i < QM_Q_DEPTH; i++) {
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res[i].out_mac_dma = res->out_mac_dma +
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i * (SEC_MAX_MAC_LEN << 1);
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res[i].out_mac = res->out_mac + i * (SEC_MAX_MAC_LEN << 1);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static void sec_free_mac_resource(struct device *dev, struct sec_alg_res *res)
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{
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if (res->out_mac)
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dma_free_coherent(dev, SEC_TOTAL_MAC_SZ << 1,
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res->out_mac, res->out_mac_dma);
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}
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static int sec_alg_resource_alloc(struct sec_ctx *ctx,
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struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx)
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{
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struct device *dev = SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx);
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struct sec_alg_res *res = qp_ctx->res;
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int ret;
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return sec_alloc_civ_resource(dev, qp_ctx->res);
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ret = sec_alloc_civ_resource(dev, res);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD) {
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ret = sec_alloc_mac_resource(dev, res);
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if (ret)
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goto get_fail;
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}
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return 0;
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get_fail:
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sec_free_civ_resource(dev, res);
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return ret;
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}
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static void sec_alg_resource_free(struct sec_ctx *ctx,
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@ -196,6 +275,9 @@ static void sec_alg_resource_free(struct sec_ctx *ctx,
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struct device *dev = SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx);
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sec_free_civ_resource(dev, qp_ctx->res);
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if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD)
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sec_free_mac_resource(dev, qp_ctx->res);
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}
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static int sec_create_qp_ctx(struct hisi_qm *qm, struct sec_ctx *ctx,
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@ -339,12 +421,34 @@ static void sec_cipher_uninit(struct sec_ctx *ctx)
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c_ctx->c_key, c_ctx->c_key_dma);
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}
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static int sec_auth_init(struct sec_ctx *ctx)
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{
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struct sec_auth_ctx *a_ctx = &ctx->a_ctx;
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a_ctx->a_key = dma_alloc_coherent(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), SEC_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
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&a_ctx->a_key_dma, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!a_ctx->a_key)
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return -ENOMEM;
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return 0;
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}
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static void sec_auth_uninit(struct sec_ctx *ctx)
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{
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struct sec_auth_ctx *a_ctx = &ctx->a_ctx;
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memzero_explicit(a_ctx->a_key, SEC_MAX_KEY_SIZE);
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dma_free_coherent(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), SEC_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
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a_ctx->a_key, a_ctx->a_key_dma);
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}
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static int sec_skcipher_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
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{
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struct sec_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
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int ret;
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ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
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ctx->alg_type = SEC_SKCIPHER;
