arm64: errata: Fix KVM Spectre-v2 mitigation selection for Cortex-A57/A72

Both the Spectre-v2 and Spectre-BHB mitigations involve running a sequence
immediately after exiting a guest, before any branches. In the stable
kernels these sequences are built by copying templates into an empty vector
slot.

For Spectre-BHB, Cortex-A57 and A72 require the branchy loop with k=8.
If Spectre-v2 needs mitigating at the same time, a firmware call to EL3 is
needed. The work EL3 does at this point is also enough to mitigate
Spectre-BHB.

When enabling the Spectre-BHB mitigation, spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation()
should check if a slot has already been allocated for Spectre-v2, meaning
no work is needed for Spectre-BHB.

This check was missed in the earlier backport, add it.

Fixes: 4dd8aae585 ("arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels")
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
James Morse 2022-11-30 18:29:56 +00:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent bd8b9fb0d3
commit 844512da02
1 changed files with 7 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -876,7 +876,13 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
} else if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
switch (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_SYSTEM)) {
case 8:
kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start);
/*
* A57/A72-r0 will already have selected the
* spectre-indirect vector, which is sufficient
* for BHB too.
*/
if (!__this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.fn))
kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start);
break;
case 24:
kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start);