uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user()

commit 74e19ef0ff upstream.

The results of "access_ok()" can be mis-speculated.  The result is that
you can end speculatively:

	if (access_ok(from, size))
		// Right here

even for bad from/size combinations.  On first glance, it would be ideal
to just add a speculation barrier to "access_ok()" so that its results
can never be mis-speculated.

But there are lots of system calls just doing access_ok() via
"copy_to_user()" and friends (example: fstat() and friends).  Those are
generally not problematic because they do not _consume_ data from
userspace other than the pointer.  They are also very quick and common
system calls that should not be needlessly slowed down.

"copy_from_user()" on the other hand uses a user-controller pointer and
is frequently followed up with code that might affect caches.  Take
something like this:

	if (!copy_from_user(&kernelvar, uptr, size))
		do_something_with(kernelvar);

If userspace passes in an evil 'uptr' that *actually* points to a kernel
addresses, and then do_something_with() has cache (or other)
side-effects, it could allow userspace to infer kernel data values.

Add a barrier to the common copy_from_user() code to prevent
mis-speculated values which happen after the copy.

Also add a stub for architectures that do not define barrier_nospec().
This makes the macro usable in generic code.

Since the barrier is now usable in generic code, the x86 #ifdef in the
BPF code can also go away.

Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>   # BPF bits
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Dave Hansen 2023-02-21 12:30:15 -08:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 173cadcece
commit 684db631a1
3 changed files with 11 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
struct task_struct;
#ifndef barrier_nospec
# define barrier_nospec() do { } while (0)
#endif
/**
* array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise
* @index: array element index

View File

@ -1908,9 +1908,7 @@ out:
* reuse preexisting logic from Spectre v1 mitigation that
* happens to produce the required code on x86 for v4 as well.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
barrier_nospec();
#endif
CONT;
#define LDST(SIZEOP, SIZE) \
STX_MEM_##SIZEOP: \

View File

@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <linux/fault-inject-usercopy.h>
#include <linux/instrumented.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
/* out-of-line parts */
@ -12,6 +13,12 @@ unsigned long _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n
unsigned long res = n;
might_fault();
if (!should_fail_usercopy() && likely(access_ok(from, n))) {
/*
* Ensure that bad access_ok() speculation will not
* lead to nasty side effects *after* the copy is
* finished:
*/
barrier_nospec();
instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, res);