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crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct sec_req));
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ctx->c_ctx.ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
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if (ctx->c_ctx.ivsize > SEC_IV_SIZE) {
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@ -547,6 +651,126 @@ static void sec_skcipher_sgl_unmap(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
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sec_cipher_unmap(dev, c_req, sk_req->src, sk_req->dst);
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}
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static int sec_aead_aes_set_key(struct sec_cipher_ctx *c_ctx,
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struct crypto_authenc_keys *keys)
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{
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switch (keys->enckeylen) {
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case AES_KEYSIZE_128:
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c_ctx->c_key_len = SEC_CKEY_128BIT;
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break;
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case AES_KEYSIZE_192:
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c_ctx->c_key_len = SEC_CKEY_192BIT;
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break;
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case AES_KEYSIZE_256:
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c_ctx->c_key_len = SEC_CKEY_256BIT;
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break;
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default:
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pr_err("hisi_sec2: aead aes key error!\n");
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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memcpy(c_ctx->c_key, keys->enckey, keys->enckeylen);
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return 0;
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}
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static int sec_aead_auth_set_key(struct sec_auth_ctx *ctx,
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struct crypto_authenc_keys *keys)
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{
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struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm = ctx->hash_tfm;
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SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, hash_tfm);
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int blocksize, ret;
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if (!keys->authkeylen) {
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pr_err("hisi_sec2: aead auth key error!\n");
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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blocksize = crypto_shash_blocksize(hash_tfm);
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if (keys->authkeylen > blocksize) {
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ret = crypto_shash_digest(shash, keys->authkey,
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keys->authkeylen, ctx->a_key);
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if (ret) {
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pr_err("hisi_sec2: aead auth disgest error!\n");
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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ctx->a_key_len = blocksize;
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} else {
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memcpy(ctx->a_key, keys->authkey, keys->authkeylen);
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ctx->a_key_len = keys->authkeylen;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int sec_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
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const u32 keylen, const enum sec_hash_alg a_alg,
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const enum sec_calg c_alg,
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const enum sec_mac_len mac_len,
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const enum sec_cmode c_mode)
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{
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struct sec_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
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struct sec_cipher_ctx *c_ctx = &ctx->c_ctx;
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struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
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int ret;
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ctx->a_ctx.a_alg = a_alg;
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ctx->c_ctx.c_alg = c_alg;
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ctx->a_ctx.mac_len = mac_len;
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c_ctx->c_mode = c_mode;
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if (crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen))
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goto bad_key;
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ret = sec_aead_aes_set_key(c_ctx, &keys);
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if (ret) {
