integrity-v5.17

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iIoEABYIADIWIQQdXVVFGN5XqKr1Hj7LwZzRsCrn5QUCYdxh3xQcem9oYXJAbGlu
 dXguaWJtLmNvbQAKCRDLwZzRsCrn5bXsAP9xioC+sDpA+KgicrTxLQp2HBHVdkdj
 hnsSw7KE6d1YFwD/Zu1BPi/iX1HHcEvTm34x9jKWeU54VCyqsXJG+zArDA0=
 =/eFf
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'integrity-v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "The few changes are all kexec related:

   - The MOK keys are loaded onto the .platform keyring in order to
     verify the kexec kernel image signature.

     However, the MOK keys should only be trusted when secure boot is
     enabled. Before loading the MOK keys onto the .platform keyring,
     make sure the system is booted in secure boot mode.

   - When carrying the IMA measurement list across kexec, limit dumping
     the measurement list to when dynamic debug or CONFIG_DEBUG is
     enabled.

   - kselftest: add kexec_file_load selftest support for PowerNV and
     other cleanup"

* tag 'integrity-v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  selftests/kexec: Enable secureboot tests for PowerPC
  ima: silence measurement list hexdump during kexec
  selftests/kexec: update searching for the Kconfig
  selftest/kexec: fix "ignored null byte in input" warning
  integrity: Do not load MOK and MOKx when secure boot be disabled
  ima: Fix undefined arch_ima_get_secureboot() and co
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2022-01-11 13:11:10 -08:00
commit 84bfcc0b69
6 changed files with 74 additions and 33 deletions

View File

@ -50,21 +50,6 @@ static inline void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void) {}
extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void);
extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void);
#else
static inline bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
{
return false;
}
static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
{
return NULL;
}
#endif
#else
static inline enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
{
@ -155,6 +140,21 @@ static inline int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void);
extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void);
#else
static inline bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
{
return false;
}
static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
{
return NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
struct kimage;

View File

@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ static int ima_dump_measurement_list(unsigned long *buffer_size, void **buffer,
}
memcpy(file.buf, &khdr, sizeof(khdr));
print_hex_dump(KERN_DEBUG, "ima dump: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
16, 1, file.buf,
file.count < 100 ? file.count : 100, true);
print_hex_dump_debug("ima dump: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
file.buf, file.count < 100 ? file.count : 100,
true);
*buffer_size = file.count;
*buffer = file.buf;

View File

@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include "../integrity.h"
@ -176,6 +177,10 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
kfree(dbx);
}
/* the MOK/MOKx can not be trusted when secure boot is disabled */
if (!arch_ima_get_secureboot())
return 0;
mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status);
if (!mokx) {
if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)

View File

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
uname_M := $(shell uname -m 2>/dev/null || echo not)
ARCH ?= $(shell echo $(uname_M) | sed -e s/i.86/x86/ -e s/x86_64/x86/)
ifeq ($(ARCH),x86)
ifeq ($(ARCH),$(filter $(ARCH),x86 ppc64le))
TEST_PROGS := test_kexec_load.sh test_kexec_file_load.sh
TEST_FILES := kexec_common_lib.sh

View File

@ -91,6 +91,27 @@ get_efi_var_secureboot_mode()
return 0;
}
# On powerpc platform, check device-tree property
# /proc/device-tree/ibm,secureboot/os-secureboot-enforcing
# to detect secureboot state.
get_ppc64_secureboot_mode()
{
local secure_boot_file="/proc/device-tree/ibm,secureboot/os-secureboot-enforcing"
# Check for secure boot file existence
if [ -f $secure_boot_file ]; then
log_info "Secureboot is enabled (Device tree)"
return 1;
fi
log_info "Secureboot is not enabled (Device tree)"
return 0;
}
# Return the architecture of the system
get_arch()
{
echo $(arch)
}
# Check efivar SecureBoot-$(the UUID) and SetupMode-$(the UUID).
# The secure boot mode can be accessed either as the last integer
# of "od -An -t u1 /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/SecureBoot-*" or from
@ -100,14 +121,19 @@ get_efi_var_secureboot_mode()
get_secureboot_mode()
{
local secureboot_mode=0
local system_arch=$(get_arch)
get_efivarfs_secureboot_mode
secureboot_mode=$?
# fallback to using the efi_var files
if [ $secureboot_mode -eq 0 ]; then
get_efi_var_secureboot_mode
if [ "$system_arch" == "ppc64le" ]; then
get_ppc64_secureboot_mode
secureboot_mode=$?
else
get_efivarfs_secureboot_mode
secureboot_mode=$?
# fallback to using the efi_var files
if [ $secureboot_mode -eq 0 ]; then
get_efi_var_secureboot_mode
secureboot_mode=$?
fi
fi
if [ $secureboot_mode -eq 0 ]; then
@ -138,15 +164,20 @@ kconfig_enabled()
return 0
}
# Attempt to get the kernel config first via proc, and then by
# extracting it from the kernel image or the configs.ko using
# scripts/extract-ikconfig.
# Attempt to get the kernel config first by checking the modules directory
# then via proc, and finally by extracting it from the kernel image or the
# configs.ko using scripts/extract-ikconfig.
# Return 1 for found.
get_kconfig()
{
local proc_config="/proc/config.gz"
local module_dir="/lib/modules/`uname -r`"
local configs_module="$module_dir/kernel/kernel/configs.ko"
local configs_module="$module_dir/kernel/kernel/configs.ko*"
if [ -f $module_dir/config ]; then
IKCONFIG=$module_dir/config
return 1
fi
if [ ! -f $proc_config ]; then
modprobe configs > /dev/null 2>&1

View File

@ -97,10 +97,11 @@ check_for_imasig()
check_for_modsig()
{
local module_sig_string="~Module signature appended~"
local sig="$(tail --bytes $((${#module_sig_string} + 1)) $KERNEL_IMAGE)"
local ret=0
if [ "$sig" == "$module_sig_string" ]; then
tail --bytes $((${#module_sig_string} + 1)) $KERNEL_IMAGE | \
grep -q "$module_sig_string"
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
ret=1
log_info "kexec kernel image modsig signed"
else
@ -225,8 +226,12 @@ get_secureboot_mode
secureboot=$?
# Are there pe and ima signatures
check_for_pesig
pe_signed=$?
if [ "$(get_arch)" == 'ppc64le' ]; then
pe_signed=0
else
check_for_pesig
pe_signed=$?
fi
check_for_imasig
ima_signed=$?