From 75cf0290271bf6dae9dee982aef15242dadf97e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Potapenko Date: Thu, 15 Sep 2022 17:03:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] instrumented.h: add KMSAN support To avoid false positives, KMSAN needs to unpoison the data copied from the userspace. To detect infoleaks - check the memory buffer passed to copy_to_user(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-19-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko Reviewed-by: Marco Elver Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: Eric Dumazet Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Jens Axboe Cc: Joonsoo Kim Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin Cc: Pekka Enberg Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Petr Mladek Cc: Stephen Rothwell Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Vasily Gorbik Cc: Vegard Nossum Cc: Vlastimil Babka Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- include/linux/instrumented.h | 18 ++++++++++++----- include/linux/kmsan-checks.h | 19 ++++++++++++++++++ mm/kmsan/hooks.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/instrumented.h b/include/linux/instrumented.h index 9f1dba8f717b..501fa8486749 100644 --- a/include/linux/instrumented.h +++ b/include/linux/instrumented.h @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * This header provides generic wrappers for memory access instrumentation that - * the compiler cannot emit for: KASAN, KCSAN. + * the compiler cannot emit for: KASAN, KCSAN, KMSAN. */ #ifndef _LINUX_INSTRUMENTED_H #define _LINUX_INSTRUMENTED_H @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include /** @@ -117,6 +118,7 @@ instrument_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) { kasan_check_read(from, n); kcsan_check_read(from, n); + kmsan_copy_to_user(to, from, n, 0); } /** @@ -151,6 +153,7 @@ static __always_inline void instrument_copy_from_user_after(const void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n, unsigned long left) { + kmsan_unpoison_memory(to, n - left); } /** @@ -162,10 +165,14 @@ instrument_copy_from_user_after(const void *to, const void __user *from, * * @to destination variable, may not be address-taken */ -#define instrument_get_user(to) \ -({ \ +#define instrument_get_user(to) \ +({ \ + u64 __tmp = (u64)(to); \ + kmsan_unpoison_memory(&__tmp, sizeof(__tmp)); \ + to = __tmp; \ }) + /** * instrument_put_user() - add instrumentation to put_user()-like macros * @@ -177,8 +184,9 @@ instrument_copy_from_user_after(const void *to, const void __user *from, * @ptr userspace pointer to copy to * @size number of bytes to copy */ -#define instrument_put_user(from, ptr, size) \ -({ \ +#define instrument_put_user(from, ptr, size) \ +({ \ + kmsan_copy_to_user(ptr, &from, sizeof(from), 0); \ }) #endif /* _LINUX_INSTRUMENTED_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/kmsan-checks.h b/include/linux/kmsan-checks.h index a6522a0c28df..c4cae333deec 100644 --- a/include/linux/kmsan-checks.h +++ b/include/linux/kmsan-checks.h @@ -46,6 +46,21 @@ void kmsan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size); */ void kmsan_check_memory(const void *address, size_t size); +/** + * kmsan_copy_to_user() - Notify KMSAN about a data transfer to userspace. + * @to: destination address in the userspace. + * @from: source address in the kernel. + * @to_copy: number of bytes to copy. + * @left: number of bytes not copied. + * + * If this is a real userspace data transfer, KMSAN checks the bytes that were + * actually copied to ensure there was no information leak. If @to belongs to + * the kernel space (which is possible for compat syscalls), KMSAN just copies + * the metadata. + */ +void kmsan_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, size_t to_copy, + size_t left); + #else static inline void kmsan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, @@ -58,6 +73,10 @@ static inline void kmsan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) static inline void kmsan_check_memory(const void *address, size_t size) { } +static inline void kmsan_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, + size_t to_copy, size_t left) +{ +} #endif diff --git a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c index 6f3e64b0b61f..5c0eb25d984d 100644 --- a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c +++ b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c @@ -205,6 +205,44 @@ void kmsan_iounmap_page_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) kmsan_leave_runtime(); } +void kmsan_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, size_t to_copy, + size_t left) +{ + unsigned long ua_flags; + + if (!kmsan_enabled || kmsan_in_runtime()) + return; + /* + * At this point we've copied the memory already. It's hard to check it + * before copying, as the size of actually copied buffer is unknown. + */ + + /* copy_to_user() may copy zero bytes. No need to check. */ + if (!to_copy) + return; + /* Or maybe copy_to_user() failed to copy anything. */ + if (to_copy <= left) + return; + + ua_flags = user_access_save(); + if ((u64)to < TASK_SIZE) { + /* This is a user memory access, check it. */ + kmsan_internal_check_memory((void *)from, to_copy - left, to, + REASON_COPY_TO_USER); + } else { + /* Otherwise this is a kernel memory access. This happens when a + * compat syscall passes an argument allocated on the kernel + * stack to a real syscall. + * Don't check anything, just copy the shadow of the copied + * bytes. + */ + kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata((void *)to, (void *)from, + to_copy - left); + } + user_access_restore(ua_flags); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmsan_copy_to_user); + /* Functions from kmsan-checks.h follow. */ void kmsan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, gfp_t flags) {