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bpf: Fix reg_set_min_max corruption of fake_reg
[ Upstream commit9242480126
] Juan reported that after doing some changes to buzzer [0] and implementing a new fuzzing strategy guided by coverage, they noticed the following in one of the probes: [...] 13: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) ; R0=map_value(ks=4,vs=8) R6_w=scalar() 14: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 15: (b4) w0 = -1 ; R0_w=0xffffffff 16: (74) w0 >>= 1 ; R0_w=0x7fffffff 17: (5c) w6 &= w0 ; R0_w=0x7fffffff R6_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff)) 18: (44) w6 |= 2 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) 19: (56) if w6 != 0x7ffffffd goto pc+1 REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (true_reg2): range bounds violation u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg1): range bounds violation u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg2): const tnum out of sync with range bounds u64=[0x0, 0xffffffffffffffff] s64=[0x8000000000000000, 0x7fffffffffffffff] u32=[0x0, 0xffffffff] s32=[0x80000000, 0x7fffffff] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) 19: R6_w=0x7fffffff 20: (95) exit from 19 to 21: R0=0x7fffffff R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 21: R0=0x7fffffff R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 21: (14) w6 -= 2147483632 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=14,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffd)) 22: (76) if w6 s>= 0xe goto pc+1 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=13,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffd)) 23: (95) exit from 22 to 24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 24: (14) w6 -= 14 ; R6_w=0 [...] What can be seen here is a register invariant violation on line 19. After the binary-or in line 18, the verifier knows that bit 2 is set but knows nothing about the rest of the content which was loaded from a map value, meaning, range is [2,0x7fffffff] with var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd). When in line 19 the verifier analyzes the branch, it splits the register states in reg_set_min_max() into the registers of the true branch (true_reg1, true_reg2) and the registers of the false branch (false_reg1, false_reg2). Since the test is w6 != 0x7ffffffd, the src_reg is a known constant. Internally, the verifier creates a "fake" register initialized as scalar to the value of 0x7ffffffd, and then passes it onto reg_set_min_max(). Now, for line 19, it is mathematically impossible to take the false branch of this program, yet the verifier analyzes it. It is impossible because the second bit of r6 will be set due to the prior or operation and the constant in the condition has that bit unset (hex(fd) == binary(1111 1101). When the verifier first analyzes the false / fall-through branch, it will compute an intersection between the var_off of r6 and of the constant. This is because the verifier creates a "fake" register initialized to the value of the constant. The intersection result later refines both registers in regs_refine_cond_op(): [...] t = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_subreg(reg2->var_off)); reg1->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg1->var_off, t); reg2->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg2->var_off, t); [...] Since the verifier is analyzing the false branch of the conditional jump, reg1 is equal to false_reg1 and reg2 is equal to false_reg2, i.e. the reg2 is the "fake" register that was meant to hold a constant value. The resulting var_off of the intersection says that both registers now hold a known value of var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) or in other words: this operation manages to make the verifier think that the "constant" value that was passed in the jump operation now holds a different value. Normally this would not be an issue since it should not influence the true branch, however, false_reg2 and true_reg2 are pointers to the same "fake" register. Meaning, the false branch can influence the results of the true branch. In line 24, the verifier assumes R6_w=0, but the actual runtime value in this case is 1. The fix is simply not passing in the same "fake" register location as inputs to reg_set_min_max(), but instead making a copy. Moving the fake_reg into the env also reduces stack consumption by 120 bytes. With this, the verifier successfully rejects invalid accesses from the test program. [0] https://github.com/google/buzzer Fixes:67420501e8
("bpf: generalize reg_set_min_max() to handle non-const register comparisons") Reported-by: Juan José López Jaimez <jjlopezjaimez@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613115310.25383-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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2 changed files with 12 additions and 4 deletions
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@ -737,6 +737,8 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {
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/* Same as scratched_regs but for stack slots */
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u64 scratched_stack_slots;
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u64 prev_log_pos, prev_insn_print_pos;
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/* buffer used to temporary hold constants as scalar registers */
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struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg[2];
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/* buffer used to generate temporary string representations,
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* e.g., in reg_type_str() to generate reg_type string
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*/
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@ -14973,7 +14973,6 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
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struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs;
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struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL;
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struct bpf_reg_state *eq_branch_regs;
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struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg = {};
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u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
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bool is_jmp32;
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int pred = -1;
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@ -15039,7 +15038,8 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
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verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n");
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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src_reg = &fake_reg;
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src_reg = &env->fake_reg[0];
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memset(src_reg, 0, sizeof(*src_reg));
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src_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
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__mark_reg_known(src_reg, insn->imm);
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}
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@ -15099,10 +15099,16 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
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&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg],
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dst_reg, src_reg, opcode, is_jmp32);
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} else /* BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K */ {
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/* reg_set_min_max() can mangle the fake_reg. Make a copy
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* so that these are two different memory locations. The
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* src_reg is not used beyond here in context of K.
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*/
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memcpy(&env->fake_reg[1], &env->fake_reg[0],
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sizeof(env->fake_reg[0]));
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err = reg_set_min_max(env,
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&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
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src_reg /* fake one */,
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dst_reg, src_reg /* same fake one */,
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&env->fake_reg[0],
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dst_reg, &env->fake_reg[1],
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opcode, is_jmp32);
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}
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if (err)
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