bpf: handle fake register spill to stack with BPF_ST_MEM instruction
When verifier validates BPF_ST_MEM instruction that stores known
constant to stack (e.g., *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 123), it effectively spills
a fake register with a constant (but initially imprecise) value to
a stack slot. Because read-side logic treats it as a proper register
fill from stack slot, we need to mark such stack slot initialization as
INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS instruction to stop precision backtracking from
missing it.
Fixes: 41f6f64e69
("bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231209010958.66758-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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@ -4498,7 +4498,6 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
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__mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, insn->imm);
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fake_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE;
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save_register_state(env, state, spi, &fake_reg, size);
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insn_flags = 0; /* not a register spill */
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} else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) {
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/* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */
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if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
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