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dev_err(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), "set sec cipher key err!\n");
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goto bad_key;
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}
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ret = sec_aead_auth_set_key(&ctx->a_ctx, &keys);
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if (ret) {
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dev_err(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), "set sec auth key err!\n");
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goto bad_key;
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}
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return 0;
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bad_key:
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memzero_explicit(&keys, sizeof(struct crypto_authenc_keys));
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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#define GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(name, aalg, calg, maclen, cmode) \
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static int sec_setkey_##name(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, \
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u32 keylen) \
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{ \
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return sec_aead_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, aalg, calg, maclen, cmode);\
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}
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GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(aes_cbc_sha1, SEC_A_HMAC_SHA1,
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SEC_CALG_AES, SEC_HMAC_SHA1_MAC, SEC_CMODE_CBC)
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GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(aes_cbc_sha256, SEC_A_HMAC_SHA256,
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SEC_CALG_AES, SEC_HMAC_SHA256_MAC, SEC_CMODE_CBC)
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GEN_SEC_AEAD_SETKEY_FUNC(aes_cbc_sha512, SEC_A_HMAC_SHA512,
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SEC_CALG_AES, SEC_HMAC_SHA512_MAC, SEC_CMODE_CBC)
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static int sec_aead_sgl_map(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
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{
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struct aead_request *aq = req->aead_req.aead_req;
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return sec_cipher_map(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), req, aq->src, aq->dst);
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}
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static void sec_aead_sgl_unmap(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
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{
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struct device *dev = SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx);
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struct sec_cipher_req *cq = &req->c_req;
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struct aead_request *aq = req->aead_req.aead_req;
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sec_cipher_unmap(dev, cq, aq->src, aq->dst);
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}
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static int sec_request_transfer(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
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{
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int ret;
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@ -629,20 +853,31 @@ static int sec_skcipher_bd_fill(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
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return 0;
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}
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static void sec_update_iv(struct sec_req *req)
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static void sec_update_iv(struct sec_req *req, enum sec_alg_type alg_type)
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{
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struct aead_request *aead_req = req->aead_req.aead_req;
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struct skcipher_request *sk_req = req->c_req.sk_req;
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u32 iv_size = req->ctx->c_ctx.ivsize;
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struct scatterlist *sgl;
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unsigned int cryptlen;
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size_t sz;
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||||
u8 *iv;
|
||||
|
||||
if (req->c_req.encrypt)
|
||||
sgl = sk_req->dst;
|
||||
sgl = alg_type == SEC_SKCIPHER ? sk_req->dst : aead_req->dst;
|
||||
else
|
||||
sgl = sk_req->src;
|
||||
sgl = alg_type == SEC_SKCIPHER ? sk_req->src : aead_req->src;
|
||||
|
||||
sz = sg_pcopy_to_buffer(sgl, sg_nents(sgl), sk_req->iv,
|
||||
iv_size, sk_req->cryptlen - iv_size);
|
||||
if (alg_type == SEC_SKCIPHER) {
|
||||
iv = sk_req->iv;
|
||||
cryptlen = sk_req->cryptlen;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
