fs: don't audit the capability check in simple_xattr_list()

[ Upstream commit e7eda157c4 ]

The check being unconditional may lead to unwanted denials reported by
LSMs when a process has the capability granted by DAC, but denied by an
LSM. In the case of SELinux such denials are a problem, since they can't
be effectively filtered out via the policy and when not silenced, they
produce noise that may hide a true problem or an attack.

Checking for the capability only if any trusted xattr is actually
present wouldn't really address the issue, since calling listxattr(2) on
such node on its own doesn't indicate an explicit attempt to see the
trusted xattrs. Additionally, it could potentially leak the presence of
trusted xattrs to an unprivileged user if they can check for the denials
(e.g. through dmesg).

Therefore, it's best (and simplest) to keep the check unconditional and
instead use ns_capable_noaudit() that will silence any associated LSM
denials.

Fixes: 38f3865744 ("xattr: extract simple_xattr code from tmpfs")
Reported-by: Martin Pitt <mpitt@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

fs/xattr.c

@@ -1147,7 +1147,7 @@ static int xattr_list_one(char **buffer, ssize_t *remaining_size,
 ssize_t simple_xattr_list(struct inode *inode, struct simple_xattrs *xattrs,
 			  char *buffer, size_t size)
 {
-	bool trusted = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+	bool trusted = ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
 	struct simple_xattr *xattr;
 	ssize_t remaining_size = size;
 	int err = 0;