diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 94fa46d2d805..23863c75e808 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2214,6 +2214,28 @@
 			Format: <first>,<last>
 			Specifies range of consoles to be captured by the MDA.
 
+	mds=		[X86,INTEL]
+			Control mitigation for the Micro-architectural Data
+			Sampling (MDS) vulnerability.
+
+			Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against CPU
+			internal buffers which can forward information to a
+			disclosure gadget under certain conditions.
+
+			In vulnerable processors, the speculatively
+			forwarded data can be used in a cache side channel
+			attack, to access data to which the attacker does
+			not have direct access.
+
+			This parameter controls the MDS mitigation. The
+			options are:
+
+			full    - Enable MDS mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+			off     - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			mds=full.
+
 	mem=nn[KMG]	[KNL,BOOT] Force usage of a specific amount of memory
 			Amount of memory to be used when the kernel is not able
 			to see the whole system memory or for test.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index b12c8d70dd33..85ab25ac4d1d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -988,4 +988,9 @@ enum l1tf_mitigations {
 
 extern enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation;
 
+enum mds_mitigations {
+	MDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	MDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
+};
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index c10e3fe8f5fc..a357a7cb8d00 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
 
 /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -105,6 +106,8 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 
 	l1tf_select_mitigation();
 
+	mds_select_mitigation();
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 	/*
 	 * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
@@ -210,6 +213,50 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
 }
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"MDS: " fmt
+
+/* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
+static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
+static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
+	[MDS_MITIGATION_OFF]	= "Vulnerable",
+	[MDS_MITIGATION_FULL]	= "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers"
+};
+
+static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+			static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+		else
+			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	}
+	pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
 
@@ -602,6 +649,26 @@ static void update_indir_branch_cond(void)
 		static_branch_disable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
 }
 
+/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
+static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are
+	 * affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
+	 *
+	 * The other variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so
+	 * clearing the buffers on idle just to prevent the Store Buffer
+	 * repartitioning leak would be a window dressing exercise.
+	 */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
+		return;
+
+	if (sched_smt_active())
+		static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+	else
+		static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
+}
+
 void arch_smt_update(void)
 {
 	/* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */
@@ -622,6 +689,9 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
 		break;
 	}
 
+	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL)
+		update_mds_branch_idle();
+
 	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 }