iv = aead_req->iv;
|
||||
cryptlen = aead_req->cryptlen;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
sz = sg_pcopy_to_buffer(sgl, sg_nents(sgl), iv, iv_size,
|
||||
cryptlen - iv_size);
|
||||
if (unlikely(sz != iv_size))
|
||||
dev_err(SEC_CTX_DEV(req->ctx), "copy output iv error!\n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -658,7 +893,7 @@ static void sec_skcipher_callback(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req,
|
|||
|
||||
/* IV output at encrypto of CBC mode */
|
||||
if (!err && ctx->c_ctx.c_mode == SEC_CMODE_CBC && req->c_req.encrypt)
|
||||
sec_update_iv(req);
|
||||
sec_update_iv(req, SEC_SKCIPHER);
|
||||
|
||||
if (req->fake_busy)
|
||||
sk_req->base.complete(&sk_req->base, -EINPROGRESS);
|
||||
|
|
@ -666,6 +901,102 @@ static void sec_skcipher_callback(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req,
|
|||
sk_req->base.complete(&sk_req->base, err);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void sec_aead_copy_iv(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct aead_request *aead_req = req->aead_req.aead_req;
|
||||
u8 *c_ivin = req->qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].c_ivin;
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(c_ivin, aead_req->iv, ctx->c_ctx.ivsize);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void sec_auth_bd_fill_ex(struct sec_auth_ctx *ctx, int dir,
|
||||
struct sec_req *req, struct sec_sqe *sec_sqe)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct sec_aead_req *a_req = &req->aead_req;
|
||||
struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req;
|
||||
struct aead_request *aq = a_req->aead_req;
|
||||
|
||||
sec_sqe->type2.a_key_addr = cpu_to_le64(ctx->a_key_dma);
|
||||
|
||||
sec_sqe->type2.mac_key_alg =
|
||||
cpu_to_le32(ctx->mac_len / SEC_SQE_LEN_RATE);
|
||||
|
||||
sec_sqe->type2.mac_key_alg |=
|
||||
cpu_to_le32((u32)((ctx->a_key_len) /
|
||||
SEC_SQE_LEN_RATE) << SEC_AKEY_OFFSET);
|
||||
|
||||
sec_sqe->type2.mac_key_alg |=
|
||||
cpu_to_le32((u32)(ctx->a_alg) << SEC_AEAD_ALG_OFFSET);
|
||||
|
||||
sec_sqe->type_cipher_auth |= SEC_AUTH_TYPE1 << SEC_AUTH_OFFSET;
|
||||
|
||||
if (dir)
|
||||
sec_sqe->sds_sa_type &= SEC_CIPHER_AUTH;
|
||||
else
|
||||
sec_sqe->sds_sa_type |= SEC_AUTH_CIPHER;
|
||||
|
||||
sec_sqe->type2.alen_ivllen = cpu_to_le32(c_req->c_len + aq->assoclen);
|
||||
|
||||
sec_sqe->type2.cipher_src_offset = cpu_to_le16((u16)aq->assoclen);
|
||||
|
||||
sec_sqe->type2.mac_addr =
|
||||
cpu_to_le64(req->qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].out_mac_dma);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int sec_aead_bd_fill(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct sec_auth_ctx *auth_ctx = &ctx->a_ctx;
|
||||
struct sec_sqe *sec_sqe = &req->sec_sqe;
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = sec_skcipher_bd_fill(ctx, req);
|
||||
if (unlikely(ret)) {
|
||||
dev_err(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), "skcipher bd fill is error!\n");
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
sec_auth_bd_fill_ex(auth_ctx, req->c_req.encrypt, req, sec_sqe);
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void sec_aead_callback(struct sec_ctx *c, struct sec_req *req, int err)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct aead_request *a_req = req->aead_req.aead_req;
|
||||
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(a_req);
|
||||
struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req;
|
||||
size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
|
||||
struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx = req->qp_ctx;
|
||||
size_t sz;
|
||||
|
||||
atomic_dec(&qp_ctx->pending_reqs);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!err && c->c_ctx.c_mode == SEC_CMODE_CBC && c_req->encrypt)
|
||||
sec_update_iv(req, SEC_AEAD);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Copy output mac */
|
||||
if (!err && c_req->encrypt) {
|
||||
struct scatterlist *sgl = a_req->dst;
|
||||
|
||||
sz = sg_pcopy_from_buffer(sgl, sg_nents(sgl),
|
||||
qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].out_mac,
|
||||
authsize, a_req->cryptlen +
|
||||
a_req->assoclen);
|
||||
|
||||
if (unlikely(sz != authsize)) {
|
||||
dev_err(SEC_CTX_DEV(req->ctx), "copy out mac err!\n");
|
||||
err = -EINVAL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
sec_free_req_id(req);
|
||||
|
||||
if (req->fake_busy)
|
||||
a_req->base.complete(&a_req->base, -EINPROGRESS);
|
||||
|
||||
a_req->base.complete(&a_req->base, err);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void sec_request_uninit(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx = req->qp_ctx;
|
||||
|
|
@ -712,7 +1043,7 @@ static int sec_process(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
|
|||
|
||||
/* Output IV as decrypto */
|
||||
if (ctx->c_ctx.c_mode == SEC_CMODE_CBC && !req->c_req.encrypt)
|
||||
sec_update_iv(req);
|
||||
sec_update_iv(req, ctx->alg_type);
|
||||
|
||||
ret = ctx->req_op->bd_send(ctx, req);
|
||||
if (unlikely(ret != -EBUSY && ret != -EINPROGRESS)) {
|
||||
|
|
@ -724,10 +1055,16 @@ static int sec_process(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
|
|||
|
||||
err_send_req:
|
||||
/* As failing, restore the IV from user */
|
||||
if (ctx->c_ctx.c_mode == SEC_CMODE_CBC && !req->c_req.encrypt)
|
||||
memcpy(req->c_req.sk_req->iv,
|
||||
req->qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].c_ivin,
|
||||
ctx->c_ctx.ivsize);
|
||||
if (ctx->c_ctx.c_mode == SEC_CMODE_CBC && !req->c_req.encrypt) {
|
||||
if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_SKCIPHER)
|
||||
memcpy(req->c_req.sk_req->iv,
|
||||
req->qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].c_ivin,
|
||||
ctx->c_ctx.ivsize);
|
||||
else
|
||||
memcpy(req->aead_req.aead_req->iv,
|
||||
req->qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].c_ivin,
|
||||
ctx->c_ctx.ivsize);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
sec_request_untransfer(ctx, req);
|
||||
err_uninit_req:
|
||||
|
|
@ -746,6 +1083,16 @@ static const struct sec_req_op sec_skcipher_req_ops = {
|
|||
.process = sec_process,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static const struct sec_req_op sec_aead_req_ops = {
|
||||
.buf_map = sec_aead_sgl_map,
|
||||
.buf_unmap = sec_aead_sgl_unmap,
|
||||
.do_transfer = sec_aead_copy_iv,
|
||||
.bd_fill = sec_aead_bd_fill,
|
||||
.bd_send = sec_bd_send,
|
||||
.callback = sec_aead_callback,
|
||||
.process = sec_process,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static int sec_skcipher_ctx_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct sec_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
|
||||
|
|
@ -760,6 +1107,96 @@ static void sec_skcipher_ctx_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
|
|||
sec_skcipher_uninit(tfm);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int sec_aead_init(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct sec_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct sec_req));
|
||||
ctx->alg_type = SEC_AEAD;
|
||||
ctx->c_ctx.ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
|
||||
if (ctx->c_ctx.ivsize > SEC_IV_SIZE) {
|
||||
dev_err(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), "get error aead iv size!\n");
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctx->req_op = &sec_aead_req_ops;
|
||||
ret = sec_ctx_base_init(ctx);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = sec_auth_init(ctx);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
goto err_auth_init;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = sec_cipher_init(ctx);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
goto err_cipher_init;
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
|
||||
err_cipher_init:
|
||||
sec_auth_uninit(ctx);
|
||||
err_auth_init:
|
||||
sec_ctx_base_uninit(ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void sec_aead_exit(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct sec_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
||||
|
||||
sec_cipher_uninit(ctx);
|
||||
sec_auth_uninit(ctx);
|
||||
sec_ctx_base_uninit(ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int sec_aead_ctx_init(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const char *hash_name)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct sec_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
||||
struct sec_auth_ctx *auth_ctx = &ctx->a_ctx;
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = sec_aead_init(tfm);
|
||||
if (ret) {
|
||||
pr_err("hisi_sec2: aead init error!\n");
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
auth_ctx->hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_name, 0, 0);
|
||||
if (IS_ERR(auth_ctx->hash_tfm)) {
|
||||
dev_err(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), "aead alloc shash error!\n");
|
||||
sec_aead_exit(tfm);
|
||||
return PTR_ERR(auth_ctx->hash_tfm);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void sec_aead_ctx_exit(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct sec_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
||||
|
||||
crypto_free_shash(ctx->a_ctx.hash_tfm);
|
||||
sec_aead_exit(tfm);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int sec_aead_sha1_ctx_init(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return sec_aead_ctx_init(tfm, "sha1");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int sec_aead_sha256_ctx_init(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return sec_aead_ctx_init(tfm, "sha256");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int sec_aead_sha512_ctx_init(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return sec_aead_ctx_init(tfm, "sha512");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int sec_skcipher_param_check(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *sreq)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct skcipher_request *sk_req = sreq->c_req.sk_req;
|
||||
|
|
@ -877,25 +1314,133 @@ static struct skcipher_alg sec_skciphers[] = {
|
|||
AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static int sec_aead_param_check(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *sreq)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u8 c_alg = ctx->c_ctx.c_alg;
|
||||
struct aead_request *req = sreq->aead_req.aead_req;
|
||||
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
||||
size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
|
||||
|
||||
if (unlikely(!req->src || !req->dst || !req->cryptlen)) {
|
||||
dev_err(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), "aead input param error!\n");
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Support AES only */
|
||||
if (unlikely(c_alg != SEC_CALG_AES)) {
|
||||
dev_err(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), "aead crypto alg error!\n");
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (sreq->c_req.encrypt)
|
||||
sreq->c_req.c_len = req->cryptlen;
|
||||
else
|
||||
sreq->c_req.c_len = req->cryptlen - authsize;
|
||||
|
||||
if (unlikely(sreq->c_req.c_len & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1))) {
|
||||
dev_err(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), "aead crypto length error!\n");
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int sec_aead_crypto(struct aead_request *a_req, bool encrypt)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(a_req);
|
||||
struct sec_req *req = aead_request_ctx(a_req);
|
||||
struct sec_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
req->aead_req.aead_req = a_req;
|
||||
req->c_req.encrypt = encrypt;
|
||||
req->ctx = ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = sec_aead_param_check(ctx, req);
|
||||
if (unlikely(ret))
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
|
||||
return ctx->req_op->process(ctx, req);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int sec_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *a_req)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return sec_aead_crypto(a_req, true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int sec_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *a_req)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return sec_aead_crypto(a_req, false);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define SEC_AEAD_GEN_ALG(sec_cra_name, sec_set_key, ctx_init,\
|
||||
ctx_exit, blk_size, iv_size, max_authsize)\
|
||||
{\
|
||||
.base = {\
|
||||
.cra_name = sec_cra_name,\
|
||||
.cra_driver_name = "hisi_sec_"sec_cra_name,\
|
||||
.cra_priority = SEC_PRIORITY,\
|
||||
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,\
|
||||
.cra_blocksize = blk_size,\
|
||||
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sec_ctx),\
|
||||
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,\
|
||||
},\
|
||||
.init = ctx_init,\
|
||||
.exit = ctx_exit,\
|
||||
.setkey = sec_set_key,\
|
||||
.decrypt = sec_aead_decrypt,\
|
||||
.encrypt = sec_aead_encrypt,\
|
||||
.ivsize = iv_size,\
|
||||
.maxauthsize = max_authsize,\
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define SEC_AEAD_ALG(algname, keyfunc, aead_init, blksize, ivsize, authsize)\
|
||||
SEC_AEAD_GEN_ALG(algname, keyfunc, aead_init,\
|
||||
sec_aead_ctx_exit, blksize, ivsize, authsize)
|
||||
|
||||
static struct aead_alg sec_aeads[] = {
|
||||
SEC_AEAD_ALG("authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))",
|
||||
sec_setkey_aes_cbc_sha1, sec_aead_sha1_ctx_init,
|
||||
AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE),
|
||||
|
||||
SEC_AEAD_ALG("authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
|
||||
sec_setkey_aes_cbc_sha256, sec_aead_sha256_ctx_init,
|
||||
AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE),
|
||||
|
||||
SEC_AEAD_ALG("authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(aes))",
|
||||
sec_setkey_aes_cbc_sha512, sec_aead_sha512_ctx_init,
|
||||
AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
int sec_register_to_crypto(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* To avoid repeat register */
|
||||
mutex_lock(&sec_algs_lock);
|
||||
if (++sec_active_devs == 1)
|
||||
if (atomic_add_return(1, &sec_active_devs) == 1) {
|
||||
ret = crypto_register_skciphers(sec_skciphers,
|
||||
ARRAY_SIZE(sec_skciphers));
|
||||
mutex_unlock(&sec_algs_lock);
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = crypto_register_aeads(sec_aeads, ARRAY_SIZE(sec_aeads));
|
||||
if (ret)
|
||||
goto reg_aead_fail;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
|
||||
reg_aead_fail:
|
||||
crypto_unregister_skciphers(sec_skciphers, ARRAY_SIZE(sec_skciphers));
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void sec_unregister_from_crypto(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
mutex_lock(&sec_algs_lock);
|
||||
if (--sec_active_devs == 0)
|
||||
if (atomic_sub_return(1, &sec_active_devs) == 0) {
|
||||
crypto_unregister_skciphers(sec_skciphers,
|
||||
ARRAY_SIZE(sec_skciphers));
|
||||
mutex_unlock(&sec_algs_lock);
|
||||
crypto_unregister_aeads(sec_aeads, ARRAY_SIZE(sec_aeads));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -14,6 +14,18 @@ enum sec_calg {
|
|||
SEC_CALG_SM4 = 0x3,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
enum sec_hash_alg {
|
||||
SEC_A_HMAC_SHA1 = 0x10,
|
||||
SEC_A_HMAC_SHA256 = 0x11,
|
||||
SEC_A_HMAC_SHA512 = 0x15,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
enum sec_mac_len {
|
||||
SEC_HMAC_SHA1_MAC = 20,
|
||||
SEC_HMAC_SHA256_MAC = 32,
|
||||
SEC_HMAC_SHA512_MAC = 64,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
enum sec_cmode {
|
||||
SEC_CMODE_ECB = 0x0,
|
||||
SEC_CMODE_CBC = 0x1,
|
||||
|
|
@ -34,6 +46,12 @@ enum sec_bd_type {
|
|||
SEC_BD_TYPE2 = 0x2,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
enum sec_auth {
|
||||
SEC_NO_AUTH = 0x0,
|
||||
SEC_AUTH_TYPE1 = 0x1,
|
||||
SEC_AUTH_TYPE2 = 0x2,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
enum sec_cipher_dir {
|
||||
SEC_CIPHER_ENC = 0x1,
|
||||
SEC_CIPHER_DEC = 0x2,
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue